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Abstract 
The doctrine of non-retrogression – sometimes known as a prohibition on ‘backwards steps’ 
– in economic and social rights has garnered increasing attention in the aftermath of the 
financial and economic crises. The attention has clarified aspects of the norm, and has gone 
some way to providing rights-holders with a vitally needed tool in the context of recent 
austerity programmes. Yet despite this solid base of attention and the successive 
enumerations of the doctrine by the CESCR, there remain serious deficiencies in the 
understanding of the doctrine. 
The core of this thesis addresses the need for a fuller understanding. It considers 
retrogression in a systematic way and addresses a number of routes to realising rights. 
While doing so, the work focuses on the problem areas to provide a deeper consideration. 
The research identifies and addresses a series of fundamental questions that still afflict 
retrogression, including: where did the doctrine originate from; what is the conceptual basis 
for the doctrine; how might the doctrine be reformed to better pursue a role within the 
ICESCR system; what are the key tests of a successful doctrine; and to what extent could a 
reformed doctrine address these key challenges? 
It is argued that non-retrogression’s past is deeply confused, and its future will be beset 
with challenges. In the process of making this argument, the thesis contextualises, 
deconstructs, repurposes, reconstructs, and tests the doctrine. The end result is a fuller 
picture of the severe limitations of the current forms of the doctrine of non-retrogression, 
and the positing of a reconstructed doctrine that is less vulnerable to the many threats to 
non-retrogression’s success. 
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Chapter 1 
Retrogression in the Spotlight: An Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The financial and economic crises1 of 2007/2008 were, amongst many other things, a stellar 
diagnostic tool. They showed up more clearly than ever the existence of legal and social 
fractures, redundancies and disorder. One such diagnosis related to the underdeveloped 
and unconvincing doctrine of non-retrogression. 
The crises thrust the doctrine of non-retrogression into the frame as a tool of valuable 
human rights resistance to the direct and indirect effects of the crises. Yet, instead of 
resistance to fiscal austerity and its frequently rights-violating policies, the doctrine shrunk 
in the spotlight. 
To imagine the lack-lustre performance of the doctrine of non-retrogression in protecting 
economic and social rights2 as an attack of ‘stage-fright’ however, would be to ignore the 
significant deficiencies that had pre-existed the crises. The boundaries, conditions, purpose 
and conceptual identity of non-retrogression were, and to a large extent still are, all 
indefinite. Yet, this follows more than twenty-five years of development by the principal 
guardian of this legal mechanism, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR; the Committee). The Committee has devoted a reasonable quantity of 
attention to the doctrine, but this attention has lacked consistency, clarity, and quality. In 
addition, the CESCR has rarely applied the doctrine in practice. The result has been a 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 Throughout the work the financial and economic crises are referred to as two separate ‘crises’ rather than a conjoined ‘crisis’. 
This is to emphasise the different starting points, impacts and potential responses to each crisis (for a discussion of each see 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the 
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (PublicAffairs 2011); Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis 
Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown (Verso 2013)). Seeing the crises in plural form also serves to 
destabilise the narrative of these events as ‘The Crisis’ which has served to obscure the cause(s) of the most recent turbulence, 
and the existence of predecessor crises and their impacts (on the sleight of hand that the term ‘Crisis’ enables see Ferdi De 
Ville and Jan Orbie, ‘The European Commission’s Neoliberal Trade Discourse Since the Crisis: Legitimizing Continuity 
through Subtle Discursive Change’ (2014) 16(1) The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 149, 150.; on the 
numerous other crises faced by the CESCR see Aoife Nolan, Nicholas J Lusiani and Christian Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No 
Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), 
Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 126). One such crisis that was side-lined in dominant 
crisis discourse was the crippling world food crisis that preceded both of these financial and economic phenomena. While the 
roots of this crisis can be traced back to similar macroeconomic processes it has largely been seen as a distinct issue (Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Building Resilience: A Human Rights Framework for World Food and Nutrition Security (UN 
Doc A/HRC/9/23 (Appendix I) 2008) 27ff). 
2 The phrase ‘economic and social rights’ (abbreviated to ESR) is used here to cover the full range of economic, social and 
cultural rights as expressed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The analysis applies 
equally to ‘cultural’ rights as to ‘social’ and ‘economic’ rights and as such the use of ‘ESR’ is a stylistic rather than substantive 
choice. Young posits that the terminological variations in this area of study are geographically bounded, noting the use of the 
terms, ‘“social welfare rights” and “economic rights” (North America), “socio-economic rights” (South Africa), and “social 
rights” (Europe)’ (Katharine Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ 
(2008) 33 The Yale Journal of International Law 113, 118, note 19; for furtehr discussion see, Terence Daintith, ‘The 
Constitutional Protection of Economic Rights’ (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 56, 57ff.). The terms are 
commonly seen as interchangeable; Paul O’Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International Standards and 
Comparative Experiences (Routledge 2012) 3–4. 
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complex doctrine, with deeply confused conceptual roots, that is unable to meet the 
primary challenges of utility and implementation that it faces. 
First appearing in 1990 the doctrine took a concise form, with the CESCR noting that: 
any deliberately retrogressive measures … would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of 
the full use of the maximum available resources.3 
Attention to this brief statement of the CESCR from the academy and NGOs has gathered 
apace especially since the most recent financial and economic crises. This attention has 
served to highlight a number of the doctrine’s deficiencies and to suggest a number of 
strategies that might be employed in order to effectively enforce non-retrogression 
obligations.4 This clarity has proved important in developing a fuller understanding of 
States’ obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).5 It has gone some way to providing rights-holders with a vitally needed 
tool in the context of recent austerity programmes which have threatened ESR in exactly 
the way that the non-retrogression doctrine aims to prevent. Yet despite this solid base of 
attention and the successive enumerations of the doctrine by the CESCR, there remain 
serious deficiencies in the understanding of the doctrine. 
The core of this thesis addresses the need for a fuller understanding. It considers 
retrogression in a systematic way and addresses the full array of routes to realising rights. 
While doing so, the work zooms in on the problem areas to provide a deeper consideration. 
The research identifies and addresses a series of fundamental questions that still afflict 
retrogression, including: where did the doctrine originate from; what is the conceptual basis 
for the doctrine; how might the doctrine be reformed to better pursue a role within the 
ICESCR system; what are the key tests of a successful doctrine; and to what extent could a 
reformed doctrine address these key challenges? 
In the process of addressing these questions the thesis contextualises, deconstructs, 
repurposes, reconstructs, and tests the doctrine. It argues that there is not a single doctrine 
of non-retrogression, but rather are several versions that require repurposing to allow the 
doctrine to more effectively respond to challenges. Particular challenges that are explored 
in the course of the thesis are those coming from the largest and most high-level structural 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
3 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23, 
1990) para 9.  
4 See, eg, Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 1). 
5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3). 
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issues; the particular distortions that crises can bring; the challenges for a technical, 
international doctrine in meeting the demands of micro groups; and the very real 
difficulties faced in practically applying the doctrine’s terms. In doing this the research 
adopts a forward looking approach, seeking new solutions to future problems. 
1.2. Situating the Thesis 
This research comes at a significant point in time. It is now 50 years since the ICESCR was 
adopted, and the Covenant has a ratification rate of almost 85% of States.6 After the long 
absence of an effective monitoring mechanism for the ICESCR, the CESCR is now 
approaching its thirtieth year of operation. It has produced 23 General Comments and 
another 24 substantive statements. The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is, at last, on its 
feet and the CESCR has issued substantive views on two Communications.7 Further, if the 
recently superseded Millennium Development Goals are taken as a proxy, some of the most 
crucial ESR indicators are at their all-time high water mark.8 
The depth of interest in ESR globally is also impressive. Networks of NGOs, scholars, 
monitoring bodies, courts and more informal advocacy groups centre their attention on the 
rights. This attention has brought an added depth and texture to the normative 
frameworks, resulting in the analysis of: ESR indicators and fact finding;9 the question of 
whether, and under what standards of review, ESR disputes can be adjudicated upon;10 new 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
6 The ICESCR has 164 States Parties, out of a United Nations membership of 193, amounting to 84.9% (as at 20 September 
2016). 
7 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 December 2008, entered 
into force 5 May 2013, UN Res A/RES/63/117); IDG v Spain [2015] CESCR Communication 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014; 
López Rodríguez v Spain [2016] CESCR Communication 1/2013, UN Doc E/C.12/57/D/1/2013.  
8 Catharine Way (ed), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (United Nations 2015) 5–7 (but see also the very poorest, 
women and those affected by climate change who have been left behind at p8). 
9 See, eg, Maria Green, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights 
Measurement’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1062; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra Lawson-Remer and Susan Randolph, 
Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights (Oxford University Press 2015); Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey (eds), The 
Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding (OUP USA 2016) especially chs 1, 2, 3, 17. 
10 See, eg, Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2008); Fons Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from 
Domestic Systems (Intersentia 2006); Fons Coomans and Universiteit Maastricht. Centre for Human Rights, Justiciability of 
Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Intersentia ; Holmes Beach, Fla 2006); Malcolm Langford 
editor, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2008); 
Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal’ 
[2007] Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Working Paper Number 15, Anashri Pillay, ‘Courts, Variable Standards of 
Review and Resource Allocation: Developing a Model for the Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights’ (2007) 6 European 
Human Rights Law Review 616; Anashri Pillay, ‘Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Developing Principles of Judicial 
Restraint in South Africa and the United Kingdom’ (2013) 3 Public Law 599; Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2012); Mark Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review’ (2003) 82 Texas Law Review 
1895.Bruce Porter, ‘The Reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating Claims from the Margins’ (2009) 27(1) Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 39. 
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ways of ESR enforcement;11 economic and budgetary questions;12 and what has often been 
termed the ‘nature’ of the rights (i.e. the foundations, philosophy and core content behind 
ESR).13 
And yet, the founding vision of the ICESCR is far from being realised. There remain gaping 
holes in ESR protection and a multitude of new and continuing threats to the enjoyment of 
rights generally. In the words of a joint communique of the UN special procedures: 
human rights remain under severe threat, including from conflict, poverty 
and inequality, the adverse impact of climate change, the backlash against 
women’s human rights, abuses by non-state actors and attacks against the 
universality of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.14 
Of course, the financial and economic crises of 2007/2008 and the following rush to fiscal 
austerity in many countries throughout the world, pose yet another threat to ESR standards. 
It is unsurprising that the combination of an economic downturn and a contractionary turn 
in fiscal policy affected economic and social rights most seriously,15 and the most vulnerable 
disproportionately.16 As has by now been clearly demonstrated,17 the human rights response 
to the crises was slow and ineffective. The meagre use of ESR and the frail response of the 
CESCR to the financial and economic crises is a case study in the space (perhaps, the chasm) 
between the promise and reality of ESR enforcement. 
Less headline-grabbing, but crucial to improving this overall picture, is the way in which 
ESR have sometimes been side-lined by micro groups in their calls for improved social 
conditions. Globally, protests against State economic policies have not tended to organise 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
11 See for example; Audrey R Chapman, ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18(1) Human Rights Quarterly 23; Robert E Robertson, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the 
Obligation to Devote the Maximum Available Resources to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human 
Rights Quarterly 693. 
12 See for example; Rory O’Connell and others, Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: 
Rights and Resources (Routledge 2014); contributions in Aoife Nolan, Rory O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights 
and Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Hart 2013); Aoife Nolan and Mira Dutschke, 
‘Article 2 (1) ICESCR and States Parties’ Obligations: Whither the Budget?’ (2010) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 280; 
Radhika Balakrishan and others, ‘Maximum Available Resources & Human Rights: Analytical Report’ (Rutgers University 2011); 
contributions in Radhika Balakrishnan, James Heintz and Diane Elson, Rethinking Economic Policy for Social Justice: The 
Radical Potential of Human Rights (Routledge 2016).  
13 See for example; Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156; Matthew CR Craven, 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (Clarendon Press; OUP 
1995); M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003). 
14 UN Experts, ‘As the Covenants Turn 50, It Is Time to Turn Norms into Action’ (OHCHR, 10 December 2015) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16861&LangID=E> accessed 20 September 2016. 
15 Ignacio Saiz, ‘Rights in Recession? Challenges for Economic and Social Rights Enforcement in Times of Crisis’ (2009) 1 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 277. 
16 Independent Expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, Rights-Based Approach to Recovery (UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/34 2011) para 23. 
17 Aoife Nolan, ‘Not Fit for Purpose? Human Rights in Times of Financial and Economic Crisis’ (2015) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review 360; Saiz (n 15). 
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around ESR standards.18 Where rights discourse has been used, there has been little 
evidence of a tie to legal standards.19 At the other extreme of power and scale, but equally 
concerning, is the manner in which the rights have failed to reliably influence high-level 
policy making. This ‘disregard not only of substantive rights protections but of the very idea 
of state responsibility’ was acutely demonstrated as responses to the crises took shape.20 
Doctrinally, too, the ICESCR has some pressing issues. While there is now at least a basic 
shape to most of the norms in the Covenant, much further attention is still required. The 
general obligations of the ICESCR remain some of its most under-developed. For example, 
despite the acknowledged centrality of the progressive realisation obligation to a basic 
understanding of ESR, there are still no clear answers on its justifications, functioning, or 
monitoring. Similarly, there are developing but broad answers on the scope of the maximum 
available resources obligation and the general limitations clause. The same is true of the 
typologies and analytical frameworks. While these were originally developed to help 
demonstrate that ESR could be successfully deconstructed into more manageable segments, 
they now form part of the CESCR’s approach to the rights. As such, their future role requires 
clarification, and if their use is to continue then further honing and pruning is needed. 
Touching on very nearly all of the issues outlined above is the doctrine of non-retrogression. 
It has been referred to as a doctrine governing backwards steps,21 but its content can be 
more broadly conceived as rebuking State failure. In facing up to the deep challenges 
sketched above, such a doctrine could barely be more relevant. Used properly, non-
retrogression could be potent in tackling State failures and their threats to rights, while also 
having the potential to supplement some of the flaws in the ICESCR’s doctrinal content and 
mask the CESCR’s institutional frailties. Yet, the doctrine is currently far from realising such 
potential. The trends which the doctrine is well-placed to address are complex and require 
further unpacking. To do so, the following section will outline the current literature, before 
providing a brief survey of the legal landscape. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
18 Sara Burke, ‘Human Rights Missing from Social Justice Activism’ (openDemocracy, 29 September 2015) 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/sara-burke/human-rights-missing-from-social-justice-activism> accessed 
20 September 2016. 
19 For a distinction between the use of rights discourse and rights ideology in protest, see Thomas Murray, Contesting 
Economic and Social Rights in Ireland: Constitution, State and Society, 1848-2016 (CUP 2016). Much of recent social activism 
would also be likely to fall short of Madlingozi’s definition of ‘effective legal mobilisation’ Tshepo Madlingozi, ‘Post-Apartheid 
Social Movements and Legal Mobilisation’ in Malcolm Langford and others (eds), Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: 
Symbols Or Substance? (CUP 2013) 94–5. 
20 Margot E Salomon, ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 521, 522. 
21 See Chapter 3, pp74-76. 
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1.2.1.  Relevance 
The thesis research has relevance to a number of closely interrelated and current needs. The 
first of these is the improvement of legal standards. Second, is the substantive improvement 
in rights protections. The third is the development of ‘knowledge’ and scholarly 
understanding of the law, its rationales, and its implications. The outcomes which the 
research seeks are, therefore, a firmer understanding of the law, more effective legal 
standards, and improved rights enjoyment. 
These research objectives are, given the scope of the thesis, pursued in the context of the 
doctrine of non-retrogression. The relevance of non-retrogression to each of the ICESCR’s 
current needs is easily demonstrated. As the failings of non-retrogression are 
predominantly legal-doctrinal, there is significant scope for improving the overall legal 
standards related to ESR through a detailed analysis of the normative content of the 
doctrine. 
Yet, it is also clear that the practice of the CESCR has been deficient. No matter how 
incomplete the doctrinal position of non-retrogression, the Committee could have done 
much more to add clarity to, and enforce the norm. In other words, the CESCR has failed to 
follow through on the promise of the doctrine. Again, in the context of the current research, 
this implies that thorough analysis of the operation of non-retrogression in its institutional 
context can bring significant gains in substantive ESR enjoyment.  
The final need – the need for an improved scholarly understanding of non-retrogression – 
can also be addressed through a systematic examination of the legal standards. Despite its 
broad applicability and many problematic aspects, the doctrine has thus far been subject to 
only limited critical attention. Tackling non-retrogression in depth can improve knowledge 
and understanding of the norms. 
In specific terms, then, how is the research relevant? It is, perhaps as a result of its practical 
orientation, of significant relevance to a range of actors. It provides a new degree of 
precision on the role, origins, applicability and enforcement of the doctrine. This is 
meaningful for States wishing to determine the extent of their ESR obligations, for the 
CESCR wishing to hold them to account, for advocacy groups attempting to mount 
arguments against retrogressions in ESR protection, and for individuals who wish to know 
the scope of their legal rights. 
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The thesis addresses the full suite of routes to rights ‘vindication’ (to borrow the term used 
prominently by Paul O’Connell).22 It is well known that the IHRL system entails a number 
of enforcement difficulties by virtue of its international and consensual constitution. While 
recognising this limitation, the analysis below also promotes the idea that there are many 
means of enforcing ESR that are not currently being used to their full potential. It therefore 
tends towards looking at enforcement mechanisms with commonalities or 
complementarities with non-retrogression. 
One type of enforcement, however, that is not extensively engaged with here are domestic 
mechanisms. The reasons for this are two-fold. The first of these is a simple choice of 
research design. The research is centred on understanding non-retrogression at the 
international level, meaning the very wide range of international documents and the 
numerous approached to retrogression at that level are the most relevant. This design 
choice is supported by the exceptional need for analyses of retrogression at that level, 
especially in light of landmark developments such as the CESCR’s Letter to States and the 
Optional Protocol.23 The second reason is more instrumental as, even if national systems 
were considered to a greater degree, there would be little clarity to be gained. The diverse 
systems of national laws, patchy enforcement, and deeply contextual meanings of 
retrogression-like laws, all limit their relevance to the international sphere.24 Besides this 
qualification, and in order to contribute some progress in enforcement efforts, the research 
takes a broad approach to draw out the links between legal developments and substantive 
gains in ESR protection. 
The relevance of the research is therefore grounded in a systematic view of the importance 
of the subject matter, the actors that shape norms and practice, and the values 
underpinning the legal area. This combination is intended to ensure that important 
questions are addressed in a useable manner. 
1.2.2. State of the Art 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
22 Paul O’Connell (n 2). 
23 Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc 
HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (n 7). 
24 For discussion of this patchy jurisprudence see text attached to nn36-47 below. 
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The thesis is written against the backdrop of some quantity of attention, but little critical 
attention. The doctrine of non-retrogression is frequently mentioned in the CESCR’s 
General Comments.25  However, these invocations are inconsistent and often brief.26 NGOs 
are also regular visitors to the non-retrogression concept.27 Many NGO uses will invoke the 
doctrine of non-retrogression to describe a reduction in rights standards with little 
attention to the full meaning and conditionality of the legal norm.28 The preponderance of 
the academic literature is similarly simplistic.29 While the doctrine is sometimes used in 
argument, it is rare to find more than one or two versions of it detailed, and critical 
attention (highlighting the irregular use of the doctrine, its inconsistencies, its conceptual 
flaws or similar issues) is seldom present. Likewise in general usage, for example in the 
(mainstream and social) media or in everyday discussion the term or idea is infrequently 
used with an understanding of its legal depth.30 
There are two exceptions to this general picture. The first of these relates to the minority of 
the academic literature. While it is true that the general picture of the scholarship is of a 
superficial approach to the doctrine, there are a handful of notable exceptions. Key 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
25 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23 1990) para 
9; CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education (Art 13 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/10 1999) para 13; CESCR, 
General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2000/4 
2000) para 32; CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2002/11 2002) 
para 19; CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Art 3 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2005/4 2005) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of 
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Art 15(1)(c) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/17 2006) para 27; CESCR, General 
Comment 18: The Right to Work (Art 6 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/18 2005) para para 21; CESCR, General Comment 19: 
The Right to Social Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/19 2007) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 21: Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art 15(1)(a) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/21 2001) para 65; CESCR, General 
Comment 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/22 2016) para 38; 
CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (Art 7 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/GC/23 2016) para 52. See further a timeline of the CESCR’s use of the doctrine of non-retrogression at Appendix A. 
26 See further Appendices A and B and Chapter 3. 
27 For a selection see The Right to Education Project and Coalition, The UK’s Support of the Growth of Private Education 
through Its Development Aid: Questioning Its Responsibilities as Regards Its Human Rights Extraterritorial Obligations (2015) 
paras 57, 58; David Suzuki Foundation, Environmental Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the Pacific Coast 
of Canada (2016) paras 47, 48, 58; Amnesty International, Canada: Submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2016) 17; Joint Civil Society Organizations, Alternative Report to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights on the Occasion of the Review of the Republic of Kenya (2016) 7; Amnesty International, Spain: Submission to 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2016) especially 8–11. 
28 See, eg, The Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and Social Rights Advocacy Centre, The Right to Effective Remedies for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Canada (2016) para 3; Joint Civil Society Organizations, Towards the Realization of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Kenya (2016) 23. 
29 Although it should be noted that the focus of each of these authors is largely elsewhere, a selection of basic treatments of 
the obligation can be seen in, Cecily Rose, ‘The Application of Human Rights Law to Private Sector Complicity in 
Governmental Corruption’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 715, 720, 734; Noel Villaroman, ‘The Need for Debt 
Relief: How Debt Servicing Leads to Violations of State Obligations under the ICESCR’ (2010) 17 Human Rights Brief 2, 6–7; 
Fons Coomans, ‘Justiciability of the Right to Education’ (2009) 2 Erasmus Law Review 427, 131; Katja Luopajärvi, ‘Is There an 
Obligation on States to Accept International Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons under International 
Law?’ (2003) 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 678, 686; Radhika Balakrishnan and Diane Elson, ‘Auditing Economic 
Policy in the Light of Obligations on Economic and Social Rights’ (2008) 5(1) Essex Human Rights Review 6; Marcelo 
Thompson, ‘Property Enforcement or Retrogressive Measure? Copyright Reform in Canada and the Human Right of Access to 
Knowledge’ (2007) 4(1&2) University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 162. 
30 An indicative search of UK news results shows around 550 uses in the last 10 years, with none being linked to social rights. 
Generally, the term is used instead as an approximate alternative for ‘backwards’, or as a substitute for the term ‘regressive’ in 
relation to taxation (LexisNexis search, January 2016). 
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contributions (in chronological order) from Sepúlveda,31 Courtis,32 Nolan,33 O’Connell et 
al,34 and Nolan et al,35 have begun, progressed, defined and shaped critical attention to non-
retrogression. The thesis employs these (and some other) more critical and deeper 
examinations of the doctrine, rather than being substantively coloured by the larger 
quantity of material that is predominantly focussed on other issues. 
The second exception to the frequent-but-basic trend in uses of non-retrogression, is the 
emerging presence of the doctrine outside of the ICESCR context. For example, courts in 
the United Kingdom have (briefly) referred to the doctrine,36 as have courts in New 
Zealand,37 Peru,38 South Africa,39 and Kenya.40 Nolan et al, additionally highlight the use of 
retrogression-type ideas by constitutional courts in Hungary, Latvia, Germany and 
Portugal.41 At the European Court of Human Rights two separate opinions of Judge de 
Albuquerque have endorsed a substantively similar, but more basic, doctrine of non-
retrogression in relation to ‘social rights’.42 
The European Committee on Social Rights (ECommSR) and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) have slightly more developed approaches to non-
retrogression, although each rests its reasoning more explicitly on non-ICESCR 
instruments. For example, the ECommSR has made a strong finding of retrogression in 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
31 Sepúlveda (n 13). 
32 Christian Courtis, ‘La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales: Apuntes Introductorios’ in Christian 
Courtis (ed), Ni Un Paso Atrás: La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales (Editores de Puerto 2006). 
33 Aoife Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in Aoife Nolan, Rory 
O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets & the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights 
(Hart 2013); see also earlier discussion of the concept by this author in Aoife Nolan, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, 
Democracy and the Courts (Hart Publishing 2011) 248ff. 
34 O’Connell and others (n 12). 
35 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 1). 
36 R (on the application of Hurley and Moore) v Secretary of State for Business Innovation & Skills [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin) 
[38]; R (on the application of Aspinall, Pepper and Others) (formerly including Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2014] EWHC 4134 (Admin) [35] - [38]. 
37 Refugee Appeal Nos. 75221 & 75225 [2005] NZRSAA 289 [21], [32]; BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 800091 [98]. 
38 Lima Asociacion De Tecnicos Y Sub-Oficiales De Procedencia v Reserva Del Ejercito Peruano [2007] 03477-2007-PA/TC [22]. 
39 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28 [105]; Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT 11/00) [2000] ZACC 19 [45]; Glenister v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011] ZACC 6 [157]. 
40 The relevant parts of the Grootboom judgment quoted by Mutemi v Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Others 
[2013] eKLR 133/2013 (High Court of Kenya) [19]. 
41 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 1) 143–144. 
42 Konstantin Markin v Russia App no 30078/06 (ECtHR, 22 March 2012) (Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Pinto De Albuquerque (Concurring part)), discussion attached to fns 29-30. The Judge cites inter alia six CESCR General 
Comments. However, in citing the International Court of Justice, the Judge would also seem to conflate the doctrine of non-
retrogression with a general limitations clause; Legal Consequences Of The Construction Of A Wall In The Occupied Palestinian 
Territory [2004] No 131 (ICJ), para 136. In another judgment, again in a concurring opinion, de Albuquerque notes the impact 
of the retrogressive measures doctrine; K.M.C. v Hungary App no 19554/11(ECtHR, 19 November 2012), fn 19. 
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relation to fiscal austerity43 grounding itself in article 12 section 3 of the European Social 
Charter.44 The IACHR draws on the CESCR’s General Comment 3,45 to find that article 26 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights entails an analogous non-retrogression duty.46 
The IACHR also argued before the Inter-American Court in the more well-known Five 
Pensioners case, that ‘States may not adopt regressive measures in relation to the level of 
development achieved’.47 
In some respects, then, the approaches to non-retrogression can be seen as nascent. This 
characterisation is especially true of critical approaches to the contents and context of the 
doctrine. While the CESCR continues to detail it in General Comments, and there are 
regular invocations of it in academic literature and NGO submissions, there is little 
engagement with, or critical attention to, the doctrine. National and regional courts and 
tribunals currently cite non-retrogression rarely, and it is clear that the doctrine is currently 
at an early stage of its development and has little influence at those levels.  
1.3. Limitations, Approach and Methods 
A number of different theoretical, methodological and disciplinary approaches are 
combined in addressing the research questions. Non-retrogression is deceptively wide-
ranging, with consequences and demands far beyond what a narrowly-drawn legal analysis 
could address. As such the different chapters that follow rely on theories from law, 
economics, and sociology, and invoke methods and ‘ways of thinking’ from law, history, and 
political science. This more diverse approach allows for a discussion not only of what 
retrogression is, but why it is needed, and how it functions. 
As within any piece of research, however, there are boundaries and limitations to what is 
offered here. There is no claim to comprehensiveness in the chapters that follow. One of the 
most notable circumscriptions of the work is its focus on the international level (i.e. the 
ICESCR, CESCR, and the Optional Protocol). This facilitates a deeper attention of the issues 
in this arena, and it is this depth that most helpfully advances the legal position. As is 
developed in the chapters of the thesis, many of the problematic aspects of the doctrine 
have been created and perpetuated by shallow attention from the CESCR and other actors. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
43 General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil 
Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece [2012] 66/2011 (European Committee on Social Rights), para 47.  
44 European Social Charter (signed 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965, UNTS 89 (ETS 155)). 
45 Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al v El Salvador [2001] IACtHR Case 12.249, Report No. 29/01 , para 105. 
46 ibid para 106 (and fn 64). 
47 Case of the ‘Five Pensioners’ v Peru [2003] IACtHR Series C No.98 , para 142b. 
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Therefore, the thesis’ approach of sustained and deep attention acts as a corrective. 
Although there are no doubt interesting comparisons to be drawn with the approaches 
under the European Social Charter,48 or in national settings,49 their inclusion would have 
risked surveying, without properly addressing, the doctrine’s issues. In much the same way, 
the research has excluded the question of retrogression’s applicability to civil and political 
rights, or more generally in other legal contexts. 
Another limitation of note is the approach taken towards the recent austerity programmes. 
This research is to a large extent focussed on the doctrine rather than the circumstances to 
which it could be applied. While examples are, of course, used in the process of analysing 
the doctrine, they are the secondary focus. Therefore, chapter 6, while focussing on the 
crisis, looks at how the doctrine was affected by it rather than the converse. In this vein, 
there remains clear scope for a project that applies the doctrine of non-retrogression to a 
variety of austerity and other measures. In many senses this would be the (politically) more 
attractive project. 
There are four strong reasons why such an approach was not adopted here. First, and most 
straightforwardly, it is the CESCR which is empowered to make judgements on the presence 
– or not – of retrogression. There would, in the end, be little to be gained by making 
sustained judgments in the place of the Committee, or even by highlighting obvious cases 
that ‘might have been’. This would only be to demonstrate (and not even in a clear cut way) 
what is already widely suspected; that the CESCR has not perfected its approach to the 
doctrine. Secondly, even if such an approach was the preferred one, there would be 
inadequate information to make it successful. There are, as is fully discussed in several 
places below, many gaps and uncertainties in the normative framework and a chronic lack 
of applied examples. As such, the doctrine’s full application to a test case would be such a 
highly speculative exercise so as to have little value. Thirdly, such a practical application 
would be a partial duplication of some of the existing examples of legal/rights responses to 
austerity.50 The final, and perhaps most crucial reason against this approach, is the scope of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
48 For some discussion, see Eibe H Riedel, Social Security as a Human Right: Drafting a General Comment on Article 9 ICESCR - 
Some Challenges (Springer Science & Business Media 2006) 185; Salomon (n 20) 540–1. The European Committee on Social 
Rights has, for example, found ‘that financial consolidation measures which fail to respect [the core framework of social 
security, deny protection against shocks, or are exclusionary] constitute retrogressive steps which cannot be deemed to be in 
conformity with Article 12§3’; General Federation of Employees (n 43). See also, Luis Jimena Quesada, ‘Protecting Economic and 
Social Rights in Times of Economic Crisis: What Role for the Judges?’ (2014) fn3, see also 4, 9. 
49 See jurisprudence cited above at nn36-47. 
50 Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Mauled by the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in Ireland’s Economic Meltdown’ 
(2012) <http://www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr.ireland.briefing.12.02.2012.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016; Center for Economic 
and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Spain: Visualizing Rights’ (2012) 
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non-retrogression. While austerity is an important example of when retrogression can come 
about, it is only one example. Non-retrogression, if applied fully, can be an ‘everyday’ tool 
for ESR enforcement. To frame any sustained analysis of the doctrine solely in terms of the 
financial and economic crises, however important these have been for the doctrine and 
however damaging for the rights, would be to skew the picture of the legal standards. 
A further thread that runs through the research is the forward looking style. It is 
persistently acknowledged in the chapters below that while the pace of the ICESCR’s 
development is relatively slow, the external environment (i.e. the world beyond the ESR 
norms) moves at speed. As such, the research has avoided attempts for their own sake of an 
autopsy of the responses to the crises. Likewise, while there is much to say the Optional 
Protocol, the research has sought not to simply lament the years without it. Of course, 
these and other histories are often used below to aid analyses of future directions, but they 
are not carried out for purely retrospective purposes. This leads the thesis to take as givens 
certain well-argued and largely settled debates on justiciability, interdependence, and 
whether ESR are ‘real rights’. 
While the research excludes a focus on these issues, it is in many other respects, very open. 
The research questions are addressed with reference to a number of theoretical, disciplinary 
and methodological perspectives. Theoretically, the work is diverse precisely in order to 
facilitate an open and balanced assessment of the doctrine and to allow its analysis and 
findings to be acceptable to a broader range of readers. This is certainly not the only 
approach that could have been taken, and a purely positivist approach to the subject matter 
or, at the opposite pole, one grounded in critical legal theory would have been very 
possible. Even within (or besides) these two extremes there were opportunities to adopt, 
wholesale, a particular theory of social movements, or of emergencies, or of 
macroeconomics. However, while the research is theoretically engaged and constantly 
makes use of relevant theories, the underlying approach has been to reduce the polarisation 
of readers at the level of theory. This approach has been taken so that constructive 
(dis)agreements can be had that are directly linked to the doctrine of non-retrogression. 
In addition to its theoretical diversities, the argument incorporates developments from 
several disciplinary traditions. This is intended to reflect these disciplines’ relevance to, and 
interest in, the human rights ‘project’. Insights from political science, sociology, history, and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
<http://www.cesr.org/downloads/FACTSHEET_Spain_2015_web.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016; Styliani Kaltsouni and 
Athina Kosma, ‘The Impact of the Crisis on Fundamental Rights Across Member States of the EU: Country Report on Greece’ 
(Study for the LIBE Committee 2015). 
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economics are all relied upon. However, given the legal core of non-retrogression’s identity, 
it is unsurprising that the primary frame of reference in what follows is a legal one. 
The primary methodological approach that underpins the research is legal-doctrinal 
research. Much of the analysis and many of the findings are drawn from a close examination 
of materials from across the spectrum of international human rights law but predominantly 
relating to the ICESCR. These materials include treaties, General Comments, Statements 
and Concluding Observations. Another key source throughout the work is the scholarship 
that is both directly related to retrogression and the indirectly related theoretical or 
conceptual writings. Beyond the legal methodology, the research at times also draws upon 
historical methods to more fully contextualise developments and uses basic statistical and 
mathematical techniques, tables and diagrams. This allows the research to demonstrate the 
scale of various phenomena, to rebut commonly assumed ideas, and to condense a broad 
picture into more manageable comparisons. 
There is one final aspect of the approach that needs highlighting here. In the thesis’ title 
and throughout the chapters below, the modified purpose and the reformed doctrine that 
are posited are qualified as ‘(re)’ purposed and ‘(re)’ constructed entities. Although a 
sometimes cumbersome expression, the bracketing of the qualifier is an important 
reminder throughout of an important substantive point. Specifically, that the ‘purposing’ 
and the ‘constructing’ of the doctrine that is carried out here can neither be identified as an 
entirely fresh enterprise, nor a simple repetition of existing efforts. In other words, the work 
is forced to sit in the space between being a first deliberate purposing and construction of 
the doctrine, and on the other hand performing a remodelling role which re-purposes and 
re-constructs the doctrine. Against the backdrop of the doctrine’s almost accidental 
creation, it is impossible – particularly according to a postmodern constructivist 
standpoint51 – to properly know whether the process of purposing and constructing 
retrogression here is novel, or whether it is a revival of previous processes and is therefore 
more akin to a repurposing and reconstruction. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
51 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics’ (2001) 4(1) Annual Review of Political Science 391, 395. 
34	 Chapter	1	
	
1.4. Structure 
The thesis addresses its questions (and many others) in the course of the following eight 
chapters. In turn, these eight chapters are divided into two parts, each with a different 
emphasis. Part I focusses on finding or (re)constructing a purpose for the doctrine, while 
Part II is centred on how the design of the doctrine itself might achieve that purpose.  
1.4.1.  Part I – (Re)constructing Retrogression for a Purpose 
Chapter Two begins with a reminder that while the doctrine of non-retrogression has been a 
consistent feature of the work of the CESCR, it was not included in the text of the ICESCR. 
This aspect of the doctrine’s history as well as other connected factors (such as the creation 
of the CESCR itself and the history of the progressive realisation obligation) provide 
important context for later considerations of the nature and purpose of the doctrine. To 
provide this historical context, this chapter traces the history of the International Bill of 
Rights (IBoR), the development of the progressive realisation obligation, and begins to 
uncover the origins of non-retrogression. 
Beyond simply providing context, however, Chapter Two makes a number of findings 
worthy of attention in their own right. For example, it reviews the travaux préparatoires and 
the ratification records for the IBoR to argue that we should move beyond accounts that 
solely rely on the Cold War history, towards a more nuanced history of the International 
Covenants. Further, the chapter seeks to develop a stronger understanding of the reasons 
for progressive realisation’s inclusion and what, latterly, might have provided the impetus 
for an additional non-retrogression doctrine. 
Chapter Three addresses the shapeshifting forms of the doctrine of non-retrogression. Since 
the genesis of ‘the’ doctrine of non-retrogression, the CESCR’s successive statements 
defining it have been viewed as comprising a single – and coherent – whole. This chapter 
subjects that view to sustained critical attention, eventually demonstrating a doctrine that 
is significantly fragmented. In fact, it is argued that there are nine variations in the 
doctrine’s criteria which can be grouped into four separate models of non-retrogression. 
These conceptual models are termed the Component, Corollary, Composite, and Un-
Coupled models. These four models of non-retrogression are distinguished according to 
their legal basis and the relationship with progressive realisation that each has. 
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The four models and the associated analysis leads Chapter Three to conclude that the 
doctrine lacks a core purpose around which it can be effectively (and cohesively) organised. 
Thus, while each of the doctrines of non-retrogression have some common features, there is 
little to bind the models together. 
Chapter Four – the final in this (re)purposing phase – takes this analysis a step further. 
Given the identified fragmentation, and the lack of a core purpose that is shown in 
preceding chapters, this chapter assesses whether the doctrine of non-retrogression should 
be continued at all. The doctrine is rescued on the basis of its capacity to remedy the 
doctrinal flaws of the ICESCR, its ‘brand recognition’, and a pragmatic recognition of the 
doctrine’s current support. The chapter proceeds instead to consider how the doctrine 
might be reconsidered in order to become a more coherent and effective norm. 
In light of the deficiency in the purpose, it is suggested that reforming the doctrine’s 
purpose could provide non-retrogression with an organising concept for the future. This 
proposition is carefully defended. Having argued that the doctrine requires a clearly defined 
purpose, it is then suggested that this should be linked to the progressive realisation 
obligation. The final stage in the analysis of Chapter Four is to take this new purpose and to 
re-form, reconstruct or re-orientate non-retrogression in order to better pursue this 
purpose. As such the chapter concludes by proposing a substantially modified doctrine of 
non-retrogression. 
1.4.2.  Part II – (Re)constructing Retrogression for a Purpose 
There are a number of key stress tests which the (re)constructed doctrine of non-
retrogression must meet in order to show that it might be more effective at pursuing a 
purpose than the current arrangements are. 
Chapter Five addresses the first of these ‘stress tests’, namely the doctrine’s capacity to 
engage with issues of a truly ‘macro’ or structural scale (such as globalisation or 
environmental degradation). The chapter assesses how well the CESCR has previously dealt 
with structural issues of concern, and considers where the (re)constructed doctrine might 
gain additional traction. 
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In its assessment of the Committee’s previous efforts in relation to structural issues, 
Chapter Five delineates several levels of engagement. It considers how the Committee has 
addressed the larger issues within its mandate through its views under the Optional 
Protocol, and its Letters, Statements, Concluding Observations and General Comments. It 
is argued that at present the Committee’s approach is limiting in terms of its voice and its 
relevance on structural issues, and damaging in its inability to provide individual justice for 
structural ESR violations. The chapter then turns to evaluate how a reconstructed doctrine 
of non-retrogression might improve these types of engagement. 
Chapter Six constitutes a further test for the (re)constructed version of retrogression. It 
argues that, following the 2007/8 financial and economic crises, the response of the CESCR 
(following a long delay) was a damaging one. It took the ICESCR system towards greater 
accommodation of emergencies, and adopted derogation-style language. 
The chapter argues that this crisis response demonstrates the risk of retrogression being 
weakened or dis-applied in times of crisis. It asserts the need for a resilient doctrine of non-
retrogression, capable of flexibility while also having an overarching direction attached to it. 
It looks at how the (re)constructed doctrine might provide such resilience in responding to 
the next crisis. 
Chapter Seven - the third of the ‘stress tests’ – assesses the doctrine’s ability to respond to 
‘micro concerns’ or the concerns of social movements. Engendering this sort of 
responsiveness is a difficult task given the multiple institutional and doctrinal barriers that 
surround the CESCR, and the diversity and plurality of social movements. This chapter 
examines these barriers to the use of non-retrogression in depth, and includes a discussion 
of how ‘micro concerns’ are to be defined. 
The chapter proceeds to argue, notwithstanding these difficulties, that responding to these 
groups and their concerns should be of central importance to the CESCR. It is argued that 
the Committee can benefit from the additional capacity and expertise of these groups, and 
can be guided by their concerns when formulating strategy and responses. Finally, the 
chapter turns to assess the possibilities for improved performance. Focussing particularly 
on the role that the reformed retrogression can play, the analysis suggests a range of 
straightforward changes in approach that could be made (as well as proposing some more 
difficult-to-achieve changes). 
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Chapter Eight presents the final key test for the newly proposed doctrine of non-
retrogression. This relates to its ability to meet the practical challenges of enforcement. A 
range of practical difficulties and confusions have beset the use of the doctrine thus far. 
These include difficulties with proof, timing and terminology. This chapter details the ways 
in which the enforcement of the prohibition on retrogression has been restrained. It does so 
by using a number of examples and through a close look at the dynamics of the CESCR’s 
operations and the demands that have flowed from the doctrine’s construction in the past. 
The chapter also assesses the (re)construction’s prospects of practical success. As a number 
of the limitations upon effectiveness flow from either the nature of the international rights 
system or from other constraints upon the Committee, it is acknowledged that a simple 
doctrinal reconstruction will not enable perfect enforcement. However, it is argued that if 
the (re)construction is accompanied by institutional and procedural innovations a real and 
effective function for retrogression can be realised.  
The concluding chapter of the thesis (Chapter Nine) takes stock of the arguments and 
analyses advanced in the course of the preceding seven chapters. This chapter, therefore 
gathers together and systematises the implications of the research for the future of the 
doctrine of non-retrogression. This will bring together the discussions on the roots, 
construction and flaws of the existing retrogression with the proposals and critiques of the 
(re)constructed definition. In doing so, the chapter shows how the potential of the doctrine 
of non-retrogression is unrivalled. Although the importance of various other reforms and 
obligations are acknowledged, none provide the breadth of benefits that could come from a 
properly functioning doctrine of non-retrogression. 
However, the chapter also goes a step further. It suggests areas of cross-applicability, where 
the findings might also have implications for the operation ICESCR and even the 
international human rights regime more broadly. 
Before proceeding to chapter two and the examination of the historical context of the 
ICESCR and non-retrogression, a final note on the thesis’ tone is needed. A consistent 
‘critical friend’ approach is adopted. This responds to a view of the human rights literature 
which has, in general terms, been described as the product of ‘uncritical proponents and 
uncritical critics’.52  Like all generalisations, there are numerous and notable exceptions, 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
52 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009) 8. 
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however the description is often accurate. As such, a real attempt has been made here to 
avoid blind adherence to the human rights project and its norms (blind in the sense that 
context, alternative projects, or internal failures are missed or minimised). Likewise, real 
care has been taken in dealing with the tranche of (sometimes self-proclaimed) critique 
that puts forward forceful and often exciting arguments but which bears all too little 
relation to the legal position and instead attacks an (at least partly) hypothetical situation. 
It is the argument of the thesis that non-retrogression’s past is deeply confused, and its 
future will be beset with challenges. Neither of these features can be properly analysed 
through overly accepting or dismissive approaches (by being an ‘uncritical proponent’ or an 
‘uncritical critic’). The research presented here is an attempt to avoid both of these poles 
and to assess the doctrine of non-retrogression in the depth that it desperately needs.
 
 
 
Part I - (Re)constructing Purpose for Retrogression 
  
	
 
 
Chapter 2 
History 
2.1. Introduction 
Given the widespread familiarity with the ICESCR’s controversial history, it seems an almost 
clichéd starting point. It has become accepted common ground that the system of IHRL has 
been infected by Cold War divisions, and a denigration of ESR. Yet, familiar as the story 
may be, there are good reasons for returning to it here.  
Later in the thesis, the (re)purposing and (re)construction of non-retrogression are 
discussed in depth. Such re-constructions lack meaning without a base understanding of 
the original purpose and construction of the doctrine. Revisiting even the most well-
established historical tenets is especially important as the doctrine was not created in one 
swift movement, but rather has had an incremental development. This process of 
development has added multiple layers and increasing complexity over time. These 
multiple points of development permit minor historical inaccuracies – normally 
unremarkable – to add up into a misleading picture. This demands an historical 
examination which can critically revisit key debates and which is capable of correcting such 
narrative inaccuracies. Without such a revisionist history, the danger is that the original 
purpose and construction of retr0gression are wrongly understood, and that any 
reconstructions start with a faulty point of reference. 
In particular, this chapter addresses some of the key circumstances that surrounded the 
negotiation of the international human rights machinery, the ICESCR, and the progressive 
realisation obligation. The doctrine’s own identity touches on questions of the role of 
international human rights, the differences between ESR and CPR, and the construction 
and effectiveness of progressive realisation. An accurate understanding of these 
circumstances – achieved here through a revisionist history – is central to grasping what the 
doctrine of non-retrogression was meant to achieve, and how. 
One example of how the revision of the traditional historical account changes our view of 
the doctrine relates to progressive realisation. Under the traditional narratives of Cold War 
division and the denigration and non-acceptance of retrogression, it is easy to see the 
progressive realisation obligation as a term of compromise. Seen in this way, the purpose 
and construction of retrogression appear as a remedy to State resistance and a politicised 
negotiation. However, if – as is advanced below – the history of the Covenants and the 
progressive realisation obligation is less contested and polarised than is generally thought, 
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retrogression appears differently. The doctrine is less of a response to the denigration of 
ESR, and its roots are elsewhere. This might mean its construction and purpose were the 
result of attempts by the CESCR to innovate, or – as the chapter argues in its penultimate 
section – as the result of an accidental creation by the CESCR.  
To provide a better grounding for later discussions of relationships such as these, the 
following sections recount some of the history of the International Bill of Rights, the 
ICESCR, progressive realisation, the CESCR and the doctrine of non-retrogression. What 
follows is an undoubtedly partial account of the system-at-large, however the central focus 
are those historical aspects with pertinence to non-retrogression. Within the space available 
this restricted approach allows for more comprehensive treatment of those relevant features 
and a better understanding of non-retrogression. 
Within this selective focus, the chapter sets the traditional narratives of the Cold War 
history of the system against the role of ‘Third World’ countries, and against ratification 
records. Revision of these two aspects respectively reveal a broader range of motivations 
behind the ICESCR, and the need for caution when examining the level of state buy-in to 
the Covenants. Further, the discussion below engages with some of the early controversies 
and difficulties that were built into the ‘progressive realisation’ obligation from the 
beginning. A final section builds upon these historical revisions, to find the beginnings of 
the doctrine of non-retrogression. This section is heavily contextualised to show the quite 
extreme challenges faced by the new CESCR at the point at which non-retrogression is said 
to have been created.  
2.2. Historical Method 
The approach taken to understanding the doctrine of non-retrogression in this chapter is an 
historical one. In adopting this approach, there are several departures from standard legal 
method and its (mis)use of historical materials. As such, a brief note on the historical 
method is needed. 
Historical analyses done by lawyers have a bad reputation.1 This reputation largely comes 
from the practice of lawyers who, in looking at series of past legal events, are often most 
interested in the ‘net result of [an] evolution’,2 or the current understanding of an older 
legal development. Such an exercise can be to the detriment to a full historical 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 Edward L Rubin, ‘Law and and the Methodology of Law’ [1997] Wisconsin Law Review 522, 522–523. 
2 John Phillip Reid, ‘Law and History’ (1993) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 193, 195. 
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understanding of events, and is commonly referred to as ‘law-office’ history.3 This is an 
unsurprising disciplinary trait given the continuing relevance of even very old 
jurisprudence. Further, despite the disapproval of historians, this pursuit does have value, 
particularly for the legal practitioner working to determine the current significance of a 
legal rule or development.4 Yet, it is also clear that ‘[l]aw-office history is a legal practice, 
not a historical one’.5  
Historical method goes much beyond a simple use of ‘old’ events in modern settings, and 
instead requires an attempt to understand the accompanying context of the events.6 If there 
is to be a genuine commitment to understanding the history of the law as-it-happened, 
then the disciplinary cannons of ‘history’ must be adopted.7 This includes ‘let[ting] the past 
be the past’,8 reading sources as the ‘contemporaries of the authors would’,9 and eschewing 
the ‘premature use of universal [general] terms’.10 Such an historical approach to the 
reconstruction of legal events, Lesaffer notes, ‘ensure[s] that explanations are derived from 
the past and not dictated by the present’.11 This is a rewarding methodological approach as 
it aids the legal scholar in understanding how and why a legal principle developed as it did. 
In the context of the current study of non-retrogression there is a clear distinction between 
these two methodologies of law-office history and ‘real’ history. As noted above, these 
different inquiries have different aims and utilities. However, while law-office history offers 
an understanding of today’s meaning of ICESCR doctrines, genuine historical methods offer 
an understanding of the significance of those doctrines at the time that they were 
developed.12 This latter understanding is what is sought in this chapter. The historical 
interest here is not, as is commonly the case, an appeal to the authority that history can 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
3 ibid 197. 
4 Frederic William Maitland, ‘Why the History of English Law Is Not Written’ in Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher (ed), The 
Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, vol. 1 (CUP 1911) 491; Randall Lesaffer, ‘International Law and Its History: The 
Story of an Unrequited Love’ in Matthew CR Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds), Time, History and 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 37. 
5 Mark Tushnet, ‘Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law’ (1996) 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review 909, 934. 
6 Reid (n 5) 194. 
7 Rubin (n 4) 522–523; In the absence of a genuine understanding by lawyers of historical techniques, it has been suggested 
that lawyers use the (familiar) rules of legal evidence in their historical analyses; Matthew J Festa, ‘Applying a Usable Past: The 
Use of History in Law’ (2008) 38 Seton Hall Law Review 538.  
8 Lesaffer (n 7) 37. 
9 ibid 38. 
10 Michael Moïssey Postan, ‘History and the Social Sciences’, Fact and relevance: essays on historical method (Cambridge 
University Press 1971) 19. 
11 Lesaffer (n 7) 40. 
12 Reid (n 5) 194; Of course, the gap between these two understandings is likely to be less severe the shorter a temporal 
distance there is between them. Understanding legal developments from 1217, for example, is an undoubtedly more complex 
task (as Geraldine Van Bueren does in ‘Socio-Economic Rights and a Bill of Rights - an Overlooked British Tradition’ [2013] 
Public Law 821, 825).  
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offer, but rather is a search for evidence on the meaning, conceptual basis and development 
of the doctrine of non-retrogression.13 
Such an historical exercise has an additional practical function. There is a clear legal-
interpretative utility in establishing the past context of ICESCR developments. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) – despite favouring reliance on the text of 
treaties – allows for such historical factors to be used to interpreting the meaning of a 
treaty.14 The requirement in the VCLT that the ‘object and purpose’ of international 
agreements can be used as an interpretative device demonstrates the persistence of such 
‘original intent’ techniques.15 Of course, the interpretation of treaties is not limited to the 
original intent of their drafters as ‘object and purpose’ interpretations allow for flexibility in 
accommodating the evolving object(s) and purpose(s) of the treaty.16 However, the limited 
role that does exist for the object, purpose, and intent in determining the legal meaning of 
the treaty, means that the examination of the history and the travaux is all the more 
important. Such historical analyses of the ICESCR obligations, and of the doctrine of non-
retrogression in particular, are capable of contributing not only to historical understanding, 
but also legal interpretation. 
2.3. A Cold War History of the International Bill of Rights 
The standard history of economic and social rights at the international level is one of 
division, subordination, and inferiority. Cold War influences are said to have permeated the 
preparation and drafting of the International Bill of Rights, causing the rights contained in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights17 (UDHR) to be divided into separate (and 
unequal) treaties. Most scholars adopt and agree with this traditional narrative of ESR 
history, which emphasises the role of the Cold War in securing the dominance of CPR 
relative to ESR. It is often posited that, following the optimistic references18 to ‘human 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
13 Reid (n 5) 193. 
14 Francis G Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the 
Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference’ (1969) 18 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 318, 325ff. 
15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 332 UNTS 1980) art 31(1). 
16 Jacobs (n 17) 320. However, much less flexibility is inherent in art 31(4) which requires that ‘[a] special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended’ (VCLT, art 31(1)). Additionally, in light of art 32 VCLT which 
notes that preparatory work and the context of the agreement’s conclusion should be used only where an ‘ambiguous’ or 
‘manifestly absurd’ interpretation would otherwise result, it is likely that art 31(4) on ‘special meaning’ will apply only where 
States parties have taken steps to agree a definition of terms. 
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 1948, UN Res A/810). 
18 Schabas’ argues there was less cause for optimism even at this early stage, noting that human rights only received the 
attention they did in the Charter due to miscalculations from the US, UK and Russia and the consequent pressure from 
smaller nations. William Schabas (ed), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Travaux Préparatoires (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) lxxv. 
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rights run[ning] through the [UN] Charter like a golden thread’,19 the Cold War caused the 
thread to unravel into two distinct strands; ESR and CPR. Often the literature makes use of 
metaphors to indicate that due to the Cold War, ESR sit at a disadvantage to CPR. Thus, for 
example, ESR have been described as the ‘poor cousins’20 and ‘poor relations’21 of CPR, 
‘second-class’ rights,22 and a ‘little sister’23 to the ICCPR.24 So pervasive is this view that the 
CESCR itself has noted the perception of the ICESCR as a ‘poor relation’ to its civil and 
political counterpart.25  
Behind these descriptions is the claim that the West resisted the inclusion of ESR in the 
UDHR at an early stage.26 The ‘classic’ CPR are argued to have fitted with the political 
traditions of Western nations, while the East found ESR more appealing. According to this 
account, these beginnings of division were exacerbated by the Cold War years that 
followed, with states taking ‘extreme positions’, and an ‘objective consideration of the key 
issues’ being precluded during that period.27 It is claimed that states were polarised28 by the 
conflict, and each bloc supposedly prioritised the covenant which best matched its 
ideological emphases.29 Elements of the UN’s work became mired in politicisation30 and the 
formation and progress of the two international covenants slowed. Accordingly, the end of 
the Cold War purportedly brought a ‘soothing cessation to the ideological rivalry that 
constrained and hindered human rights’ and ushered in a new era for the neglected 
ICESCR.31 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
19 John Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation’ (1976) 17 William and Mary Law Review 527, 
527. 
20 Joint Committee on Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-First Report of 
Session 2003-04 (The Stationery Office 2004) para 163; Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jaqueline Mowbray, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 2014) 1; Colm 
O’Cinneide, ‘Bringing Socio-Economic Rights Back into the Mainstream’ 1 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543127> accessed 9 
October 2016. 
21 Matthew CR Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its 
Development (Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press 1995) 9, 352. 
22 Mashood A Baderin and Robert McCorquodale, ‘Introduction’ in Mashood A Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), 
Economic, social and cultural rights in action (Oxford University Press 2007) 10. 
23 Rachel Johnstone, ‘Feminist Influences on the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 28 Human Rights 
Quarterly 148, 150. There are, however, no references to the ICESCR as a ‘little brother’ to the stronger ICCPR. 
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 
171). 
25 CESCR, ‘Report on the Sixth Session’ (1992) UN Doc E/1992/23 para 362.; section repeated in CESCR, ‘Report on the Seventh 
Session’ (1993) UN Doc E/1993/22 para 2. 
26 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (M Nijhoff 1995) 191. 
27 Philip Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (1994) 26 Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 137, 150. 
28 Alicia Ely Yamin, ‘The Right to Health Under International Law and Its Relevance to the United States’ (2005) 95 American 
Journal of Public Health 1156, 1156. 
29 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Fact Sheet 33)’ (2008) 9. 
30 Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment (Routledge 2013) 127, 138. 
31 Philip C Aka and Gloria J Browne, ‘Education, Human Rights, and the Post-Cold War Era’ (1998) 15 New York Law School 
Journal of Human Rights 421, 421; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 33) 9. 
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2.4.  Revised Histories of the International Bill of Rights  
However, the past decade has seen a number of emerging – and valuable – revisionist 
histories which challenge the centrality of this Cold War narrative.32 These range from 
histories which forefront ‘struggle’,33 others which segment and shorten the history of 
human rights and the International Bill of Rights,34 and still others which challenge directly 
the ‘myth of Western opposition’ to social rights.35 These histories provide alternative, more 
compelling descriptions of the circumstances that surrounded the conclusion of the key 
IHRL instrument. This is central to resituating the doctrine as it shows up a different range 
of possible intentions and purposes. 
These alternative histories have value in promoting an ‘epistemological scepticism’ as a 
route to unsettling dominant narratives or unlocking stagnant debates.36 This general value 
of revisionism is applicable to the present research. Through revisiting key moments in 
history, the danger of situating – ex post – the doctrine of non-retrogression within a 
stagnant narrative is reduced. Instead it opens up opportunities to go beyond a descriptive 
account of the doctrine, its origins and a (narrow) account of its future. Rather, alternative 
histories open up questions that have broader relevance for the IHRL system as a whole, the 
ICESCR, and the doctrine. In blunt terms, rather than carving a hole for retrogression 
within debates that are settled (however unsatisfactorily), fractures in the dominant 
histories are used to show that retrogression’s place within the ICESCR is as uncertain as it 
is for many other Covenant obligations. Given this aim, the extent of the historical 
revisiting below, can be (and is) limited. As the focus is on key fractures that open up new 
analytical opportunities, a comprehensive approach is not taken. Instead, what follows 
devotes most attention to two key revisions; the influence of ‘Third World’ states, and 
history as portrayed by the ratification records of the two Covenants. 
 
 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
32 For a summary of the purpose and boundaries of revisionist history see; Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Revisionist Histories 
(Routledge 2013) 8–18. For a critique see; Joseph V Femia, ‘An Historicist Critique of “Revisionist” Methods for Studying the 
History of Ideas’ (1981) 20 History and Theory 113. 
33 Christopher NJ Roberts, The Contentious History of the International Bill of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014) 
for a snapshot of this position see 51–52. 
34 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard University Press 2012). 
35 Daniel J Whelan and Jack Donnelly, ‘The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting 
the Record Straight’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 908. 
36 Santiago Juan-Navarro, Archival Reflections: Postmodern Fiction of the Americas (self-Reflexivity, Historical Revisionism, 
Utopia) (Bucknell University Press 2000) 195. 
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2.4.1.  A History with ‘Third World’ Influence 
When the traditional history of the international human rights system is told through 
Eastern and Western blocs, the contributions of those states that were onlookers to Cold 
War aggressions are minimized. Yet revisiting such ‘Third World’ contributions can be 
helpful in freeing the ICESCR from the economic and governance binaries is it assumed to 
sit between. In particular, it collapses the image of the ESR system as treading a path 
between endorsing a ‘Western’, small state, capitalist system and an ‘Eastern’, ‘socialist’, 
large state system, as the more effectual for the realization of rights. In several instances 
‘Third World’ countries added another set of concerns, perspectives or priorities. 
From the very earliest days of the UN’s existence at the San Francisco Conference on 
International Organisation, Panama presented a text proposed as a single rights Covenant 
including CPR alongside ESR such as the rights to work, social security, food and housing.37 
Out of a clear desire to see the inclusion of a declaration of human rights in the UN Charter, 
the small Central American state repeatedly presented the document for discussion.38 This 
draft text contained eighteen articles39 and, according to the then Director of the UN 
Division on Human Rights, was the best of the range of working texts presented.40 The 
strength of text presented by the Panamanian delegation was undoubtedly a function of it 
having been drawn from the earlier drafting processes of the American Law Institute 
(ALI).41 That body had previously worked from 1941-1949 on a Statement of Essential 
Human Rights.42 The Panamanian draft eventually failed to receive support in any of the 
committees in which it was presented. Having never been officially adopted by the ALI, 
opposition was likely from lawyers in the US,43 and René Casin, the French representative, 
noted that it had been drafted in the western hemisphere and required broader input.44 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
37 Schabas (n 21) lxxvii. It included (in order) mention of freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, freedom to form associations, freedom from wrongful interference, fair trial, freedom from arbitrary detention, 
retroactive laws, property rights, education, work, conditions of work, food and housing, social security, participation in 
government, and equal protection; ‘Statement of Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation of Panama’ (1946) UN 
Doc E/HR/3. 
38 In, eg, ‘Commission on Human Rights Provisional Agenda’ (1946) UN Doc E/HR/5. 
39 ‘Statement of Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation of Panama’ (n 41). 
40 John P Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations: A Great Adventure (Transnational Publishers 1984) 32. 
41 AW Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford 
University Press 2004) 323. A project that was begun by Harvard Professor of tort law, Warren E Seavey, on a budget of just 
$15,000 (Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, ‘Taming the States: The American Law Institute and the “Statement of Essential Human Rights”’ 
(2012) 7 Journal of Global History 461, 463, 466). 
42 Jordon Steele, ‘Statement of Essential Human Rights Project Records’ (University of Pennsylvania 2011) 
<http://dla.library.upenn.edu/cocoon/dla/ead/ead.pdf?fq=creator_facet%3A%22American%20Law%20Institute%22%20AND%
20date_facet%3A%221940s%22&id=EAD_upenn_biddle_USPULPULALI04006&> accessed 20 September 2016. 
43 Simpson (n 45) 323; Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals : Text and Materials (Oxford University Press 2008) 271. 
44 Schabas (n 21) lxxx. Although this observation is likely correct, the objection ignores the efforts made by the ALI to survey 
the rights found in global constitutions and in international studies; Vik (n 45) 462, 468. 
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However, the similar scope of the Panamanian declaration to the final International Bill of 
Rights demonstrates that early acceptance of ESR alongside CPR was present. 
Later in time, the influence of ‘Third World’ states was seen again when the ICESCR and 
ICCPR were being negotiated. Traditional Cold War division narratives have failed to 
acknowledge the influence of the development agendas of post-colonial states on the 
drafting of the Covenants.45 Waltz is critical of the degree to which these Cold War analyses 
have ‘obfuscated’ understanding of the relevant politics.46 Strikingly excluded from 
consideration are the non-aligned movement and the Bandung conference. Bandung 
represented a significant moment for Asian and African states described as an 
‘unprecedented and unrepeated moment of unity of purpose’.47 At the 1955 gathering, Asian 
and African States declared that none of them should ‘serve the particular interests of any 
of the big powers’.48 Particularly averse to regionalism or ideological groupings, these new 
nation-states used the Bandung conference to underscore the importance of the inclusion 
of a broad range of ideological positions and the adoption of ‘pragmatist’ foreign policy.49 
In addition the range of ESR was attractive to Third World states with rising development 
agendas, and for whom ESR held a political resonance.50 These two factors – self-interest 
and non-alignment – resulted in the broad support of Third World states for ESR, but not 
for ideological division.51 Acknowledging such influence – as well as being inherently 
valuable – allows for a reframing of the content of the ICESCR system to recognize it as 
being capable of holding opportunity for States. 
2.4.2.  A History Centring Ratification Records 
Another area of the history of the IBoR deserves renewed attention. The Cold War narrative 
portrays a decisive split between East and West demonstrated in the blocs’ divided loyalty 
to the ICESCR and the ICCPR respectively. However, as will be shown below, such a split is 
not reflected in the ratification records of the two Covenants. This small segment of a 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
45 Daniel J Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (University of Pennsylvania Press 2011) 62. 
46 Susan Eileen Waltz, ‘Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 44, 69. 
47 Jamie AC Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Didier Millet 2005) 2.  
48 ‘Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung’ (1955) principle 6(a) 
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(NUS Press 2008) 5. 
50 Susan Waltz, ‘Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2002) 23 Third World 
Quarterly 437, 444. 
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revised history for the IBoR, has relevance for the understanding of the ICESCR and the 
current research on retrogression. A significant part of this relevance lies in the way in 
which the revisited history exposes the distance between States’ formal acceptance of the 
ICESCR and their substantive acceptance or implementation of its terms. This, for 
retrogression and more generally, holds strategic lessons on where the greatest gains in 
protection are to be made and where a doctrine such as non-retrogression has the most 
potential. 
States’ formal acceptance of the two Covenants is easy to demonstrate. The equality with 
which the two sets of rights were treated is easily seen from the ratification records. The 
importance of such formal equality was keen felt by States throughout the drafting process, 
where the potential impacts upon ratifications of having a unified or divided covenant were 
frequently discussed. France, for example, in the Commission on Human Rights voiced 
concerns about the possibility of a neglected ESR treaty and the symbolic dangers of this 
prospect.52 In the result, these concerns amounted to little with the ICESCR and the ICCPR 
entering into force within a few months of each other.53 Analysis of the ratification records 
shows that States ratified the two Covenants in quick succession.54 Indeed, States ratified 
the ICESCR an average of 51 days before the ICCPR. The proximity with which the two 
covenants were ratified can be seen in Figure 1 below, which shows how the vast majority of 
states (147 or 88%) ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR within a year of each other. Only a few 
outliers waited for a longer period before ratifying the second Covenant.		
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
52 ‘Summary Record of the 248th Meeting of the International Law Commission’ (1954) UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.248 17. 
53 The ICESCR entering into force on the 3 January 1976 and the ICCPR entering into force on the 23 March 1976 (only 80 days 
apart). 
54 Full calculations in Appendix C. Figures include all ratifications to the end of 2015. 
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In addition, the trajectory of ratifications of the ICCPR and the ICESCR is almost identical.55 
When looking at the different accumulation of ratifications of the two Covenants, a 
similarly consistent picture emerges (figure 2). There are minor differences between the 
years of 1984 and 1990, where the ICESCR maintained a higher level of ratifications (around 
5 more). This marginal trend is reversed from 1996 to the present, with the ICCPR 
maintaining between one and five ratifications more than the ICESCR. The trend of the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR being ratified at similar rates remains true for states in the Western 
bloc.56 Such a willingness by states to ratify both Covenants at almost the same rate would 
seem to refute claims that states had an aversion to undertaking formal ESR commitments. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
55 Full calculations in Appendix C. Figures correct as at 20 September 2016. 
56 Roughly approximated as those States in NATO during the Cold War (with the exception of the ratifications of West 
Germany); John W Young, The Longman Companion to Cold War and Detente, 1941-91 (Longman 1993) 198–200. 
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Overall, the pattern of ratifications is remarkably similar and would not support any 
assertion that disagreements over the substance of the treaties were significantly reflected 
in the levels of ratification. A narrative of Cold War ideological division cannot account for 
such similar ratification patterns. Neither can Cold War differences satisfactorily account 
for the continuing neglect of ESR. The Cold War ended in 1989 with the collapse of 
communism in eastern Europe,57 yet in the years since there has been no radical surge in 
support for ESR.58 If, as the current textbook version of events has it, ESR were neglected by 
the West as a tool in an ideological war it would be reasonable to expect a reversal of this 
position when the wounds of war had healed. There is little or no evidence of this. 
It is, perhaps, notable that regardless of the large and equal numbers of ratifications to the 
Covenants, the US remained stubbornly accepting of only the ICCPR. Although it signed 
the ICESCR shortly after it entered into force,59 it is possible that the narrative of division 
between the two Covenants was reinforced not by the number of States which resisted ESR 
(which was relatively small), but by the influence of those which did. 
However, what the ratification records do not convey is the degree to which States 
substantively accepted the contents of the ICESCR. The whole question of whether, when 
and why States act upon their international human rights obligations is a complex – and 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
57 ibid 152. 
58 The low level of ratifications for the complaints mechanism support this assertion. Its 21 ratifications (as at 20 September 
2016) is very similar to the number of parties to the complaints mechanism of the CRC, but is a much lower number than the 
complaints mechanism for the CEDAW (56) collected in a similar period; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013, UN Res A/RES/63/117). The 
ratification records for the ICESCR itself also demonstrate this contention. See Appendix C. 
59 The US signed the ICESCR on 5 October 1977 (just over a year and a half after the Covenant had entered into force). 
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highly interesting – one.60 Without entering into those debates, one observation is 
important for the current research. It seems likely that mechanisms such as progressive 
realization were included in the ICESCR not (or not only) to improve the operational 
effectiveness of the Covenant, but also to soften the obligations to ensure State buy-in.61 
However, hindsight indicates that while there was formal buy-in in the form of ratification, 
the inclusion of the progressivity condition perhaps did less to ensure that there was 
substantive acceptance. Indeed, the inclusion of the progressive realisation condition may 
have been counterproductive in this respect, facilitating the undermining of ESR during and 
since the Cold War. Beyond underscoring the importance of separating out formal and 
substantive State actions in assessments of the ICESCR’s success, this also demonstrates 
that deference to States should have deep justifications that go beyond maintaining the 
formal acquiescence of national delegations. 
2.5.  Development of ‘Progressive Realisation’ 
The obligation to achieve progressively the full realization of the ICESCR rights found in 
article 2(1) of the ICESCR has a particular relevance both in terms of an historical account of 
the Covenant, and in terms of analysis of the doctrine of non-retrogression. The obligation 
(known as the obligation of ‘progressive realisation’) applies in conjunction with the 
substantive provisions such as the rights to work, social security, an adequate standard of 
living, health, education, and culture, which are listed in Part III of the ICESCR.  The 
adopted text of Article 2(1) reads in full; 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.62 
With the strong link that is often claimed between retrogression and progressive 
realisation, understanding the nature of that relationship is crucial to later attempts to 
(re)construct the doctrine 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
60 Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935; Samuel Moyn, ‘Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make Enough of a Difference?’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), Cambridge Companion to Human 
Rights Law (Cambridge University Press 2012); Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic 
Politics (2009) especially chapters 5, 9; Emilie M Hafner-Burton and James Ron, ‘Human Rights Institutions: Rhetoric and 
Efficacy’ (2007) 44 Journal of Peace Research 379; Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton, Brad L LeVeck and David G Victor, ‘How 
Activists Perceive the Utility of International Law’ [2015] SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2685381> accessed 20 
September 2016. 
61 ‘Summary Record of the 248th Meeting of the International Law Commission’ (n 56) 17. 
62 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3) art 2(1) (emphasis added). 
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 The formulation of progressive realisation was arrived at relatively early in the drafting 
process and was substantially settled by 1951.63 At this point, many other obligations were 
still some distance from their final form.64 Despite the level of attention that it has had in 
more recent times, the idea of progressivity itself was a relatively uncontroversial one.65 
Debates tended to centre on the words that would accompany ‘progressive’ in order to 
ensure an adequate and realistic rate of realisation.66 However, on the word itself there was 
reasonable consensus.67 The ease with which this formulation was settled on may be partly 
thanks to the inclusion of the idea of ‘progressive measures’ in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.68 
The text of the comparator provisions in the ICCPR differs markedly.69 While the ICESCR 
focusses more on the practical undertakings of States ‘to take steps…with a view to 
achieving progressively’, the ICCPR first provides something of a meta-objective for the 
Covenant, requiring that States ‘respect’ and ‘ensure’ rights,70 before going on to list the 
ways in which States should do so. Having a meta or background value is important, as is 
argued further below,71 as an additional interpretative tool and guiding standard where the 
obligations are unclear. 
The immediacy of the ICCPR is often counter-posed to the progressiveness of the ICESCR.72 
However, any such distinction must also be qualified by noting the immediate obligations 
within the ICESCR.73 In addition, away from the headline general obligations, both of the 
Covenants use remarkably similar terms when requiring States to report to supervisory 
mechanisms. Both require States to submit updates on the ‘progress’ made in the 
implementation of the rights.74 The inclusion of such a condition in the ICCPR is somewhat 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
63 The phrase ‘international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical’ had, however, originally only read 
‘international co-operation’; Commission on Human Rights (n 2) para 23. 
64 Secretary General, Activities of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies in the Field of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (UN Doc E/CN4/364/Rev.l 1952) Appendix, 69. 
65 Third Committee of the General Assembly, Agenda Item 43 (n 2) paras 10, 14, 21, 34, 48. 
66 Commission on Human Rights (n 2) 16; Third Committee of the General Assembly, Draft International Covenants on Human 
Rights (n 2) para 40; Third Committee of the General Assembly, Agenda Item 43 (n 2) para 34. 
67 Commission on Human Rights (n 2) para 28. 
68 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (n 20) preamble. 
69 See Table 1. 
70 These terms provided an overall purpose for the Covenant long before Shue gave them a more closely defined meaning; 
Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (1st edn, Princeton University Press 1980). 
71 See Chapter 3, p93. 
72 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Mashood A Baderin and Manisul Ssenjoyonjo (eds), 
International Human Rights Law: Six Decades After the UDHR and Beyond (Routledge 2016) 59. 
73 M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Intersentia 2003) 128ff. See, eg, the obligation of non-discrimination or the minimum core obligation.  
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 28) art 40(1); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (n 65) art 16. 
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contradictory given that the treaty’s requirement of immediate realisation of the rights is 
antithetical to a ‘progress’ update.75 
 ICCPR ICESCR 
Nature of State 
undertaking 
… undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant…76 
… undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through 
international assistance and 
co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights 
recognized in the present 
Covenant..77 
Nature of 
implementation 
measures 
required  
Where not already provided for by 
existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to 
take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions 
of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such laws or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.78 
... by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the 
adoption of legislative 
measures.79 
  
A final point of note is the manner in which the ICCPR assumes that States are already in 
partial compliance with the Covenant standards. The subsection’s opening phrase ‘[w]here 
not already provided for’ is absent from the ICESCR, and indicates the extent to which the 
ICCPR was seen as the international codification of existing domestic CPR standards.  
Notwithstanding these differences in approach, the two texts were considered together 
during the drafting process.80 The sometimes-marked variances are commonly attributed to 
the accommodation of the ‘realities of the real world’ implying there are more 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
75 See contra Nowak, who argues that the art 40 ‘progress’ provision is correctly read to require information on progress which 
is above and beyond what is legally required by the ICCPR; Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engel 2005) 62. 
76 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 28) art 2(1). 
77 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 65) art 2(1) (emphasis added). 
78 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 28) art 2(2). 
79 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 65) art 2(1) (emphasis added). 
80 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 24) 134. 
Table	1	
History	 55	
	
implementation difficulties with ESR and a greater need for flexibility.81 Indeed the 
progressive realisation obligation (and the Covenant with it) has frequently been 
characterised as ‘flexible’.82 The CESCR itself has termed the obligation a ‘necessary 
flexibility device’.83 
However often article 2(1) has been described as flexible, its drafters’ intent and its 
construction do not inevitably lend themselves to this conclusion. The provision requires 
that each State takes steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively’ the ICESCR rights.84 Rather than a more open requirement that 
States progress towards full realisation, the Covenant stipulates that progress must occur at 
the rate that resources allow. As such, the only respect in which the condition of 
progressive realisation can accurately be said to differ to its CPR counterpart is in its 
acknowledgement of – but not flexibility towards – the limitations that a State’s maximum 
of available resources can impose. The article constitutes an acknowledgement of, but not a 
flexibility towards, resource constraints as it sets down in clear and unyielding terms that 
States must realise the ICESCR rights where its resources allow. Likewise, the temporal 
flexibility that is often said to exist in article 2(1) is overstated;85 a longer timeline for the 
realisation of ESR being permissible only where resource constraints require it. 
Practically speaking, such an acknowledgement of the ‘realities of the real word’ would also 
be beneficial to the ICCPR. CPR are clearly capable of having resource implications.86 Yet, 
with its harsh ‘implement immediately or violate’ construction, States could be found to be 
infringing the ICCPR even if non-implementation was due to resource constraints. Such a 
scenario could easily arise where a State’s prison system was in such a poor condition that it 
was in violation of the right to be free from ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.87 It is possible that the ICCPR accounts for such resource limitations, but in a 
less transparent manner. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
81 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23 
1990) para 9. 
82 Lillian Chenwi, ‘Unpacking“ Progressive Realisation”, Its Relation to Resources, Minimum Core and Reasonableness, and 
Some Methodological Considerations for Assessing Compliance’ (2013) 46 De Jure 742, 744. See also n66 above. 
83 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 83) para 9. 
84 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 65) art 2(1). 
85 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 83) para 9. Although a temporal dimension was indeed discussed during the drafting with the 
options of ‘rapid’ or ‘accelerated’ progressive realisation mooted, similar discussions were had in respect of the ICCPR; Saul, 
Kinley and Mowbray (n 24) 134; Nowak (n 81) 31–32. 
86 Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 172. For example, the resources required to 
maintain conditions of imprisonment above an inhuman and degrading standard, or the costs implicit in providing for fair 
trials. 
87 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 28) art 7. 
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This acknowledgement of the genuine limitations that resource constraints can place upon 
State implementation of rights, raises the question of which other ‘realities’ might have 
been acknowledged. For example, States may face genuine difficulties in generating 
effective policies, or be impeded, despite their best education and promotion efforts, by a 
slow rate of social change.88 
The Third Committee of the General Assembly, during its discussions of the two Covenants, 
showed an awareness of how such constraints upon States may create a fictional divide 
between what States are legally bound to do and what they have the capacity to achieve. 
This concern was most prominent with respect to the ICCPR where some argued for the 
‘almost immediate’ application of the Covenant to allow States to adjust constitutional 
arrangements where necessary.89 
In its drafting and construction it is clear that the obligation of progressive realisation does 
not,90 nor was it intended to,91 release States from meaningful obligations. Neither, as has 
been discussed above, is it flexible in what it requires of States. 
However, despite the clear obligation set down by the article, the monitoring of it is much 
more challenging.92 The idea of progression requires a comparator point in order to 
establish what progress has been made. This requires good quality data that is free from 
State or other biases, collected according to a scientific methodology, and with consistency 
so that data points can be compared across time. At the same time, qualifying the 
obligation with respect to the maximum of available resources requires a complex 
assessment of the resources available to the State and the manner in which they have been 
expended. Understandably perhaps then, the obligation has faced severe criticism, 
uncertainty, and a search for ways in which it might be supplemented or improved.  
2.6. The Beginnings of ‘Retrogressive Measures’ 
The genesis of non-retrogression can be found in the CESCR’s General Comment 3. There, 
in just a sentence, an idea and a word was introduced that would develop into something 
significantly more important. Yet, there is little in the years leading up to the drafting of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
88 Difficulties that were somewhat acknowledged during the drafting process; Third Committee of the General Assembly, 
Agenda Item 43 (n 2) para 25.  
89 ibid para 23 (emphasis added). 
90 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 83) para 9. 
91 However it has been noted that while the divergence from the language of the ICCPR was indeed deliberate, the full 
consequences of this may not have been understood; Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 24) 134. 
92 This is further discussed below at Chapter 3, pp80-94. 
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General Comment 3 to suggest that the Committee at that time was attempting to generate 
a substantially new doctrine in that fifth session. In fact, the opposite may be true. Those 
early days of the doctrine of non-retrogression are addressed below, first in terms of the 
institutional issues that afflicted the Committee during that period and, second in relation 
to its performance and priorities in the preceding years.  
2.6.1.  Institutional Factors 
The CESCR itself was established some nine years after the entry into force of the ICESCR 
and following a series of failed attempts by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to 
monitor States’ compliance with the Covenant obligations. One of these attempts was an 
initial Sessional Working Group that was established in 197693 and began work in 1979.94 
The function of that Group was then modified to a greater or lesser extent in 1978, 1979, 
1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 before being disbanded in favour of the new CESCR arrangement 
in 1985.95 Two years after having been disbanded, the results of the Working Group’s efforts 
were dismissed as ‘patently inadequate’ by two members of the new CESCR.96 
This left the newly formed CESCR in a position of precariousness. It had long been argued 
that a reformed monitoring system was needed for the ICESCR and the Committee was 
seen as a ‘last ditch’ attempt.97 There was, therefore, a degree of pressure upon the new 
CESCR to reform an ‘under fire’ and dysfunctional system of reporting 98 and to begin the 
process of effectively monitoring State compliance.99 Whether as a result of such pressures, 
or contributing to them, some instability is evident in the early work of the Committee. 
Committee members, Alston and Simma describe the threat posed to the CESCR by 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
93 By ECOSOC, Review of the Composition, Organization and Administrative Arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of 
Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC 
Res 1985/17 1976). 
94 Philip Alston and Bruno Simma, ‘First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 81 The 
American Journal of International Law 747, 748. 
95 The CESCR held its first session in 1987. CESCR, ‘Report on the First Session’ UN Doc E/1987/28; Alston and Simma (n 97) 
748–9. 
96 Alston and Simma (n 97) 748. Another year later the pair reflected that the CESCR was progressing away from the ‘sterile 
formalism’ of previous efforts (Philip Alston and Bruno Simma, ‘Second Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (1988) 82 The American Journal of International Law 603, 604.), while the CESCR noted that there was no 
‘reliable or complete picture’ of the realization of ESR despite the ‘124 initial reports and 44 second periodic reports’ that had 
been examined (CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session’ UN Doc E/1988/14 para 368). Alston noted elsewhere that the new 
committee would have to ‘overcome the inheritance’ of the Working Group that had a ‘rather discouraging track record’ 
(Philip Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332, 333.). 
97 Alston (n 99) 335ff. 
98 ibid 332. 
99 The gender (im)balance within the Committee might also have added to this list of pressures, with 16 of the 18 members of 
the first CESCR being male. See CESCR, ‘Report on the First Session’ UN Doc E/1987/28 60. 
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overtones of politicisation during the first session.100 Similarly, the problem of limited 
time101 (and connected concerns of limited financial resources102), and a lingering 
uncertainty as to the degree of independence that the ECOSOC parent body would afford to 
the CESCR all contributed to a sense of instability.103 The reports of the Committee’s 
activities reflect similar uncertainties.104 Indeed, it is arguable that this atmosphere 
contributed to a lack of confidence that continued for years into the CESCR’s existence, 
with the Committee remaining undecided on its ‘own appropriate role amidst the rapid 
global changes’ until at least 1992.105 
With regard to the drafting of General Comments, uncertainty also existed. The decision to 
adopt General Comments similar to those of the Human Rights Committee106 was made at 
the second session of the Committee in 1987 following an invitation from ECOSOC.107 The 
third session saw a General Comment on ‘Reporting by States parties’ adopted, while a 
Comment on ‘International technical assistance measures’ was adopted at the fourth 
session. Despite being adopted within a year of each other, these two comments vary 
markedly in their format and style. Neither Comment addresses particularly substantive 
issues of Covenant rights. There was some consideration of the broad purposes of, and 
procedures for, adopting General Comments.108 However, unlike the detailed directions for 
adopting State Reports there was no comprehensive guidance as to what a General 
Comment should contain.109 Indeed, the most consistent rationale given by the CESCR for 
the adoption of General Comments was the desire to draw upon the accumulated 
experience of the Committee.110 In introducing the idea of General Comments, the sessional 
reports reflect emphases on continuity (repeatedly referencing the large number of reports 
that had been examined) and on plurality of experience being incorporated (there had been 
State reports from ‘all regions of the world, with different socio-economic, cultural, political 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
100 Alston and Simma (n 99) 604, 615. Of course, their perspective is one of many – no doubt other Committee members would 
have expressed the threat somewhat differently. The point here is not to conclusively ascertain what the threats to the 
Committee were, but instead to highlight the instability that existed. 
101 Alston and Simma (n 97) 751, 754. 
102 ibid 754–5. 
103 ibid 755–6. 
104 Matthew Craven and Caroline Dommen, ‘Making Room for Substance: Fifth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (1991) 9 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 83, 89. 
105 CESCR, ‘Report on the Sixth Session’ UN Doc E/1992/23 para 332. 
106 The Human Rights Committee being the equivalent body that supervises the implementation of the ICCPR. That 
Committee had adopted fifteen General Comments at this point, but it would be misleading to say that these Comments 
provided any extensive guidance to the CESCR, as fourteen of that number had been very short and lacked detail. 
107 CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session’ (n 99) 366–7. 
108 ibid 366–70. 
109 Annex IV: Revised guidelines regarding the form and contents of reports to be submitted by States parties under articles 16 
and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in ‘Report on the Fifth Session’ UN Doc 
E/1991/23. 
110 CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session’ (n 99) 168–9. This recounting of the ‘extensive experience’ of the Committee is also 
present in CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 83) 10. 
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and legal systems’).111 Such factors point toward the introduction of General Comments as a 
development of procedure aimed at clarifying rather than as a mechanism to implement 
substantive innovations. 
Given the desire to reassure States of the appropriateness of General Comments and in the 
context of a temporary and fragile history, it is unlikely the Committee would have sought 
to introduce any substantial innovation. That the Committee intended to develop a 
doctrine of non-retrogression in what was their first fully substantive General Comment 
therefore is doubtful.112 This prospect seems even more unlikely given the significant 
implications that could result. As a general obligation of the Covenant, the Committee 
altering (or elaborating upon) the obligation of progressive realisation would mean altering 
an obligation that applied in combination with all ICESCR rights.113 
2.6.2. Track Record 
If the institutional history of the CESCR makes it unlikely that there was a drive to innovate 
a new doctrine of retrogression, the context of its engagement with the notion of 
progressive realisation makes it even more unlikely. A clear understanding of the obligation 
of progressive realisation, as the central general obligation of the ICESCR, was (and 
remains) crucial to the interpretation of the Covenant. In the examination of State reports 
prior to General Comment 3, there had been clear difficulties in subjecting States’ progress 
to any kind of sustained or rigorous analysis.114 The term ‘progressive’ was used infrequently 
in the early sessions of the Committee and generally the early approach of the Committee 
entailed looking for some minimal evidence of ‘progress’. The amount, speed, or 
effectiveness of progress is rarely examined in early State reports. Even with the modest aim 
of giving a rough assessment of ‘progress’, the CESCR was inconsistent in its approach and 
struggled to make sense of the limited information provided by States. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
111 CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session’ (n 99) 368. 
112 The Committee member that drafted General Comment 3 and put it forward for consideration and amendment was Philip 
Alston. (CESCR, ‘Report on the Fifth Session’ (n 19) 255). Three years earlier Alston had reflected that a long road lay ahead of 
the CESCR and, when it came to institutions at least, there is ‘not just…the need for, but even the desirability of, a slow but 
steady evolutionary development’. (Alston (n 99) 334.) Neither does an obvious mention of the concept of retrogression 
appear in his academic work (including the encyclopaedic, Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States 
Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 156; or Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals : Text and Materials (Oxford University Press 2008)). 
113 Sepúlveda (n 79) 320. 
114 In this connection, Alston and Simma were critical of the practice of States’ ‘frequent practice of cramming the reports with 
descriptive and statistical information that is unfocussed, unrefined and generally meaningless in terms of facilitating any sort 
of temporal, spatial or distributional comparisons’. (Alston and Simma (n 99) 750.) 
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In one bizarre example, in concluding remarks on the report of the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, the CESCR ‘noted the substantial progress made’ before continuing to 
observe that ‘the report contained very few meaningful statistics which would have enabled 
an evaluation to be made of the status of economic and social rights’.115 In respect of 
Cameroon, the CESCR noted it was unable to make an assessment as to ‘progress’ as there 
was a lack of statistical and other data provided.116 Neither did the ‘snapshot’ of the position 
of ESR given by the United Kingdom’s report, according to the CESCR, provide an adequate 
explanation of the progression of rights enjoyment.117 Presumably, in an effort to address 
these information absences and to better monitor the obligation of progressive realization, 
a number of new requirements were introduced in General Comment 1. The text of that 
Comment makes recommendations aimed at improving the evaluation, monitoring, and 
planning for progressive realisation.118 In addition the detailed guidance on the format of 
State reports was substantially revised at the fifth session.119 
Although these amendments to procedures are significant for monitoring purposes, they do 
little to add to the normative content of the progressive realisation obligation. As such, 
General Comment 3 can be seen as the CESCR’s first attempt to inject a degree of content 
and clarity into this important State duty. Indeed, this is how two contemporaneous 
commentators saw the General Comment.120 In this context, it is difficult to see any 
rationale for adding – in the form of a new doctrine to govern backwards steps – further and 
novel complexity to the already problematic progressive realisation concept.  
Rather, in respect of progressive realisation, it seems more likely that the General Comment 
is a straightforwardly expanded version of the standards set down in the Limburg Principles 
four years earlier.121 Those Limburg Principles contained no mention of retrogression, or 
any conceptual consideration of backwards steps, and the CESCR was clearly cognisant of 
these principles, citing them in a following session.122 It would seem unlikely that a 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
115 CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session’ (n 99) 157. 
116 CESCR, ‘Report on the Third Session’ UN Doc E/1989/22 para 38. Similar concerns arose in relation to Ecuador; CESCR, 
‘Report on the Fifth Session’ (n 112) 157. 
117 CESCR, ‘Report on the Third Session’ (n 119) 265. 
118 CESCR, General Comment 1 : Reporting by States Parties (UN Doc E/1989/22 2008). 
119 CESCR, ‘Report on the Fifth Session’ (n 112) Annex IV. 
120 Craven and Dommen (n 107) 92. Of course, although the development of the progressive realization obligation has been 
tracked here, General Comment 3 also deals with other important terms of the ICESCR, including on non-discrimination, 
immediate obligations, and remedial measures. 
121 ‘The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ UN 
Document E/CN.4/1987/17 ss 16–28. 
122 CESCR, ‘Report on the Seventh Session’ (n 29) Annex IV, para 43. 
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Committee invested in developing a coherent and clear obligation of progressive 
realisation, would stray too far from those highly important and influential guidelines.123 
Given the analysis above, it would seem that the initial introduction of the phrase 
‘retrogressive measures’ into the vocabulary of the CESCR and its General Comments was 
not intended to develop a new head of obligation. This is a significant but, perhaps given 
the context, unsurprising finding. It points to a need for caution when making the claim 
that a legal innovation has resulted from the CESCR’s General Comment 3 work. 
One of the most important implications of such an accidental development of the doctrine 
– as opposed to a new description of an old obligation – relates to the search for a 
conceptual basis for the doctrine. If the doctrine was created accidentally, the Committee 
could simply not have paid any attention to conceptual (or even textual) bases for a 
doctrine that governed backwards steps. This means that modern attempts to find a 
conceptual basis for the doctrine that dates back to the ICESCR or General Comment 3, 
overreach the CESCR’s own intentions and are a highly retrospective and somewhat 
artificial exercise. These more conceptual issues are addressed in the following chapter.  
2.7. Conclusions 
The chapter began by promising the rewards of an historical method in understanding the 
development of the doctrine of non-retrogression. In two key respects, the development of 
the International Bill of Rights, and the ICESCR within it, has been shown to have had a 
more complex history than is often portrayed. The chapter sought to move beyond blunt 
acceptance of the Cold War narrative to show that there is more to the story of ESR. 
Through a foregrounding of ‘Third World’ influence and measures of States’ formal 
acceptance of the Covenants, the importance of such an alternative account was 
highlighted. In assessing the roots and debate surrounding progressive realisation, further 
historical revisions were suggested to enable a more nuanced, less polarised account of the 
obligation. 
The chapter ended by arguing that the CESCR had no intention of introducing a new 
doctrine. This is highly significant as it shows how the fragility of the doctrine’s conceptual 
basis was built in from the beginning. This conclusion about the origins of the doctrine is 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
123 Indeed, one author notes that the CESCR was ‘inspired’ by the Limburg principles in its early years. Felipe Gómez Isa, ‘The 
Reversibility of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Crisis Contexts’ in Eider Muniategi Azkona and Lina Klemkaite (eds), 
Local Initiatives to the Global Financial Crisis: Looking for Alternatives to the Current Socio-Economic Scenario (Universidad de 
Deusto 2012) 35. 
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based on attention to the earliest days of the CESCR; its position, the threats to the new 
body, and the priorities for it. Seeing non-retrogression less as a conceptual development 
and more as the introduction of a new word to describe a violation of progressive 
realisation, is an important finding that is returned to in the following chapter. Crucially, 
this conclusion on the accidental creation of the doctrine also begins to show the need for a 
thought-out (re)purposing and (re)construction. 
As well as providing vital context on the position of ESR within the international sphere, 
the exploration of the ICESCR’s history showed a more diverse range of motivations for the 
conclusion of the Covenants, and greater levels of consensus – at least at the formal level. 
This, and the early history of non-retrogression, demonstrate the fragile conceptual and 
legal ground on which the doctrine rests. These conceptual and legal questions form the 
substance of the following chapter.  
Chapter 3 
The Fragmentation of Retrogression 
3.1. Introduction 
While the thesis claims to be concerned with ‘the’ doctrine of non-retrogression, describing 
the doctrine as such masks the multiple versions of it that have been promulgated by the 
CESCR. The doctrine has developed greatly in its meanings since the initial inclusion of the 
word ‘retrogressive’ in General Comment 3 in 1990. Eleven General Comments,1 several 
other statements from the CESCR,2 use by various Special Procedures,3 and use in academic4 
and advocacy contexts5 has developed an intricate picture of the doctrine and its meaning. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23 1990) para 
9; CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education (Art 13 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/10 1999) para 13; CESCR, 
General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2000/4 
2000) para 32; CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2002/11 2002) 
para 19; CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Art 3 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2005/4 2005) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of 
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Art 15(1)(c) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/17 2006) para 27; CESCR, General 
Comment 18: The Right to Work (Art 6 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/18 2005) para 21; CESCR, General Comment 19: The 
Right to Social Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/19 2007) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 21: Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art 15(1)(a) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/21 2001) para 65; CESCR, General 
Comment 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/22 2016) para 38; 
CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (Art 7 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/GC/23 2016) para 52. See also a timeline of these and other interventions at Appendix A. The criteria within each are 
listed in Appendix B. 
2 CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” Under an Optional Protocol 
to the Covenant’ (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 paras 9–10; Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed by 
the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW; CESCR, 
‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (UN Doc E/C12/2016/1 2016) para 4. 
3 Including by mandate holders as diverse as the Special Rapporteur on the right to health, the Independent Expert on the 
effects of foreign debt, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, and the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights; Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to 
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic (UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/25/Add3 2011) para 14; Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International 
Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Reports on Three Multi-Stake Holder Consultations on the Draft General Guidelines on Foreign Debt and Human Rights Held in 
2010 (UN Doc A/HRC/17/37 2011) para 89; Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Mission to Indonesia (UN Doc A/HRC/25/54 2013) 
para 8; Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, The Role of Development Cooperation and Food Aid in Realizing the Right to 
Adequate Food : Moving from Charity to Obligation (UN Doc A/HRC/10/5 2009) para 41; Special Rapporteur on contemporary 
forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, Summary of Activities (UN Doc A/HRC/27/53 2014) para 23; Special 
Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Common Violations of the Human Rights to Water and 
Sanitation (UN Doc A/HRC/27/55 2014) para 46; Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Fiscal Policy and 
Taxation Policies (UN Doc A/HRC/26/28 2014) para 28. 
4 Aoife Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in Aoife Nolan, Rory 
O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets & the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights 
(Hart 2013) 41; Aoife Nolan, Nicholas J Lusiani and Christian Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on 
the Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after 
the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 121; M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003) 319–322; Margot E Salomon, ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights 
and International Institutions’ (2015) 21(4) European Law Journal 521, 540–1; Radhika Balakrishnan and Diane Elson, Economic 
Policy and Human Rights: Holding Governments to Account (Zed Books 2011) 8, 28; Rory O’Connell and others, Applying an 
International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and Resources (Routledge 2014) 70ff; Murray 
Wesson, ‘Disagreement and the Constitutionalisation of Social Rights’ (2012) 12(2) Human Rights Law Review 221, 252–3; Diane 
Elson, ‘The Reduction of the UK Budget Deficit: A Human Rights Perspective’ (2012) 26(2) International Review of Applied 
Economics 177, 180–182; Murray Wesson, ‘Social Condition and Social Rights’ (2006) 69 Saskatchewan Law Review 107, 115–116. 
5 Particularly in the work of the Center for Economic and Social Rights; Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), 
‘Mauled by the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in Ireland’s Economic Meltdown’ (2012) 
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This chapter undertakes two parallel and complementary tasks. One of these is to 
counteract the view that has prevailed of the doctrine as a single entity. The chapter divides 
and complicates this picture, showing a range of directions and approaches that have been 
taken. This is an important prerequisite to the second task of searching for the doctrine’s 
core, and particularly its core purpose. With a better understanding of what the doctrine is, 
and what it is intended to achieve, the thesis can move on to engaging with these functions. 
These sources of the doctrine’s development, both within and beyond the CESCR, are 
discussed below and are acknowledged as having contributed to a well-developed and 
highly important doctrine. Terminology has also been an important shaper of the doctrine 
and Section 3.2.1. below highlights this role. However, in seeking to understand what the 
core of the doctrine is, the bulk of the chapter focuses on the more substantive question of 
the doctrine’s formation. 
The doctrine of non-retrogression is formed of a prima facie prohibition6 on ‘retrogressive’ 
measures and a number of criteria which, if satisfied, can nonetheless pass a measure as 
‘permissible’ retrogression. It is this latter part of the doctrine – the criteria specifying when 
retrogression is permissible – that has evolved over time. This aspect of the doctrine can be 
classed into distinct versions (nine in total) and each of these versions requires careful 
analysis in order to understand its implications and how it affects the doctrine and ESR 
holistically. 
Although there are nine versions of the doctrine of non-retrogression, these can be 
coherently grouped into four of what I have called ‘conceptual models’. These models are 
used as analytical frames to categorise and distinguish the phases of retrogression. Each of 
these conceptual models seeks to highlight the position of the doctrine of non-retrogression 
relative to the ICESCR. By grouping the doctrine into four models, there is a sense of 
discontinuity injected into the consideration of the doctrine. This discontinuity is 
important to the chapter’s first task of complicating and counteracting the ‘single doctrine’ 
view. It allows the analysis to effectively draw attention to both the minor evolutions 
(differences in the doctrine’s criteria) and the major developments (differences in the 
doctrine’s legal basis). With the developments and evolutions (i.e. the discontinuities) 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
<http://www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr.ireland.briefing.12.02.2012.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016; Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESR), ‘Spain: Visualizing Rights’ (2012) <http://www.cesr.org/downloads/FACTSHEET_Spain_2015_web.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2016; Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), Egypt: Factsheet (2013) 
<http://cesr.org/downloads/Egypt.Factsheet.web.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016. 
6 Depending on which version of the doctrine one consults, there is a ‘strong presumption’ against retrogression, or 
retrogression is impermissible ‘in principle’, or straightforwardly ‘not permitted’; for an example of each, see respectively 
CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 45; CESCR, General Comment 17 (n 1) para 27; CESCR, General Comment 21 (n 1) para 65. 
See further Chapter 8, pp214-219. 
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foregrounded, the chapter is then well placed to move to its second task of identifying any 
parts of retrogression that have remained stable. These consistent features might then be 
taken forwards to form the core of retrogression. 
The key features (in brief) of the conceptual models that the chapter develops are outlined 
here. 
• The Component model posits that non-retrogression was not a self-supporting 
doctrine, but rather defined the conditions for a breach of the progressive 
realisation obligation. On this view, ‘retrogression’ was not a substantive 
development, but merely the indicated term to be used where States failed to 
progressively realise the rights in an ‘expeditious and effective’ manner. 
• The Corollary model identifies the doctrine of non-retrogression as a rough opposite 
of the obligation to progressively realise. Although in this form, the doctrine was 
free to develop its own semi-distinctive identity, it remained constituted and 
constrained by the scope of the progressive realisation obligation. 
• As a Composite, the doctrine of non-retrogression diverges from a strict grounding 
in one obligation (as is the case with the Component and Corollary models). Instead 
the doctrine is composed of multiple ICESCR obligations and principles, and as a 
more independent entity.  
• The Un-Coupled conceptual model of non-retrogression highlights the separation of 
the doctrine from a grounding (only) in the ICESCR obligations. It theorises non-
retrogression as a ‘new’ obligation upon States, where the content of the doctrine 
cannot be satisfactorily linked to the ICESCR articles. 
Although necessarily presented in a somewhat linear fashion, there is not a straightforward 
timeline of evolution from a Component to an Un-Coupled model. Occasionally, a 
developing trajectory away from a particular model was disrupted to go back to an earlier 
form. An example of this is the move from a Corollary to Composite model between General 
Comment 187 and the Statement on the Use of the Maximum of Available Resources under an 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (‘MAR under OP’).8 This looked to be a new turn towards 
the Composite model and that conceptualisation was also used with some enthusiasm in 
the following General Comment 19.9 This apparent trend, however, was reversed when the 
CESCR returned to employ a Corollary model in General Comment 21.10 This sometimes 
disordered and swirling trajectory of development means a prediction of the doctrine’s 
future development is difficult. In particular, it is difficult to say whether the somewhat 
more radical approach of the Un-Coupled model will continue as the global economic and 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
7 CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 1) para 21. 
8 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2) paras 9-10. 
9 CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 1) para 42. 
10 CESCR, General Comment 21 (n 1) para 65. 
66	 Chapter	3	
	
political context changes. In a sense this adds a degree of uncertainty to the analysis, but it 
also demonstrates the acute need for such an assessment. That the historical progression of 
the doctrine shows that the CESCR could adopt any (variation) of these models in its next 
General Comment or statement serves to highlight the openness of the approach and the 
need for an injection of direction and conceptual clarity.11 
There are a number of phases in the chapter’s deconstruction and its search for a core. After 
setting out the premises on which the modelling rests, the chapter enters into the task of 
unravelling the doctrine, first in its semantic aspects before comprehensively examining its 
models and its legal bases. Following this, the chapter will identify any ‘core’ features of the 
various doctrines discussed and more general findings are set out. 
3.2. The Formation of the Doctrine 
Before proceeding to flesh out the four conceptual models, some underpinning assumptions 
about the doctrine’s formation need to be explicated. There are broadly three issues here; 
the first about the sources of the doctrine, the second about how the stages of its 
development are linked, and the third regarding the semantic stylings of retrogression. 
Often these premises remain below the surface, but they deserve attention as they are 
foundational to our understanding of the doctrine, and their examination shows that some 
assumptions on retrogression’s form better ‘fit’ the pattern of the doctrine’s development. 
3.2.1.  Sources 
As has previously been highlighted, the doctrine has been included in eleven General 
Comments,12 several other statements from the CESCR,13 and been used by various Special 
Procedures.14 Yet, when addressing the obligations of the non-retrogression doctrine, these 
sources can be treated in several ways. Does each mention of the doctrine constitute a 
context-specific enunciation, or a contribution to a general understanding of non-
retrogression?  
The former option – treating statements of the doctrine’s scope as unique to a context – 
would create a somewhat complex picture. While some body of generalised non-
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
11 This call for conceptual clarity is seen prominently in Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 4) 121. 
12 See those General Comments listed in n 1 above. 
13 See those statements listed in n 2 above. 
14 See those reports of Special Mandate holders listed in n 3 above. 
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retrogression obligations would remain (e.g. from General Comment 3),15 most other 
comments on the doctrine would be taken to apply only to specific rights. This would 
result, inter alia, in the non-retrogression criteria for the right to social security differing 
markedly from the criteria for ascertaining a retrogressive measure in respect of the right to 
education. Besides the practical difficulties in applying such varying standards to different 
rights, there would be several issues of principle if such an approach was the CESCR’s 
intended one. First, varying standards of review for retrogressive measures would, without 
any clear justification for such differential treatment, do damage to the (theoretical) notion 
of interdependence and indivisibility of rights.16 Second, for those ICESCR rights awaiting 
the individual attention of a General Comment (or for those rights considered prior to the 
CESCR’s enthusiasm for the doctrine), only the generalised advice on non-retrogression 
would be available to define the scope of obligations.  
The alternative assumption – that there is not a version of non-retrogression for each right, 
but rather a general picture of the doctrine and its meaning – is altogether more plausible. 
Yet, even on this view there can be diverging approaches. Are we to take all of the CESCR’s 
work as contributing to this general picture of the doctrine, or are certain sources to be 
excluded as a result of their different form? In practice, this asks the question whether only 
the CESCR’s General Comments contribute to the binding understanding of the doctrine or, 
if its discussion in Statements and Letters17 form a part of the CESCR’s views and the 
doctrine’s content.  Both views are arguable. In favour of General Comment exceptionalism, 
it can be argued that their authority is enhanced by the fact that these outputs are more 
established (in the sense that all treaty bodies rely on this mechanism18) and that they have 
a general character (in the sense that the Comments address obligations in the abstract 
rather than in relation to a specific context).19 Yet despite these features of General 
Comments, in arguing in favour of an inclusive interpretation of the CESCR’s sources, a 
return to the principles of public international law is rewarding. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
15 Such a bundle of obligations would deal with ‘the nature of States parties obligations’ in general, rather than in connection 
to a specific right. CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) para 9. 
16 For a critique of the substantive commitment to this see Daniel J Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2011) 1–31. 
17 The analysis in this chapter largely sets the work in Concluding Observations aside to focus on the other sources. The 
extreme inconsistency and paucity of detail in Concluding Observations, combined with the ‘applied’ context of the 
statements makes depth of analysis impossible. These sources are more central to the discussion of practical applications of 
the doctrine in Chapters 5 and 8. 
18 Or on its equivalent ‘General Recommendation’ (the terminology used by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women for the same type of statement). 
19 Similar to the General Comments of treaty bodies the practice of producing Statements is widespread. However, Statements 
tend to focus on current or thematic issues rather than act as a longer-term guidance on the content of rights. The CESCR’s 
handling of individual communications would typify the treatment of the obligations in a specific context. 
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There remains an ambiguity around the legal status of General Comments and around the 
relevant alternative sources (the CESCR’s MAR under OP,20 its 2012 ‘Letter to States’,21 and 
its Statement on Public Debt and Austerity22). There are a number of different approaches 
to the international legal status of the documents. It has been noted that these comments 
and statements are not authoritative within international law in and of themselves, but 
rather have a general utility in the interpretation of the obligations under the relevant 
treaty.23 The particular relevance of the views of the treaty bodies to the task of 
interpretation is said to be a consequence of those bodies’ ‘special experience’ with the 
subject matter of the treaties.24 Elsewhere it has been claimed that States’ acquiescence with 
the views of the CESCR can constitute an ‘interpretation’ of the ICESCR within the meaning 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.25 On that basis differentiating between 
the CESCR’s interpretations in its General Comments and in its statements, is less 
defensible. 
The relative status of the Committee’s Statements and Letters remains open to challenge, 
however. The rarity of such open letters, and a lack of attention to their status leaves 
significant ambiguity.26 Again, a return to general principles of public international law 
sheds some (limited) light on the status.27 There are two, more or less distinct issues to be 
addressed; first the potential ‘hard law’ roots for the CESCR’s documents (and therefore for 
retrogression), and second, the softer legal bases for its existence. 
An obvious, but necessary, preliminary point is that the doctrine’s absence from the ICESCR 
itself removes the prospect of a direct legal basis. Indeed, discussions of the doctrine (or 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
20 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2). 
21 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2). 
22 CESCR, ‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (n 2). 
23 Christine Chinkin, ‘Sources’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 
2013) 81; Office of the High Commisoner for Human Rights, The Human Rights Treaty Bodies (2015) 4 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/TB_booklet_en.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016. 
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide) [1996] (ICJ) 640, 654 (Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry). 
25  Yogesh Tyagi, ‘The Denunciation of Human Rights Treaties’ in James Crawford and Vaughan Lowe (eds), British Year Book 
of International Law 2008 (Oxford University Press 2009) 139; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980, 332 UNTS 1980) article 31(3)(b). It should be noted generally that the applicability of 
articles 19 and 20 of the VCLT in the human rights context has been challenged. See Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols 
Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 (UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add6 1994) para 17; Catherine J Redgwell, 
‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24(52)’ (1997) 46(2) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 390, 404–6. 
26 Nolan (n 4) 50 and fn54.  
27 As alluded to by Simma and Alston, there is likely to be a connection between the solidity of enforcement mechanisms and 
the grounding of international human rights in international law; Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human 
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ (1988) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 82, 83–85. 
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similar ideas) also seem to be absent from the travaux préparatoires.28 This clearly 
eliminates any well-founded claim that the CESCR’s work is merely a restatement of treaty 
obligations. Moving beyond treaties to the other recognised sources of international law 
(international custom and the general principles of law29) is therefore necessary. It is 
sometimes suggested that the sources of international human rights law demand 
qualitatively different treatment within the structures of general international law.30 This is 
eschewed here for two reasons. First, the discussion remains unsettled, so it can contribute 
only further confusion to an already complex identification of retrogression’s sources. 
Second, and more importantly, while it might strategically serve some areas of international 
human rights well to argue for an exceptional designation within international law, non-
retrogression is not one of those areas. The overall approach of the chapter is to seek 
solidity and legal grounding for retrogression; neither of which can be found in a 
developing rule of exception.  
When turning to find a foundation in the sources of international law, discounting 
customary international law as the basis for the CESCR’s enunciation(s) of the doctrine of 
non-retrogression is unproblematic. As is well known, the formation of such a custom 
requires both State practice and opinio juris,31 elements that remain decidedly non-existent 
for non-retrogression in any form.32 A further port-of-call in seeking a ‘hard’ legal basis for 
the CESCR’s vision of non-retrogression is the nebulously termed ‘general principles of 
law’.33 Here lies a general potential for the integration of international human rights law, 
according to Simma and Alston, who identify the International Court of Justice’s trend 
towards such an approach.34 Yet, despite the Court’s flexibility regarding a ‘formal source’ 
for the fundamental human rights principles that it integrates, this flexibility is unlikely to 
stretch far beyond the perceived (and limited) ‘fundamentals’ of rights protection.35 In all 
reality, this excludes any rendering of non-retrogression from acceptance as a ‘general 
principle’ and consequently as grounded in formal hard law.  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
28 Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jaqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 2014); Matthew CR Craven, The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (Clarendon Press; OUP 1995). 
29 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) arts 38b and 38c. 
30 Some of the development of human rights exceptionalism can be seen in Redgwell (n 25). 
31 See generally Malcolm Shaw, International Law (CUP 2014) 51ff. 
32 Indeed Simma and Alston question the practical role that can be played by international human rights in the creation of 
customary law partly due to the lack of ‘interaction’ between States as regards the international human rights system; Simma 
and Alston (n 27) 99. 
33 Statute of the International Court of Justice (n 29) art 38c. 
34 Simma and Alston (n 27) 105–6. 
35 ibid 105. 
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This demands recourse to the softer forms of international law.36 Perhaps due to its capacity 
to broker compromise in a sensitive area of State policy,37 softer law plays a significant role 
in the international human rights regime.38 As bodies of independent experts, the 
committees lack the authority39 to create and interpret obligations that a State would 
have.40 Yet, as pointed out by Mechlem, with human rights treaties, leaving the 
interpretation solely in the hands of States would lead to overly restrictive interpretations.41 
As a consequence, treaty bodies act ‘in lieu’ of States and are primarily responsibility for the 
interpretation of the human rights treaty.42 This function of the committees grounds the 
argument – made by the International Law Association43 – that treaty body practice might 
count as ‘subsequent practice’ under the VCLT rules on treaty interpretation.44 
A number of consequences would flow from attributing such a weight to treaty body 
practice. It would, importantly, give a significant interpretative weight to the work of the 
committees. Further, as the authority is derived from the institutional position of the treaty 
body, the form of its output (be it a Letter, Statement or General Comment) would be less 
relevant in determining legal weightiness.45 On the other hand, situating the treaty bodies 
as interpreters, rather than adjudicators,46 of the human rights treaties underlines the 
importance of a close link between their work and the parent treaty. The primary rule of 
treaty interpretation remains that the ‘treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms’.47 Straying from the 
ordinary meaning of the text, risks diminishing the weight that is attached to the 
committees’ interpretations. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
36 The term ‘softer’ rather than soft is deliberately used to denote the increasing acknowledgement of a spectrum (rather than 
a dichotomy) of authority; Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Law-Making and Sources’ in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 189. Cf D’Amato’s view of soft law as a 
hindrance to the hard and distinctive categories of international law’s sources, and as ‘a vehicle used by impatient idealists’; 
ibid 199. 
37 CM Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38 International &amp; 
Comparative Law Quarterly 850, 861. 
38 Paula Gerber, Joanna Kyriakakis and Katie O’Byrne, ‘General Comment 16 on State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the 
Business Sector on Children’s Rights: What Is Its Standing, Meaning and Effect’ (2013) 14 Melb. J. Int’l L. 93, 99–104. 
39 Which is reserved almost exclusively for States; Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2014) 16–18. 
40 Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (3rd 
edn, OUP 2010) 299. 
41 Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 905, 
919. 
42 ibid. A function also with some grounding in the ICESCR itself; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3) art 21. 
43International Law Association, ‘International Human Rights and Practice: Final Report on the Impact of the Findings of the 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) para 22. 
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 25) art 31(3)b. 
45 See further the citation of non-General Comment work by national courts; International Law Association (n 43) 103–115. 
46 CAT, General Comment 1: Communications Concerning the Return of a Person to a State Where There May Be Grounds He 
Would Be Subjected to Torture (Article 3 in the Context of Article 22) (UN Doc A/53/44, annex IX 1998) para 9. 
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 25) art 31(1). 
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The above argumentation has utility in turning the search for legal weight away from the 
form and status of documents, and towards the authority of the committees to interpret the 
treaties. Nonetheless, as the form-based approach remains dominant in the literature, it is 
worth briefly addressing the question of whether Statements and Letters of the CESCR 
might have legal force.48 
The CESCR has only ever produced two open letters,49 although its use of statements is 
significantly more widespread.50 No other treaty monitoring committee has a practice of 
producing open letters such as these and it has been suggested that that the Letter may not 
even have the status of soft law.51 Yet the Letter may still have, or acquire, some form of soft 
law status as a result of Committee’s use of its tests in subsequent documents.52 For 
example, of the 68 States that have been examined since the release of the Letter, 19 have 
been reminded of it or have had its wording reproduced in their Concluding Observations.53 
This means that the Letter has already been used more times than retrogression has ever 
been mentioned in all of its other forms.54 
Such an acquisition of a legal basis for the Letter could follow from the CESCR’s primary 
responsibility for the interpretation of the Covenant and would allow its interpretations to 
count as ‘subsequent practice’ under the VCLT rules on treaty interpretation, thus giving 
the letters and statements of the Committee some legal significance.55 In any case, even if 
outputs of the CESCR such as Statements and Letters lack soft law status, adjudicative 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
48 The following two paragraphs are adapted from; Ben TC Warwick, ‘Socio-Economic Rights During Economic Crises: A 
Changed Approach to Non-Retrogression’ (2016) 65(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 249, 255–256. 
49 The other letter being similarly formatted and presented, and being in respect of the post-2015 development agenda. 
Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 30th November 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN 
Doc CESCR/49th/AP//MAB. 
50 Statements are formatted differently, and generally come from the CESCR as a whole, having been ‘adopted’ in one of the 
CESCR’s sessions, rather than from the Chairperson ‘on behalf of’ the Committee.  
51 Aoife Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in Aoife Nolan, Rory 
O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds.)  Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social 
Rights (Hart 2013), 50. 
52 ibid, 51. 
53 In the CESCR’s Concluding Observations: Angola (UN Doc E/C12/AGO/CO/4-5 2016) para 8; Concluding Observations: 
Sweden (UN Doc  E/C12/SWE/CO/6 2016) para 30; Concluding Observations: United Kingdom (UN Doc E/C12/GBR/CO/6 2016) 
para 19; Concluding Observations: Canada (UN Doc E/C12/CAN/CO/6 2016) para 10; Concluding Observations: Greece (UN Doc 
E/C12/GRC/CO/2 2015) para 8; Concluding Observations: Italy (UN Doc E/C12/ITA/CO/5 2015) para 9; Concluding 
Observations: Sudan (UN Doc E/C12/SDN/CO/2 2015) para 18; Concluding Observations: Iraq (UN Doc E/C12/IRQ/CO/4 2015) 
para 16; Concluding Observations: Ireland (UN Doc E/C12/IRL/CO/3 2015) para 11; Concluding Observations: Portugal (UN Doc 
E/C12/PRT/CO/4 2014) para 6; Concluding Observations: Slovenia (UN Doc E/C12/SVN/CO/2 2014) para 8; Concluding 
Observations: Romania (UN Doc E/C12/ROU/CO/3-5 2014) para 15; Concluding Observations: Czech Republic (UN Doc 
E/C12/CZE/CO/2 2014) para 14; Concluding Observations: Ukraine (UN Doc E/C12/UKR/CO/6 2014) para 5; Concluding 
Observations: Japan (UN Doc E/C12/JPN/CO/3 2013) para 9; Concluding Observations: New Zealand (UN Doc E/C12/NZL/CO/3 
2012) para 17; Concluding Observations: Iceland (UN Doc E/C12/ISL/CO/4 2012) para 6; Concluding Observations: Bulgaria (UN 
Doc E/C12/BGR/CO/4-5 2012) para 11; Concluding Observations: Spain (UN Doc E/C12/ESP/CO/5 2012) para 8. 
54 Which, by comparison, is around 15 mentions over a period of 25 years. 
55 International Law Association (n 43) para 22; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 25) art 31(3)b.  
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bodies would likely take them seriously as an interpretation of the ICESCR obligations.56 An 
absence of legal obligation does not necessarily imply that States will feel free to, or indeed 
will, act outside of the recommendation.57 And, as traditional public international lawyers 
often note, soft law can ‘harden’ and form the basis of customary international law or a new 
treaty (amendment).58 
Further, such statements have significance beyond their legal influence. By providing (at 
the very least) a point of reference or a form of words that can be reproduced in the 
CESCR’s Concluding Observations on State reports, such outputs of the CESCR hold a 
degree of rhetorical power. 
These factors point towards assuming as the most likely intention of the CESCR an 
inclusive, generalized view of the sources that address the doctrine of non-retrogression. As 
such, criteria that are developed in the context of a General Comment on, for example 
health, will be treated as criteria applying to all ICESCR rights. Additionally, no strong 
distinction will be assumed between General Comments, Statements and Letters as sources 
of the doctrine’s content. 
3.2.2.  Continuity 
In addition to the above premises regarding the sources of the doctrine, when employing 
these sources certain assumptions must be made about their treatment. Thus, the question 
arises; should the first enunciation of non-retrogression in 1991 be treated as equally valid as 
the more recent interpretations?59 The answer to such a question is dependent upon the 
degree to which the doctrine is seen as a changing entity.60 The multiple re-statements of 
non-retrogression can be viewed as: a consistent whole, that hasn’t changed or has changed 
minimally; a consistent whole that has developed over time; or as several (divergent) 
doctrines. Some of these different treatments of the various versions of the doctrine are 
more plausible than others, but the view taken affects the overall approach to the doctrine 
significantly.  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
56 Crystallization into customary international law is also possible. See generally Shaw (n 31) 201. 
57 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’ (1977) 71(2) American Journal of 
International Law 296, 300–301. 
58 DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 57. The use in the Concluding Observations is 
likely to hasten this hardening. 
59 For a statement of the general approach of international law to ‘inter-temporal validity’, see Hersch Lauterpacht, 
International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht (CUP 1970) 132. 
60 In which case treatment in the classical ‘living instrument’ manner would be appropriate. See for an example; Tyrer v United 
Kingdom [1978] European Court of Human Rights Application  5856/72 [31]; CommRC, General Comment 8: The Right of the 
Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and from Cruel or Degrading Punishment (UN Doc CRC/C/G8/8 2006) para 20. 
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Treating the doctrine as unchanging cannot adequately account for the various criteria that 
have been added over time.61 It is possible, if not entirely convincing, to treat the different 
criteria of the doctrine as a general and a specific version of non-retrogression. For example, 
the CESCR’s statement (MAR under OP) could be treated as creating a doctrine of non-
retrogression only applicable to Optional Protocol complaints. Alternatively, it is possible to 
treat the retrogression in the Letter to States as a statement on how the doctrine should be 
assessed in a crisis and therefore to view it as separate to the generalised doctrine. Yet, 
although the CESCR would clearly have been aware that the release of a letter represented a 
break with previous practice, there is little to evidence an intention that goes beyond this. 
The contention that the CESCR intended to complicate non-retrogression into multiple 
regimes, does not have strong foundations. Elsewhere, there has been no trend of creating 
context-specific obligations for general ICESCR obligations. On the contrary, in its General 
Comment on the right to work, the CESCR notes that ‘[a]s for all other rights in the 
Covenant’  there is a presumption against retrogression.62 There are also a large number of 
general principles (eg. respect, protect fulfil; AAAQ; minimum core) that apply with 
striking consistency. Additionally, similar objections apply here as with the prospect of 
right-specific retrogression discussed above; damage to interdependence and indivisibility, 
and the lack of consideration of other scenarios that could be considered ‘special’. This 
leads to the conclusion that it is not a process of specialisation that has led the doctrine 
towards multiple versions. 
If not unchanging or splintered into specialised and generalised regimes, how else might 
the doctrine’s development be thought of? Two options remain; treating non-retrogression 
as a single but incrementally developing entity, or treating it as multiple and well-
differentiated doctrines. As will be fully shown below (in section 3.3.), the clear and marked 
phases of the doctrine cannot be accounted for by natural, incremental developments over 
time. The traditional ‘living instrument’ approach of the CommRC and the ECtHR63 cannot 
account for the nature and pace of change to retrogression.  The concept cannot adequately 
be thought of as having a singular form, but must instead be seen as having a multiple and 
fragmented form. 
 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
61 See a timeline of the CESCR’s various interventions at Appendix A, and the various criteria it has used at Appendix B. 
62 CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 1) 34; identical language is also used in CESCR, ‘General Comment 21: Right of Everyone to 
Take Part in Cultural Life’ para 46. 
63 Conway Blake, ‘Normative Instruments in International Human Rights Law: Locating the General Comment’ (2008) 17 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper Number 22 <http://chrgj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/blake.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016. 
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3.2.3.  Semantic Evolutions 
It is also important to clarify the terminology used to describe the doctrine. Semantics have 
had a bearing on the formation of the doctrine. At its most basic it is described as; ‘The’ 
‘Doctrine’ of ‘Non’-‘Retrogression’. Each of those four words (to which one might also add 
‘regression’, ‘backwards steps’ and ‘measures’) steer retrogression in particular directions. 
This is a generally worn observation on the nature, function and interpretation of 
language.64 Combined with the retort to such a semantic examination that some descriptor 
word is always necessary, a substantive critique of the semantics surrounding retrogression 
seems less pressing. However, there does remain a value in explaining the potential 
implications and emphases of the linguistic choices. This matches the deconstructing and 
reflexive theme of the chapter. 
Several more isolated instances of linguistic deviation by the CESCR can be briefly dealt 
with.65 The first appearance of the concept employed the term ‘retrogressive’ and in the 
work of the CESCR this has remained the term used in the vast majority of instances. There 
have been only infrequent uses of the correlated term ‘retrogression’,66 but there have been 
multiple uses (including in General Comment 2167) of the distinct term ‘regressive’.68 It 
might be argued that employing a single term for describing the concept would be an 
advantage in terms of strengthening and clarifying meaning. Indeed, the out-of-place use of 
the term ‘regressive’ over the more established ‘retrogressive’ in the CESCR’s Letter to States 
on the crises69 was highlighted as contributing to uncertainty around the future of the 
doctrine.70 The choice of which term to assemble around, is a relatively simple one. The 
term ‘regressive’ has a well-established meaning beyond the ICESCR (especially in relation 
to tax71).72 The less-developed ‘retrogressive’ term can therefore be preferred to ‘regressive’ 
as it contributes a particularity around which an insulated legal meaning can be formed. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
64 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ [1982] Critical Inquiry 179, 182ff. 
65 Special mandate holders are sometimes more flexible in their use of the terms, see for an example of a mandate holder 
seeming to note an absolute prohibition on retrogression; Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health (n 3) para 14. 
66 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt (UN Doc E/C12/EGY/CO/2-4 2013) paras 6, 18. 
67 CESCR, ‘General Comment 21’ (n 62) para 65. 
68 CESCR, ‘Report on the Sixth Session’ (1992) UN Doc E/1992/23 para 219 (Concluding Observations on Finland); CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Mali (UN Doc E/C12/1994/17 1994) para 52; CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom (UN 
Doc E/C12/GBR/CO/5 2009) para 33; CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Sessions’ (2011) UN Doc E/2011/22 
para 463 (Decision on cooperation with specialized agencies); CESCR, Concluding Observations: Spain (n 53) para 28. 
69 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2). 
70 Nolan (n 4) 50–1. 
71 This is an especial issue where the CESCR or State would wish to address the quite separate matter of regressive tax or 
financing regimes; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Columbia (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add74 2011) para 14; State Party Report under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Ireland (UN Doc E/1990/6/Add29 2000) para 231. 
72 ‘Regressive’ is defined as ‘[o]f, relating to, or designating backward movement in space; characterized by such movement; 
retrograde’; Oxford English Dictionary, Regressive (2014). 
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Such linguistic particularity is necessary in light of the (ab)use of both ‘regressive’ and 
‘retrogressive’ in contexts that are not linked to their legal meaning. Thus State reports to 
the CESCR73 and the CRC74 have employed the term in general descriptions as an 
approximation for ‘backwards’ or ‘undesirable’, while one State has employed the 
mathematical meaning of ‘regression’ (a statistical technique) in its report75 and another has 
discussed ‘retrogression’ on matters of civil and political rights.76 There are many times 
fewer (mis)uses of the ‘retrogression’ term in State reports to the CESCR.77 A report of the 
Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the ICESCR, notes that States 
couched some of their concerns about harmful amendments in terms of ‘retrogression’.78 As 
far as these distinctions are concerned, then, to maintain a distinctive and bounded 
meaning, ‘retrogressive’ and its companion terms ‘retrogression’, ‘retrogressively’, and 
‘retrogressed’ are clearly preferable. 
If ‘retrogressive’ is the adjective or adverb of the concept, what is the noun or verb it 
describes?79 Here, the terms ‘measure’80 and ‘step’81 are used without distinction by the 
Committee. On the whole, this substitution seems unproblematic. The term ‘measure’ may 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
73 State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Croatia (UN Doc 
E/1990/5/Add46 2000) para 403; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Jamaica (UN Doc E/C12/JAM/3-4 2011) para 180; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Kenya (UN Doc E/C12/KEN/1 2007) para 134; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: El Salvador (UN Doc E/1990/5/Add25 1995) para 176; State Party Report under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Argentina (UN Doc E/C12/ARG/3 2011) paras 205, 499, 683; State Party 
Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Belgium (UN Doc E/C12/BEL/3 2006) para 
124; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Austria (UN Doc 
E/1994/104/Add28 2004) para 160; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Columbia (UN Doc E/C12/4/Add6 2000) paras 60, 316; State Party Report under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Czech Republic (UN Doc E/1990/5/Add47 2001) paras 8, 183; State Party Report under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poland (UN Doc E/C12/4/Add9 2001) para 363; State Party 
Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Republic of Moldova (UN Doc E/C12/MDA/2 
2009) paras 578, 580; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Korea (UN 
Doc E/C12/KOR/3 2008) para 347; State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Cameroon (UN Doc E/C12/CMR/2-3 2010) paras 505, 535. 
74 State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Bosnia and Herzegovina (OPSC) (UN Doc 
CRC/C/OPSC/BIH/1 2010) para 231; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Burundi (UN Doc 
CRC/C/3/Add58 1998) para 225; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Republic of Maldives (UN 
Doc CRC/C/MDV/4-5 2012) para 67; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Bolivia (UN Doc 
CRC/C/BOL/4 2009) para 290; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Sao Tome and Principe (UN 
Doc CRC/C/8/Add49 2003) para 429; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Myanmar (UN Doc 
CRC/C/8/Add9 1995) para 11; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Kenya (UN Doc CRC/C/KEN/2 
2006) para 446; State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Peru (UN Doc CRC/C/125/Add6 2005) para 
209. 
75  State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Armenia (UN Doc CRC/C/93/Add6 2003) para 325. 
76 State Party Report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) (UN 
Doc CRC/C/83/Add9 (Part I) 2004) para 85. 
77 The only notable example being, State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Korea (UN Doc E/1990/6/Add23 1999) para 65. 
78 Catarina de Albuquerque, Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Its Fifth Session (UN Doc A/HRC/8/7 2008) paras 161, 243. 
79 This distinction between retrogression as a noun or verb is an important one that is returned to in Chapter 8, especially 
pp222-223. 
80 Used widely in all General Comments that mention regression or retrogression. For a list of those General Comments see 
Appendix A. 
81 Used in Concluding Observations as well as in CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 1) para 21; CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2) paras 
9-10.  
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capture a narrower range of State activity in some respects than ‘step’. The latter term 
might be taken to denote any movement whatsoever, while the word ‘measure’ connotes a 
stately solidity. 
For completeness’ sake, a glance at the negation of ‘retrogressive measures’ is necessary. 
Retrogressive measures are, in the most basic terms, a negative prospect. However, a 
‘doctrine of retrogression’ does not readily indicate the doctrine’s censure of the measures. 
Several terms have thus been prefixed to ‘retrogressive measures’ in order to highlight that 
the doctrine seeks to discourage retrogression. As such, it is often described as the doctrine 
of ‘non-retrogression’82 or as a ‘prohibition’ on retrogression.83 The ‘non’ and ‘prohibition’ 
here are presumably to reinforce the objective of avoiding (all) retrogression. With greater 
nuance, and capturing the dynamic of the doctrine as permitting some kinds of 
retrogression, is the term ‘impermissible’ retrogressive measure.84 In a similar way to ‘non’, 
this term clearly communicates the basic idea that retrogression runs contrary to the 
Covenant. The difficulty in communicating this idea with the ‘retrogression’ term itself is 
both troubling and unsurprising. It is unsurprising because of the opacity of the term (why 
not describe a prohibition on ‘rights reduction’, or as a doctrine of ‘rights curtailment’?). On 
the other hand, it is troubling that the opacity of the ‘retrogressive’ term has been so hard 
to overcome. Such difficulty was undoubtedly a factor in the turn towards the description of 
retrogression as a prohibition on ‘backwards steps’.85 Yet there should be extreme caution 
around allowing names to shape the substance of the doctrine. Retrogression should not 
come to govern only ‘backwards steps’ because this role is easier to describe. 
If the subject of the regulations developed in the CESCR’s work are ‘impermissible 
retrogressive steps’, how then can the regulations themselves be described? The scholarship 
has tended to describe the bundle of regulation as a ‘doctrine’. However, this is terminology 
alien to the Committee itself, not appearing anywhere in its work in connection to 
retrogression (or its terminological variants).  Neither, however, does the CESCR describe 
retrogression in other terms (examples might be as a ‘mechanism’, ‘principle’, or 
‘obligation’). Without guidance from the Committee as to its preferred designation, the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
82 For a selection of examples see Radhika Balakrishnan, Diane Elson and Raj Patel, ‘Rethinking Macro Economic Strategies 
from a Human Rights Perspective’ (2010) 53 Development 27, 31; Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 4); Salomon (n 4) 544; 
Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full 
Enjoyment of All Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 3) para 71; Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food (n 3) para 41.  
83 This phrasing is widespread. For one example see Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (n 3) para 28. 
84 This phrasing is widespread. For one example see, CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 45. 
85 See for example, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (n 3) para 28; Special Rapporteur on the human 
right to safe drinking water and sanitation (n 3) para 46. The analogous term, ‘backsliding’ is also used; Center for Economic 
and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Mauled by the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in Ireland’s Economic Meltdown’ (n 5) 6; Nolan, Lusiani 
and Courtis (n 4) 125. 
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path of least resistance would be to continue using the term ‘doctrine’ as proposed in the 
scholarship. Yet there are a number of difficulties with this term. The term contains a 
certain solidity,86 that is almost certainly useful in advocacy contexts, but which could 
overreach the basis of retrogression itself. The term might be seen to specify retrogression 
as a stable and free-standing legal concept, a characterisation that is argued below (in 
Section 3.3.) to be somewhat dubious. An alternative term, such as ‘mechanism’ perhaps 
returns retrogression to a status subordinate to other obligations. A mechanism of 
retrogression, instead of serving its own (separatist) aims, could be regarded as working 
flexibly for the improvement of another legally well-grounded ICESCR obligation. Yet there 
are difficulties with this term too. The CESCR has previously used ‘mechanism’ to denote 
actions within States parties,87 and adding an international monitoring dimension might 
create conflicts of meaning. More significantly, a shift to terming retrogression as a 
‘mechanism’ cedes a degree of authority that is inherent in the ‘doctrine’ term. Ultimately, 
the choice of term is contingent upon the purpose and construction of retrogression that 
one adopts. Viewed as subservient to progressive realisation, it can be thought of as a mere 
mechanism in achieving this purpose, while, if viewed as a standalone entity the term 
‘doctrine’ would be more appropriate. 
Finally, the role of terminology in constructing the image of a single doctrine has been 
pivotal. The description of ‘the’ doctrine of non-retrogression has served to suggest a unity 
to the disparate elements and diverse enunciations of retrogression. As discussed in depth 
below, there are in fact some nine different combinations of criteria that can be classed into 
not one, but four conceptually distinct versions of the doctrine of non-retrogression.  
These four conceptual models have somewhat distinct legal groundings, and will be 
referred to as the Component model, the Corollary model, the Composite model and the 
Un-Coupled model.  
3.3. Four Doctrines of ‘Non-Retrogression’: Conceptual Models and their 
Application 
In suggesting the existence of four conceptual models of non-retrogression, this section 
runs counter to the predominating view of non-retrogression. Non-retrogression is most 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
86 Perhaps reflected in the most relevant dictionary definition; ‘Doctrine: A body or system of principles or tenets; a doctrinal 
or theoretical system; a theory; a science, or department of knowledge’. Oxford English Dictionary, Doctrine (2014).  
87 For an example see, CESCR, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art 11 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/5 
1999) paras 24, 29–31. 
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commonly thought of as a single doctrine.88 These analyses have undoubtedly aided the 
development of norms and, in particular, the practice surrounding both the doctrine and 
more broadly, the realisation of ESR. This development of the doctrine has allowed parts of 
international civil society to construct a human-rights based response to the financial and 
economic crises that would certainly have been more difficult without it.89 Yet the ‘single 
doctrine’ view has failed to identify a firm conceptual footing in the ICESCR. The addition 
of further criteria over time has not resulted in the clarity so desired (and needed). As such, 
the single doctrine has failed in the pragmatic aspect (lacking clarity and effectiveness) and 
in theoretical aspect (lacking a conceptual grounding) and the vision of a single doctrine 
begins to look unconvincing. As a key point of departure, the analysis below distinguishes 
and groups the nine separate combinations of criteria that the CESCR has produced to 
determine the existence of a retrogressive measure.90  This is used in the final substantive 
section to suggest that, in order to design a conceptually convincing doctrine, we must be 
clear and open what purpose lies at its core, and what its legal basis is.  
  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
88 Some give a fuller account of the doctrine’s variations (Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 4) 134; Aoife Nolan, ‘Economic and 
Social Rights, Budgets and the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2013) 21(2) The International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 248, 257; Illari Aragon Noriega, ‘Judicial Review of the Right of Health and Its Progressive Realisation: The Case of the 
Constitutional Court of Peru’ (2012) 1 UCLJLJ 166, 172; Radhika Balakrishnan and Diane Elson, ‘Auditing Economic Policy in the 
Light of Obligations on Economic and Social Rights’ (2008) 5(1) Essex Human Rights Review 6.), while others rest with the 
enunciation in General Comment 3 (Craig M Scott, ‘Covenant Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance Plan’ (1994) 6 
Constitutional Forum 79, 81; Dianne Otto and David Wiseman, ‘In Search of “Effective Remedies”: Applying the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Australia’ (2001) 7(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 5, 44; Maria 
Green, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement’ (2001) 
23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1062, 1070). 
89 For some examples see; Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Mauled by the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in 
Ireland’s Economic Meltdown’ (n 5) 5, 6, 11; Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Austerity and Retrogression: Have 
Governments Got the Right? (Open Letter to Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy)’ (6 February 2012) 
<http://www.cesr.org/article.php?id=1229> accessed 20 September 2016; Luis Jimena Quesada, ‘Conference on “Protecting 
Economic and Social Rights in Times of Crisis: What Role for the Judges?”’ (European Commission For Democracy Through 
Law (Venice Commission) 2014) 4 <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-LA(2014)003-
e> accessed 20 September 2016; ESCR-net, ‘The Financial Crisis and Global Economic Recession: Towards a Human Rights 
Response’ (no date) <https://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/EconomicCrisisHRStatement_ESCR-
Net_final_eng_withendorsements.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016; Elmira Nazombe, ‘The US Financial Crisis, Post-2015 
Development Agenda, and Human Rights’ <http://www.rightingfinance.org/?p=1011> accessed 20 September 2016; Joanna 
Manganara, ‘The Effects of the Economic Crisis on Women in Europe’ <http://womenalliance.org/the-effects-of-the-
economic-crisis-on-women-in-europe> accessed 20 September 2016; Rory O’Connell and others, ‘Budget Analysis and Housing 
in Northern Ireland’ (Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series 2014-15 2015) 
<http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefing_papers/series4/kess_oconnell_h
arvey_nolan_rooney.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016. 
90 See Appendix B for details of the various criteria and the nine sets of obligations that have been distinguished. 
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3.3.1. The ‘Component’ Model 
The Component model is best typified by the configuration of non-retrogression in General 
Comment 3. There the doctrine sits within the obligation to progressively realise the rights. 
Such a modelling of the doctrine deprives it of any significant (independent) substance. In 
this sense, non-retrogression is barely a ‘doctrine’ at all, and is closer to a description of the 
conditions for a breach of the progressive realisation obligation. Its purpose might be 
thought of as providing supporting language to the progressive realisation duty. Indeed, the 
first mention of the term ‘retrogressive’ was nested in the General Comment next to 
guidance on interpreting state obligations under article 2(1) of the ICESCR.91 This model 
hinges on the view that the CESCR did not intend to create a new doctrine of non-
retrogression in General Comment 3, but instead intended to clarify the extent of the 
progressive realisation doctrine. This new interpretation of the General Comment is 
developed fully below.  
A component obligation can be seen as one deeply connected to an existing and well 
established part of the legal framework. Such an obligation fits within the functioning of 
another concept or obligation, rather than having a separate legal identity. Indeed, if 
obligation B is a component of obligation A, it (B) might be thought of as somewhat 
necessary to the functioning of that obligation (A). A purportedly novel development that 
has no substantive innovation (although there may be innovation in some other respect) 
could be classed as a component of another obligation. With such little change to the 
substance of the obligation, it is probable that such an obligation or something similar was 
envisaged during the treaty drafting process. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, it is likely that the history of non-retrogression is less 
bold than might be thought.92 Although the starting point of the history of non-
retrogression for ESR at the international level is a single sentence in the CESCR’s General 
Comment 3, the history of the CESCR’s early sessions provides little to suggest that this 
sentence was intended as the advent of a novel obligation. This makes it unlikely that the 
CESCR in General Comment 3 set out to detail a doctrine to govern the taking of 
‘backwards’ steps that would supplement the progressive ‘forwardness’ of progressive 
realisation. More simply, the doctrine of retrogressive measures was not really intended as a 
conceptually innovative doctrine at all.  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
91 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) para 9. 
92 See Chapter 2, pp16-22. 
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‘Retrogression’ was not designed by the CESCR as a separate concept, but instead was 
intended as a component of the progressive realisation obligation. The term ‘retrogressive 
measure’ was intended only for use as a term to denote a violation of the obligation to 
progressively realise the rights contained in the ICESCR. In other words, according to 
General Comment 3 while progressive realisation required ‘expeditious and effective’ 
realisation, a retrogressive measure was a measure that did something less than 
progressively realise rights in a fully ‘expeditious and effective’ manner. 
The reasons for ascribing this humbler meaning to General Comment 3 retrogression can 
broadly be described in terms of history and context, and a close re-reading of the text. 
As a full account of the relevant history of the CESCR was given in the preceding chapter, 
only the salient points are returned to here. The dominant theme of the years that led up to 
the introduction of the term ‘retrogression’ by the CESCR, is of uncertainty. Despite 
ECOSOC having been mandated by the text of the ICESCR to monitor the implementation 
of the Covenant,93 it had failed to do so effectively, as had the various Sessional Working 
Groups that it had set up.94 As such, the newly formed CESCR was in a position of 
precariousness, tasked with demonstrating that the ICESCR was capable of effective 
supervision while contemporaneously reforming a confused system of partial State reports. 
In addition to this set of inherited issues, the new Committee faced threats of its own in 
terms of independence from ECOSOC,95 resources,96 time97 and the politicisation98 of its 
functioning. The CESCR’s introduction of General Comments brought it in line with its 
sister body, the Human Rights Committee, but was a practice that came with its own risks. 
There was a heavy emphasis on the experience of the CESCR in examining States’ previous 
reports, which, it was argued made the Committee well-placed to offer guidance in the form 
of General Comments.99 Yet, the Committee did not claim any significant powers to develop 
the ICESCR obligations. Neither, in light of the substantial lack of clarity around some of 
the obligations (and progressive realisation, in particular) is it likely that the Committee 
were intent upon opening up new obligations and with them, new potential confusions. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
93 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) art 17. 
94 Philip Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (1987) 9(3) Human Rights Quarterly 332, 332. 
95 Philip Alston and Bruno Simma, ‘First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 81(3) 
The American Journal of International Law 747, 755–756. 
96 Alston and Simma, ‘First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 95). Alston and Simma, 
‘First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 95). 
97 Alston and Simma, ‘First Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 95) 754.  
98 Philip Alston and Bruno Simma, ‘Second Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1988) 
82(3) The American Journal of International Law 603, 604, 615. 
99 CESCR, ‘Report on the Second Session’ (1988) UN Doc E/1988/14 para 368.  
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In looking at the text of General Comment 3, there is even less to suggest that the 
Committee intended to develop a new category of obligation. There it notes;100  
  
 
 
 
In that Comment, in 1990, the meaning of a retrogressive measure was contained in a single 
sentence. That sentence was positioned curiously at the conclusion of a paragraph on 
progressive realisation. Progressive realisation is described as ‘[t]he principle obligation of 
result’, and is elaborated in a paragraph only marginally longer than any other in the 
General Comment. The Committee begin by recounting the long-term nature of some 
rights, before emphasising that Covenant obligations are not devoid of content and 
meaning. It reiterates this point by noting the flexibility provided by the progressive 
realisation formulation on the one hand, and the clear obligations that it sets down, on the 
other. The final sentence before the introduction of the term ‘retrogressive’ gives the only 
real substantive clarification – that progressive realisation ‘imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards [the full realisation of the ICESCR rights]’.  
If as the dominant view implies, this sentence was to be viewed as the end of the 
consideration of progressive realisation before the Comment moved on to consider a new 
and somewhat separate obligation of non-retrogression, there would be several matters 
outstanding. Why was there so little clarification given as to the content of the progressive 
realisation obligation, despite the CESCR’s insistence that progressive realisation was a 
concept full of content and meaning? Why, despite introducing progressive realisation as a 
‘necessary flexibility device’,  does the General Comment only elaborate upon the 
obligations that derive from it (expeditious and effective progression), and not touch upon 
the flexibilities afforded to States? 
A further important implication of viewing progressive realisation and retrogression as 
sitting separately from one another is that there would be no discussion of the maximum of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
100 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) para 9 (emphasis and annotation added). 
Component View:  
Progressive realisation 
Progressive 
realisation 
Retrogression 
‘It [progressive realisation] thus imposes an 
obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards that goal. 
Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures 
in that regard would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified 
by reference to the totality of the rights provided 
for in the Covenant and in the context of the full 
use of the maximum available resources.’ 
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available resources attached to progressive realisation. If the CESCR intended retrogression 
to sit as a separate head of obligation then the paragraph should be read as subdivided into 
a section on progressive realisation and a section on retrogression. Yet the crucial obligation 
regarding the maximum of available resources, which appears linked to progressive 
realisation in the ICESCR itself, only appears once in the paragraph – in relation to 
retrogression. 
However, the alternative (and better) reading of the final sentence is that it represents not 
the establishment of a new doctrine of non-retrogression, but rather a continuation of the 
CESCR’s elaboration upon the meaning of progressive realisation. This way, non-
retrogression can be seen as a ‘component’ of the obligation to progressively realise. In 
particular, ‘retrogression’ in the context of General Comment 3 can be read as describing 
the conditions for a violation of the obligation to progressively realise. 
If, as the penultimate sentence of paragraph 9 of the General Comment indicated, 
successful progressive realisation entailed moving ‘as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible’, then a retrogressive measure was something less than that. In detailing the 
boundaries and obligations of progressive realisation the CESCR sought to outline what 
successful progressive realisation entailed, but also the circumstances in which a violation 
of that obligation would be found. Thus, the introduction of the ‘retrogressive measures’ 
term was used to denote a prima facie violation of the obligation to progressively realise. 
The Committee noted that if States were to progress at a pace or effectiveness less than a 
notional optimum (i.e. they failed to expeditiously and effectively progressively realise the 
rights and took a retrogressive measure), then certain conditions had to be demonstrated in 
order to avoid a finding of violation.  
The conditions that States had to fulfil were; carefully considering the measure, justifying 
the measure by reference to all of the other ICESCR rights, and ensuring that the maximum 
available resources were being used. These conditions were not particularly stringent and 
could have reasonably been fulfilled by, for example, a proper process for the adoption of 
the measure (for example in a State legislature), a human rights impact assessment,101 and 
the full use of resources. This suite of measures seems broadly proportionate to the gravity 
of the offence, if it was the intention of the Committee to define a retrogressive measure as 
a less-than-optimum (or non-progressive) measure. The overall dynamic that this would 
have established was one of ‘comply or explain’. It required States to demonstrate that they 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
101 Even accounting for the fact that these impact assessments are a relatively recent development, a State undertaking an 
analogous consideration of the implications of a prima facie retrogressive policy would likely satisfy this condition. 
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had moved as ‘expeditiously and effectively as possible’ towards realising the ICESCR rights 
or to justify why they had failed to do so. 
This approach would have offered a true clarification to the problematic progressive 
realisation doctrine. This system of obligations was closely linked to the contents of the 
Covenant and was unlikely to upset the institutional stability that had been nurtured by the 
newly formed CESCR for the previous four years. It also directly addressed the problems 
that had been encountered in vague State reporting. This clarification of progressive 
realisation detailed clear routes for the rigorous examination of State reports no matter 
whether States wished to defend their record or plead otherwise. It delivered on the 
promise of the progressive realisation doctrine to offer both ‘flexibility’ and ‘clear 
obligations’. Perhaps most importantly, it provided an uncomplicated route to finding and 
declaring a violation of the obligation to progressively realise. 
The simplicity of the regime ushered in by General Comment 3 can be seen in figure 3. 
Taking the curve to represent the notional ‘expeditious and effective’ optimum rate of 
progressive realisation, anything less than this rate (i.e. anything that fell into the grey 
shaded area) would be a prima facie retrogressive measure. It shows the close relationship 
between a breach of progressive realisation and non-retrogression.  
 
 
 
 
 
As a counterfactual, if the Committee in General Comment 3 really did intend to define a 
new doctrine of retrogression as a doctrine of ‘backwards steps’, then they did so in an 
ambiguous and inadequate way. If the CESCR intended to introduce the international 
community to the idea of a ‘retrogressive measure’ in General Comment 3, it would seem 
Rights 
Enjoyment 
Time 
Figure 3 
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surprising that it chose to do so in only a single sentence. Other novel concepts, such as the 
‘minimum core’ received a much larger debut.102 In its introduction of the new concept the 
Committee did not describe or indicate what constituted a ‘retrogressive measure’, beyond 
indicating that it is ‘deliberate’.  As this was a novel application of the term within the 
human rights and socio-economic rights realm(s), there was no evident meaning for the 
term. Did it mean an intention to go backwards (regardless of the result)? Was 
retrogression to mean an on-the-ground deterioration in rights protection? Could ‘legal’ 
measures, lauded by the Committee as ‘highly desirable and in some cases […] 
indispensable’,103 constitute retrogressive measures? What relationship did the 
‘retrogressive’ term have with the well-established term ‘regressive’?  
Rather than address these definitional questions (the ‘what’ question) or provide 
clarification by means of clear examples, the CESCR chose to focus on the question of when 
such measures were permissible. The Committee outlined a number of circumstances that 
would have to exist for such measures to be permissible (careful consideration, full 
justification by reference to other ICESCR rights, and the full use resources). This 
uncertainty on the ‘what’ question has continued in the CESCR’s work. Elucidation has 
generally come through the addition of ill-defined justificatory criteria, rather than an 
exposition of the nature of retrogression itself.104 
The above analysis points away from the predominant view of a single non-retrogression 
doctrine, or the view of General Comment 3 as a substantive innovation within the ICESCR. 
Neither of these can fully account for both the factual-contextual matrix and the substance 
of the CESCR’s brief statement on the subject. It seems clear on this account, that the 
introduction of the phrase ‘retrogressive measure’ was intended to augment the weak 
existing understanding of the progressive realisation obligation. Thus the retrogression of 
General Comment 3 looks most like a component element of progressive realisation. The 
understanding that should be accepted of that early non-retrogression ‘doctrine’ is one that 
sees its functioning as subsumed within, and an integral part of, the functioning of 
progressive realisation; i.e. retrogression meant a violation of the obligation to expeditiously 
and effectively progressively realise. 
 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
102 Consisting of a paragraph of 255 words and 14 lines, compared to retrogression’s 47 words and 3 lines. On its debut, the 
Respect, Protect, Fulfil typology received an introduction of 178 words and 15 lines; in CESCR, General Comment 12 (n 87) para 
15. 
103 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) para 3. 
104 Nolan (n 4) 47. 
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3.3.2.  The ‘Corollary’ Model 
The Corollary model is best – if crudely – described as seeing non-retrogression as the 
opposite of the progressive realisation obligation. In the simplest of terms, progressive 
realisation requires states to go ‘forward’ in their rights protection and non-retrogression 
regulates the instances when that protection goes ‘backward’. Of course, it is more complex 
than this; holding a mirror up to progressive realisation would not show the doctrine of 
non-retrogression. 
This Corollary concept is distinct from the Component model, as a corollary obligation (or 
doctrine) can be seen as one which is strongly implied by another obligation, but which sits 
separately. As such, a corollary obligation can take on its own semi-distinctive identity but 
would remain solidly grounded in (and attached to) another obligation. The purpose of a 
corollary obligation might be to fill a (perceived) gap in the original schema of obligations. 
Whereas a component is a minor innovation that could conceivably have been envisaged by 
drafters of the original obligation, a corollary is a more significant innovation and might 
represent an area not addressed in the drafting process. 
The ‘corollary’ model of the doctrine of non-retrogression has dominated discussions105 for a 
large part of the last two decades.106 For the most part, the Corollary conceptualisation is 
well-founded and I argue that some six statements of the CESCR that can be appropriately 
categorised in this way.107 These six Corollary statements share a common construction. 
Each notes that there is a strong presumption108 against deliberate retrogression, and to be 
permissible such measures must be justified by reference to the totality of rights, place the 
burden of justification upon the State, and require the consideration of alternatives.109 
There are only minor differences between these ‘corollary’ criteria and the previous criteria 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
105 A selection of those that have employed this model are Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 4) 123; Scott (n 88) 81; Nolan (n 88) 
256; Noriega (n 88) 172; Otto and Wiseman (n 88) 44. 
106 It seems that the first clear separation of progressive realization and retrogression into separate (corollary) heads of 
obligation occurred in 1997 with the Maastricht Guidelines; ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (SIM 1998) s 14. 
107 CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 45; CESCR, General Comment 14 (n 1) para 32; CESCR, General Comment 15 (n 1) para 
19; CESCR, General Comment 17 (n 1) para 27; CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 1) para 21; CESCR, ‘General Comment 21’ (n 62) 
para 65. See also Table 2, p79. 
108 Sometimes retrogressive measures are instead described as being impermissible ‘in principle’ or being ‘not permitted’. 
CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 1) para 21; and CESCR, ‘General Comment 21’ (n 62) para 65 respectively. See further Table 3, 
Chapter 8, p217. 
109 Each of these (except General Comment 17) also requires a context of the State Party employing the Maximum of Available 
Resources. 
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attached to the ‘component’ model above. Yet there are subtle other ways in which the 
doctrine changes between these two models.110 
What distinguishes this approach from the component model discussed above, is its 
emphasis on the ‘backwards’ character of retrogression. At the core of this view is the 
notion that implicit in the obligation to progressively improve ICESCR rights realisation is 
an additional obligation not to take retrogressive steps.111 While the previous section 
described retrogression as a slowing, or something less than an expeditious and effective 
optimum,112 this ‘corollary’ model looks for a deeper deterioration of rights enjoyment to the 
point that they are enjoyed at a lower level than at an earlier point; what might be termed 
‘negative realisation’.113  
 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
110 In addition to the changes described below, the word used for ‘retrogressive’ in the Spanish translations of the General 
Comments also changes between General Comment 3 and General Comment 13. Originally described as ‘las medidas de 
carácter deliberadamente retroactivo’, later the phrase ‘medida regresiva’ is used. The original version of the General Comment 
was produced in English, however the difference in terminology will remain in Spanish-language uses of the General 
Comments.  CDESC, Observación General 3: La Índole de Las Obligaciones de Los Estados Partes (UN Doc E/1991/23, 1990) para 
9; CDESC, Observaciones Generales 13: El Derecho a La Educación (artículo 13 Del Pacto) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/10) para 45 
(emphasis added). 
111 See for example Aoife Nolan and Mira Dutschke, ‘Article 2 (1) ICESCR and States Parties’ Obligations: Whither the Budget?’ 
(2010) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 280, 280, 282. 
112 Logically, it is possible to be less than fully ‘expeditious and effective’ and still to improve standards. It is not clear that such 
a scenario would entail the finding of a breach of the ‘corollary’ doctrine, as there would be no ‘backwards’ step per se in rights 
standards. 
113 The Committee itself has used such a ‘backwards steps’ conceptualisation in its work; CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Eighth 
and Forty-Ninth Sessions’ UN Doc E/2013/22 para 12; CESCR, ‘Report on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions’ UN Doc 
E/1999/22 Day of General Discussion, para 507. 
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This is a substantial alteration to the simple ‘progressive realisation/ breach’ structure of the 
Component model. Representing this doctrine diagrammatically (figure 4) demonstrates 
the distinction. Here the CESCR were looking for an actual reduction in rights protection 
(rather than a slowed realisation). In the diagram the top curve continues to represent the 
optimum level of rights realisation. It is clear that there logically remains an area where 
States might realise rights too slowly (the light grey hatched area), but not actually reduce 
the protection of rights (the area represented by the dark grey area). The Corollary model 
leaves a space for the Committee to chide States for inadequate progress, without 
condemning them for material reductions in rights protections. In doing so, the progressive 
realisation obligation retains its own highly flexible content which can be monitored. 
Besides the content of retrogression and progressive realisation, however, there remains a 
‘gap’ between them. This, in effect, leaves a further type of measure implied; stagnation.114  
Of course, the acceptance of this as another class of State action would mean the existence 
doctrines of both stagnation and retrogression that were without direct grounding in the 
ICESCR. 
Life is not as simple as graphs, however. The notion of an optimum rate of progressive 
realisation is bound to stay just that – a notion. Determining an optimum policy route for 
any given country is well beyond the current state of knowledge. Yet, this is not to say that 
such an optimum scheme is not useful. There are frequently situations where States allow 
rights realisation to progress but at a (painfully) slow rate. The example of women’s equal 
pay is an often cited one. Although the gap between rates of pay is generally115 closing, we 
are told that it will take many more years (or until 2058 for the women of the United 
States).116 This is progress, but perhaps not ‘optimum’ progress, and would most likely fall 
into the gap left by the Corollary model.117  
This corollary approach, certainly in an abstract sense, has much to recommend it. In the 
early appearances of the doctrine in the CESCR’s work there are close ties between the 
criteria for determining a retrogressive measure and the terms of the Covenant as a whole. 
This substantively expanded the obligations that flowed from article 2(1), while maintaining 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
114 Thematic Study by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Structure and Role of 
National Mechanisms for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN 
Doc A/HRC/13/29 2009) para 67; CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2) para 9. 
115 Although in 2013 the gap widened in the UK; ‘The Gender Pay Gap’ (Fawcett Society) 
<http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/our-work/campaigns/gender-pay-gap/> accessed 20 September 2016. 
116 Institute for Women’s Policy Research, ‘The Status of Women in the States: 2015 Employment and Earnings’ (2015) 7. 
117 This highlights the more strategic issues of advocacy and enforcement that go unaddressed. Where should the CESCR and 
civil society focus their energies in the face of such a regime? On the one hand, retrogression would seem to be a more severe 
deprivation of rights, but ignoring this kind of slow progression falling into the ‘gap’ might allow stubborn and intractable 
injustices to have a longer lifespan. 
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a solid legal basis and without taking the political-institutional risks of attempting to 
establish a doctrine that was without roots in the ICESCR.  
In the early work of the CESCR, there are few grounds for disagreement with this 
conceptualisation. The rough implication that the ICESCR obligation to progressively 
improve contains a ‘strong presumption against’118 backwards steps is intuitive. A 
requirement that alternatives119 should be considered before enacting a backwards step can 
be mapped onto the strong language of article 2(1) (‘all appropriate means’). That such 
backwards steps should be justified by reference to other rights120 seems well grounded in 
the progressive realisation article as it echoes the obligation to work towards the ‘full 
realization of the rights’ recognized in the Covenant.121 Placing the burden on States of 
proving that such retrogressive measures meet these requirements122 is a clearly pragmatic 
step that is implicit in the notion of the State as primary duty bearer. Finally, the obligation 
to use the maximum of available resources is also explicit in article 2(1)123 and so it can only 
be seen as an supplement to non-retrogression, not a new part of it.124 
This version of the doctrine mirrors the parent obligation of progressive realisation in most 
respects. There is one anomaly, however. The condition that backwards steps have to be 
‘deliberate’ in order to be considered as retrogressive is not readily reconcilable with the 
progressive realisation obligation (or any other for that matter).125 That measures are to be 
‘deliberate’ if they are to be found to be retrogressive is best explained as being a hangover 
from the early General Comment 3 regime. However, in the new regime the condition can 
be seen as introducing a degree of flexibility. This flexibility introduced by a ‘deliberateness’ 
requirement for backwards steps, avoids the prospect of the CESCR being forced to find a 
violation of the Covenant where it feels that a State had little culpability for the backwards 
move. Although an artefact of the previous doctrine, the flexibility afforded to the CESCR 
warrants the continued inclusion of the word. The meaning of ‘deliberate’ remains ill-
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
118 CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 45. 
119 ibid. 
120 ibid. 
121 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) art 2(1). 
122 CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 45. 
123 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) art 2(1). 
124 CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 45. 
125 Nolan also highlights the Committee’s silence on the meaning of ‘deliberate’ as problematic, while the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Water and Adequate Sanitation has sought to emphasise the duties of States even where retrogression is not 
deliberate; Nolan (n 4) 47; Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation (n 3) para 47. See 
further discussion below at Chapter 8, pp211-213. 
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defined in the retrogression context, and its continued inclusion allows the CESCR to treat 
progressive realisation (and non-retrogression) with a degree of ‘real world’ flexibility.126  
With non-retrogression in this form, there is little departure from the ICESCR obligations. 
As a corollary to progressive realisation the doctrine addressed a basic scenario, namely; 
what does progressive realisation have to say about instances where rights protection is 
going backwards rather than forwards? In answering this question, the doctrine of non-
retrogression remained closely connected to the contours of the progressive realisation 
obligation, while filling a gap left in it. However, perhaps inevitably, the doctrine also took 
on an identity of its own, with a separate name and separate normative guidance. This 
semi-separate identity allowed the doctrine to move smoothly away from the obligations 
that were entirely rooted in progressive realisation and began the transition towards a 
composite doctrine. 
3.3.3.  The ‘Composite’ Model 
While the Component and Corollary models of non-retrogression maintain a close 
connection to the progressive realisation obligation, for a brief period in 2007 the CESCR 
moved away from such a direct link. In both its MAR under OP, and in General Comment 19 
the Committee adopted a Composite approach. 127 Although the approach might be revived 
in future, its period of influence so far has been short lived as in November 2009 there was a 
move back to the Corollary conception of non-retrogression in General Comment 21.128 It is 
conjecture, but nonetheless interesting, to suggest that the reversal in position that took 
place might have been a  result of the financial and economic crises which broke in 2007/8. 
The structure of the Composite model builds on and intensifies the beginnings of 
divergence that took place under the Corollary doctrine. While the two models of non-
retrogression outlined above envisaged the doctrine as embedded within (component 
model), or as a mirror of, progressive realisation (corollary model), the ‘composite’ model 
goes much further. Non-retrogression under this model can be defined as a composite of 
obligations that are derived from the progressive realisation obligation and a number of 
other ICESCR rights and general principles. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
126 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) para 9. 
127 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2) para 9-10; CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 1) para 42. 
128 CESCR, ‘General Comment 21’ (n 62) para 65. 
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The understanding of a composite obligation advanced here is relatively self-explanatory, 
and is defined as an obligation (or a set of entangled obligations) that is constituted of 
several other State duties. Little substantive innovation is implicit in this kind of obligation, 
as it is a collection of other substantive obligations. Rather, the innovation in crafting a 
composite obligation lies in the novel collection that takes place; the choice of which 
obligations to collect. Grouping obligations in such a way requires clear articulation of the 
boundaries of the chosen composite and perhaps also, the reasons for that particular 
collection of obligations. Without such clarity, it is possible that a large, confusing and ill-
defined composite of conflicting obligations might result. If such issues are avoided, there is 
significant potential for the promotion of interdependence that can occur through the 
absorption of other relevant obligations. Cross-fertilisation and consistency of obligations 
would seem to be a natural result.  
The versions of non-retrogression advanced by the CESCR in its MAR under OP statement 
and in General Comment 19 can be thought of as composite models of the non-
retrogression obligation. Although each of these two CESCR documents outlines a different 
set of criteria to be used in defining a breach of the obligation (see table 2 above), each is 
demonstrably a composite of a number of ICESCR obligations, human rights principles and 
procedural protections. It is difficult or impossible to see the non-retrogression doctrines in 
these two documents as wholly or even predominantly linked to the progressive realisation 
obligation. 
In General Comment 19 the CESCR adds seven further aspects to the criteria that had been 
consistently used in the Corollary model. On the one hand the composite doctrine of non-
retrogression includes a need for reasonable justifications, participatory decision-making, 
independent review, and respect for the minimum essential levels of rights. On the other 
hand, this composite looks (very) negatively upon discrimination, measures having a 
sustained impact upon individuals and groups, and unreasonable impacts. These 
conditions, although separate to progressive realisation, can be related to other obligations 
and principles of the ICESCR. That the Covenant contains obligations of non-
discrimination129 and minimum core obligations130 is well-established. The rights of 
participation, the requirement of reasonableness, and the mitigation of long-term effects 
can also be located in the ICESCR values or in ESR practice more broadly.131 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
129 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) arts 2(2) and 3. 
130 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) paras 10-11. 
131 For a number of examples of such values being present see; Sepúlveda (n 4) 364, 337ff; Saul, Kinley and Mowbray (n 28) 634. 
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The MAR under OP statement also contains a composite doctrine of non-retrogression, 
albeit a differently composed one. In fact the statement accounts for nested applications of 
non-retrogression in two separate scenarios; ‘normal’ scenarios of retrogression, and 
instances where a State uses ‘“resource constraints” as an explanation for any retrogressive 
steps taken’.132 In respect of the first of these scenarios (where resources are not at issue), 
the CESCR essentially repeats the Corollary model. However, a composite is outlined for 
use in cases where a State claims it is operating under resource constraints. In such 
scenarios the Committee will additionally consider ‘the country’s level of development’, 
‘whether the situation concerned the enjoyment of the minimum core’, ‘the country’s 
current economic situation’, ‘the existence of other serious claims on the State party’s 
limited resources’, any ‘low-cost options’, and ‘whether the State party had sought 
cooperation’.133 Many of these criteria for assessment seem to be an explication of how the 
CESCR might assess compliance with the Maximum Available Resources obligation rather 
than conditions that are restricted to application in the context of non-retrogression. 
However, there is also a clear inclusion of the articles on international cooperation,134 the 
minimum core obligation,135 and to a lesser extent the flexibility given to developing 
countries and their economic situation.136 
This approach takes the doctrine of non-retrogression to a number of new destinations. 
First, it disturbs the ‘roots’ of the doctrine. With no mention of retrogression in the ICESCR 
itself, most aspects of the legitimacy, legality and force of the doctrine rely on a solid 
connection to another part of the Covenant. As is argued above, it is possible to locate a 
connection to the ICESCR, but the link is not straightforward and the CESCR has not 
demonstrated it. Second, while the expansion of the criteria attached to the doctrine might 
appropriately promote human rights principles, it is unlikely to make monitoring easier. 
Under General Comment 19, for example, the Committee would require accurate 
information on some twelve areas including some highly complex aspects in order to 
properly make a finding of impermissible retrogression. Third, the shift towards a 
composite approach changes the emphasis of non-retrogression. Practically, the CESCR 
would not be carrying out an exacting examination of (non-)compliance with a doctrine, 
but rather would assess State actions in the round to look for a (composite) deterioration of 
human rights. In other words, the composite model dilutes focus sufficiently to move the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
132 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2) para 10.  
133 ibid para 10.  
134 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) arts 2(1) and 11. 
135 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 1) paras 10-11. 
136 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) art 2(3). 
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centre of analysis away from the ‘measure’ alleged to be retrogressive, and towards the 
context of its adoption. 
3.3.4.  The ‘Un-Coupled’ Model 
The Un-Coupled model of the doctrine highlights the relinquishment of a predominant 
base in the content of the ICESCR. Although such a doctrine might well support the 
promotion of ICESCR rights (as endorsing social democracy or installing human rights 
activists in government might) the connection to the terms of the Covenant is lacking. The 
CESCR began a trend of such Un-Coupled doctrines in its Letter to States.137 This and other 
interventions can be conceptualised as being Un-Coupled from the ICESCR as much of their 
content departs so markedly from the Covenant, and instead draws inspiration from a 
broader range of sources.138  
Here, the term ‘Un-Coupled’ is taken to describe a doctrine separated from its legal basis. 
Such separation does not necessarily damage the utility of the doctrine in promoting 
ICESCR rights,139 but on a legal level there are clear problems. Such a tentative (or non-
existent) legal basis might be counteracted by strengths elsewhere that can contribute to 
the legitimacy of the doctrine (for example a demonstrable consistency with the demands 
of the ICESCR) and validate it as a self-supporting principle. The Un-Coupled doctrine is 
substantively innovative and raises new tests and issues of policy. 
A number of traditional ICESCR concepts do remain in the Letter to States, General 
Comments 22 and 23, and in the Statement on Public Debt. Features such as the 
requirement of non-discrimination and – in most of these un-coupled versions – the need 
to satisfy the minimum core remain present.140 However, there are also significant 
departures in these documents. For example, the binding nature of the ICESCR would seem 
to be subordinated when its obligations are noted in the Letter as ‘guideposts’ for States. 
Elsewhere, these Un-Coupled versions note that to justify retrogression State must ensure 
measures are temporary, necessary and proportionate.141 The first of these departures notes 
that the ICESCR provides guideposts for State action. This is in direct contradiction of the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
137 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2). 
138 CESCR, General Comment 22 (n 1) para 38; CESCR, General Comment 23 (n 1) para 52; CESCR, ‘Statement on Public Debt, 
Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (n 2) para 4. 
139 Although in this case the separation and content of the Letter to States is concerning; for a full discussion see Chapter 6. 
140 Although even crediting these as ICESCR concepts might be a stretch, with non-discrimination a cornerstone of the human 
rights system generally, and the minimum core expressly linked to ILO standards in the letter. The minimum core 
requirement is not included in General Comment 22.  
141 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2). 
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CESCR’s long-standing argument that Covenant is neither a bundle of objectives, nor a 
statement of principles, but is a justiciable and legally binding text.142 Additionally, the 
requirement that retrogressive measures be temporary, necessary and proportionate 
although clearly inspired by other (human rights) instruments143 is without foundation in 
the ICESCR.144 
The abdication of a basis in the ICESCR is troubling as the size of the challenge that can be 
mounted by such an a-legal doctrine is likely to be drastically reduced. This is especially 
disturbing where non-retrogression is concerned; how far can a doctrine without a legal 
basis make demanding (with potential to be radically demanding) claims on State 
resources? While it is possible for retrogression to lack a legal-doctrinal basis, and still 
retain some soft-law basis by virtue of the authority of the CESCR, this would leave the 
legality of the doctrine highly contingent. As discussed above,145 it is most likely that the 
work of the CESCR derives legal authority as a result of the Committee’s unique position as 
interpreter of the ICESCR. This significantly ties the CESCR to the Covenant; it is not a 
creator of the law, merely an interpreter of it. To maintain a legal authority, the CESCR 
would need to demonstrate how the Un-Coupled doctrine is a valid interpretation of the 
ICESCR. 
3.4. The Core Purpose of Retrogression 
It becomes evident from this identification of the multiple conceptual models of non-
retrogression, that a core purpose for the doctrine is absent. The four conceptual models as 
developed, demonstrate diverse conceptual footings upon which the doctrine has rested 
through the years of its development. Yet, beyond mere conceptual diversity, the models 
show the varied purposes for the doctrine of non-retrogression. Some brief distinctions can 
be drawn out here. The strong connection between the Component model of the doctrine 
and the progressive realisation obligation can be seen have a purpose of strengthening the 
latter obligation. Separately, the Corollary model, while remaining focussed on promotion 
of the progressive realisation obligation as a secondary purpose, additionally re-purposed 
retrogression to address reductions in rights protection. The purpose of the Composite 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
142 See a strong statement of this in State Party Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: United Kingdom (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add79 2002) para 11. 
143 In particular the ICCPR and the ECHR; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29: States Of Emergency (Art 4) 
(CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add11 2001); European Convention on Human Rights (1950) art 15(1).  
144 See further Chapter 6 for a full discussion of this departure. 
145 At section 3.2.1.. 
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models can be seen unifying the ICESCR obligations, while the Un-Coupled model can be 
cast as a model to offer (a somewhat extreme) pragmatic flexibility. 
The lack of core purpose for the doctrine, which arises when comparing these four models, 
results in difficulties in several areas. An absence of purpose has meant that non-
retrogression has developed without a consistent direction. In turn this has led to 
inconsistent content for the doctrine. Without a clear guiding value, or core purpose, the 
CESCR’s task of developing its successive General Comments and Statements is more 
difficult. Further, without a core purpose the doctrine has suffered from a lack of core 
content, too. This lack of core content can be seen in the difficulties with identifying the 
core space in which the doctrine operates (i.e. to what types of activity it applies), and with 
the inconsistent justificatory criteria for it. 
By confirming a strong purpose for non-retrogression, the scale and frequency of the 
doctrine’s modifications could be mitigated. Rather than radical shifts in the doctrine’s 
construction in order to address transient economic or other circumstances, such 
alterations would have to be related to an overarching and more static purpose. Similarly, 
with a settled purpose that set the doctrine in a firm relationship with the ICESCR, 
concerns about a weak legal basis would be somewhat addressed. Finally, the problems 
raised around the doctrine’s practical effectiveness can also partly be attributed to the 
absence of a purpose. The changeability and inconsistency in the doctrine’s content 
damages efforts to build civil society capacity and understanding, or to mount rigorous 
claims of retrogression.  
A clearly defined purpose could do much to add stability, strengthen retrogression’s legal 
basis and improve its practical effectiveness. It could provide a direction for the future 
development of the doctrine and act as a heuristic device in guiding the appropriate 
application of the retrogression obligations to States’ situations. Addressing these problems 
with the doctrine would, in turn, clearly contribute to retrogression’s longevity and 
credibility.  
There are no common purposes across the conceptual models, but neither are there other 
common characteristics which are well-defined or unique to the doctrine of non-
retrogression. Thus, for example, it is true that each of the four conceptual models of the 
doctrine of non-retrogression highlights modifications made to the original ICESCR 
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obligations accepted by States.146 Further, all four of the models have a connection with the 
Maximum Available Resources obligation,147 and rely on some assessment of progress. 
However, these general observations would likely hold for any socio-economic right, and do 
little to further an assessment of the content of the doctrine. Beyond these broad (almost 
trite) observations, the doctrine can be seen as fragmented and capricious; it applies to 
different types of action and with different justificatory criteria.  
The first question where it is claimed that a State has enacted a retrogressive measure, 
would be to establish the prima facie existence of such a measure, before moving on the 
consider if it was ‘permissible’.148 While the dominant image of the doctrine associates it 
with ‘backwards steps’ by States, it is argued above that the Component model is not in fact 
only concerned with ‘backwardness’. In addition to backwardsness, the Component model 
is concerned with all less-than ‘optimum’ rates of progression on rights enjoyment. These 
two spheres represent distinct but overlapping classes of State action. It is clear that where 
there is a fully ‘backwards step’ an application of all models of the doctrine would be 
triggered. However, where there is no backwards step but merely weak progress there 
would seem to be a role for the Component doctrine but not for the others. Further, in 
establishing what might be a prima facie case of retrogression the CESCR has noted that a 
prerequisite is State ‘deliberateness’; that is the CESCR has noted that this is the case most 
of the time.149 Elsewhere the CESCR has left this element untouched, making it hard to 
identify a core type of measure that could possibly be retrogressive. These are important 
distinctions as they demonstrate the difficulty in establishing a core class of State actions 
that are even potentially retrogressive. As such, from the very start of any process of 
assessing possible retrogression there is uncertainty about where and when the doctrine 
might apply. 
Even brushing past the substantial issue of when to apply the doctrine, there is remarkably 
little consistency on the other side of the equation, on what exactly the justificatory criteria 
to be applied are. An indication of this lack of consistency is the nine separate and different 
configurations of the doctrine that are seen across the CESCR’s work.150 Even grouping these 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
146 In the text of the ICESCR there is no concession afforded to States which, for whatever reason, failed to progressively realise 
ESR. Flowing from this strict picture of the obligations as set down in the ICESCR, the doctrine of non-retrogression in any 
form can only be seen as a softening of the Covenant obligations. All of the doctrine’s versions offer States the possibility of 
justifying a failure to progressively realise in the way that the Covenant demands. 
147 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 42) article 2(1). 
148 This dynamic springs from the description of the ‘strong presumption against’ retrogression or such measures being 
impermissible ‘in principle’; see, eg, CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 1) para 13; CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 1) 21. 
149 This condition being missing from, Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2); CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 2); CESCR, General 
Comment 16 (n 1). 
150 See Appendix B. 
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configurations to look at their conceptual underpinnings as is done above, there are no less 
than four potential conceptual roots of the doctrine. Determining the core content of the 
doctrine in the context of such a lack of consistency is simply not possible. Not a single one 
of the criteria (even those that might seem most fundamental) are applied across all 
versions of the doctrine. This only leaves a majoritarian estimation of the core criteria 
attached to ‘the’ doctrine, where one might identify an aspect of the doctrine that is present 
in most elucidations as comprising the core. Such estimations, if carried out, would seem to 
adopt precisely the approximation approach to non-retrogression that has so far been 
challenged here. Further, beyond these methodological issues there is little qualitatively 
enlightening about assessing the core justificatory criteria of non-retrogression in this way. 
That the requirement that retrogression should be ‘justified by reference to the totality of 
rights’ is more persistently present than other criteria (present in nine of fourteen 
elucidations) is not indicative of its relevance to the core of retrogression. In these senses, 
the doctrine deconstructs itself by neither offering consistency, nor a normative direction 
onto which the inconsistencies can be mapped and explained. 
This mixture of inconsistencies combines in an unfortunate manner. To employ an analogy 
from criminal law, there is no clarity about the nature of the offence or its definition, and 
the defences to the offence fluctuate. In practice, such an offence would not be allowed to 
continue to exist in criminal law, and if it did, prosecutions would not be taken. Of course, 
the level of detail normal in criminal law is not expected in General Comments, however 
the result remains much the same. There are indeed very few ‘prosecutions’ or – in human 
rights language – examinations of State actions as regards retrogression.151 A more certain 
and productive path elsewhere is taken in, for example, the examination of the use of 
Maximum of Available Resources,152 or scrutiny of potential discriminations.153 This clearly 
points beyond the merely theoretically unsatisfactory nature of the inconsistencies, and 
towards the practical manifestations that result. 154 
It is clear that there is both a theoretical and practical need to resolve the inconsistencies 
within retrogression and equally that there is not an easy resolution to these 
inconsistencies. In such circumstances a return to the purpose that guides retrogression 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
151 Where the Committee makes any finding at all related to retrogression, the language used is usually recommendatory. For 
example it ‘strongly recommends that the State party reconsider’ (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada (UN Doc 
E/C12/CAN/CO/4; E/C12/CAN/CO/5 2006) para 52.), or ‘it notes that this planned law, on the face of it, represents …a 
retrogressive measure’ (UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations of the CESCR: 
Chile’ para 28), or ‘reiterates its recommendation … that the social security reform …does not retrogressively affect’ the rights 
(CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany (UN Doc E/C12/DEU/CO/5 2011) para 21.). 
152 For example in, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iceland (n 53) 6.  
153 For example in, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Spain (n 53) para 9, 13. 
154 The practical aspects of the subject are explored further in Chapter 8. 
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would be profitable. However, as highlighted above, there is also a lack of clarity in even 
this basic respect. 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has deconstructed, on a relatively doctrinal level, the concept of non-
retrogression. The sources that form the doctrine, their legal basis and their interrelation 
were all addressed. An inclusive view of the CESCR sources was adopted, with their 
contents taken as generally applicable, rather than as being limited to a specific right or 
context. The semantic stylings of retrogression were also discussed, with the use of the 
terms ‘impermissible retrogressive measures’ or ‘steps’ being preferred. The question of 
whether the regulation of retrogression amounts to a ‘doctrine’ or a ‘mechanism’ was 
discussed above at section 3.2.3. 
These preliminary deconstructions provided the building blocks for the explosion of the 
‘single doctrine’ view. The notion of a single unchanging entity was broken into nine 
versions (or combinations of criteria) which in turn were regrouped into four models, each 
with a distinct conceptual structure. These four conceptual footings cast the various stages 
of retrogression as a Component of progressive realisation, as a Corollary to progressive 
realisation, as a Composite bundle of ICESCR obligations, and an entity Un-Coupled from a 
firm basis in the ICESCR. 
The shifting conceptual bases of retrogression caused difficulties in the final section which 
aimed to identify the core content and purpose of the doctrine. This final stage of the 
analysis grappled with the multiple inconsistencies in the doctrine and a number of 
different purposes. It was argued that there was no core purpose for the doctrine, and 
further that there was no consistency to be found in the criteria of the versions of the 
doctrine. This is a vital underpinning for later chapters. In particular, the next chapter picks 
up this task of finding an overarching purpose and construction for the doctrine. 
There is a radically different approach needed to retrogression in light of the fractured 
construction described here. Whereas ‘tinkering’ might have been appropriate if 
retrogression could be viewed as a single doctrine, after observing the multiple splinters of 
the concept above, it is clear that a more substantial (re)construction is needed. This 
process begins in the following chapter, with the construction of a purpose for 
retrogression. 
Chapter 4 
(Re)purposed and (Re)constructed Retrogression 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins the radically different approach to retrogression that the previous 
chapter argued was needed in light of the doctrine’s fractured construction. This culminates 
in the (re)purposing and (re)construction of the doctrine in sections 4.4. and 4.5.. However, 
before embarking on these (re)constructions, the chapter addresses the relationship 
between retrogression and other key ICESCR concepts. Addressing these relationships and 
the doctrine’s place within the Covenant prior to undertaking the task of (re)construction is 
important as those interactions are significant in shaping the purpose and construction 
given to the doctrine later on. 
In spite of all of its flaws and lack of direction the doctrine of non-retrogression has 
something to add to the enforcement and normative security of the ICESCR obligations.  
The process of fragmentation and the lack of purpose has meant that the doctrine has 
lacked a guiding value in its development and has been without a set of values to direct its 
application to country situations. This disarray and lack of direction consistently present 
throughout the history of the doctrine. This chapter addresses the causes and consequences 
of the doctrine’s fragmentation and suggests a (re)construction of the doctrine in order to 
resolve or reduce its fragmentation in future. Beyond simply suggesting a (re)construction 
that can encourage consistency, however, the chapter proposes a doctrine that can address 
the failures of current versions of retrogression. This begins the process – taken up in the 
rest of the thesis – of stress-testing the (re)constructed doctrine, and highlighting the areas 
it can make most of a difference.  
In the previous chapter in addition to it being argued that there is absence of a core purpose 
for retrogression, it was also shown that the doctrine has an uncertain legal basis, at best 
being constructed from the interpretative authority of the CESCR. The changeability and 
multiple renderings of the doctrine were also highlighted, as were questions about the 
doctrine’s effectiveness and practical operation. 
This chapter broadens that analysis to examine the doctrine’s place within the Covenant. In 
doing so, it moves beyond attempts to frame retrogression primarily according to its 
internal workings (as was largely the undertaking of the last chapter) and instead orientates 
it according to key themes in the ICESCR. This involves a close look at the relationship 
between the key progressive realisation obligation and retrogression, and at the interplay 
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between the cornerstone ‘respect, protect, fulfil’ typology and the doctrine. Clarifying these 
relationships is central to the later tasks of the chapter; the repurposing and reconstruction 
of retrogression. Sections 4.2. - 4.4. below build upon the clarified image of the doctrines 
place within the Covenant and its lack of purpose to suggest new directions for 
retrogression. Following this is the case for abandoning the doctrine (or its terminology) 
altogether. Following this, the chapter turns to finding a coherent purpose for retrogression 
and defending that purpose on a number of grounds. The final part of the chapter puts this 
repurposing into practice by presenting a new direction for retrogression and discussing 
some of the key rationales behind it. It is suggested that a definition of retrogression that is 
linked to all kinds of action, including contributions to trends is needed. 
4.2. Retrogression’s Place 
Few – including the CESCR – would grant the same level of attention or importance to the 
doctrine as they would to other general obligations such as the minimum core, progressive 
realisation or non-discrimination. In this context of subsidiarity, it is useful to understand 
how the doctrine relates to key overlapping obligations in the ICESCR. Through a process of 
relating the doctrine to anchor points in the Covenant, a better approximation of its 
function might be formed. 
Put in simple terms, answers are needed to the questions: where does retrogression fit 
within the ICESCR; can it be described as an immediate obligation; how does it relate to 
other well-known typologies; and how does it relate to other obligations? Some of these 
questions have already been answered or can be answered briefly. However, clear replies to 
all of them are essential to framing the process of (re)constructing the doctrine’s purpose 
and form. 
For example, it has already been argued that the prohibition on retrogression is an 
immediate obligation not subject to the progressive realisation qualification.1 Separately, it 
is also clear, inter alia from the strict framing of the CESCR’s outputs, that the non-
discrimination2 and minimum core obligations3 are not subject to the flexibilities offered by 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 Rory O’Connell and others, Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and 
Resources (Routledge 2014) 64; Christian Courtis, ‘La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales: Apuntes 
Introductorios’ in Christian Courtis (ed), Ni Un Paso Atrás: La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales 
(Editores de Puerto 2006) 9. 
2 CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Art 3 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2005/4 2005) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security 
(Art. 9 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/19 2007) para 42; Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed 
by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW. 
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the doctrine of non-retrogression. This is the correct position for the Committee to take as 
these are separate and free-standing obligations. For them to be subjected to the 
justification process of retrogression would damage their strong and immediate character. 
However, this is not to say that the relative importance of each obligation is clear, or that 
they could currently be placed on a hierarchy of significance.4 
Nevertheless, other aspects of retrogression’s position within the ICESCR require greater 
consideration. The sections below deal with two of those areas where retrogression’s 
awkward place within the Covenant perpetuates. Addressed first is the relationship with 
progressive realisation and, secondly, the relationship with the tripartite typology is 
discussed. In the context of the current chapter these obligations are particularly important 
as they help shape later discussions of how a (re)purposed and (re)constructed doctrine 
might speak to progressive realisation and the various aspects of the tripartite typology. 
4.2.1.  Retrogression’s Relationship with Progression 
In lieu of authoritative guidance, there have been several scholarly attempts to clarify and 
simplify the CESCR’s complex construction of the doctrine of non-retrogression. Within 
these academic accounts, there has been some lack of agreement and this might be viewed 
as sometimes adding to the complexity of the doctrine. As each is a product of its time and 
the CESCR is constantly reinventing the doctrine, these scholarly contributions can age 
quickly. In addition, the line between suggestion and description has sometimes been 
insufficiently bright, leaving ambiguity as to what is currently the case and what is proposed 
as a more successful approach. One of the most prominent differences in approach seen in 
the academic literature has been the approach to dividing the progressive realisation 
obligation from the obligation of non-retrogression. The following sections aim to unpack 
the approaches of Sepúlveda and O’Connell et al who have devoted particular space to this 
issue. 
It should be emphasised that in what follows is only one possible reading of the respective 
scholars’ understandings. Naturally, while the reading given here represents this author’s 
view of the most accurate interpretation, there might be room for other appraisals. It is also 
emphasised that cross-comparisons between the accounts of retrogression (beyond those 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
3 CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an Optional Protocol 
to the Covenant’ UN Doc E/C12/2007/1 paras 9-10; Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2). 
4 Aoife Nolan, Nicholas J Lusiani and Christian Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the 
Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the 
Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 145. 
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provided below) should be cautiously made as there is a complex web of overlapping and 
conflicting terminology. 
4.2.1.1. Sepúlveda on Retrogression’s Relationship with Progression  
Sepúlveda, in her 2003 book,5 discusses retrogression in the context of the article 2(1) 
obligations.6 To understand her considered approach to the doctrine, it is necessary to 
briefly set out the context in which she sees the doctrine. 
Sepúlveda conceptualises the ICESCR’s progressive realisation obligation as comprising two 
corollary obligations; non-retrogression and continuous improvement.7 This is a distinctive 
interpretation of article 2(1) insofar as it sees ‘continuous improvement’ and non-
retrogression both being nested within progressive realisation. This contrasts with the 
traditional view of progressive realisation as the primary obligation beneath which sits a 
residual category of non-retrogression.8 
Yet, what follows this division is more interesting in the current context. Sepúlveda suggests 
that the first obligation – to continuously improve – would largely be violated by omissions 
or passivity.9 This can happen in two ways. First, where declining conditions in the State are 
met with State inaction there may be a breach. In her own words, Sepúlveda notes that 
‘States cannot tolerate a decline in the degree of protection afforded to a particular right 
without taking any action to try to redress or improve the situation’.10 Sepúlveda cites the 
CESCR’s use of the obligation where HIV rates increase without an adequate State 
response.11 The second way, in Sepúlveda’s account, in which States can breach their 
obligation to continuously improve is through inaction in the face of an opportunity to 
improve ESR conditions.12 Here she cites the Committee’s example of a stagnating 
minimum wage despite an improved economy. In both cases, there is essentially a concern 
with the gap between the possible and actual actions of the State (see figure 5 below). 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
5 Thus, she writes before a flurry of seven General Comments and Statements which address the topic. See further the timeline 
of the CESCR’s interventions at Appendix A. 
6 M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Intersentia 2003) 319ff. 
7 ibid 319, 321. 
8 See, eg, Sandra Liebenberg, ‘The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 232, 251; Kam Chetty, ‘The Public Finance Implications of Recent 
Socio-Economic Rights Judgments’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 245. 
9 Sepúlveda (n 6) 320. 
10 ibid 321. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid 322. 
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Having framed the obligation to continuously improve in terms of inaction-despite-
capacity, Sepúlveda moves on to consider retrogression. The definition of this obligation, 
she acknowledges, remains unclear.13 Yet from the materials available to her, Sepúlveda 
notes that it is ‘possible to argue’ that retrogressive measures occur when there is a ‘step 
back in the level of protection [of ESR] which is the consequence of an intentional decision 
by the State’.14 Retrogression, in Sepúlveda’s account, therefore requires both action and a 
reduction in ESR standards. 
 
Taken together, it is clear that Sepúlveda sees the two classes of obligation being primarily 
divided by the action/inaction of the State rather than by changes in ESR enjoyment. Thus, 
she sees it possible to incorporate within ‘continuous improvement’, reductions in ESR 
attainment (that others would class as retrogression) so long as such reductions are the 
result of State inaction. The approach is solid, and deals well with some of the conceptual 
ambiguities of the CESCR’s work. However, Sepúlveda’s analysis raises a number of 
interesting points. 
First, by centring her analysis on the action/inaction dichotomy, and associating 
retrogression with action, she runs into the classic critique of the malleability of these 
concepts.15 As Nolan, Porter and Langford have argued, ‘most examples of “inaction” can be 
recast as examples of “action”’ and ‘the question of whether or not a right is infringed 
should not depend on whether the situation complained of is seen as state action rather 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
13 ibid 323. 
14 ibid. 
15 Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal’ 
[2007] Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Working Paper Number 15, 11ff; see also, Sandra Fredman, Human Rights 
Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP Oxford 2008) 66–70. 
State Capacity Stable 
Gap due to inaction 
ESR Enjoyment 
Gap due to 
inaction 
Figure 5 
ESR Enjoyment 
reduced due to 
deliberate action 
Dealt with under 
Retrogression 
Dealt with under 
‘Continuous Improvement’ 
104	 Chapter	4	
	
than inaction’.16 Indeed, Sepúlveda’s examples can be recast in exactly such a manner. 
While an increase in HIV rates increase without an adequate State response can be seen as 
State inaction, it can also be reframed as an active State choice to prioritise other areas. 
The malleability of the action/inaction divide would have significant implications for the 
obligations States operate under. When a result occurs as a consequence of actions taken, 
under Sepúlveda’s understanding this is to be classed as retrogression (which comes with 
flexibilities for States).17 However, if a result is due to inaction then this would be engage 
the ‘continuous improvement’ duty (which contains no significant flexibilities). Following 
this approach would therefore entail a strong incentive for States to cast their failures as 
active-but-necessary in order to access the routes to justification that the doctrine of non-
retrogression provides. It is perverse to treat State actions that lead to violations any less 
stringently than State inactions (as Sepúlveda’s approach implies). 
Second, Sepúlveda’s interpretation of General Comment 4 emphasises a strong need for 
causation in relation to retrogression.18 In the course of argument Sepúlveda cites part of 
the following passage:  
[i]t would thus appear to the Committee that a general decline in living 
and housing conditions, directly attributable to policy and legislative 
decisions by States parties, and in the absence of accompanying 
compensatory measures, would be inconsistent with the obligations 
under the Covenant.19 
Although careful not to argue that it is conclusively the case, and in subsequent paragraphs 
noting a broader view of the causative link,20 Sepúlveda highlights the Committee’s phrase 
‘directly attributable’ in this quotation. This leads her to suggest that retrogression must be 
a ‘consequence’ of an intentional State decision (a strong test of causation).21 While the 
requirement of State intention can easily be derived from the frequent use of the term 
‘deliberate’ in General Comments,22 the same cannot be said of the inference related to 
causation. The ‘directly attributable’ formulation has not been invoked by the CESCR in any 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
16 Nolan, Porter and Langford (n 15) 11–12. 
17 See, eg, Sepúlveda (n 6) 328. 
18 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 8, pp214-219. 
19 CESCR, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art 11(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1992/23 1991) para 11. 
(emphasis added) 
20 Broadening to include State measures that result in a ‘direct or collateral negative effect’ (emphasis added); Sepúlveda (n 6) 
323; and in subsequent work Independent Expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, Rights-Based 
Approach to Recovery (UN Doc A/HRC/17/34 2011) para 18; Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘Alternatives to Austerity: A 
Human Rights Framework for Economic Recovery’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial 
Crisis (CUP 2014) 27. 
21 Sepúlveda (n 6) 323. 
22 To give three examples; CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the Covenant) (UN 
Doc E/1991/23 1990) para 9; CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education (Art 13 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/1999/10 1999) para 45; CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12 of the 
Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2000/4 2000) para 32. 
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of its other General Comments; the closest connected use of this language being the use of 
the term ‘attributable’ without the word ‘directly’ and its more stringent connotations.23 
Further, in both of its uses of the term ‘attributable’, it is arguable that the CESCR does not 
connect the word to the retrogression context. While in General Comment 4 there is a 
mention of ‘general decline’, the doctrine of ‘retrogression’ is not mentioned anywhere in 
this General Comment.24 
The importance of the above discussion lies in the consequences of applying a ‘directly 
attributable’ test to retrogression. Requiring such a strong connection between State action 
and the negative result (that requires not only a ‘deliberate’ move, but also a consequence 
that is ‘directly attributable’ to that move), increases the difficulty of proving State 
responsibility under the doctrine retrogression. In Sepúlveda’s estimation, the step back 
would have to be a ‘consequence’ of State action. Such a stringent test of causation poses 
particular difficulties where there are multiple causes for a single backwards step.25 In 
addition, this formulation would capture a much narrower range situations than the 
CESCR’s usual assertion of State responsibility for ‘any deliberately retrogressive 
measures’.26 
Aside, perhaps, from her reading of the causation relationship, the way in which Sepúlveda 
defines retrogression is an entirely plausible reading of the CESCR’s work. By focusing on 
the active nature of the CESCR’s terms ‘deliberate’ and ‘measure’, she is able to draw the 
link between retrogression and State action. This provides a way of the dividing the article 
2(1) obligations in an action/ inaction syntax that is familiar to human rights scholarship. 
However, the division is not a perfectly neat one. In order to cast retrogression as being the 
result of State action, Sepúlveda places stagnation and backwards steps that are the result of 
State nonchalance, under the banner of continuous improvement.27 Yet the more 
traditional focus on the nature of the result, rather than on the nature of the State action, 
usually leads all such backwards steps to be dealt with under retrogression, rather than 
under progressive realization. Thus in Sepúlveda’s account, reductions in ESR standards can 
be dealt with either as a violation of the obligation to continuously improve (if the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
23 CESCR, General Comment 7: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art 11(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1998/22, annex IV 1997) 
para 5. 
24 Cf Colm O’Cinneide, ‘Austerity and the Faded Dream of a “Social Europe”’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights 
after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 195; O’Connell and others (n 1) 70. Leckie mentions retrogression and general 
decline as separate obligations; Scott Leckie, ‘Another Step towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20(1) Human Rights Quarterly 81, 99–100. 
25 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 4) 127–128. 
26 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 22) para 9. 
27 Sepúlveda (n 6) 320–322. 
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reduction is due to inaction), or as a violation of the obligation to avoid retrogression (if the 
reduction is due to a deliberate action).28 This conception of the two obligations leaves an 
open and highly important question about another area of State activity. By combining the 
terms ‘deliberate’ and ‘action’ might States escape responsibility for unintentional actions?29  
Thus, while Sepúlveda’s analysis opens up a number of significant questions, her view of 
impermissible retrogression is relatively straightforward. It can be seen that the division 
between retrogression and ‘continuous improvement’ is made by State actions or inactions. 
It is grounded in an understanding of retrogression as involving active, intentional and 
causative State measures.  
4.2.1.2. O’Connell et al on Retrogression’s Relationship with Progression 
In their work focussing on State budgeting in the context of international ESR obligations, 
Rory O’Connell, Aoife Nolan, Colin Harvey, Mira Dutschke and Eoin Rooney address the 
assessment of retrogression in relation to State budgets. Such budget allocations are an 
important case study in the operation of retrogression; both being a frequent cause, and a 
more empirically quantifiable example, of retrogression. In their work they acknowledge 
that ‘progressive realisation is not simply reducible to resources but resources do play a 
[limiting] key role’.30 This is an important reminder of the range of (almost) resource-free 
State actions that can be taken to progressively realise ESR or to prevent retrogression (such 
as legislating or revising existing policy). 
By assessing a number of ESR budget analysis reports,31 the authors are able to draw some 
conclusions about the prevailing views surrounding budgeting and retrogressive measures. 
Unsurprisingly, they see agreement in the literature that State expenditure to obstruct ESR 
improvement or existing enjoyment can constitute retrogression.32 More subtly, the authors 
also find	 evidence	 that	 suggests	 agreement that a reduction in ESR expenditure despite 
‘stable/growing’ need can constitute a retrogressive measure.33 Extending this 
understanding to the converse position, this leads O’Connell et al to emphasise that 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
28 See Figure 5 above (based on ibid 319–332.). 
29 See Chapter 8, pp211-213. 
30 O’Connell and others (n 1) 47. 
31 ibid 39. 
32 ibid 48 (table 2.6). 
33 ibid. 
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reduced resourcing can be justified if ‘enjoyment of ESR continues to increase’.34 
These and other aspects detailed in the research emphasise the need to focus primarily on 
changes to the enjoyment of ESR when assessing for retrogression, rather than only or 
predominantly on the upstream budgetary measures. Changes to budgetary expenditure, 
they note, can only ever be used as a ‘proxy for what is important’ (i.e. levels of ESR 
enjoyment).35 O’Connell et al provide many reasons why identifying a (positive or negative) 
change in expenditure is not the same as identifying a (positive or negative) change in ESR 
enjoyment. These include; inflation, expenditure not leading to a proportionate change in 
realisation, demographic changes, and changes in need.36 Such a results-based paradigm is 
less focused on whether the State is responsible for an action or an inaction. 
These authors focus their idea of retrogression on decreased ESR enjoyment.37 They thus 
depart from Sepúlveda’s retrogression-by-action conception discussed above, noting at one 
point that ‘[housing related declines in ESR enjoyment] can constitute retrogressive 
measures if caused by deliberate action or inaction of the state’.38 The distinction for these 
authors is therefore whether a decrease or an insufficient increase in ESR enjoyment is at 
issue. Where there is a case of insufficient progress in ESR enjoyment (i.e. where progress is 
not ‘optimised’39), it seems that these authors would deal with the issue as a matter of 
inadequate progressive realisation. While, on the other hand, reductions in ESR enjoyment 
would be handled under the obligation of non-retrogression (see figure 6).40 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
34 ibid 48. 
35 ibid 57, 155–6. 
36 ibid 57. 
37 For example, ibid 48, 57, 156, 168. 
38 ibid 156 (emphasis added). Similar sentiments are visible in the authors’ argument that the respect obligation entails both 
positive and negative obligations; ibid 47. 
39 O’Connell and others (n 1) 69. 
40 This also appears to be Scott’s understanding in Craig M Scott, ‘Covenant Constitutionalism and the Canada Assistance 
Plan’ (1994) 6 Constitutional Forum 79, 81–82. 
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4.2.2. Non-Retrogression and Obligations to Respect, Protect and Fulfil 
Another aspect of retrogression’s place within the ICESCR regime that gives rise to difficult 
and abstract questions is its interaction with the tripartite typology. It is, of course, 
important to note the nature of the typology as an analytical device and that the ICESCR 
obligations are not intended to fit neatly into its categories.41 However, there are significant 
questions about whether traditional views of non-retrogression can be differentiated from a 
‘respect’ type obligation. An absolute answer to this question is currently not possible. 
There has been very little attention to these interactions and they are far from simple 
comparisons to make.42 Thus far it has been argued that the obligations to respect and 
protect receive a similar level of scrutiny to the obligation not to retrogress.43 Yet it is 
unclear whether the fulfil obligation is similarly scrutinised. The second indication of the 
complexity of these comparisons are the justificatory criteria attached to non-retrogression. 
It has been argued that the obligation to respect might not even be qualified by reference to 
resource constraints,44 yet as has been discussed above, there are a plethora of justificatory 
criteria used in relation to retrogression. Indeed, such a different treatment of prima facie 
violations might render a comparison between the obligations nugatory. However, with the 
respect, protect, fulfil categorisation being so central to understandings of the ICESCR45 it 
means that retrogression’s unclear relationship with the typology produces a further 
uncertainty regarding the doctrine’s place within the Covenant. As such, even engaging in a 
partial assessment has some value.  
There is some difficulty in comparing accurately how non-retrogression fits with the 
respect, protect, fulfil typology as both are enunciated in multiple forms. For argument’s 
sake (because, in this context, not much falls on which form is chosen), representative 
definitions of each have been taken from a recent General Comment of the CESCR.46 For 
reference, the tripartite typology is commonly described by the Committee as comprising: 
three types or levels of obligations on States parties: (a) the obligation to 
respect; (b) the obligation to protect; and (c) the obligation to fulfil. The 
obligation to respect requires States parties to refrain from interfering, 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
41 Shue reminds us that such typologies are a ‘ladder to be climbed and left behind’; Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, 
Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Princeton UP 1996) 160. 
42 O’Connell and others (n 1) 92. 
43 Malcolm Langford and Jeff A King, ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social 
rights jurisprudence: emerging trends in international and comparative law (CUP 2008) 502. 
44 O’Connell and others (n 1) 90–91. 
45 For example, it is included in many CESCR General Comments; CESCR, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food 
(Art 11 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/5 1999) para 15; CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of 
the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2002/11 2002) paras 20-29; CESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work (Art 6 of the 
Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/18 2005) para 22. 
46 CESCR, General Comment 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art 15(1)(a) of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/GC/21 2001) para 65 (retrogression), paras 48-54 (tripartite typology). 
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directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right[s]. The obligation to 
protect requires States parties to take steps to prevent third parties from 
interfering in the right[s]. Lastly, the obligation to fulfil requires States 
parties to take appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial, budgetary, 
promotional and other measures aimed at the full realization of the 
right[s].47 
Dealing first with the synergies between retrogression and the respect obligation; the 
CESCR’s understanding immediately demonstrates the close connection between the 
respect obligation to ‘refrain from interfering’ and a non-retrogression obligation to avoid 
backwards steps.48 Courtis’ view of retrogression also implies a close correlation between 
non-retrogression and the obligation to respect. He defines retrogression as ‘any measure 
adopted by the state that suppresses, restricts or limits the content of [existing 
entitlements]’.49 Yet, as O’Connell, Nolan, Harvey, Dutschke and Rooney carefully 
illustrate with examples, while a violation of the obligation to respect may also be 
accompanied by a violation of the non-retrogression obligation, this need not necessarily 
be the case.50 
On close examination a slight difference between the two can be discerned. As O’Connell 
et al reason, the focus of the respect obligation on non-interference alongside 
retrogression’s focus on maintaining the existing level of enjoyment, results in scenarios 
where the two have different applications.51 There are two (exceptional) ways in which 
one of the obligations might be applied without the other. The first of these relates to 
retrogression while respecting, the other to violations of the obligation to respect while 
not retrogressing.  
On a relatively strict reading, it can be said that the respect obligation will be engaged 
where there is any State interference with existing enjoyment (including the nature and 
level of that enjoyment).52 On the other hand, retrogression would be engaged where 
there is a change in the level of enjoyment, but probably not where there is a change in 
the way that that level of enjoyment is attained (i.e. non-retrogression is less concerned 
by changes in the mode of enjoyment). This might have relevance in the case of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
47 ibid para 48. It should additionally be noted that the CESCR sub-divides the fulfil obligation into obligations to ‘facilitate, 
promote and provide’; ibid para 51. 
48 CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Eighth and Forty-Ninth Sessions’ UN Doc E/2013/22 para 12; CESCR, ‘Report on the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Sessions’ UN Doc E/1999/22 Day of General Discussion, para 507. 
49 Christian Courtis, ‘Standards to Make ESC Rights Justiciable: A Summary Exploration’ (2009) 2(4) Erasmus Law Review 379, 
393. 
50 O’Connell and others (n 1) 91–92. 
51 ibid. 
52 Koch describes this as a duty ‘to uphold the status quo’ Ida Elisabeth Koch, ‘Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?’ 
(2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 81, 88–89. 
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increasing food bank use in developed countries, for instance. The obligation to respect 
existing fulfilment of the right to food would clearly be violated were State policies 
shown to have interfered with individual’s existing ways of enjoying their right. However, 
if an equivalent level of enjoyment could be realised in a different way (for example) 
through charitable food banks then the obligation of non-retrogression might not be 
engaged. In this example, however, there is an important caveat; to avoid a prima facie 
violation of retrogression the level of enjoyment would have to be truly equivalent. This 
means, for example, that the reduced accessibility or acceptability which might come 
with this different mode of food provision could readily constitute retrogression. 
However, the basic example demonstrates how a State might not be respecting the right 
to food, while avoiding retrogression.53 
The other way in which one of the obligations can be engaged without the other is where 
respect and retrogression co-exist. For O’Connell et al, this seems to be the more likely 
and more significant differentiation between the obligations: 
the difference between the obligation to respect and the obligation not to 
take retrogressive measures essentially relates to the situation where a 
step backwards by the state (retrogression) does not interfere with the 
existing enjoyment of the right (the obligation to respect).54 
The reason for this view is clear and well expressed in the authors’ example. Respect-
plus-retrogression can occur where there is ‘a promise of funding that is subsequently 
withdrawn’.55 Such occurrences are frequent and mean that the distinction between the 
obligation to ‘respect’ and of non-retrogression is more than a purely theoretical one.56 
This variety of coexistence of respect and retrogression occurs where the retrogression 
does not affect the existing enjoyment of a right (the litmus test for the respect 
obligation). One of the only ways in which this can occur is where the sort of promised 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
53 O’Connell et al provide the example of ‘the state adopting a “city beautification” policy and ordering the eviction of 
occupants of areas and buildings targeted for redevelopment’ where the state additionally ‘fails to provide adequate alternative 
housing’. The authors – correctly – suggest that this scenario would entail both retrogression and a lack of ‘respect’. If the 
example were to be modified so that adequate alternative house was indeed provided, then this could be an example of a lack 
of respect without a retrogressive measure. This is because existing enjoyment would be affected (the evictions), without the 
level of enjoyment being affected (there being adequate alternative accommodation). O’Connell and others (n 1) 92. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 See, eg, QUB Budget Analysis Project, ‘Budgeting for Economic and Social Rights: A Human Rights Framework’ (2010) 24 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695955> accessed 20 September 2016; Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Mauled by 
the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in Ireland’s Economic Meltdown’ (2012) 19 
<http://www.cesr.org/downloads/cesr.ireland.briefing.12.02.2012.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016; ‘Trudeau’s Empty Budget 
Promises on the Nation-to-Nation Relationship’ <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2016/03/23/trudeaus-empty-budget-promises-
on-the-nation-to-nation-relationship/> accessed 20 September 2016; Subodh Varma and others, ‘Budget 2016: New Budget 
Here, but Old One’s Funds Still Unspent’ (The Economic Times) 
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/budget-2016-new-budget-here-but-old-ones-funds-still-
unspent/articleshow/51184928.cms> accessed 20 September 2016.  
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progression described by O’Connell et al, is later left undelivered.57  
The central difference between the respect obligation and obligation of non-retrogression 
is therefore the focus on existing enjoyment in respect of the former and on the level of 
enjoyment in the latter. 
Therefore, when one moves beyond the respect part of the typology to consider the 
interaction between retrogression and the protect obligation, much the same results can 
be seen. The obligation to protect – in the CESCR’s words – ‘requires States parties to 
take steps to prevent third parties from interfering’.58 This requires the State to achieve 
the same result as in the case of the respect obligation (i.e. maintenance of the status 
quo), but must protect that result from interfering corporations etcetera rather than from 
itself. As is well known, the reason the respect/protect difference is of analytical utility is 
because of its demonstration of the different types of State action required.59 So while the 
respect obligation will mostly require the State to refrain from acting, the protect 
obligation will require a degree of State action in order to prevent others from acting.60 
However, so far as the obligation of non-retrogression is concerned, this distinction is 
unimportant. As long as it is accepted that the duty of non-retrogression can require 
both State inaction and action (including State actions to deal with third parties),61 there 
will be identical relationships as between respect-retrogression and protect-
retrogression. 
Several examples can help solidify this point. As with before, the right to food can be 
usefully employed. In the scenario where an individual’s level of enjoyment of her right to 
food is disrupted by the extreme and unscrupulous raising of prices by a supermarket 
while the State fails to act, the obligation to protect will be violated. This is simply 
because the State has failed to take steps to prevent third parties from interfering with 
the right.62 However, as long as an equivalent or better level of enjoyment of the right is 
enjoyed there will be no violation of the non-retrogression obligation. Practically, this 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
57 O’Connell and others (n 1) 92. 
58 CESCR, General Comment 21 (n 46) para 48. 
59 Koch (n 52) 82. 
60 Although this is not a neat divide as the CESCR has included as range of more positive duties within the respect category; 
ibid 88–89. 
61 The CESCR sometimes seems to leave open this possibility and O’Connell et al do appear to see inactions as capable of 
leading to retrogression, but Sepúlveda does not appear to see inaction as falling within retrogression; CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Germany (UN Doc E/C12/DEU/CO/5 2011) para 20; O’Connell and others (n 1) 156, 70 (where they note 
respectively that housing related reductions in rights enjoyment ‘can constitute retrogressive measures if caused by deliberate 
action or inaction of the state’ and that ‘an absence of adequate compensatory measures’ can form part of retrogression); see 
also, above section 4.2.1.2.;; Sepúlveda (n 6) 319, 323–324. 
62 CESCR, General Comment 21 (n 46) para 48; cf the suggestion that the ‘protect’ obligation is somewhat larger than this Koch 
(n 52) 91. 
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might involve a comprehensive, well-designed and quality programme of State support in 
order to fill the gap left by the supermarket’s abuse. 
Again mirroring the situation in relation to respect, it is possible for protection and 
retrogression to diverge. For example, the protect obligation would not be engaged by a 
broken State promise to better regulate tax abuses or poor working conditions 
perpetuated by third parties, but such a situation could well engage the prohibition on 
retrogression. 
The relationship between retrogression, as traditionally viewed, and the fulfil obligation 
is looser than for the other parts of the typology. Fulfil requires that ‘States parties to take 
appropriate … measures aimed at the full realization of the right[s]’.63 It therefore links 
most clearly to the duty of progressive improvement and less clearly with the current 
view of retrogression as governing backwards slippage. Of course, there is some synergy 
between the two in cases of reduced ESR enjoyment. Where ESR enjoyment is reduced it 
would engage retrogression, and almost by definition involve the State failing to fulfil the 
rights (although this failure might be justifiable by reference to the progressivity of this 
duty). However, there is no overlap in the opposite case; it does not follow that a failure 
to fulfil will mean retrogression has occurred. 
The other difference of relevance here is the progressive nature of the fulfil obligation.64 
Whereas all of the respect, protect, and non-retrogression obligations are largely (or 
wholly) obligations of immediate effect, fulfil operates differently. This distinction would 
make it difficult to have a depth of overlap between the obligations of non-retrogression 
and fulfil even into the future. 
The various relationships between retrogression and other key ICESCR ideas that have 
been discussed here is not static. It is important that, no matter what form(s) the 
doctrine of non-retrogression takes in the future, it is compared, contrasted, linked and 
differentiated from the (also developing) pictures of central tenets of the Covenant.  
4.3. Replacing Retrogression? 
The sometimes uncomfortable positioning of retrogression within the cannons of the 
ICESCR, adds further difficulty to defining its proper location within the Covenant system. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
63 CESCR, General Comment 21 (n 46) para 48. 
64 O’Connell and others (n 1) 108. 
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With so many challenges with the doctrine’s direction, why should further effort and 
resource be expended on its rescue? 
One answer to this question treats the doctrine’s defining weakness as a strength. The 
disarray of retrogression can be turned into a constructive tool that can address other 
difficulties within the Covenant. It is well known that the ICESCR and its companion 
treaties are not flawless documents; enforcement, responsiveness, accountability of non-
state actors, and extraterritoriality are just some of the more prominent issues. In this 
context, it is the very malleability of retrogression that means that it can be shaped into 
solutions to both the procedural and substantive lacunae in the ICESCR.  
Yet, malleable as retrogression might be, other doctrine innovations might be even more 
flexible – and perhaps more effective – in remedying the ICESCR’s difficulties. Why then, is 
the continued existence, in particular, of a doctrine of non-retrogression required? A new 
doctrine or an adaption of an existing ESR concept might equally be used in remedying the 
ICESCR’s issues and could avoid the identified failings with the non-retrogression doctrine. 
However, there are also justifications that speak specifically to the continuation of the non-
retrogression doctrine. Just as there have been substantial difficulties identified with 
retrogression, these difficulties are neither fatal nor unique to the doctrine of non-
retrogression. The lack of a certain legal basis is a trend across many doctrines, devices and 
mechanisms used in international human rights law.65 Questions around the effectiveness 
of the doctrine can also be asked of other areas of the international human rights regime.66 
Likewise, the changeability of retrogression is mirrored in other doctrinal developments 
(such as the respect, protect, fulfil framework).67 While such difficulties with legality, 
changeability and effectiveness are present with several human rights devices, these 
critiques are perhaps more pronounced in relation to the doctrine of non-retrogression 
In any case, these difficulties are not fatal (individually or in combination) to the continued 
existence of the doctrine. There is no threshold (however useful it might be) for the 
discarding of mechanisms of international human rights that have amassed so many 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
65 See for example, the minimum core doctrine of the CESCR or the Human Rights Committee’s stance on treaty reservations, 
both of which have disputed legal bases in their respective parent treaties; CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 22) para 10; Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant 
or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 (UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add6 1994). 
66 See broadly, Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935. 
67 Sepúlveda (n 6) 157ff. 
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difficulties as to raise questions about their continued existence. There is no formal ‘repeal’ 
of such problem-laden doctrines; at best they are edged into quiet retirement.68 
There are, however, significant advantages to the continuation of some concept of non-
retrogression rather than beginning afresh with a new concept. First, and practically 
speaking, there is no indication that the CESCR intends to abolish the doctrine of non-
retrogression. Nor is there an indication that the Committee is willing to ‘start’ a new 
doctrine that addresses the issues where retrogression was ineffective. It seems pragmatic, 
therefore, to explore the possibilities of an effective doctrine that can supplement the 
ICESCR’s defects, and which works within the existing shell of non-retrogression. 
In addition, the doctrine of non-retrogression has accumulated ‘brand recognition’ as an 
ICESCR obligation. Despite the confusion about the exact meaning of the term, its existence 
is recognised in UN documents,69 textbooks,70 and advocacy communities.71 Indeed, despite 
the confused history of non-retrogression, there is longevity and resilience to the doctrine 
as evidenced by its history of over twenty-five years. Implicit in this continued recognition 
is also a degree of acceptance. Replacing the doctrine would involve setting this recognition 
and acceptance aside and beginning a new history. 
The damage done by the abandonment of the retrogression ‘brand’ would extend to the 
recognition of the term beyond the CESCR and its associated communities. The doctrine of 
non-retrogression has filtered into the work of the CommRC72 and the work of various 
Special Rapporteurs.73 There is inertia that precedes such infiltration, with a period of time 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
68 Eg, the conduct/result typology; ibid 184. 
69 For a selection see Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health, Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic (UN Doc A/HRC/17/25/Add3 2011) para 14; Independent 
Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of 
All Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Reports on Three Multi-Stake Holder Consultations on 
the Draft General Guidelines on Foreign Debt and Human Rights Held in 2010 (UN Doc A/HRC/17/37 2011) para 89; Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-
discrimination in this context, Mission to Indonesia (UN Doc A/HRC/25/54 2013) para 8; Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, The Role of Development Cooperation and Food Aid in Realizing the Right to Adequate Food : Moving from Charity to 
Obligation (UN Doc A/HRC/10/5 2009) para 41; Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and 
consequences, Summary of Activities (UN Doc A/HRC/27/53 2014) para 23; Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe 
drinking water and sanitation, Common Violations of the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation (UN Doc A/HRC/27/55 2014) 
para 46; Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Fiscal Policy and Taxation Policies (UN Doc A/HRC/26/28 
2014) para 28. 
70 Fons Coomans, ‘Education and Work’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (OUP Oxford 
2013) 246; Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (CUP 2014) 531; Philip Alston 
and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (OUP 2012) 323, 325. 
71 Particularly by Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Mauled by the Celtic Tiger: Human Rights in Ireland’s 
Economic Meltdown’ (n 56); Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), ‘Spain: Visualizing Rights’ (2012) 
<http://www.cesr.org/downloads/FACTSHEET_Spain_2015_web.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016; Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESR), Egypt: Factsheet (2013) <http://cesr.org/downloads/Egypt.Factsheet.web.pdf> accessed 20 September 
2016. 
72 See, eg, CommRC, General Comment 15 on the Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health (Art. 24) (UN Doc CRC/C/GC/15 2013) para 72. 
73 See, eg, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (n 69) para 28. 
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passing before such individuals and bodies recognise and adopt the concept into their work. 
This would be likely to apply to any alteration to the doctrine of non-retrogression, but 
might be especially pronounced where new concepts or terms are introduced. 
The doctrine of non-retrogression, then, despite its lack of purpose and serious substantive 
inconsistencies should be retained for its potential and symbolism. The doctrine holds 
potential in addressing some of the ICESCR’s imperfections, and its name-recognition and 
integration into the work of various UN actors and advocacy communities demands that, at 
least, the terminology of non-retrogression be retained. 
4.4. A Progressive Realisation-Related Purpose 
If, then, retrogression is to be retained, how should it be reformed? Clearly, the reasons that 
the doctrine of non-retrogression is in need of a clearly defined purpose are not divorced 
from the type of purpose that is needed. As such the proposed purpose must respond to the 
challenges posed by the doctrine’s disarray, the weak legal basis of some versions of the 
doctrine, and the under-employment of the doctrine (especially in certain contexts). 
On this basis, it is suggested that the purpose of the doctrine of non-retrogression should 
be to further the article 2(1) obligation of progressive realisation. The reasons for orientating 
towards such a purpose can be divided into ‘foundational’ comprising reasons of 
symbolism, legality and history, and ‘operational’, comprising arguments surrounding the 
functioning of progressive realisation. An important function of this set of rationales is to 
provide a (re)constructed doctrine of non-retrogression with a firm normative basis. 
Through developing a progressive realisation-related purpose for the doctrine rather than 
its own independent grounding, it is given a weightier basis. By the same token, however, 
the reasons below make a case for attaching the doctrine not solely to the legal 
understanding of progressive realisation, but basing it in a broader range of factors. It is this 
more diverse range of operational rationales that allow a broad (re)construction of the 
doctrine which can address structural threats, micro actors’ concerns, crises, and its 
practical difficulties.  
4.4.1.  Foundational rationales 
Many of the doctrine’s iterations have had a clear link to progressive realisation. Despite 
having their own weaknesses and having different forms to the type of doctrine now 
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needed, the original enunciation of the doctrine,74 and many that followed later,75 contained 
the idea being returned to here; that retrogression can supplement and support article 2(1). 
Through a return to that traditional idea, reformulations of the doctrine can claim a lineage 
that adds to the rhetorical value of the doctrine. 
 
There is clear symbolism in restating the centrality of the progressive realisation obligation 
by orientating a secondary obligation to face it squarely. Some have expressed caution at 
relying upon subsidiary obligations while ignoring the central progressive realisation 
obligation.76 (Re)purposing the doctrine of non-retrogression to support article 2(1), both 
acknowledges the imperfections of that article’s formulation and emphasises the potential 
for its effective use. 
 
Another ‘foundational’ rationale for a progressive realisation-related purpose is linked to 
the legality of any doctrine. While it is possible to construct a legal basis for all of the 
various iterations of the doctrine discussed in the previous chapter, it is additionally clear 
that most straightforward route to providing a legal basis for the doctrine comes from the 
ICESCR’s progressive realisation provision. In its first foray into the territory of non-
retrogression, the CESCR tied the doctrine to progressive realisation.77 As the progressive 
realisation obligation itself appears in the highly ratified ICESCR,78 the obligation provides a 
strong legal foundation for retrogression. The purpose proposed for retrogression below 
emphasises a straightforward connection between retrogression and progressive realisation, 
and as such does not require legal support from other sources (such as general principles of 
human rights). 
4.4.2. Operational rationales 
There are, in addition, operational reasons for orientating retrogression towards supporting 
progressive realisation. These centre on the current practical difficulties encountered in the 
enforcement and conceptualisation of the progressive realisation obligation.  
The CESCR has struggled in its attempts at applying progressive realisation in Concluding 
Observations. A pattern can be seen in its recommendations to States that indicates the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
74 See Chapter 3, pp80-85. 
75 See above Chapter 3, pp86-90. 
76 Eva Brems, ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’ (2009) 9(3) Human Rights Law Review 349. 
77 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 22) para 9. Although see Chapter 3, pp80-85 for discussion of how the CESCR did not intend 
to create a separate obligation of retrogression. 
78 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3) article 2(1). 164 ratifications as at 20th September 2016. 
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Committee’s discomfort with its own interpretation of progressive realisation in General 
Comment 3. Only once79 does the CESCR invoke the formulation of ‘effective and 
expeditious’ progressive realisation that it prescribed in that General Comment.80 Elsewhere 
the CESCR is limited to invoking a distorted conception of the dynamic ‘rate over time’81 
previously set down. Applications requiring countries to ‘speed up progress’,82 progressively 
realise to a ‘fuller extent’, 83 or noting a ‘lack of progress’,84 are distortions as they remove 
the optimising requirement of the Committee’s interpretation of progressive realisation. 
Whereas the requirement of ‘effective and expeditious’ realisation draws a clear conceptual 
line against which States are to be measured, the CESCR’s persuasions to ‘speed up’ are less 
exacting and provide no such conceptual clarity. However, despite the conceptual clarity of 
the ‘effective and expeditious’ formulation, practically determining the level of State activity 
that satisfies this requirement is highly demanding. It is this practical problem that has 
likely caused the CESCR to warp its own test. 
Far more common than either correct or distorted uses of progressive realisation in the 
Concluding Observations, however, is an avoidance of its use altogether. In the vast 
majority of Concluding Observations there is no attempt to apply the obligation. On the 
occasions where the Committee gives a reason for its non-application of the obligation, the 
reason is almost uniformly a lack of data. Repeatedly, the Concluding Observations note the 
need for ‘effective mechanisms for monitoring’,85 an ‘absence of statistics’,86 or similar 
difficulties in evaluating progressive realisation.87 These practical difficulties experienced by 
the CESCR are reflected in the literature on the subject. Elements of the scholarship note 
that the obligation is ‘extremely complicated’ and requires an ‘enormous quantity of good 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
79 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan (UN Doc E/C12/JPN/CO/3 2013) para 7. 
80 CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 22) para 11. 
81 Eitan Felner, ‘Closing the “Escape Hatch”: A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights’ (2009) 1(3) Journal of Human Rights Practice 402, 414. 
82 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add67 2001) para 52. 
83 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add29 1998) para 7. 
84 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Benin (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add78 2002) para 13. 
85 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add95 2003) para 23. 
86 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Bolivia (UN Doc E/C12/BOL/CO/2 2008) para 13. 
87 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sudan (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add48 2000) para 21; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Angola 
(UN Doc E/C12/AGO/CO/3 2008) para 20; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kuwait (UN Doc E/C12/KWT/CO/2 2013) para 4; 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan (UN Doc E/C12/UZB/CO/1 2006) paras 12, 48. 
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quality data’,88 or simply that there is not enough data,89 and that progressive realisation 
issues are usually linked to structural issues.90 
Given that progressive realisation is so laden with practical issues, a reorientation of 
retrogression towards resolving some of these core problems is required. There are both 
basic conceptual commonalities and practical synergies between the two obligations that 
might be exploited to improve the effectiveness of both. 
4.5. Reconstructed Retrogression 
The challenge, then, in reconstructing retrogression in order to pursue the purpose of 
supporting the progressive realisation obligation, is to strike a balance between internal 
coherence and innovation. While it is clearly important for retrogression to fit within the 
ICESCR and to have a close connection to article 2(1), a simple duplication of that article 
will do little to further its aims and would lead to retrogression’s redundancy. As such, it is 
crucial that the (re)constructed doctrine addresses distinctive but complementary concerns, 
to progressive realisation.  
Consequently, the proposed (re)construction of the doctrine sees: 
a retrogressive measure defined as an action, inaction or contribution to a 
trend which is likely to negatively affect the progressive realisation of 
individuals’ ICESCR rights. 
Given the critical nature of the discussion above on the CESCR’s deviation from a clear legal 
basis for the doctrine of non-retrogression, it is necessary to demonstrate from the start, a 
basis for the proposed (re)construction. As will be obvious from the wording used, the 
primary basis in law is the article 2(1) obligation of progressive realisation. The 
(re)constructed phrasing explicitly references this obligation and deliberately orientates 
retrogression towards its pursuit. Additionally, the ICESCR’s long-term obligation upon 
States to work towards the ‘full realization’ of the rights,91 provides a basis for the ‘long-
view’ of progressive realisation that the (re)construction takes (discussed further below) 
with its additional and more strategic approach. The broad supervisory and implementation 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
88 Cees Flinterman, ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1997) 15 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 244, 244. 
89 Edward Anderson and Marta Foresti, ‘Assessing Compliance: The Challenges for Economic and Social Rights’ (2009) 1(3) 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 469, 470. 
90 Felner (n 81) 407. 
91 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 78) art 2(1). 
	(Re)purposing	and	(Re)constructing	Retrogression		 119	
	
competences set out in articles 18-23 of the Covenant mandate the CESCR’s role in 
monitoring such a provision on retrogression.92 
The following chapters of the thesis address in depth the ways in which this 
(re)construction might be better positioned to engage with structural concerns and the 
particular impacts that crises can have. It also tests the extent to which the (re)constructed 
doctrine might be more responsive to micro-level concerns and how it might be more 
effectively implemented than current versions. This chapter, however, is dedicated to giving 
an overview and sketching the primary features of this (re)constructed doctrine. It is 
principally a ‘commentary’ on the wording of the (re)constructed definition. However, the 
larger implications that flow from several of the phrases in the (re)constructed doctrine are 
more fully explored in later chapters, and only signposts are provided here. 
4.5.1. Introduction and reconstructed character 
The (re)construction is radically different to the CESCR’s developed doctrine in both its 
textual alterations and in its novel character. It has greater dynamism, with a less 
mathematical formulation and a greater range of potential applications. The CESCR’s 
retrogression was limited to applications in certain materialised conditions of rights 
enjoyment,93 and there was equally limited discretion in its application.94 The 
(re)constructed retrogression gives scope for a longer term and more dynamic view of 
situations, and greater flexibility in when to apply it. As a consequence, a finding of 
retrogression would take on an altered significance. While the language suggested above – 
in particular the tie to progressive realisation – maintains (and strengthens) the legal 
character of the doctrine, it minimises the legalistic element of retrogression. In other 
words, while the (re)constructed retrogression has a clear legal basis in the progressive 
realisation obligation, it can be applied without reference to extensive and legalistic 
conditions and tests, a difficulty that affected conditions which demanded multiple layers 
of proof and strong presumptions.95 The implications of this shift in character are further 
explored below, however it is first worth pausing to consider how a change in character can 
benefit retrogression. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
92 ibid arts 18-23. 
93 The CESCR’s doctrine of non-retrogression addressing ‘measures taken’, rather than adopting a more predictive/pre-emptive 
mode and addressing measures ‘under consideration’ or measures that ‘will be taken’. See, eg, CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 
2) para 42. 
94 Especially in the latter versions of the doctrine in which an increasing number of conditions are set down to determine the 
existence of impermissible retrogression; ibid; CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of 
Available Resources” Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 paras 9-10. 
95 See, for example, CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 22) para 45; CESCR, General Comment 14 (n 22) para 32; CESCR, General 
Comment 15 (n 45) para 19. See also Figures 8 and 9 in chapter 8, pp215-216. 
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It has been highlighted in the past that the CESCR is reticent to invoke the language of 
‘violations’ in many contexts,96 and this reticence also applies to the Committee’s uses of 
retrogression. Very rarely97 has the CESCR declared a State to have violated the duty of non-
retrogression. The CESCR’s commitment to a ‘constructive dialogue’98 with States arguably 
necessitates such a cautious approach to binary terms such as violation/no violation, 
legal/illegal, or permissible/impermissible in applied contexts. However this linguistic 
caution can additionally weaken one of the primary mechanisms of ESR enforcement – the 
ability to ‘shame’ States99 – and can leave the Committee’s Concluding Observations on 
severe situations looking inadequate, especially to observers not versed in the diplomatic 
language of UN bodies.100 
On the other hand, hegemonic phenomena that threaten the fulfilment of ESR rarely 
invoke hesitant or qualified language. Take, for example, the unambiguous rallying call of 
neoliberalism; ‘There Is No Alternative’. The hegemony’s brute use of language to force the 
adoption of certain meanings also stands in contrast to the more measured approach of 
human rights discourse. This sets a trap for those using ‘forms and languages of protest or 
resistance’ to contest established power as they are forced to use the terms of the prevailing 
hegemony101 or risk talking with an ‘internal’ language, understood within the community of 
opposition, but with little traction beyond it.102 Consequently, hegemonies are places where 
there is a deep ‘struggle at the level of social language’ and where meaning comes to be 
determined.103 For the ICESCR system to define the meaning of a given situation, requires 
its language to have an adaptability able to meet the hegemony’s capacity to keep ‘its 
balance … by shifting continually to meet its various challengers’.104  
Linguistic moves will – and should – always give way to the formal legal responses of the 
CESCR. However, there is currently a significant gap between the small number of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
96 Audrey R Chapman, ‘A “violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (1996) 18(1) Human Rights Quarterly 23. 
97 The exceptions being (respectively) an historical finding of retrogression and a finding of measures with a ‘retrogressive 
nature’. CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada (UN Doc E/C12/CAN/CO/4; E/C12/CAN/CO/5 2006) para 52; CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: New Zealand (UN Doc E/C12/NZL/CO/3 2012) para 17. 
98 For a discussion of approaches to Concluding Observations see; Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Concluding Observations of 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6(1) Human Rights Law Review 27, especially 36. 
99 Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights 
Organization’ (2004) 26(1) Human Rights Quarterly 63, 67. 
100 For example the CESCR’s response to Spain’s austerity measures; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Spain (UN Doc 
E/C12/ESP/CO/5 2012).  
101 William C Roseberry, ‘Hegemony and the Languages of Contention’ in GM Joseph and Daniel Nugent (eds), Everyday forms 
of state formation: revolution and the negotiation of rule in modern Mexico (Duke University Press 1994) 363–4. 
102 ibid 361. 
103 Vincent B Leitch, The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (1st edn, W W Norton & Co 2001) 2447. 
104 ibid. 
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situations where the CESCR is prepared to clearly declare a violation of the Covenant, and 
the small number of situations where there is clearly no violation. In other words, beyond 
the two extreme situations in which there is an adequate normative and evidential basis to 
declare a violation or no violation, there is a large area of linguistic ‘grey’. The hard legal 
standards do not leave such a grey area as they are usually constructed in binary terms with 
no space in between. Thus, for example, the ICESCR repeatedly requires that rights are 
‘exercised without discrimination of any kind’.105 However, linguistically and practically 
there is a grey middle ground where evidence is difficult to obtain or where adequate data is 
not available. 
It is in this ‘grey’ space where the CESCR is currently unwilling (in the pursuit of 
‘constructive dialogue’) or unable (due to a lack of evidence or legal clarity), to make a clear 
finding either way, that there is the greatest capacity for an increased Committee role. 
While the Committee seems to be (subconsciously) aware of this space and its role within 
it, its current approach is limited and linear. The Committee has issued heavily qualified 
responses and warnings to States, and as such has barely attempted to shape the social 
meanings attached to its observations and recommendations. Although the institutional 
aspects of the CESCR are an important part of such engagements, the legal framework 
could also better accommodate attempts to provide language capable of adaptability and 
engagement with social language and meaning.106 
The (re)construction of retrogression develops a new character of dynamism, a strong legal 
basis without excessive legalism, and endows retrogression with importance as a linguistic 
signifier. These characteristics are important constants that have capacity to inform the 
interpretation of individual clauses. However, there is significance in the formulation of 
each phrase within the (re)constructed definition. These are explored in groups below 
according to the aspect primarily affected, however it is clear that the implications of a 
particular word or phrase can cut across the categories used here. 
4.5.2.  Structural elements 
The phrase ‘contribution to a trend’ in the (re)constructed doctrine entails significant 
innovation on the existing rights frameworks. The term is not found in any of the main 
international human rights treaties. Neither has the word ‘trend’ been used frequently in 
the General Comments of the treaty monitoring bodies. As such it has not acquired a 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
105 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 78) art 2(2). 
106 An important reason for addressing such social meaning is the capacity for grassroots engagement discussed in Chapter 7. 
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specific or defined meaning.107 The phrase allows for a broader range of State actions to be 
captured within the purview of retrogression. However, the phrase is also intended to 
indicate a concern with ‘trends’ that are broader than an individual State(’s) action. The use 
of the notion of a ‘trend’ and its possible implications for retrogression are discussed at 
greater length in the following chapter. However, for now it suffices to note that a focus on 
‘trends’ might allow the CESCR to engage in greater depth with large-scale issues of 
significance such as environmental damage, growing income inequality, the growth of 
extremism, technological developments, or fiscal austerity. 
The (re)constructed phrasing loosens the connection between State action and the (alleged) 
harm. This has three significant results. The first is a diversification of the actors that the 
doctrine of non-retrogression might have cognisance of. That is to say that, any need that 
existed under the old doctrines to demonstrate the State’s sole or primary responsibility for 
a phenomenon is extinguished.108 With the requirement of showing only ‘a contribution’, 
the actions of States can be examined even in the context of a complex mesh of 
public/private sector influence109 and where multilateral State action is a factor.110 
Conversely, under this approach there would be no State responsibility for actions of non-
state actors where there was no State contribution to the action or trend. In practice, such 
instances will be vanishingly rare as harms to ESR will usually be linked to the State’s failure 
to regulate or intervene in respect of such actors.111 An example where a State may evade 
responsibility for the harms perpetrated by non-state actors, might be where the State has a 
comprehensive and effective system of regulation which is positively enforced, but which a 
non-state actor nonetheless violates. However, it is not likely that the ICESCR currently 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
107 The closest analogous use of the term was by the CommRC to refer ‘to the ongoing trends of decentralization, and 
outsourcing and privatizing of State functions’; CommRC, General Comment 16: State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the 
Business Sector on Children’s Rights (UN Doc CRC/C/GC/16 2003) para 1. 
108 There is an indication of the CESCR’s tendency to think in terms of attributing retrogression to a single State in its General 
Comments. The wording reproduced through many of them refers to the non-retrogression obligations of ‘the State Party’. 
The exception to this form of words is where the Committee refers instead to the obligations of ‘States parties’ in Comments 3 
and 18. While the former indicates obligations divided along traditional State lines, the latter leaves open the possibility of 
‘joint and severable’ ESR obligations amongst States parties. It should be noted, however, that the language of ‘States parties’ is 
also capable of referring simply to divided obligations that belong to multiple States. CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 22) para 9; 
CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 45) para 21.  
109 An area of growing interest to ESR scholars and human rights scholars more generally; Koen De Feyter and Felipe Gómez 
Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Intersentia 2005). 
110 As in, eg, human rights un-friendly schemes of taxation; Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (n 69) 
para 78.  
111 The legal mapping of this tends to be less stringent. The threshold for finding a State has discharged its positive obligations 
varies but some of the tests include ‘reasonableness’, ‘all feasible precautions’, and ‘due diligence’; Brian Griffey, ‘The 
“Reasonableness” Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 11(2) Human Rights Law Review 275; Ergi v Turkey App No 40/1993/435/514 
(ECtHR, 28 July 1998) para 78; Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, State 
Responsibility for Eliminating Violence against Women (UN Doc A/HRC/23/49 2013) paras 39-40. 
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covers such scenarios.112 And, although comprehensive non-State actor accountability is not 
secured, the finding of (partial) responsibility of a single State becomes more achievable. 
While the first shift of this terminology is an accommodation of a diversity of actors, the 
second shift of significance is an embracing of a focus on more diverse State actions. The 
CESCR’s retrogression precipitates a focus on State ‘measures’.113 Furthermore, such 
measures, according to the Committee, must be ‘taken’, ‘introduced’ or ‘adopted’ by the 
State, or more explicitly be a ‘course of action’.114 Examples of measures provided by the 
CESCR have also tended to emphasise ‘active’ steps by the State. So for example, in relation 
to social security the Committee suggest that ‘measures’ encompasses the ‘repeal or 
suspension of legislation’, ‘active support’ for harmful measures, ‘the establishment’ of 
differentiated eligibility based on residency, ‘active denial of … rights’.115 While such a focus 
on the ‘active’ choices of the State is justifiable based on the additional framing of 
retrogressive measures as a ‘deliberate’, it is also a limiting factor on the effectiveness of the 
doctrine. 
Such a focus only on the active measures taken by a State fails to acknowledge the range of 
harms that can result from State inactions. It can, as Dowell-Jones has highlighted, in fact 
act as a disincentive to those States which have been proactive in their approach to ESR by 
drawing attention to measures that have been started and then stopped or reduced, while 
paying less attention to States that never began a programme of ‘active’ measures.116 By 
focussing on inactions too in the formulation of the (re)constructed doctrine, it removes 
the bias towards the actions of States. 
In particular, it removes a difficulty of proof that exists under the CESCR’s doctrine that 
affects its ability to contribute to structural (or ‘macro’) debates. It is clear that in the 
majority of truly structural phenomena, such as climate change, the State will not have 
enacted a specific ‘measure’ to cause, or allow the causation of, ESR infringements. Yet, at 
the same time, there may be many policies with smaller effects that in aggregate contribute 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
112 John H Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ [2008] American Journal of International Law 1, 22–23 (noting that the usual 
duty upon States vis-a-vis third parties is one of due diligence); CESCR, General Comment 16 (n 2) para 28 (where the CESCR 
requires that States ‘act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against [men 
and women] by private actors’); Andrew Clapham and Mariano Garcia Rubio, ‘The Obligations of States with Regard to Non-
State Actors in the Context of the Right to Health’ [2002] Health and Human Rights Working Paper Series 12, fn26 
<http://www.who.int/entity/hhr/Series_3%20Non-State_Actors_Clapham_Rubio.pdf?ua=1> accessed 20 September 2016. Were 
the Covenant to cover such instances, the State would be implicated in cases of full horizontal application of the ICESCR 
between individuals. 
113 CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 2) para 42. 
114 CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 45) 21; CESCR, General Comment 15 (n 45) para 32; CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 94) 9. 
115 CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 2) para 64. 
116 Mary Dowell-Jones, Contextualising the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Assessing the 
Economic Deficit (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 52. 
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to the phenomena, or a range of inactions that the State might be held accountable for. This 
is a complexity in the web of State activity that is not well captured by simple action/ 
inaction binaries. Through focussing on a ‘contribution to a trend’ the (re)constructed 
doctrine opens up a space for State accountability for a broader range of measures, actions, 
and inactions.  
Third, is that while the CESCR’s retrogression required a clear causal link between State 
action and a negative rights-impact, the new phrasing loosens this connection. In many 
cases, where there are multiple influencing factors and a crowded policy environment, it 
will be (and has been117) difficult to prove that a specific State policy action resulted in (is 
causally linked to) a specific negative outcome for an individual.118 Through seeking only a 
‘contribution’ to the negative outcome, the (re)constructed version of the doctrine requires 
a more realistic level of proof.119 While the (re)constructed doctrine’s loosening of the 
requirement for causality between State action and human rights impact might seem 
radical, it is worth noting that analogous duties are already imposed on States. This is most 
especially true of the obligation to ‘protect’ which holds States accountable for not 
preventing the harms of third parties (an indirect causal relationship at best).120 
There is, as noted in previous sections,121 a significant challenge in (re)constructing a 
version of retrogression that supports and furthers the progressive realisation obligation 
while also remaining within the constraints of the ICESCR system. The suggested text of the 
(re)constructed doctrine seeks to achieve this through adopting a novel way of achieving 
the obligation, while leaving the obligation itself untouched. An explicit link to progressive 
realisation roots retrogression in the (evolving) substance of progressive realisation, while 
adopting a markedly different approach to the pursuit of progressivity. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
117 Examples abound, such as an increase in food poverty (caused, for instance, by State cuts to social security, State policy on 
food provision, anti-competitive supermarket practices, the economic crisis, or a harsh winter), exploitative clothing 
manufacture (caused, for instance, by the State weakening regulations, rogue companies, or desperate economic conditions), 
and worsening health outcomes (caused for instance, by reduced State expenditure on health, privatisation of health services, 
increased pollution, or more demanding labour). The point here is that it is not impossible to show which phenomena were 
contributory causes, but that it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that the cause of a negative result was State actions. 
118 Such an indication of the need to demonstrate ‘cause and effect’ can be seen in repeated reminders of the State’s ‘burden’ of 
showing that prima facie retrogression is justified. Such a reverse burden of proof is entirely appropriate given the State’s 
greater capacity, however it emphasises the need for a retrogressive measure to be demonstrated in the first instance. See, eg, 
CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 22) para 45. See further Table 3, Chapter 8, p217. 
119 In doing so it addresses one of the key problems highlighted by Sepúlveda when she argues that harms must be ‘directly 
attributable’ to the State. See above pp104-106. 
120 See generally on the respect, protect, fulfil typology; Sepúlveda (n 6) 157. See also above pp108-112. 
121 Above pp118ff. 
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At its core, the progressive realisation obligation focusses on whether States have improved 
levels of rights enjoyment and the rate at which that improvement occurs.122 This is, 
although not commonly framed as such, a mathematical assessment of progress, albeit one 
that is significantly complicated by qualitative factors.123 Stripping qualitative factors away, 
an assessment of performance on the obligation entails looking at the level of protection of 
a right in year X, and assessing whether there has been an improvement in protection in 
year Y. So, for example, if 94% of a State’s population fully enjoyed their right to food in 
2003, the question is whether that percentage increased or decreased in 2008? Coming to 
such a determination engages fraught debates on the utility and accuracy of indicators and 
statistics in human rights.124 
This function of monitoring compliance over time, although again being infrequently 
acknowledged, is an unusual function for a legal doctrine. Bluntly, the usual method of 
assessing legal compliance is to look at actions or results in a specific and narrow 
timeframe. Such a ‘snapshot’ assessment is inadequate for the progressive realisation 
obligation, as it relies on having a comparator against which to assess progress. It is this 
comparative element that poses difficulties, with poor and changeable data preventing the 
CESCR from making like-for-like comparisons. 
Even if one moves beyond such difficulties, this is not the whole story as qualitative factors 
must be integrated. Consideration should be given to whether those deprived of their right 
are from a particular minority,125 whether the pace of improvement might have been 
better,126 the prevailing (economic, political, security, social) conditions in the country 
during the period,127 whether the improvement had come at the cost of another right, 
etcetera. This glance at the layers of difficulty in assessing progress shows how 
mathematical assessments are implicated in the logic of the obligation, and how such 
mathematics can be at best complex, and at worst problematic. 
In addition, the progressive realisation obligation says little about how such improvements 
are achieved. This is classically defended as a position that appropriately respects the State’s 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
122 This dynamic caused unease during the discussions of what complaints mechanisms to include in the ICESCR, where it was 
said that, ‘it would be impossible for the committee to determine what rate of progress in any particular case should be’; 
‘Annotation on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights’ (1955) UN Doc A/2929 Pt. II, at 124, para 41 . 
123 For examples see; Chapman (n 96) 33. 
124 For a good overview see; Maria Green, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to 
Human Rights Measurement’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1062, 1062. 
125 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 94) paras 4, 8(f). 
126 ie whether the progressive realisation has been  ‘expeditious and effective’; CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 22) 9. 
127 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 94) paras 10(c), 10(d). 
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discretion on means (but not ends).128 Yet, the distinction between means and ends is 
closely analogous to the collapsed dichotomy between conduct and result. It is difficult to 
see how (even in theory) a focus only on ‘ends’ or ‘results’ would be effective or even 
possible. In any case, it is not the approach that has been taken by the CESCR or UN Special 
Rapporteurs, which have necessarily moved to incorporate a greater focus on States’ means 
of achieving rights.129 
The (re)constructed version of retrogression aims to avoid these difficulties with 
progressive realisation, while remaining centred on the obligation. ‘Progressive realisation’ 
is expressly mentioned in the (re)construction and forms the centre and purpose of the 
(re)constructed doctrine. At the same time, the more problematic aspects of progressive 
realisation are avoided by the need only to show a negative effect upon progressive 
realisation (and not to definitively show a violation). Mathematical assessments, indicators, 
and a dominant focus on ‘ends’ are all eschewed by the proposed version of retrogression. 
This puts a degree of distance between the two obligations, by adopting distinct methods of 
assessing their fulfilment. Simplistically put, while progressive realisation demands a 
detailed and complex assessment of current ESR outcomes, the (re)constructed 
retrogression permits a necessarily more speculative assessment of the medium- and 
longer-term threats to the progressive realisation of ICESCR rights. This latitude for the 
Committee might allow it to be more ambitious within its limited resource and capacity. 
4.5.3.  Improving Resilience 
While the current doctrine – without a stable content or purpose – has been open to 
somewhat capricious change, especially in a crisis situation, the (re)construction can bring 
greater resilience. The assigned purpose plays a key role in this respect. It provides a key 
point of reference for the application of the doctrine. In addition, in being orientated 
towards the most important and distinctive obligation in the ICESCR, the progressive 
realisation-related purpose is particularly stable. 
This clear purpose should guide the application of the doctrine even in the most pressurised 
situations. Furthermore, the inclusion of ‘trends’ within the scope of the (re)constructed 
retrogression, brings an additional tool for the CESCR that might be especially useful in 
times of crisis. It allows them to act early on States’ retrogressive measures which have yet 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
128 Implicit in, eg, ibid paras 8(a), 8(d).  
129 Indeed, such a function seems implicit in the CESCR’s mandate to offer technical assistance to States. 
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to result in reductions in rights enjoyment. This is especially important in crises due to the 
severe results for rights protections that can occur very quickly. 
4.5.4. Micro elements 
The phrase, ‘likely to negatively affect’, that is present in the (re)constructed doctrine 
captures a relatively broad range of situations. However, this is commensurate to the 
uncertainty that is contained in the (re)construction’s aim of addressing future threats to 
progressive realisation. This is of practical utility as it allows retrogression to be employed 
even where uncertainty remains. As such, the use of ‘likely’ can be contrasted to higher bars 
of proof such as ‘highly likely’, ‘certain to’, or ‘will lead to’. Similarly, the choice of 
‘negatively affect’ progressive realisation, is clearly more moderate than the phrases ‘cause 
damage’ or ‘seriously affect’. 
In addition to the practical dimension of these moderate requirements of proof, there is an 
overlapping benefit in making retrogression more accessible to grassroots campaigns. This 
dynamic is explored in greater depth in chapter 7 below, however here it suffices to say that 
the large information asymmetry between State organs and individuals, NGOs and 
campaign groups requires sensitive handling by any (re)construction of retrogression. By 
adopting a requirement for proof that is flexible (‘likely’, ‘negative’), advocacy organisations 
might better be able to challenge State policy in spite of their relative under-resourcing and 
lack of comprehensive information. 
While important that the doctrine responds to high-level, structural policy debates, it is 
also the raison d’etre of the ICESCR to protect and further individuals’ ESR. The phrase 
‘negatively affect the progressive realisation of individuals’ ICESCR rights’, inserts such a 
focus in the (re)constructed retrogression. This promotes a re-connection to the individual 
and her experience.  As is extensively explored below, this allows a reflection of individual 
and grass-roots concerns in the usage of retrogression and acts as a check on any excessive 
abstraction of the concept. By taking its focus as the individual, this phrasing would also be 
likely to be of greater utility in Optional Protocol complaints. 
4.5.5. Practical elements 
It has been noted that the doctrine of non-retrogression as developed by the CESCR fails to 
provide a definition of what a retrogressive measure is, and instead outlines when the 
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obligation to avoid retrogression will be breached.130 Such an approach arguably underlines 
the CESCR’s own uncertainty surrounding the content of the doctrine.131 The 
(re)construction of the doctrine avoids such definitional uncertainty from the beginning. 
There does remain in any such rewrite, uncertainty about how and to what situations the 
new doctrine might be applied, however, clarity in this regard is contributed through 
explication in subsequent chapters. 
There is an additional advantage to a straightforward definition of a retrogressive measure. 
Whereas there was little indication of what constituted a ‘retrogressive measure’, the 
CESCR contributed significant detail on the criteria for finding a breach of the obligation. 
This caused attention to focus on the legal/technical aspect (is there a ‘breach’?), rather 
than on the actual/substantive element (what is the ‘retrogression’ that we should be 
concerned about?). Put differently the predominance of attention was on the ‘doctrine’ 
rather than the ‘retrogression’ itself. While focus on the former rather than the latter is 
likely to bring less controversy, it, in effect, serves to divert focus and debate from the 
pronounced wrongdoing. In its structure and terms, the (re)constructed retrogression 
plainly gives prominence to the impugned action of the State. 
As is explored in the following four chapters the (re)construction is markedly different to 
the CESCR’s retrogression. As such, it could be asked if it can really be called ‘retrogression’ 
at all? The new concept is undoubtedly a distance apart from the old images of the doctrine. 
Yet, if the well-known current meanings of retrogression are bracketed momentarily, the 
new and (re)constructed view of retrogression can fairly fit within the term. The idea of 
‘retrogression’ captured within the (re)constructed definition simply highlights a negative 
effect. This simpler rendering is arguably more intuitive and its direction can be understood 
without resorting to technical legal definitions. In fact, in comparison with the established 
ideas of the doctrine, the (re)construction arguably fits more comfortably within the 
‘retrogression’ terminology.  
Elsewhere, the (re)construction moves to clarify the type of state activity that it is at issue 
by linking the definition of a retrogressive ‘measure’ to any ‘action’. While previously, there 
was uncertainty surrounding the meaning of ‘measure’ in the context – did it mean a policy 
measure, a budgetary allocation, a law, or something broader? – the reformulation is more 
certain. It is clear under the (re)constructed version that a broad view of state activity 
should be taken. In particular, this approach allows the more diffuse or less formalised 
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131 See Chapter 3, p85. 
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actions to be encompassed, and does not constrain the doctrine to a consideration of 
legislative or completed policy measures. 
Under the CESCR’s previously developed views of non-retrogression there was ambiguity 
around whether omissions could constitute retrogression. Language that traditionally 
surrounded the doctrine discussed measures that would be ‘taken’, ‘introduced’,132 
‘adopted’,133 ‘undertaken’,134 Indeed General Comments 14, 15 and 17 deal with retrogression 
in close connection to an elucidation of the commission/omission divide, seemingly as a 
specific example of a violation that can occur through ‘acts of commission’.135 This matches 
the content of the Maastricht Guidelines which characterises retrogression as one of its 
‘violations through acts of commission’.136 Yet in later elucidations the CESCR moves 
towards accepting omissions can constitute retrogression. This is illustrated in its statement 
on Maximum Available Resources under an Optional Protocol where it is explicitly noted 
that a ‘failure to take steps’ can constitute a prima facie retrogressive measure.137 The 
requirement for a retrogressive measure to be ‘deliberate’ also contributes somewhat to a 
‘commission’ conceptualisation. Although it is logically possible for a State to deliberately 
omit to take steps, identification and proof of such scenarios would be excessively 
difficult.138 
The (re)constructed version of retrogression avoids the highly criticised 
commission/omission binary. It does so by encompassing any ‘contribution to a trend’ 
within the category of ‘actions’ that states will be held accountable. This approach avoids 
the difficulties inherent in holding states culpable for purely unintended (non-deliberate) 
omissions, while capturing all of those actions and ‘contributions’ which impact ESR 
negatively. 
4.6. Conclusions 
While the previous chapter concluded that many of the doctrine of non-retrogression’s 
problems could be traced to a fragmentation and a lack of purpose, this chapter has taken 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
132 CESCR, General Comment 13 (n 22) para 45. 
133 CESCR, General Comment 14 (n 22) para 32. 
134 CESCR, General Comment 16 (n 2) para 42. 
135 CESCR, General Comment 14 (n 22) para 48; CESCR, General Comment 15 (n 45) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 17: The 
Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or 
Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Art 15(1)(c) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/17 2006) para 42. 
136 ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (SIM 1998) para 14(e). 
137 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 94) para 9; likewise in its Letter to States, the CESCR implicate a ‘failure to act’ as a factor in 
considering retrogression; Chairperson of the CESCR (n 2).  
138 See Chapter 8, pp214-219. 
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the analysis a step further. It has argued that there is a case for the continuation of the 
doctrine in some form, but that it requires a new purpose in future. 
The chapter first addressed retrogression’s awkward positioning within the Covenant. This 
was central to an understanding of the appropriate purpose and place for the 
(re)constructed doctrine. In particular, the earlier sections addressed the relationship 
between retrogression and progressive realisation, and the relationship between the 
doctrine and the respect, protect, fulfil typology. 
The implications of defining a new purpose for non-retrogression and (re)constructing the 
doctrine itself, were also explored. In substance, it was suggested that the future purpose of 
the doctrine should be to further the progressive realisation obligation. This suggestion was 
defended on both ‘foundational’ and ‘operational’ levels; in sum arguing that that there are 
symbolic, legal and historical reasons as well as functional rationales for such an orientation 
of the doctrine.  
After setting out this purpose, a (re)constructed doctrine was outlined and brief comments 
on how this new doctrine might align with the purpose were outlined. A definition of 
retrogression that is linked to all kinds of action, including contributions to trends was 
suggested. In addition to a solid legal basis, it was reasoned that such a formulation would 
allow the CESCR to engage with structural issues of concern and to avoid some of the 
monitoring pitfalls that currently exist. The new dynamism of the (re)constructed doctrine 
can contribute something distinctive to the enforcement of the progressive realisation 
obligation and consequently promote a symbiotic relationship with that obligation. 
There remain significant questions surrounding the capacity of the doctrine to address 
structural threats, its resilience in crises, its responsiveness to micro concerns, and its 
ability to practically function. These questions are discussed further in the following 
chapters.
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Chapter 5 
Structural Threats 
5.1. Introduction 
With a (re)constructed purpose and form, there is a real potential for the doctrine of non-
retrogression. Its reformed construction can address areas where the previous incarnations 
failed. In better supporting the functioning of the progressive realisation obligation, the 
(re)construction must engage with the barriers to ESR enjoyment on a number of new 
levels. Those phenomena and problems that affect progressive realisation are far from 
uniformly local or small scale in nature. Indeed, some of the largest impacts on ESR will 
naturally flow from the very largest of phenomena.  
The previous chapter discussed in brief the ways in which innovations in the 
(re)constructed doctrine could address the structural pressures that bear upon ESR 
enjoyment. This chapter unpacks these structural threats and assesses in detail how the 
CESCR has dealt with them so far. It shows at its conclusion how a package of doctrinal 
changes within the (re)constructed retrogression, and some broader reforms can bring 
greater engagement with structural issues. 
While the scale of such phenomena often leads to their full effects being hard to capture 
and understand, Sepúlveda Carmona articulated the magnitude of the most recent crises 
well when she wrote; 
The onset of the global economic and financial crises, following 
consecutive fuel and food crises, exacerbated existing deprivations, 
poverty and inequality, with global ramifications exceeding those of any 
previous comparable economic downturn. Globally in 2011, 205 million 
people were unemployed – the highest number since records began. As a 
result of the crises, at least 55,000 more children are likely to die each 
year from 2009 to 2015. The prevalence of children dropping out of school 
has increased, as boys have been propelled into the workforce and girls 
given an increased burden of household tasks. By 2009, at least 100 
million more people were hungry and undernourished, a situation that 
continues to deteriorate owing to escalating food prices.1 
Issues of such large scale – and economic crises are not the only phenomena in this category 
– pose a severe challenge for the ICESCR. Addressing the hunger of 100 million people living 
in a multitude of political systems, across varied geographies, with diverse socio-economic 
and cultural backgrounds would be a formidable challenge for even the most effective 
system of legal and political regulation. For the ICESCR to successfully meet such a 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘Alternatives to Austerity: A Human Rights Framework for Economic Recovery’ in Aoife 
Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 23–4 (extensive footnotes omitted). 
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challenge looks impossible. And, while calculations of the ICESCR’s demise on this basis 
may seem drastic, if the CESCR fails to demonstrate its ability and preparedness to deal with 
such large scale issues it is entirely conceivable that NGOs will seek other means of holding 
States accountable, and the ICESCR’s relevance will drain away.  
This chapter addresses the CESCR’s engagement with the dilemmas posed by structural 
issues. It does this with the aim of determining patterns in the Committee’s current 
approach and to identify how there might be a better engagement with the structural 
potential of the progressive realisation and non-retrogression obligations in future.  
In speaking to this difficult challenge the following chapter first sketches an outline of the 
relationship between progressive realisation and these structural issues. It then addresses in 
some detail the meaning of ‘structural engagement’ and identifies four levels of 
engagement. Following this, there is an assessment of the value of the CESCR improving its 
engagements with structural issues in future before a final section turns to the question of 
what improvements might be made. A (re)constructed doctrine of non-retrogression and 
other aspects of the CESCR’s operation, are identified as key areas for improvement. 
5.2. Situating Progressive Realisation within ‘Structural Issues’ 
The limited ability to engage with structural issues can sometimes be the result of doctrinal 
limitations of the ICESCR. As noted above, there are conceptual tensions that arise when 
seeking to address both the very largest and most complex issues2 with the same tools as 
address the most individualised of issues. The progressive realisation obligation suffers from 
exactly this conceptual difficulty. Examples such as the well-known Treatment Action 
Campaign or Mazibuko cases, demonstrate how these sort of tensions between high-level 
State policy and individual needs can sometimes arise.3 While there is a reasonable degree 
of clarity about what progressive realisation entails for an individual (i.e. effective and 
expeditious progress), translating this obligation into a large-scale enterprise is more 
difficult. Individuals will have different needs, will start from different levels of rights 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
2 There is little disagreement that addressing ESR on a structural scale is a complex task. See, for example, Jessie Hohmann, 
The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (Bloomsbury Publishing 2013) 30–31; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Human Rights 
Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional Power’ (2010) 1(1) Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 47, 49; Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly 
156, 183. Although it is additionally worth noting that the claim that ESR are ‘too’ complex to properly be conceived as rights 
was used in the recent past to denigrate their status; Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly 
156, 160. 
3 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) (2002) (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa); Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (2009) (CCT 39/09) [2009] 
ZACC 28 (Constitutional Court of South Africa). 
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enjoyment, will have different informal means of securing rights, and will require different 
amounts of time, effort and resource to meet their needs. How does a State formulate a 
policy to progressively realise the rights of millions of individuals while respecting the 
nuances of their individual circumstances? How is the success of this process to be 
measured? When, if ever, can the CESCR find that the State has failed and violated its 
obligations? 
The ICESCR’s basis in individual rights can be a limitation on its ability to address such 
structural issues. Rather than addressing itself to ‘ending hunger’4 (as a generalised 
prospect), the ICESCR recognises ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’ 
(as an individual entitlement).5 While the successful pursuit of either of these aims would 
lead to broadly the same outcome, there is a difference between the two that has a bearing 
on policy formulation, implementation, and progress measurement. 
Whether the end goal (of zero hunger, satisfactory social security, or whatever else) is 
approached with an individual entitlement approach or with a general method, will 
influence the way in which policy is devised. For example, a strong commitment to an 
individual’s entitlement might focus on localised problems with reflection on individual 
needs and solutions. This approach has the benefits of recognising – and centring – the ways 
in which rights deficiencies are a ‘lived experience’.6 This latter emphasis on lived 
experience illustrates the very personal, very individual ways in which people feel and 
understand the under-fulfilment of their rights. As such, it has been convincingly argued in 
the context of austerity that, ‘[l]ived experience … tells us about much more than the 
‘economic-ness’ of austerity; it shows that austerity is always and already multiple as it is 
lived’7; it can ‘bring people back in’.8 Such a focus on lived experiences supports a 
recognition of disparate effects through an individual entitlement approach.  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
4 President of the General Assembly, Draft Outcome Document of the United Nations Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 
Development Agenda (UN Doc A/69/L85 2015) rule 2.1. 
5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3) art 11(2). 
6 For background on this term see Max van Manen, Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive 
Pedagogy (2nd edn, Routledge 2016) ch 2; Donald Vandenberg, ‘Researching Lived Experience: A Review Essay’ (1992) 42(1) 
Educational Theory 119.  
7 Esther Hitchen, ‘Living and Feeling the Austere’ (2016) 87 New Formations 102, 87–88. 
8 Maya Unnithan, ‘What Constitutes Evidence in Human Rights-Based Approaches to Health? Learning from Lived 
Experiences of Maternal and Sexual Reproductive Health’ (2015) 17(2) Health and Human Rights Journal 
<https://www.hhrjournal.org/2015/11/what-constitutes-evidence-in-human-rights-based-approaches-to-health-learning-from-
lived-experiences-of-maternal-and-sexual-reproductive-health/> accessed 20 September 2016. For examples of ‘lived 
experiences’, consider the fear of what the official-looking brown envelope might bring for the disabled social security 
recipient (Kayleigh Garthwaite, ‘Fear of the Brown Envelope: Exploring Welfare Reform with Long-Term Sickness Benefits 
Recipients’ (2014) 48(7) Social Policy & Administration 782, 788–789.), or the feelings of mental health patients that the 
‘service did not trust them and they had to constantly “prove” themselves’ (P Fallon, ‘Travelling through the System: The Lived 
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The language and theory of human rights has, of course, tracked elements of such a lived 
experience approach.9 The persistence of individual dignity as a grounding concept,10 and 
the renewal and application of that concept through processes of participation,11 are both 
intended to capture an accurate image of the effects upon individuals12 and to be used as a 
springboard to action.13 
Of course, while such an individualised approach is aimed at more nuanced and targeted 
policy, there are attendant difficulties. Such high levels of nuance are arguably ill-suited to 
addressing large scale problems. An approach which ignores or postpones attention to 
individual dignity and lived experience can be more straightforwardly formulated and 
implemented. Policies – even well-intentioned and broadly good ones – to end hunger, 
homelessness, or poor sanitation on a general level present a degree of uniformity that 
makes their execution more possible. The central concern for policies such as these is with a 
social dignity, which disregards (or least de-prioritises) the diverse individual experiences 
of, and solutions to, rights violations. 
This presents a tension for the CESCR; is addressing rights violations more quickly but more 
bluntly, preferable to a slower but more individualised treatment of the issue? Further, can 
the ICESCR be read in a manner that supports generalised action that is to the (marginal) 
detriment of individualised responses? 
Even if such questions of strategy are satisfactorily resolved, there are a range of legal 
questions to address. Considering whether the rights of an individual have been 
progressively realised appears straightforward. If an individual or local group claims that 
rights have not been progressively realised in accordance with article 2(1)14 there is a clear 
path to determining if a violation has occurred. An assessment of the progress made is 
combined with a consideration of the available resources and other factors. This apparently 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
Experience of People with Borderline Personality Disorder in Contact with Psychiatric Services’ (2003) 10(4) Journal of 
Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 393, 398.). 
9 For a complication of the arguments presented here see Eric Heinze, ‘Reality and Hyper-Reality in Human Rights’ in Rob 
Dickinson and others (eds), Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012) 198 (arguing 
that human rights are not driven by lived experience, but instead the (media) representation of that experience). 
10 See, for example, discussion in Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(2008) 19(4) European Journal of international Law 655; Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic 
Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights’ (1982) 76(2) American Political Science Review 303. 
11 The elements of which have most clearly been analysed in the children’s rights context; Laura Lundy, ‘“Voice” Is Not Enough: 
Conceptualising Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2007) 33(6) British Educational 
Research Journal 927 (although note the qualifications at 931 regarding the differences between the requirements of art 12 of 
the CRC and ‘participation’). 
12 Daniel Rothenberg, ‘The Complex Truth of Testimony: A Case Study of Human Rights Fact Finding in Iraq’ in Philip Alston 
and Sarah Knuckey (eds), The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding (OUP 2016) 196, 200. 
13 ibid 198. 
14 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 3) art 2(1). 
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simple process is, of course, more complicated in practice. Intricate questions arise, such as; 
whether progressive realisation and available resources should be assessed as separate 
obligations?15 Which metrics should be used to determine ‘resources’ and ‘progress’?16 Are 
other factors such as restraints upon the State, or particular effects upon marginalised 
groups relevant in assessing a breach?17 Although such questions complicate the 
consideration of an individual issue, the Committee can coherently seek clarification and 
support in its previous normative outputs. 
The CESCR makes such determinations on potential violations of the rights of individuals 
or local groups in the context of both Concluding Observations and Optional Protocol 
Communications.18 The latter of these engagements provide particularly clear examples of 
the Committee applying the ICESCR to a concrete situation.  While the Communications 
procedure is in its infancy, it is predicted that where authors of Optional Protocol 
Communications19 are willing to invoke the problematic20 progressive realisation obligation 
many of the Communications will follow this pattern of ‘contained’ engagement with the 
issues.21 It is in the strategic interests of Communication authors to identify a clearly 
defined issue and a remedy that could be endorsed by the CESCR. Indeed, this pattern of 
defined issues and bounded solutions can be seen in the complaints work of the Human 
Rights Committee.22 That Committee is often presented with a question related to a narrow 
set of circumstances and responds with a solution that addresses those circumstances and 
no more. This ‘bounded’ approach has so far been visible in one of the CESCR’s substantive 
views on an Optional Protocol Communication.23 An ability to come to determine specific 
remedies in response to specific issues is, in many situations, a positive. It is, after all, the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
15 Robert E Robertson, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the Maximum Available Resources to 
Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693, 702. 
16 ibid 703ff. 
17 CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” Under an Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant’ (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 para 8. 
18 For an example of the former see the CESCR’s concern with the rights of the traveler communities in Ireland; CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Ireland (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add77 2002) paras 20, 32-33. 
19 ‘Author/s of a communication’ is the term that has been adopted by the CESCR to refer to an individual or group who have 
brought their ‘case’ to the Committee; CESCR, Provisional Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted by the Committee at Its Forty-Ninth Session (UN Doc E/C12/49/3 
2012) rule 3. The use of ‘author’ is used in other treaty body complaints mechanisms also, and is notable for its de-legalization 
of the processes (those bringing a ‘case’ usually being referred to as ‘complainants’, ‘plaintiffs’, or ‘applicants’).  
20 See discussion of some of the problems with progressive realisation in Chapter 2, pp12-16 and Chapter 3, p88. 
21 In a more positive sense, such a focus can be framed as a commitment to ‘effective remedies’; Bruce Porter, ‘The 
Reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating Claims from the Margins’ (2009) 27(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 39, 
especially 46. 
22 Sam Blay and Ryszard Piotrowicz, ‘The Awfulness of Lawfulness: Some Reflections on the Tension between International 
and Domestic Law’ (2000) 21 Australian Year Book of International Law 1, 4.  
23 IDG v Spain [2015] CESCR Communication 2/2014, UN Doc. E/C.12/55/D/2/2014. 
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raison d’etre of the Optional Protocol Communications procedure and was a key feature of 
arguments encouraging the Protocol’s adoption.24  
On the other side of the large scale-small scale tension, it can be seen that the 
determination of the meaning of progressive realisation in larger, more complex contexts 
poses a different set of issues. While the obligation has traditionally and officially been said 
to require States ‘to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the [full 
realisation of the rights]’,25 this provides little by way of guidance for States. Dowell-Jones is 
unforgiving in her critique of the ‘insufficiency’ of progressive realisation and other 
obligations in guiding States’ fiscal policy choices.26 When counterposed against the deep 
complexity of state policy making – involving budgetary deficits, tax policy, competing 
resource claims, long-term and short-term priorities, and international markets, to name 
only a minority – the ‘guidance’ of article 2(1) essentially requiring States to improve their 
performance in a broad range of social goods is derisory. Clearly, there is a need for greater 
attention to the role and meaning of the progressive realisation obligation at the level of 
State policy. However (and as discussed below) stopping at a definition of progressive 
realisation within State policy would also be inadequate. The policies of individual States 
are increasingly unable to address the globalised structural issues that most threaten ESR. 
Rather, a more systematic assessment of the various levels of potential engagement is 
required in order that more effective roles can be imagined for different actors and for 
progressive realisation and non-retrogression. 
It is, in particular, the failure of progressive realisation to speak to state-level policy-making 
that  makes a full examination of the full range of possible engagements with structural 
issues crucial. However effective an individual complaints mechanism might be in offering 
contained solutions for individuals, it is unlikely to contribute significantly to the 
understanding of progressive realisation in structural or macro situations.27 
5.3. ‘Structural Engagement’ 
The meaning of ‘structural engagement’, in its simplest sense, evokes notions of ‘action’ in 
relation to ‘large’ issues, yet it requires expanded discussion. In particular, the discussion 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
24 Malcolm Langford, ‘Closing the Gap? - An Introduction to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 27(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 1, 7. 
25 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23 1990) para 
9. 
26 Mary Dowell-Jones, ‘The Economics of the Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some Human Rights Arguments’ (2015) 15(2) Human 
Rights Law Review 193, 211. 
27 ibid 218ff. 
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below settles on a definition of full structural engagement that involves action on the 
largest (macro) and ‘root cause’ issues.28 Before reaching this type of engagement, the 
section addresses the ‘other’, lesser kinds of action on smaller scale issues that can be taken 
by the CESCR, and provides examples of these engagements. In total, it identifies four sorts 
of (potential) engagement with structural issues and draws these together into a typology. 
The literature offers disparate conceptions of structural or macro issues. However, it is 
possible to gather these definitions into a multi-layered conception of the application of 
rights. Four different levels of action coupled to the varying scale of the issue can be 
identified (figure 7). These types of action move through the relatively straightforward 
application of the ICESCR to the claims of individuals and small groups, to a consideration 
of larger webs of issues, and ultimately towards the structural flaws in systems of 
governance. Of these four types of action, the CESCR has ordinarily engaged with the first 
three. In substance, this means that the work of the Committee has predominantly focussed 
on; 1) the application of existing legal doctrine; 2) noting the progress of existing processes; 
and 3) encouraging the advancement of new processes. This, as examples below 
demonstrate, amounts to a limited engagement with the structural issues of concern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
28 Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’ (2011) 74(1) The Modern Law Review 57. 
Refer (or defer) to existing agendas or 
statements which address structural issues; 
reflect agendas in tone. 
Structural flaws 4	
3	
2	
‘Root Causes’ 
Simple application of existing legal doctrine to 
defined situation. 
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5.3.1.  Level One 
At the bottom of the types of rights action is the application of existing legal doctrines to 
defined situations (number 1 in figure 7). This sort of role arises in the adjudication in the 
situations of individuals or groups and can take place in either Optional Protocol 
Communications or in certain parts of examinations of States Parties. As such applications 
are grounded in a specific situation, it is usually possible for the adjudicative body to avoid 
embroilment in larger and more complex issues and therefore they entail negligible 
engagement with more structural issues. This sort of straightforward application of the 
ICESCR to specific facts, is seen in the two substantive views that the CESCR has released 
under the Optional Protocol so far.29 
However, this pattern is not evidence for the sceptics’ arguments which seek to use 
limitations in ESR adjudication to demonstrate some flaw in the foundations of the rights.30 
While any critique of the CESCR’s adjudication31 is liable to occasionally cover sceptics’ 
ground, key tenets and premises of sceptics’ arguments differ. Here it is clear that the 
determination of ESR violations is not inherently problematic. Instead the argument here is 
that the CESCR’s current processes and doctrines might go further in addressing structural 
threats. 32 
In their adjudicatory-type activities, avoiding such large scale issues can be seen as a ‘coping 
strategy’ for UN human rights bodies. In other words, taking a closely circumscribed 
approach to adjudication allows the bodies to cope with their lack of enforcement powers 
and to provide some tangible remedies for individuals. Indeed, rather than a concern with 
the side-lining of structural issues, the development of a system of individual adjudication 
for the CESCR was more concerned that a structural approach would prevent the pursuit of 
individual justice. As such it has been argued that: 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
29 López Rodríguez v Spain [2016] CESCR Communication 1/2013, UN Doc E/C.12/57/D/1/2013; IDG v Spain [2015] CESCR 
Communication 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014. 
30 Those which dismiss ESR as non-justiciable, having a different ‘nature’ (summarised in Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and 
Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal’ [2007] Center for Human Rights 
and Global Justice, Working Paper Number 15, 7–10) or as being non-legal propositions (see, for example, EW Vierdag, ‘The 
Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1978) 9 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69). 
31 Understood as a ‘means of settling disputes or controversies’; Lon L. Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 
92(2) Harvard Law Review 353, 357. 
32 As such, aspects of the analysis here might also be applied to CPR where those rights also fail to address structural issues. 
See for example of similar critiques being applied to civil and political rights; Marks (n 27). 
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[t]he fact that there may be multiple causes of poverty and a broad range 
of remedial options can no longer justify adjudicative acquiescence to 
serious and widespread violations of fundamental human rights.33 
Such a demand for effective remedies might have strong foundations, and remedies are of 
course important to being able to deliver on its transformative potential.34 However 
complex structural issues do not ‘lend themselves to the identification of singular acts or 
violations or simple remedial orders’35 and in practice the system relies on the adjudicative 
body being mandated to take a reductive approach to large-scale issues.  
This filtration of structural concerns through variable standards36 and intensities37 of review 
effectively facilitates the consideration of an individual or small group issue. This type of 
review is not in itself a problematic method for protecting ESR for individuals and defined 
groups,38 however the approach is not well-placed for addressing issues of a much larger 
scale. 
This inaptitude can be seen in national jurisprudence39 and in the CESCR’s first views issued 
under the Optional Protocol Communication process.40 In the Communication lodged 
against Spain a woman complained that the process that led to foreclosure of her mortgage 
following several missed payments was in violation of her right to housing (taken together 
with the article 2(1) obligation ‘to take steps … by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures’). The observations of the author, State, 
and third party intervener, and the CESCR’s adjudication centres overwhelmingly on the 
individual case. However, allusions are made towards the more significant and substantive 
issues; the economic and social crises in Spain, the very large numbers of foreclosures and 
evictions,41 and the high levels of unemployment.42 In this instance, the process of 
adjudication misidentifies the culprit of the rights violation as mortgage foreclosure 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
33 Porter (n 20) 40. 
34 M Pieterse, ‘On “dialogue”, “translation” and “voice”: A Reply to Sandra Liebenberg’ in Stu Woolman and Michael Bishop 
(eds), Constitutional Conversations (Pretoria UP 2008) 33. 
35 Porter (n 20) 52. 
36 Anashri Pillay, ‘Courts, Variable Standards of Review and Resource Allocation: Developing a Model for the Enforcement of 
Social and Economic Rights’ (2007) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 616. 
37 Anashri Pillay, ‘Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Developing Principles of Judicial Restraint in South Africa and the 
United Kingdom’ (2013) 3 Public Law 599. 
38 Although cf David Bilchitz, ‘Towards a Theory of Content for Socio-Economic Rights’ in Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas and 
Theunis Roux (eds), National and International Perspectives on Social Rights (Ant N Sakkoulas/Bruylant 2008). 
39 Arguably visible in, for example, Government of the Republic of South Africa. & Ors v Grootboom & Ors 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 
(CC); Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 721 (CC); European Roma Rights Centre v. Portugal 
(Complaint No. 61/2010) (Euro. Soc. Charter).  
40 I.D.G. v Spain (n 28). 
41 ibid 3.2. 
42 ibid 6.2. 
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procedures (complete with a legal and State-centric emphasis), and in doing so minimises 
or erases the substance of the rights claim. Even a Committee predisposed to addressing 
structural issues, would struggle to address issues of fiscal austerity, macroeconomic 
choices, and/or the role of international financial institutions within the Communications 
process. 
A similar dynamic can be observed in some parts of some of the Concluding Observations 
issued by the Committee. Where the CESCR discusses a rights issue of a group within the 
State it does so as a vignette of the larger issue.43 So, for example, the Committee might 
discuss the insecure housing tenure of urban dwellers, without taking the issue-at-large of 
shrinking housing stocks and commodification. As with Optional Protocol 
Communications, this does not in itself represent a particular problem, and on the contrary, 
does add to the enforcement of ESR. However, in the same manner as the Optional Protocol 
Communications, this type of engagement falls short of addressing the structural issue and 
instead addresses one of its symptoms (the effects upon a small group). This is not to say 
that adjudicatory-type activities by the CESCR will have no effect upon structural issues, but 
only that structural issues are not directly addressed or considered in this mode of working. 
This is an important distinction as it highlights the general possibility of adjudication on an 
individual case to influence the ‘future relations’ of a range of actors within the attention of 
the Committee.44 For example, an individual case might be so symbolic of the larger issue 
that a CESCR finding on it is seen within the national polity as an indictment of the policy-
at-large. In this regard, the CESCR affects ‘social ordering’ that is more likely to touch upon 
structural issues even without directly addressing those issues.45 
The most recent Concluding Observations on Germany provide a good (but not atypical) 
example of this type of engagement within the State examination process. In three 
consecutive paragraphs, the CESCR notes ‘concerns’ with the protections afforded to three 
groups (homeless persons, transsexual and intersexed persons, and older persons in nursing 
homes).46 It is arguable that the issues of these groups are traceable to some embedded 
structures of inequality, issues with the economic system, and/or changing population 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
43 O’Flaherty notes that in Concluding Observations it is ‘commonplace for recommendations to propose approaches which 
are … very case-specific’; Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 
(2006) 6(1) Human Rights Law Review 27, 36. 
44 Lon L. Fuller (n 30) 357. 
45 ibid. 
46 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany (UN Doc E/C12/DEU/CO/5 2011) paras 25-27. For further examples of groups 
considered by the CESCR see; Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jaqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 2014) 737–738. 
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demographics. Criticism of Ireland’s system of direct provision47 provides another example. 
Both the Human Rights Committee48 and the CESCR49 offered their criticisms of the 
deficient system, but the inhumane nature of the system and the structural othering of 
asylum seekers is left unaddressed.50 There are many other examples of this dynamic in the 
CESCR’s work in everything from poverty51 to caste-based discrimination.52  
Yet, in some of these cases the CESCR makes basic recommendations that measures or 
reporting is improved, as a substitute for a full engagement with the structural issues. Such 
recommendations address only the rights violations faced by the mentioned groups and, 
therefore, fail to directly engage with the broader structural issues. There remains potential 
that the CESCR can have indirect influence upon structural problems through such limited 
recommendations. However, such a strategy relies upon the CESCR producing a large 
enough volume of recommendations, or them having an impact large enough to affect 
related issues. Neither of these tactics are currently viable. 
Affecting all of the CESCR’s activities in future, but particularly in respect of Concluding 
Observations, will be the Treaty Body strengthening process. With severe time limits upon 
its activities,53 and increasingly constrained word limits upon documentation, the 
Committee will be directed towards shorter analyses of the causes of rights violations.54 A 
recent resolution of the General Assembly ‘encourage[d] the human rights treaty bodies to 
adopt short, focussed and concrete concluding observations, including the 
recommendations therein’.55 This resolution and its associated sentiment would seem to 
further threaten the possibility of full engagement with structural issues. 
5.3.2.  Level Two 
With the CESCR’s applications of existing legal doctrines being ill-suited to full structural 
engagement, do other levels of engagement hold more promise? The next level of the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
47 A system of highly restrictive substitutes for full social security entitlements given to asylum seekers in the country. Liam 
Thornton, ‘The Rights of Others: Asylum Seekers and Direct Provision in Ireland’ (2014) 3(2) Irish Community Development 
Law Journal 22, 25–26.  
48 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Ireland (UN Doc CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 2014) paras 19-20. 
49 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland (UN Doc E/C12/IRL/CO/3 2015) para 14. 
50 Thornton (n 46) especially 23. 
51 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Bolivia (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add60 2001) paras 13, 39. 
52 CESCR, Concluding Observations: India (UN Doc E/C12/IND/CO/5 2008) para 14. 
53 Navanethem Pillay, Strengthening the United Nations human rights treaty body system (United Nations Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner, 2012) 31. 
54 UN General Assembly, Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System (UN 
Doc A/RES/68/268 2014) paras 15, 16. 
55 ibid para 6. 
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typology (level two) goes beyond such applications of doctrine. It begins engagement with 
structural problems through references to others’ work. Such engagement moves the 
ICESCR system closer to dealing with structural problems. 
This method of engagement foregrounds the structural engagements of other bodies or 
organisations. Thus, when the CESCR has acknowledged the post-2015 drafting process it 
has not always been in substantive terms.56 Many of these interventions do not contribute a 
novel (or any) analysis of the structural issues at stake. On offer instead is a simple 
recognition of the efforts. Further, as agendas targeting structural issues become established 
and their language embedded, this recognition by the CESCR extends to an ingestion of a 
new tone and thrust. 
It is important, as with the adjudication aspects discussed above, to note that such 
deferential actions by the Committee are not entirely negative. They can contribute 
normative consistency, cultivate inter-relationships between international organisations 
and agendas, and reinforce the norms of the ICESCR. However, if such actions are the 
CESCR’s only or primary engagement with structural issues, then it becomes difficult for the 
CESCR to develop its own analysis of structures and to demonstrate how an ICESCR 
approach to structural problems is distinctive from, for example, an International Labour 
Organisation or a World Bank approach. 
The CESCR’s engagement with structural issues in its Concluding Observations can be 
disappointingly weak and can amount to an erasure of the structural issues. However, on 
occasion the Concluding Observations are used to greater effect to highlight a broader trend 
that is having a bearing on ESR. Thus, while the CESCR has not gone so far as to use the 
term ‘structural discrimination’57 the Committee invokes conceptually similar notions of 
‘patterned’ or ‘societal’ discriminations.58 In one example the Committee notes the 
‘persistent discrimination against Roma people’.59 While these are welcome ‘nods’ towards 
the larger issues at play, the responses of the CESCR remain limited. In the example above, 
despite identifying the persistence of the discrimination, the CESCR limited itself to 
requiring the State to reconsider its position on recognising minorities, to ratify a regional 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
56 Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 30th November 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(2012) UN Doc CESCR/49th/AP//MAB. 
57 Wouter Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Intersentia 2005) 
60 (cf the approach of the CEDAW committee at 78). 
58 Vandenhole (n 56) 60. 
59 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Greece (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add97 2004) para 11. See for further examples, Vandenhole (n 56) 
61. 
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treaty, to investigate, to continue training, and to raise awareness.60 It is also notable that 
this minimal engagement with the effect of ‘structures’ upon rights takes place in the 
context of discrimination; the norm that has most often been thought of as structural. Close 
attention to the structural effects of economic systems or of ecological changes, are likely to 
be some way off. 
Actions by the CESCR that illustrate the tendency to invoke external standards can be seen 
in its Concluding Observations, Statements, and General Comments. Thus deference can be 
seen to the standards of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),61 the Paris Principles 
on NHRIs,62 the 0.7% aid commitment,63 and very frequently to the standards of the 
International Labour Organisation.64 Such references are useful for their reinforcement of 
existing standards and as a shortcut to a larger body of analysis on a particular issue. 
However, in just these four examples of deference65 the CESCR substantially surrenders its 
voice on development and its financing, a key mechanism of state accountability, and on 
standards of work and social security. The CESCR’s accession to the views of these various 
agreements and bodies is all the more notable for the potential divergences between the 
procedural and substantive approach of the ICESCR and those bodies. It is widely 
acknowledged, for example, that the MDGs neglected to properly engage with human rights 
standards,66 and it is clear that while the ILO has a nascent human rights agenda, this falls 
well short of the range of standards in the ICSECR.67 A ‘target’ for ‘rich countries’ to 
contribute 0.7% of their GNP to development has its roots more in realpolitik than in 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
60 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Greece (n 58) paras 31-32. 
61 For a sample see CESCR, Concluding Observations: San Marino (UN Doc E/C12/SMR/CO/4 2008) para 18; CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Afghanistan (UN Doc  E/C12/AFG/CO/2-4 2010) para 4; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka (UN Doc  
E/C12/LKA/CO/2-4 2010) para 5; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ecuador (UN Doc  E/C12/ECU/CO/3 2012) para 23; CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: China (UN Doc E/C12/CHN/CO/2 2014) para 5. 
62 For a sample see CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mongolia (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add47 2000) para 19; CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: San Marino (n 60) para 19; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add49 2000) para 25; 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Jordan (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add46 2000) para 26. 
63 UN Millenium project, ‘The 0.7% Target: An in-Depth Look’ (26 October 2015) 
<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm> accessed 20 September 2016. For a sample in the Committee’s work, see 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Belgium (UN Doc  E/C12/1/Add54 2000) para 16; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland 
(UN Doc  E/C12/1/Add52 2000) para 13; CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom (UN Doc E/C12/GBR/CO/5 2009) 
para 9; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Netherlands (UN Doc E/C12/NDL/CO/4-5 2010) para 4(e). 
64 For a sample see CESCR, Concluding Observations: San Marino (n 60) para 20; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Georgia 
(UN Doc  E/C12/1/Add42 2000) para 3; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Poland (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add82 2002) para 44; 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Estonia (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add85 2002) para 35. 
65 For others see; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Georgia (n 63) para 4 (deference to a wide range of international 
organisations on the question of poverty); CESCR, Concluding Observations: Estonia (n 63) para 54 (environmental 
protection). 
66 Summarising the critiques of others Alston notes, ‘The MDGs do not contain any particular focus on rights, thus effectively 
sidelining rights as though they were a marginal or token issue’ Philip Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of 
the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals’ (2005) 27(3) 
Human Rights Quarterly 755, 765. 
67 See for example; ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Adopted by the International Labour 
Conference at its Eighty-sixth Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998), especially para 2. 
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human rights standards.68 It is ironic that the Committee would defer to these agendas 
despite the fact that many of them are grounded in declarations or agreements that fall well 
short of the firmly binding character of the ICESCR. 
Even if caution about undermining important progress and international consensus on 
structural issues prevented the Committee from unpacking key concepts, there remains 
space for discussion. For example, in relation to aid expenditure, the CESCR might not wish 
to undermine the sufficiency of the target, but it could easily note that human rights 
standards speak to the manner in which the money is raised and expended. Similarly the 
Committee might reinforce the relevance of existing ICESCR norms (for example, 
international assistance69) to the target, or go even further to assess whether a State meeting 
the target would be in compliance with its ICESCR obligations. There is some recent 
evidence of the Committee attempting to capitalise on increased attention to an area while 
setting out the Covenant requirements. A good example of this is where the CESCR notes 
that it ‘does not agree with such [a limited] interpretation’ of the human rights duties of the 
IMF and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.70 More of this 
‘piggybacking’ onto international agendas would allow the CESCR to continue using this 
shortcut to structural issues while also demonstrating the complementarities and 
divergences of the ICESCR framework on these key structural issues. The CESCR’s 
distinctive approach can be maintained even as it attaches to established agendas.  
An additional trend in this regard is the CESCR’s tendency to avoid detailed discussion of 
structural issues in Concluding Observations by referring to its own Statements and Letters. 
This places an especial significance upon the quality of the structural engagement in those 
documents, as in many cases the Committee adds very little or nothing when raising the 
issue in the Concluding Observations. For example, of the 68 States that have been 
examined since the release of the Letter, 71 19 have been reminded of it or have had its 
wording reproduced in their Concluding Observations72 while thicker conceptions of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
68 Michael A Clemens and Todd J Moss, ‘The Ghost of 0.7 per Cent: Origins and Relevance of the International Aid Target’ 
(2007) 6(1) International Journal of Development Issues 3. 
69 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 3) art 2(1). 
70 CESCR, ‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (UN Doc E/C12/2016/1 2016) para 8.The Committee 
also does this to an extent when it suggests that ‘Egypt’s obligations under the Covenant should be taken into account in all 
aspects of its negotiations with international financial institutions’; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt (UN Doc 
E/C12/1/Add44 2000) para 28. 
71 Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc 
HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW.  
72 In the CESCR’s Concluding Observations: Angola (UN Doc E/C12/AGO/CO/4-5 2016) para 8; Concluding Observations: 
Sweden (UN Doc  E/C12/SWE/CO/6 2016) para 30; Concluding Observations: United Kingdom (UN Doc E/C12/GBR/CO/6 2016) 
para 19; Concluding Observations: Canada (UN Doc E/C12/CAN/CO/6 2016) para 10; Concluding Observations: Greece (UN Doc 
E/C12/GRC/CO/2 2015) para 8; Concluding Observations: Italy (UN Doc E/C12/ITA/CO/5 2015) para 9; Concluding 
Observations: Sudan (UN Doc E/C12/SDN/CO/2 2015) para 18; Concluding Observations: Iraq (UN Doc E/C12/IRQ/CO/4 2015) 
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retrogression or crisis issues have largely remained absent. Likewise, the CESCR’s 2001 
statement on poverty is a frequent point of reference in Concluding Observations (being 
mentioned in excess of 80 times).73 
Yet, despite the importance that is placed on those Statements and Letters, they contain 
similar deferential trends. The CESCR’s statement on the corporate sector, for example, 
relies heavily on the work of other bodies in order to construct a continuous narrative on 
the issue. In this case, part of the need to look to the work of the ILO and Human Rights 
Council might be due to the Committee’s own lack of systematic attention to the issue.74 In 
turn this inattention could be due to a range of factors including capacity and expertise. 
In another instance, the CESCR’s Letter to States on the financial and economic crises relies 
on rhetorical devices to show deference to States and to inflate the importance of (neo-
liberal) market-based idea(l)s. For example, there is a flat acceptance that ‘a lack of growth, 
impede[s] the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights’, and a 
reminder that States should ‘avoid at all times’ denials of socio-economic rights.75 This was 
weak and simplistic response to a devastating and complex crisis.76 The response in the 
Letter neatly demonstrates the Committee’s current unwillingness or inability to engage 
with important structural issues in parts of its work. In this instance in particular it is 
plausible that the controversy which surrounded crisis responses contributed to the 
Committee’s reticence to engage fully. Indeed, it was only recently when that controversy 
had subsided that the Committee released a longer, more substantive treatment of 
austerity.77 That Statement is, in some senses, a stronger rebuke to austerity governments 
and cavalier approaches of international financial institutions. However, as the Statement 
followed the CESCR’s weak treatment of the crises in its Letter, it is effectively bound within 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
para 16; Concluding Observations: Ireland (n 48) para 11; Concluding Observations: Portugal (UN Doc E/C12/PRT/CO/4 2014) 
para 6; Concluding Observations: Slovenia (UN Doc E/C12/SVN/CO/2 2014) para 8; Concluding Observations: Romania (UN 
Doc E/C12/ROU/CO/3-5 2014) para 15; Concluding Observations: Czech Republic (UN Doc E/C12/CZE/CO/2 2014) para 14; 
Concluding Observations: Ukraine (UN Doc E/C12/UKR/CO/6 2014) para 5; Concluding Observations: Japan (UN Doc 
E/C12/JPN/CO/3 2013) para 9; Concluding Observations: New Zealand (UN Doc E/C12/NZL/CO/3 2012) para 17; Concluding 
Observations: Iceland (UN Doc E/C12/ISL/CO/4 2012) para 6; Concluding Observations: Bulgaria (UN Doc E/C12/BGR/CO/4-5 
2012) para 11; Concluding Observations: Spain (UN Doc E/C12/ESP/CO/5 2012) para 8. See further Aoife Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-
Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in Aoife Nolan, Rory O’Connell and Colin Harvey 
(eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets & the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Hart 2013) 51–52. 
73 For a representative example see; CESCR, Concluding Observations: People’s Republic of China (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add107 
2005) para 59. 
74 CESCR, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UN Doc  E/C12/2011/1 2011) para 2. 
75 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 70) 3, 5. 
76 See further Chapter 6. 
77 CESCR, ‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (n 69). 
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that earlier analysis, and it thus limited to repeating large parts of it.78 
The CESCR, in its other Letter – relating to the Post-2015 development agenda – similarly 
fails to offer a full engagement with structural issues. While the Committee might have laid 
down substantive targets and defined key human rights issues, instead its limited analysis 
(while still useful) is focussed on matters of how benchmarks, indicators and data are 
incorporated and used. Perhaps in ideal circumstances the CESCR would have produced a 
series of position papers as the drafting process was ongoing, highlighting where the drafts 
would fall short of the ICESCR’s requirements and where greater ambition was needed. It 
was, after all, in the Committee’s own work that it was once said that ‘development 
cooperation activities do not automatically contribute to the promotion of respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights’.79 Yet this early statement seems to have since been 
forgotten. 
In other discussions of development, the CESCR has sought to emphasise its active 
involvement with the right to development.80 Even in the CESCR’s own terms, however, its 
activities ‘complement’81 other declarations and processes rather than shape or lead on the 
issues. It is therefore very difficult to determine the position of the Committee on the 
substance of development. Instead there are fairly meaningless statements offered about the 
‘linkage and the synergy between’ the ICESCR and the Declaration on the Right to 
Development.82  
Finally, in its General Comments the CESCR can also been seen to offer deference to 
existing agendas which address structural issues. In General Comment 18 the Committee 
can be seen to defer to the definition of the ILO on forced labour, and also defers to that 
body in relation to the termination of employment.83 Although, unusually, an ILO 
convention is mentioned in the ICESCR itself the references in the General Comment go 
well beyond that mandate and accept the ILO position on additional matters.84 This use of 
ILO definitions goes beyond the simple cooperation of the institutions and represents the 
CESCR subordinating itself on these issues. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
78 ibid para 4. 
79 CESCR, General Comment 2: International Technical Assistance Measures (Art. 22 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1990/23 1990) 
para 7. 
80 CESCR, Statement on the Importance and Relevance of the Right to Development, Adopted on the Occasion of the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of the Declaration on the Right to Development (UN Doc E/C12/2011/2 2011) especially para 6. 
81 ibid paras 5, 6. 
82 ibid para 7. 
83 CESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work (Art 6 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/18 2005) paras 9, 11. 
84 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 3) art 8(3). 
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Elsewhere, General Comments have referred to studies submitted to the General 
Assembly,85 to United Nations Principles for Older Persons,86 initiatives of the General 
Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights,87 and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development88 amongst many others.  
The persistent references to the UDHR might also be considered an example of deference.89 
In resorting to the Declaration the CESCR is elevating the (authority of the) UDHR’s 
treatment of issues over the CESCR’s own despite the Declaration not having been subject 
to the same level of scrutiny or normative development and being essentially non-binding. 
Of course, in some cases the Committee’s reference to the UDHR will simply be a 
demonstration of the history of a right, but where such references are for the purposes of 
legitimation or to provide an alternative set of norms then they arguably become more 
problematic. 
Across a range of the CESCR’s work, there is a practice of emphasising linkage and of 
deferring to the analyses of other processes. This can be seen in varying degrees in its 
Concluding Observations, Letters, Statements, and General Comments. While there is 
undoubtedly a positive role for such deference and ‘piggybacking’, its prominence in these 
documents demonstrates how the Committee’s work dodges full discussion of structural 
issues. On a functional level, such an approach is contrary to the position that the CESCR 
sought to establish in its early work, where in demanding terms it encouraged international 
organisations to take account of the CESCR’s work.90 
The discussion above is not to attach blame to the CESCR for this approach. Factors such as 
expertise and, importantly, capacity are likely to have a significant bearing in its choice to 
defer to established process. Neither is it to say that all of the CESCR’s work defers to others’ 
analyses. As will be seen below, in other instances there is a greater degree of engagement 
by the body. 
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5.3.3.  Level Three 
Drawing on Susan Marks’ work, level three has been termed engagement with ‘root causes’. 
While her work identifies a general uptick in attention to ‘root causes’ within human rights 
work,91 Marks is troubled by the meaning given to the term. The two broad brands of root 
cause are; human rights violations as a root cause of other regrettable situations (eg. of 
conflict), and phenomena which are ‘root causes’ of human right violations.92 It is the latter 
of these relationships that has become the dominant focus of what Marks terms ‘the 
explanatory turn in international human rights’ and is also central to the discussion here.93 
One strand of the critique of a ‘root causes’ approach focusses on the insufficient depth of 
the causes identified. Examples are given of root causes that are isolated from their cultural 
context94 and the erasure of historical context to identify the root cause of Haitian poverty 
‘not as the outcome of determinate forces and relations…but as local dysfunctions and 
accidents of history’.95 Marks’ key concern is that, in general, human rights institutions stop 
short of identifying the true cause of human rights violations. This leads to a documentation 
of root causes which are not truly ‘root’ or ‘causes’, but rather – according to Marks – are 
effects of a broader phenomenon.96 This understanding leads Susan Marks to suggest that:  
attention is directed at abuses, but not at the vulnerabilities that expose 
people to those abuses. Or there is a discussion of vulnerabilities, but not 
the conditions that engender and sustain vulnerabilities. Or the focus is 
turned to the conditions that engender and sustain vulnerabilities, but 
not to the larger framework within which those conditions are 
systematically reproduced.97  
In concrete examples, this might mean a focus on the indicator statistics of climate change 
(e.g. a global temperature rise of 0.87°C98), while the underlying conditions of 
environmental destruction are unaddressed; or attending to the effects of an economic 
crisis, while the hegemonic macroeconomic system is unchecked; or discussion of the 
harmful effects of discrimination, while leaving the systematic forms of racial, gender, 
wealth, and other inequalities to continue. In the terms of a metaphor, addressing false root 
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92 ibid 61. 
93 ibid 63. 
94 ibid 64. 
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96 ibid 70. 
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causes is akin to addressing the destructive behaviour of a puppet without thinking of the 
puppeteer. 
It is possible to go a small step beyond this root cause analysis, to think further about the 
relationship between the false ‘root cause’99 and the true structural cause. We can 
conceptualise the false roots as having a stranded relationship to the 
actual/macro/structural source of the human rights violation. Illustrated above in figure 7, 
this ‘stranded’ relationship is intended to convey that issues of a structural scale are rarely 
connected to individuals in a linear manner. Rather a single structural issue can, through 
multiple ‘root causes’, affect individuals in a whole range and manner of ways. Take, as an 
example of a structural issue, the neoliberal political and economic paradigm. The stranded 
effects of this include fiscal austerity, privatisation, outsourcing, and periodic crises. 
Another example of a structural issue is gender inequality. One stranded effect of this 
systematic inequality might be direct or indirect discrimination. However other strands that 
flow from systematic gender inequality might be economic biases, certain cultural 
dispositions, and/or the construction of various social practices. 
This stranded picture emphasises the linkages between root causes (e.g. between economic 
and cultural dimensions) and the way in which structural issues (at level 4 of the 
categorisation) result in more than one serious effect (at level 3). In addition, the futility of 
addressing only one purported root cause is highlighted, as without addressing the 
structural issue strands will be maintained and will continue to emerge. To stretch the 
puppet metaphor still further, addressing root causes cannot be seen as anything more than 
cutting the strings that connect the puppeteer to the puppet. Without engaging with the 
fundamental problem, the effects will continue through other routes and in other forms. 
As addressing false root causes is a somewhat limited approach, the CESCR’s focus on them 
is concerning. However, by comparison with the previous level of deference to others’ 
agendas, even this limited type of action on false root causes stretches the Committee into 
new tactics. Most commonly such action takes the form of exhortations towards States and 
international organisations to take ‘action’ or make ‘efforts’ towards the resolution of a 
structural issue. In this sense the CESCR goes beyond a purely passive role and becomes a 
more normative actor. Yet even in this role, the CESCR’s repertoire is frustratingly limited. 
Perhaps stemming from a reluctance to provide a substantive and substantial analysis of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
99 Summarised by Marks as those ‘roots’ where, ‘[i]n the first place, the investigation of causes is halted too soon. Secondly, 
effects are treated as though they were causes. And thirdly, causes are identified, only to be set aside’; Marks (n 27) 70. 
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relevant structural issues, the ‘actions’ and ‘efforts’ encouraged by the Committee tend to 
remain undefined or be self-evidently inadequate. 
Examples of this encouraging but limited analysis are visible in the CESCR’s statement on 
the ‘Rio+20 Conference’ where the Committee notes a range of necessary actions, but is 
limited in its ambition, failing to address the structural roots of the problem.100 General 
Comment 12, although a significant development in many senses, is guilty of the same 
limitation when it vaguely requires of States that they ‘ensure that the right to adequate 
food is given due attention and consider the development of further international legal 
instruments to that end’.101 While new instruments may indeed be necessary, in offering 
such a vague solution the CESCR undermines the pursuit of a more systemic solution to the 
problems faced. 
It is notable that these first three types of engagement – application, deference, 
encouragement – are structural only in the sense that the actions have some (minimal) 
potential or hope of addressing structural issues. It is further noteworthy that the vast 
majority of the activities of the CESCR can be categorised into one of these three limited 
types of action. This limitation has been highlighted by critics of human rights approaches 
who note the severe deficiency of such actions.102 However, reform proposals that are 
entirely sympathetic to the strategic and institutional approach of the human rights treaty 
bodies have also echoed these concerns.103  
5.3.4.  Level Four 
Engagement with the largest and most complex of economic, social and cultural challenges 
is most substantially addressed by the final types of engagement (number 4). The type of 
actions that might be taken under this heading might involve expansive analysis with 
tangible and significant consequences. In essence the work of the Committee at this level 
should be aiming to construct a range of analyses, strategies and actions that can reach the 
structural cause of downstream harms to human rights enjoyment. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
100 CESCR, Statement in the Context of the Rio+20 Conference on ‘the Green Economy in the Context of Sustainable Development 
and Poverty Eradication’ (UN Doc E/C12/2012/1 2012). 
101 CESCR, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art 11 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/5 1999) para 36. 
102 See, eg, Marks (n 27). 
103 The outcome document of the Dublin II process for strengthening the treaty bodies noted inter alia that, 
‘[r]ecommendations that call for structural change … should be made systematically’; Outcome Document, Strengthening the 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System (Dublin II Meeting) (2011) para 71 
<http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/DublinII_Outcome_Document.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016. 
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In this area there are few examples of CESCR involvement. However, the Committee’s 
statement on Globalisation (from 1999) is perhaps the best illustration of the type of action 
that is needed. In that statement the CESCR takes a conceptual approach to the issue of 
globalisation, rooting its analysis in the standards of the ICESCR (without being constrained 
by them), and identifying negative trends.104 The content of this Statement leads to the 
Committee to bluntly note that: 
[c]ompetitiveness, efficiency and economic rationalism must not be 
permitted to become the primary or exclusive criteria for developing 
policy.105 
However, the CESCR also provides examples of how globalisation can affect individual 
rights such as the right to form a trade union, education, social security and health.106 
Importantly however, the CESCR’s framing is successful at addressing the issue in balanced 
manner and illustrating positives to globalisation where they exist.107 
It is clear that dealing substantively with issues such as globalisation poses much more 
complex dilemmas for the CESCR. It perhaps brings the body into areas where its members’ 
collective expertise is less well-developed, and has potential to demand greater resources as 
the Committee members study and negotiate substantial actions. However, a statement 
such as the one on globalisation is significantly more valuable than many of the other efforts 
by the Committee to merely restate that there are connections between a phenomenon and 
the ICESCR without explicating that connection. 
The above analysis provides some illustrative examples of the CESCR’s engagement with 
structural issues. In doing so it points to the areas where the Committee has been least 
active in its interventions. It suggested that the Committee has engaged with structural 
issues cautiously, and to a limited extent through its application of Covenant norms, 
through its deference to existing processes and through its encouragement of ‘action’. On 
the other hand, the more substantial types of structural engagement identified above are 
rarely seen in the Committee’s work. 
5.4. The Necessity of Structural Engagement 
This failure to appropriately engage with structural issues on a deeper level, it will be argued 
below, is a problem for the CESCR. It limits the Committee’s voice on a range of issues, it 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
104 CESCR, Globalization and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Doc E/C12/1998/26 1998). 
105 ibid para 4. 
106 ibid para 3.  
107 ibid. 
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does an injustice to those who rely on its actions, and without reform it is likely to reduce 
the relevance of the ICESCR’s provisions.  
More significant, however, is the harm that the current approach does to the substantive 
goals of the Covenant. The foundations of the multi-layer typology described above are in a 
literature that is (deeply) critical of the approach taken by the international human rights 
movement.108 It has become a well-worn critique of ‘human rights’109 to note an institutional 
aversion to considering the structural roots of a problem. While the previous section 
suggested that full engagement with structural issues may in practice be avoided in the 
CESCR’s work, it is far from clear that this is a problem of institutional design. As such, the 
remaining discussion of this chapter focusses on two issues: why is structural engagement 
important; and how might the CESCR improve at it?  
These are important issues for the (re)constructed version of retrogression. It must be able 
to take on progressively greater, more effective roles in these areas if it is to be able to 
address structural issues satisfactorily. 
5.4.1.  Voice, Relevance, and Individual Justice 
The Committee’s tendency to delegate consideration of structural issues to other 
international institutions or processes has a range of potential mid-term negative effects. 
The first of these is the harm that might result to the ‘voice’ of the Committee. If a trend 
develops of the CESCR contentedly agreeing with outside bodies on a range of matters, it is 
likely that over time the views of those bodies will be sought directly more often. Thus, for 
example, if the CESCR has fully accepted the Paris Principles on NHRIs and has not itself 
added to those standards, it becomes likely that the views and leadership of a more active 
body are sought.110 Of course there is a balance to be struck. The CESCR cannot (and should 
not) take the lead in all matters remotely related to human rights. However, there will be 
issues such as development or neoliberalism where it is crucial for the promotion of the 
ICESCR that the CESCR has a strong and distinct voice.  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
108 Marks (n 27); Anne Orford, ‘Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights’ (1998) 8 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 171; David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton UP 2005). 
109 Although it is worth highlighting that a majority of the critiques are directed the idea of human rights, rather than at a 
particular manifestation of them. Occasionally this framing results in the author critiquing what they see to be problems of 
human rights, but which are not found in human rights documents. See, eg, Slavoj Žižek, ‘Against Human Rights’ (2005) 34 
New Left Review 115, especially 129. 
110 In this case, perhaps the International Coordinating Committee for NHRIs. 
Structural	Threats	 155	
	
A connected concern relates to the general relevance of the ICESCR to rights-related 
discussions. Absent a full engagement with those structural issues that affect rights most 
severely, it is possible that the ICESCR system will slip into a state of limited relevance. If 
the Covenant and the Committee fail to address issues which threaten catastrophic damage 
to the enjoyment of ESR – such as environmental harm or economic instability – then the 
ICESCR system will surely be side-lined. It must be a possibility that those organisations 
and individuals with an interest in ESR would take their advocacy to another international 
or regional body, or to the national level. While predictions of the ICESCR’s irrelevance 
might seem exaggerated, when seen in the context of the CESCR’s weak response to the 
2007/8 crises it is less difficult to imagine advocacy groups moving away from the body as a 
forum for holding States accountable. 
The final feature of the CESCR’s limited approach to structural engagement is the negative 
impact it can have upon those individuals that rely upon it. If individuals or groups rely 
upon the ICESCR system to vindicate their ESR, when the Committee fails to engage with 
structural issues and move towards resolving those issues it does rights holders a disservice. 
Without true structural engagement the ICESCR approaches the status of a sort of 
disingenuous promise; holding out the prospect of ESR for all without having, in a 
structural context, a realistic strategy for their achievement. 
5.4.2.  Structural change  
Yet in a significant sense, these three ‘challenges’ can be seen as peripheral problems of 
form or presentation when counter-posed to the more significant problem that the CESCR’s 
approach poses for achieving the substantive goals of the ICESCR. It is this aspect that 
makes clear the importance of the CESCR engaging more fully and more directly with 
structural issues.  
One of the key facets of an approach that fails to recognise the structural scale of issues, is 
the narrowness of the solutions offered. In Marks’ terms; the ‘under-diagnosis of the 
problem leads to insufficiently broad responses’.111 This focus might be a function of human 
rights systems’ tendency to focus heavily on those issues for which there is a clearly 
identifiable remedial solution.112 Yet, while this focus on remedial solutions might offer short 
term or small scale relief for rights-holders (as in the case of the Optional Protocol system 
discussed above), it falls well short of offering structural change. 
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112 ibid 71. 
156	 Chapter	5	
	
While it is possible to argue for the CESCR to limit itself to such definite and achievable 
solutions (and indeed its current resource and expertise capacities suggest that this may be 
its functional limit), there is a clear disjuncture between the ambition of the ICESCR and 
this position. Generally, ESR ‘pose a more significant challenge to the premises of possessive 
individualism underlying globalization’.113 Specifically, the ICESCR, in addition to the full 
realisation of a range of ESR, promises engagement with complex issues of resources,114 
international cooperation,115 equality,116 and individual economic freedoms.117 These promises 
further implicate the issues of environmental sustainability, development, economic 
stability, and the navigation of socio-cultural contexts. The magnitude of these issues is not 
compatible with short term or small scale solutions. This, then, leaves two possible routes 
forward. Either it can be conceded that the CESCR cannot or should not engage with the 
scale of the challenge posed by the ICESCR. Or, alternatively, it can be acknowledged that a 
more expansive engagement with the scale of those challenges is needed. 
This dilemma is further complicated by critical resistance to human rights bodies such as 
the CESCR taking up such an engagement.118 Critical voices are likely to demand that the 
CESCR reimagines its position, image and theory of itself as it takes up greater engagement 
with complex, balanced and structural issues. A primary concern voiced in this regard is 
that engaging with the detail of policy represents a juxtaposition with the concept of 
‘rights’.119 Thus, it has been argued that ‘[t]he language of “rights” contrasts with that of 
“management” and suggests that there must be some limit to the weighing of costs and 
benefits…’.120 In other words, whereas rights have previously been invoked as a trump card,121 
their use on one side (or both sides122) of a finely balanced issue denatures their special 
appeal. Yet, it is also important that the human rights framework ‘is sufficiently subtle’ so as 
to allow a range of actors to be held accountable in a range of situations.123 It is therefore a 
difficulty for bodies such as the CESCR to recognise that even as their consideration 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
113 Orford (n 107) 189. 
114 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 3) art 2(1). 
115 ibid. 
116 ibid art 2(2). 
117 ibid art 6. 
118 Generally, see Golder who notes that, ‘critical work is expended on reworking and reinscribing the ideal of human rights 
(rather than, for example, displacing, overcoming or transcending it)’; Ben Golder, ‘Beyond Redemption? Problematising the 
Critique of Human Rights in Contemporary International Legal Thought’ (2014) 2(1) London Review of International Law 77, 3. 
119 Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and Human Rights’ in Bronwen Morgan (ed), The 
Intersection of Rights and Regulation: New Directions in Sociolegal Scholarship (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd 2013) 190. 
120 Koskenniemi (n 12) 48–49. See also Pahuja (n 118) 181–191. 
121 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Aileen Kavanagh and John Oberdiek (eds), Arguing About Law (Routledge 2013); 
Philip Alston, ‘The Nature of International Human Rights Discourse: The Case of the “New” Human Rights’, Conference on an 
Interdisciplinary Inquiry into the Content and Value of the So-Called ‘New Human Rights’ (Oxford 1987) 2. 
122 Koskenniemi (n 12) 50. 
123 Orford (n 107) 196. 
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becomes more nuanced and ambitious, rights’ ‘natural place must be outside politics’, or at 
least outside of a certain kind of institutionalised politics, and ‘yet constraining politics’.124  
Beyond simply producing an inadequate scale of response, the CESCR also crucially misses 
its most important target when it fails to focus on structural issues. When it fails to directly 
address the largest of structural issues in a sustained manner, the CESCR allows patterns of 
structural reproduction to continue. Systems which maintain inequality, economic 
injustices or which promote environmental harms are adept at reproducing themselves.125 
This calls for the issues to be addressed in a sustained manner. A short burst of attention to 
globalisation, in a CESCR statement for example,126 will not pose any challenge to the 
continuation or expansion of the harms of that system. Nor is a disjointed and delayed 
response, such as that offered to austerity capable of challenging entrenched phenomena. 
By leaving systemic issues unaddressed and only addressing the more small-scale and 
concrete dimensions of an issue the Committee leaves an important part of the problem 
untouched. The relationship between the systemic and the various effects might be 
characterised as treating the symptoms of a disease while leaving the disease itself to 
continue. Thus, at the very least, the CESCR’s current approach leaves a ‘gap’ in its 
consideration of the issues affecting the Covenant. At its worst, the CESCR is ignoring the 
real problems faced. 
The task of addressing more satisfactorily the structural issues that affect ESR is 
undoubtedly an imposing one, fraught with practical, political and conceptual challenges. 
In one example in the context of a feminist critique of certain tenets of capitalism, Lee 
writes, ‘[w]hile it is simple to frame laws to charge husbands who abuse their wives, it is not 
as simple to deal with the economic violence of capitalism’.127 However, it is clear that 
concerted engagement with these issues is central to a good faith attempt at pursuing the 
ICESCR’s promise. Neither, despite the difficulties, are the promises of the ICESCR 
unattainable. In a bid to overcome ‘a feeling of hopelessness and passivity’, Orford notes 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
124 Başak Cali and Saladin Meckled-García, ‘Human Rights Legalized’ in Başak Cali and Saladin Meckled-García (eds), The 
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4. 
125 Rob White, ‘Environmental Harm and the Political Economy of Consumption’ (2002) 29 Social Justice 82, 98. 
126 CESCR, Globalization and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 103). 
127 Yumi Lee, ‘Violence against Women: Reflections on the Past and Strategies for the Future - An NGO Perspective’ (1997) 19 
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that ‘[i]t is not possible to imagine alternatives…when critics are complicit in representing 
[the status quo] as all-powerful’.128 
5.5. Improving Structural Engagement 
How then can structural engagement be improved? What role does retrogression have to 
play in this improvement? And, specifically, how can the (re)constructed version of 
retrogression contribute to such advances? Stress testing the ability of the (re)construction 
to engage with structural issues is an important goal of the section. It is clear that a 
reformed doctrine cannot be a silver bullet, however. Acknowledging this, the places where 
broader reforms are needed are also discussed. 
While, in the current research, the potential changes to retrogression are the core concern, 
there are a range of other reforms that could improve the dialogue between ESR and 
structural issues. Addressed first below are the doctrinal changes to non-retrogression, 
following which some broader institutional reforms are discussed.  
5.5.1.  Changes to Non-Retrogression 
The (re)constructed doctrine permits improved structural engagement through a number of 
key phrases.129 The first of these phrases (‘action, inaction or contribution to a trend’) 
expands the range of behaviours that States can be held accountable for under the doctrine. 
This is intended to combat the sort of engagement with structural issues that identifies false 
‘root causes’ (level three of the typology developed above). This frees the CESCR to focus on 
the real magnitude of the issue, in the knowledge that subsequently finding the link back to 
a responsible State is easier. It means that the Committee is not forced to ‘stop short’ and 
discuss false root causes for fear of losing the link to accountability. 
Further, in its focus on ‘trends’ the (re)constructed doctrine aims to address the nature of 
structural issues more comfortably. Very large structural issues will be seen in outline 
before their effects can be seen in concrete State policies or ESR violations. The recent wave 
of austerity provides one example of where State contributions to rhetoric preceded policy 
manifestations which themselves took some time before appearing in provable ESR 
violations. It was clear in some contexts long before individuals could evidence the impacts 
upon them, that the socio-economic interests, especially of the already disadvantaged, were 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
128 Orford (n 107) 194 (footnote omitted). 
129 The full (re)construction read; ‘a retrogressive measure [is] defined as an action, inaction or contribution to a trend 
which is likely to negatively affect the progressive realisation of individuals’ ICESCR right’. Chapter 4, p118. 
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to be de-prioritised. Allowing the CESCR to act on the basis of rigorous projections and 
critique austerity before it took hold in policy or real world effects, would have speeded its 
response and increased the effect of its interventions. It would mean that fewer individuals 
would have to suffer the effects of retrogressive measures and for a shorter period of time, 
before the measures were opposed by the Committee. 
The second change which facilitates the deeper structural engagement detailed in level four 
above is the phrase, ‘negatively affect the progressive realisation’. This is different to some 
current understandings of retrogression insofar as it does not only prohibit reversals in ESR 
standards (backwards steps) but rather prohibits any damage to progress that is being 
made. Again, this empowers the CESCR to intervene at an earlier stage when indications of 
the negative effects of a structural issue arise, but before the reductions in ESR enjoyment 
begin to be felt by individuals. It is also a more logically sound approach. If it can be seen 
from a period of stagnating results that a policy is not working, it makes little sense – in the 
context of the ICESCR’s demand for progress – to hold off considering the measure until it is 
actively harming individuals. 
Together with these specific doctrinal changes, the simpler formulation of the doctrine also 
facilitates its more frequent use. Rather than up to thirteen criteria that are to be assessed 
under current versions of the doctrine, the (re)constructed formulation asks a simple 
question; is the activity under consideration likely to negatively affect the progressive 
realisation? In the context of a CESCR under time and resource pressures, such simplicity 
allows the CESCR to interrogate retrogression more often and make more findings of it. 
This is essential. One of the major problems with the current versions of retrogression has 
been their underuse in the face of severe situations. Retrogression or approximations of it 
have been invoked just 15 times in the CESCR’s Concluding Observations (in addition to 19 
mentions of the Letter to States).130 The simplification of the terms of the doctrine could 
enable to Committee to engage with it more often in relation to challenging structural 
issues.  
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5.5.2. Institutional Factors 
However, as is apparent from the previous sections, a doctrinal adjustment alone would be 
inadequate. A CESCR with greater resources, broader expertise and more ambition is 
required. The Committee and its supporting staff must have the capacity to respond with 
speed to global developments, and to engage – in depth – with ongoing structural issues. 
How best to build such capacity within the political and institutional constraints of the UN, 
is a matter for other research.131 However, reform proposals must go beyond efficiency 
concerns and demonstrate how any revised committee arrangement would be better 
equipped to assert influence over structural changes that affect rights. 
One element of such reform might involve the treaty bodies working together on structural 
issues and including the insights of the special mandate holders to a greater extent. 
Phenomena such as global warming or economic dysfunction do not simply affect the 
ICESCR rights, but can have impacts upon the full range of human rights treaties. In such 
scenarios, a coordinated response makes more sense than a narrower focus on ESR only. 
The response is also likely to be better, with the greater texture and weight that the 
combined expertise and perspectives of the various committees and rapporteurs can bring. 
Another strategy might be greater co-working with non-human rights bodies. It is 
undoubtedly true that the site of the most pivotal decisions that shape the response to 
structural issues is not the CESCR. While this continues to be the case, the CESCR engaging 
and discussing structural issues with influential international organisations provides a way 
of ensuring the inclusion of ESR thinking. However, many of the issues with this approach 
that were outlined above remain relevant, including the possible cost to the distinctiveness 
of the CESCR’s voice. It is crucial that the CESCR guards jealously its unique perspective on 
socio-economic issues. 
Indeed, beyond simply being a way of the CESCR implanting its own approaches into 
influential organisations, working closely with them offers opportunities to improve its 
responses, and to learn from the work of those well-resourced organisations. 
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5.6. Conclusions 
One of the significant innovations in the (re)constructed doctrine of non-retrogression is its 
capacity to improve the CESCR’s response to structural issues. This chapter set out to 
demonstrate why, and in what respects, the Committee was currently failing to address 
those macro-scale issues and then to provide an account of how a reformed doctrine of 
non-retrogression might help. 
The chapter began by offering an assessment of why structural engagement posed a 
particular challenge for the ICESCR. It laid much of the blame at the foot of the progressive 
realisation obligation which fails to speak to high-level policy making in a coherent manner. 
In particular, the requirements placed upon States when devising and implementing a 
wide-ranging social policy are poorly delineated. 
To demonstrate the effects of this weakness, the chapter broke into four levels, the types of 
structural engagement that are required. At the one end, the CESCR was seen to be 
relatively successful in its application of existing doctrine to well-defined situations. The 
body is also competent when it comes to offering some engagement with existing agendas 
or in identifying potential causes for the under-fulfilment of ESR. The difficulty came with 
the CESCR’s capacity to link apparent ‘causes’ to their underlying structural determinants 
or to offer any real diagnosis or discussion of those structural issues. In this larger, more 
challenging task the CESCR’s performance was poor. 
Having argued that the progressive realisation obligation was an impediment to structural 
engagement, and having shown some the CESCR’s difficulties with such engagement, the 
chapter collected some of the ways in which structural engagement is crucial. It was argued 
that the distinctiveness, relevance, and ability to provide individual justice all hinged upon 
the CESCR’s ability to engage with structural issues. Further, it was argued that the capacity 
to enact change was also linked to its ability in this area. 
Finally, the chapter turned to bring together the ways in which the (re)constructed doctrine 
and other institutional reforms might address the CESCR’s weaknesses in this area. Of the 
doctrinal changes, the freedoms to interrogate larger issues that the CESCR gained from the 
changed wording were noted as the most significant. Particularly, the changes to the 
doctrine encourage the CESCR to assess a broader range of State actions and inactions and 
to look for earlier effects upon progressive realisation. The simplification of the doctrine 
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was also suggested as being helpful in increasing the frequency with which the doctrine was 
seen in Concluding Observations. 
As a whole the chapter identified the difficulties with relying upon the ICESCR’s progressive 
realisation obligation to achieve full structural engagement, and it posited changes to 
retrogression as a solution to those problems. On its own the addressing of structural issues 
would not properly fulfil retrogression’s assigned purpose. However, when combined with 
the reformed doctrine’s attention to crises, micro groups, and the practicalities of 
monitoring, it is an important starting point. The following chapters take up this work and 
continue the stress testing of the (re)constructed doctrine. 
 
		
Chapter 6 
Resilience in Crises 
6.1. Introduction 
A subcategory of the type of structural threats discussed in the previous chapter are those 
events marked by the characteristics of ‘crisis’.1 Crisis situations add pressure to the 
handling of an issue and the legal flexibility that is often offered to those tasked with 
responding to the crisis has posed a particular challenge to the operation of the doctrine of 
non-retrogression. Non-retrogression, in the absence of a derogations clause in the ICESCR, 
is the sole crisis-orientated flexibility that States can avail of. Yet, despite this, the doctrine 
has traditionally offered very little margin for emergency State responses. In the 
Committee’s words, ‘it is precisely in situations of crisis, that the Covenant requires the 
protection and promotion of all economic, social and cultural rights’.2 
This puts the doctrine of non-retrogression on something of a collision course with the 
normally flexible responses to crisis situations. On the one hand, the doctrine seeks to 
tightly regulate the options for States in crises. On the other, crises are frequently used by 
those holding power to claim greater flexibility and fewer constraints upon their actions. 
This collision appears to have resulted weakening of the doctrine of non-retrogression in 
the most recent financial and economic crises. The previously stringent controls that the 
doctrine imposed upon States were downgraded in the CESCR’s ‘Letter to States’3 resulting 
in a significantly greater degree of flexibility for those responding to the crises. 
The (re)constructed version of retrogression offers opportunities to revisit the vulnerability 
of the doctrine to crisis situations. In particular, its simplicity might mitigate the type of 
rewriting of the doctrine’s criteria that took place. However, a (re)construction would lose 
some of the stability that is currently seen in the doctrine of non-retrogression, and might 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 The terms ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ are used interchangeably here to reflect their general interchangeability in scholarship and 
public discourse (eg the economic ‘crisis’ of recent years has also been referred to as an economic ‘emergency’). This usage is 
notwithstanding that it may be useful to invoke one or other term for a specific purpose (eg for legal claims, the term 
‘emergency’ may have greater purchase). 
2 CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Sessions’ (2011) UN Doc E/2011/22 para 150. The CESCR has also endorsed 
this line of reasoning in General Comment 2: International Technical Assistance Measures (Art. 22 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/1990/23 1990) para 9; and to a lesser extent in General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the 
Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23 1990) paras 11–12. For an academic adoption of this perspective see, eg, Amrei Müller, The 
Relationship between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Humanitarian Law: An Analysis of Health Related 
Issues in Non-International Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 139. 
3 Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc 
HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW. 
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therefore be less resilient to crisis impacts. A close analysis of the doctrine’s operation in 
crises is therefore essential. 
This chapter addresses the doctrine’s resilience. It situates the issue within the context of 
the institutional pressures upon the CESCR, and shows how the current doctrine of non-
retrogression was impacted by the crises. It demonstrates the problems with the changes 
made to the doctrine and looks towards how the (re)constructed version of non-
retrogression might offer greater resilience. The chapter concludes by arguing that the 
severity of the impacts upon retrogression might be mitigated through a combination of in-
built flexibility and a strongly defined guiding purpose. 
6.2. A Committee Under Pressure 
An acknowledgement of the context in which the Committee was operating and the events 
which it was (meant to be) responding to, is helpful to understanding its use of the doctrine 
of non-retrogression. As has been well explored, the global financial crisis was no less than a 
disaster for human rights.4 However, for the Committee, it can also be described as an 
existential moment. Although there had been economic crises before,5 there was also 
greater global attention to the 2007/8 crisis.6 In addition to this, by 2007 the CESCR was a 
well-established body that had just reached its 20th anniversary. It was therefore reasonable 
to expect a robust response from the Committee. Members of the Committee showed 
moments of awareness of the gravity of the crisis and its implications for the Covenant. 
Gomes, for example, noted in a CESCR session: 
[the ICESCR’s] implementation in the future would face two major 
difficulties: the consequences of the current financial crisis; and the need 
to consider the economic, social and cultural rights of the most 
vulnerable and excluded groups in the design of global trade policies.7 
Although the CESCR might have been attuned to the importance of its role, the nature of 
that role seems to have been harder to identify. In addition to the attention the crises 
garnered, there was also significant political division and sensitivity surrounding 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
4 Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘Alternatives to Austerity: A Human Rights Framework for Economic Recovery’ in Aoife 
Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 23–24; Aoife Nolan, ‘Not Fit for Purpose? 
Human Rights in Times of Financial and Economic Crisis’ (2015) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 360, 361–363; see 
generally, Aoife Nolan, ‘Introduction’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 
2014) 1–5. 
5 Aoife Nolan, Nicholas J Lusiani and Christian Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the 
Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the 
Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 126. 
6 No doubt in part due to the countries that were affected; Bob Jessop, ‘Narratives of Crisis and Crisis Response: Perspectives 
from North and South’ in P Utting and others (eds), The Global Crisis and Transformative Social Change (Springer 2012) 23. 
7 CESCR, Summary Record of the Second Part (Public) of the 50th Meeting (18th Nov 2008) (UN Doc E/C12/2008/SR50 2009) 
para 10. 
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governments’ responses to them. This inevitably put the CESCR in a difficult position and it 
is likely to have contributed to its early paralysis on the issue. As Nolan argues, the CESCR’s 
longstanding position that compliance with the Covenant does not necessitate a particular 
economic system need not have limited the Committee from fully discussing the 
‘parameters and impacts of economic decision-making’.8 However, in the sensitivity of the 
context it is easy to see how the CESCR might have had anxieties about doing so. 
This anxiety can be seen to manifest itself in a number of ways. The CESCR seems to have 
been paralyzed for much of the crises. Between the brief attention given to the crises at its 
forty-first session (in November 2008) and the release of its letter at its forty-eighth session 
(in May 2012) there is no discussion of the appropriate response of the CESCR recorded in 
its Summary Records or Annual Reports.9 After this long period of delay the CESCR’s letter 
became the main point of normative reference for the crises and austerity.10 However, a 
further statement was released much later in 2016 on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and 
the ICESCR.11 It is unclear what the purpose or reasoning behind this second statement was, 
however, its release provides some indication of the incubation period of the CESCR’s full 
response (around eight years). 
Such delays might be explained away as resulting from a time-pressured Committee that 
had prioritized country examinations.12 However, such a conclusion does not sit easily 
alongside other CESCR discussions. In its brief (and only officially recorded) discussion of 
the crises prior to the Letter, the CESCR showed no such pessimism about its available time 
and decided that it would produce a statement very quickly by the forty-second session.13 
Indeed, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights was informed that the CESCR ‘was 
about to publish a statement’.14 Committee member Mr Sa’di was also of the view that 
drafting a statement on the crises should not take a long time.15 The same member also 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
8 Nolan, ‘Not Fit for Purpose?’ (n 3) 371. 
9 Except for a repetition at the forty third session of a promise to release a Statement on the financial crisis at the forty-second 
session; CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Third Session’ (2010) UN Doc E/2010/22 para 556. 
10 See, for example, references to the Letter in; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Slovenia (UN Doc E/C12/SVN/CO/2 2014) 
para 8; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Romania (UN Doc E/C12/ROU/CO/3-5 2014) para 15; CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Portugal (UN Doc E/C12/PRT/CO/4 2014) para 6; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Czech Republic (UN Doc 
E/C12/CZE/CO/2 2014) para 14; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ukraine (UN Doc E/C12/UKR/CO/6 2014) para 5; CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Japan (UN Doc E/C12/JPN/CO/3 2013) para 9; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Bulgaria (UN Doc 
E/C12/BGR/CO/4-5 2012) para 11; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iceland (UN Doc E/C12/ISL/CO/4 2012) para 6; CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Spain (UN Doc E/C12/ESP/CO/5 2012) para 8; CESCR, Concluding Observations: New Zealand (UN 
Doc E/C12/NZL/CO/3 2012) para 17. 
11 CESCR, ‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (UN Doc E/C12/2016/1 2016). 
12 Bras Gomes made such an argument during the CESCR’s discussions; CESCR, Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of 
the 27th Meeting (3rd Nov 2008) (UN Doc E/C12/2008/SR27 2008) para 11. 
13 CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Third Session’ (n 7) para 556. 
14 CESCR, Summary Record of the Second Part (Public) of the 50th Meeting (18th Nov 2008) (n 5) para 11 (emphasis added).  
15 ibid para 13. 
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found time to debate whether the crisis was a financial or an economic one.16 Another 
Committee member used the CESCR’s brief discussion of the crisis to raise the issue of how 
the crisis had affected the US dollar, and thus his own travel allowances.17 Given the range 
of issues that the CESCR felt able to discuss in this context, and its initial plan to publish a 
statement by its next session, it is unlikely that time constraints alone prevented the CESCR 
from engaging with the crisis.  
Rather, for the Committee the crisis can be characterised as providing a restrictive context. 
The opportunities for normative development were limited by political sensitivities, as well 
as some degree of resource and time constraints. These institutional pressures during the 
crises demonstrate the need for a strong, clear, and resilient normative framework to be 
developed in advance of crises so as to enable the straightforward application of the 
ICESCR’s norms. Unfortunately, the doctrine of non-retrogression did not provide such 
clarity and resilience. This, it is argued below, enabled the hollowing out of the obligation 
at the very time that it mattered most. 
6.3. Changes to Retrogression in the Crises 
There was a marked change in how the ICESCR dealt with retrogression during the most 
recent crises. Its Letter, as well as being its primary response to the crises, moved away from 
the CESCR’s traditional position on crises. The CESCR’s earlier approach afforded States a 
range of everyday flexibilities in protecting Covenant rights, but did not permit them 
exceptional powers or the authority to substantially weaken rights protection in times of 
crisis. It is arguable that the Letter to States changed that pattern, endorsing a new level of 
emergency flexibility for the implementation of obligations. This amounts to a near-
suspension of the doctrine of non-retrogression.  
6.3.1.  Pre-2012 Approach to Retrogression and Crises 
Taken as a whole, the ICESCR has not traditionally supported deviations from Covenant 
obligations that are rationalised as ‘emergency’ responses18 and it contains no provision 
allowing for derogations.19 Instead, flexibilities are afforded through article 2(1)20 and article 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
16 ibid. 
17 ibid para 15. 
18 Diane A Desierto, ‘ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting the Non-Expropriation Compensation 
Model during Financial Crises’ (2012) 44 George Washington International Law Review 473, 493. 
19 M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Intersentia 2003) 281 (fn 132), 293. Indeed there was no specific discussion of such a provision during the drafting 
process; Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International 
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4, and additionally through the use of less prescriptive substantive articles. The most 
significant of these flexibilities – article 4 – allows States to enact ‘limitations’ but, crucially, 
does not frame such measures as ‘emergency’ ones. 
The distinction between derogations and limitations is not an exact one, but there are 
several differences of ‘character and scope’.21 For example, derogation provisions are subject 
to a threshold condition, meaning there must usually be a ‘time of public emergency’ before 
the reduction of rights protections can be contemplated.22 This is not the case with 
limitations, which can be enacted at any time including in situations of ‘normality’. There 
are additional differences in the scope of the potential interference(s) with rights. With 
derogations regimes, the restraining factors on action tend to be the ‘exigencies of the 
situation’, ‘other obligations under international law’ and the requirement of non-
discrimination.23 In the context of limitations, however, requirements of legality, 
compatibility with the ‘nature’ of the rights and the promotion of the ‘general welfare of 
society’ restrain the potential rights-interfering actions.24  
In essence, the purpose of article 4 ICESCR is to accommodate balances between (or the 
‘harmonisation’ of25) various rights, and between rights and ‘the legitimate interests of the 
community’,26 and thus to pragmatically resolve tensions within the Covenant itself.27 In 
taking such an approach, the ICESCR accommodates situations in which different rights 
come into conflict with each other or cannot be fully realised in tandem. The Covenant 
scheme, does not however, allow for a departure from those rights for reasons that are not 
‘compatible with the nature of [the] rights’.28 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly 156, 217; ‘The Limburg Principles on 
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 
paras 46–56. 
20 Sandra Liebenberg, ‘The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa’ (2001) 
17 South African Journal on Human Rights 232, 252; Scott Leckie, ‘Another Step towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key 
Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20(1) Human Rights Quarterly 81, 94. 
21 Amrei Müller, ‘Limitations to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9(4) Human Rights Law 
Review 557, 654. 
22 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976, 999 UNTS 171) art 4. 
23 ibid article 4. 
24 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3) art 4. 
25 Alston and Quinn (n 28) 194. 
26 ibid. 
27 CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/2000/4 2000) para 28. See also Sepúlveda (n 17) 278. 
28 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 22) art 4. Sepúlveda suggests the synonym ‘essence’ here 
to imply that measures should not be contrary to the ‘essence’ of the Covenant rights; Sepúlveda (n 17) 281. 
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The use of limitations, rather than derogations, is indicative of the ICESCR’s overall 
approach to emergency management. Through prohibiting derogations, the ICESCR denies 
the need for exceptional responses to emergency situations. This approach places 
emergency responses within the ‘ordinary’ scope of application of the ICESCR and does not 
allow for exceptional emergency responses to situations that threaten security or order.29 As 
such, it has been argued that ‘the Covenant fully applies in emergency situations’.30 The 
CESCR has even made this point in relation to programmes of austerity in the past, saying 
that it: 
recognizes that adjustment programmes will often be unavoidable and 
that these will frequently involve a major element of austerity. Under 
such circumstances, however, endeavours to protect the most basic 
economic, social and cultural rights become more, rather than less, 
urgent.31  
This  ‘more, and not less, important’ approach is often justified by highlighting that the 
nature of socio-economic rights (requiring access to food, healthcare, work etc.) makes 
them especially valuable to individuals in an emergency.32 This approach to emergency is 
important to understanding the degree to which the CESCR modified its scheme of  
obligations when dealing with the financial and economic crises.  
The pattern of allowing everyday flexibility but barring exceptional or emergency responses 
is reflected in the doctrine of non-retrogression. As was noted earlier, the most lengthy 
statement of the doctrine is in the General Comment on the right to social security.33 There, 
the CESCR required States that wished to take a retrogressive step to prove that the 
measures are duly ‘justified by reference to the totality of the [ICESCR] rights’, and that the 
maximum available resources are being used.34 In addition the CESCR noted that it: 
will look carefully at whether: (a) there was reasonable justification for 
the action; (b) alternatives were comprehensively examined; (c) there was 
genuine participation of affected groups … (d) the measures were directly 
or indirectly discriminatory; (e) the measures will have a sustained impact 
on the realization of the right to social security, an unreasonable impact 
on acquired social security rights or whether an individual or group is 
deprived of access to the minimum essential level of social security; and 
(f) whether there was an independent review of the measures …35 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
29 Alston and Quinn (n 17) 202. Except, as Sepúlveda notes, ‘where such a situation is “genuinely synonymous” with general 
welfare of society’; Sepúlveda (n 17) 282. 
30 Sepúlveda (n 17) 296. See also CESCR, ‘Statement on The World Summit for Social Development and the ICESCR’ (UN Doc 
E/C12/1994/20 Annex V 1995) para 5; CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 2) paras 11–12. 
31 CESCR, General Comment 2 (n 2) para 9. 
32 CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Sessions’ (n 2) para 150. See further, Müller (n 2) 139. 
33 CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/19 2007) para 42. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
Resilience	in	Crises	 169	
	
	
As such, the principle of non-retrogression in its pre-2012 form combined with the 
individual rights, article 4, and article 2(1), to provide significant flexibilities to States. 
Where States found themselves unable to progressively realise the rights, it was open to 
them to prove the need to take backwards steps. This everyday flexibility denied the need 
for derogations, special powers or the suspension of legal frameworks. 
This helped to emphasise consistency of outcome. By refusing to subject ESR protections to 
the fluctuations of crisis situations, the importance of the rights is arguably underscored. 
Further, beyond simply emphasising the importance of the protection of the rights (a claim 
liable to being ‘trumped’ by something even more important, such as a crisis), this approach 
highlights the value of consistent protection. A final more pragmatic benefit of the 
approach that had generally been taken to retrogression prior to the Letter, is the 
maintenance of spaces for advocacy; if the obligations remain intact there remain avenues 
for contesting the State’s approach. 
6.3.2. Post-2012 Approach to Retrogression and Crises 
This general picture of how the ICESCR previously dealt with emergencies underlines the 
significance of the (legal and/or rhetorical) move that the CESCR made with respect to 
retrogression. The Letter has already proved influential, having been cited by the 
Committee in Concluding Observations,36 and its key innovations appearing in the CESCR’s 
two most recent General Comments.37 However, just how influential it proves to be in the 
medium to long term is at least partially dependent upon its legal status. The legality of the 
CESCR’s outputs was discussed at length above,38 and it was concluded – in brief – that the 
weight of all of the various Committee outputs hinged on the body’s own authority as an 
interpreter of the Covenant. This puts much less weight on the exact form of the output 
(whether it is a Letter, General Comment or Statement). 
If the Committee continues to stand behind its contents, the Letter has the potential to 
substantially shift the interpretation of the doctrine of non-retrogression – and perhaps 
consequently of the Covenant – towards greater flexibilities for States in crises. There are 
two primary indicators of this new more flexible direction; firstly, the fact that any change 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
36 See note 10 above. 
37 CESCR, General Comment 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/22 
2016) para 38; CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (Art 7 of the Covenant) (UN 
Doc E/C12/GC/23 2016) para 52. 
38 See Chapter 3, pp68-72. 
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in approach at all took place in the context of the financial and economic crises and 
secondly, the substance and character of the changes. 
It is common for crisis situations and the rhetoric surrounding them to be used to ground 
claims for greater deference to those exercising power. 39 This is what has occurred in the 
CESCR’s Letter to States. The letter formed the Committee’s primary response to the 
financial and economic crises, and the CESCR used it to make substantial alterations to the 
doctrine of non-retrogression. In addition, the CESCR relies on rhetorical devices to show 
deference to States and to inflate the importance of (neo-liberal) market-based idea(l)s. For 
example, there is a flat acceptance that ‘a lack of growth, impede[s] the progressive 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights’, and a reminder that States should ‘avoid 
at all times’ denials of socio-economic rights.40 This is weak phrasing that might be 
indicative of a cautious approach by the CESCR, and is language which has continued to be 
used since the Letter.41 If there was anything in the uncertainty of a crisis that the CESCR 
could state with confidence it was that States ‘should not’ violate socio-economic rights. 
Furthermore, this stands in stark contrast to the CESCR’s previous practice of reminding 
States that socio-economic rights are more, and not less, important in times of national 
emergency.42 At the same time, the CESCR’s use of the term ‘crisis’ in the context of 
retrogression indicates, at the very least, a passive ingestion of that characterisation of the 
situation. Previously, the doctrine had generally appeared linked to ‘everyday’ situations of 
resource constraints and only less often in emergency contexts. The CESCR had 
encountered economic crises before, and had not demonstrated so much flexibility to 
national governments.43 Such a rupture in the Committee’s approach might plausibly be 
attributed to the (perceived) nature of the financial and economic crises as international, 
rapid, structural, and severe. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
39 William E Scheuerman, ‘The Economic State of Emergency’ (1999) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1869, 1871. 
40 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3) (emphasis added). 
41 The ‘avoid’ phrasing has since been repeated in CESCR, General Comment 22 (n 36) para 38; CESCR, General Comment 23 (n 
36) para 52. 
42 CESCR, General Comment 2 (n 2) para 9. 
43 The Committee merely; ‘takes into account’ (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Solomon Islands (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add33 
1999) para 9) and ‘acknowledges’ (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mongolia (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add47 2000) para 9) the 
effects of the Asian financial crisis; ‘recognises’ Togo’s economic crisis (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Togo (UN Doc 
E/C12/1/Add61 2001) para 7); ‘notes’ the economic difficulties in Mexico (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mexico (UN Doc 
E/C12/1/Add41 1999) para 12), Algeria (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Algeria (UN Doc E/C12/1995/17 1995) para 12) and 
Suriname (CESCR, Concluding Observations: Suriname (UN Doc E/C12/1995/6 1995) para 7). It additionally highlights the 
economic difficulties in Belarus and Cameroon, but appears to offer no flexibility to those States (CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Belarus (UN Doc E/C12/1/Add7/Rev1 1996) para 10; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cameroon (UN Doc 
E/C12/CMR/CO/2-3 2012) para 14). 
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The nature of the changes is also relevant; the substantive adjustments to non-retrogression 
display a clear emergency character. Prior to the 2012 Letter, States that wished to enact 
backwards steps were required to undertake multiple and relatively onerous measures. For 
example, in the context of social security, the Committee noted that before it might declare 
a retrogressive step ‘permissible’, it would examine some eight factors that required wide-
ranging and independent review of the proposed measure. As noted above, this test 
included a requirement for participation, justifications, considerable review of the proposed 
measures and other precautions from the State.44 
However, after 2012 a shift is discernible, with the Letter stipulating only four criteria that 
States must fulfil before taking a backwards step in the context of and economic crisis. This 
approach accommodates a greater range of State responses in emergency situations. Thus 
the Committee says that in order to be acceptable: 
first, the policy is a temporary measure covering only the period of the 
crisis; second, the policy is necessary and proportionate, in the sense that 
the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be more 
detrimental to economic, social and cultural rights; third, the policy is not 
discriminatory...; fourth, the policy identifies the minimum core content 
of rights…and ensures protection of this… .45 
Yet two of these four criteria cannot even properly be described as conditions specific to the 
taking of retrogressive measures. While the inclusion of these conditions – that measures 
cannot be discriminatory, nor can they infringe the minimum core – is interesting in its 
own right, especially given the Letter’s reference to social protection floors and the role of 
the International Labour Organisation,46 these are general, longstanding and immediate47 
obligations that exist beyond the circumstances of retrogression.48  
Thus, the specific non-retrogression test is reduced to two criteria; that policies are 
temporary, and that they are necessary and proportionate. The Letter to States notes that 
the first condition on ‘any proposed policy change’ is that the policy should be temporary. 
This is similar to the approach under the ICCPR,49 the ECHR,50 and the ACHR.51 Apart from 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
44 CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 32) para 42. 
45 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3). 
46 Developed in CESCR, ‘Social protection floors: an essential element of the right to social security and of the sustainable 
development goals’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/2015/1, 2015). 
47 Bridgit Toebes, ‘The Right to Health’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (2nd edn, M Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 176; Katarina Tomaševski, ‘Indicators’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina 
Krause and Allan Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd edn, M Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 532. 
48 Although non-discrimination and non-derogable standards are also hallmarks of emergency derogation clauses; Joan 
Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1994) 61–2, 63–6. 
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 20) art 4. 
172	 Chapter	6	
	
	
having proved problematic to enforce and define,52 a condition of ‘temporariness’ denotes a 
period of exception to, or an aberration from, the more ‘permanent’ state of normality. Such 
a separation of exception (or emergency) from normality is fundamentally different to the 
approach that the ICESCR sets down. It endorses an ‘emergency paradigm’53 and departs 
from the Covenant’s previous ‘Business as Usual’ approach to the non-retrogression 
doctrine by indicating that there is to be an exception to its ‘usual’ applicability. The 
requirement that policy changes that will affect ICESCR rights be ‘necessary and 
proportionate’ is also borrowed from the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR emergency derogations 
regimes.54 
The Letter’s revised test for non-retrogression can be mapped onto the structure of the 
derogations clauses. Such provisions generally involve a dual-limbed test for determining 
the legality of a measure.55 The first limb is a threshold test, asking if the requisite 
circumstances are present for derogation.56 The second limb focuses on the substance of the 
measure introduced pursuant to the derogation. The contents of the letter take a similar 
approach. The first requirement is that there is a temporary economic and/or financial 
crisis, with elements of ‘a lack of growth’ and ‘inevitable’ adjustments to rights.57 The 
second limb of the test then uses the ‘necessary and proportionate’ test to assess the 
substance of the measure.58 Of course, while there are parallels between the Letter’s 
derogation-style terminology and structure, and other international and regional human 
rights frameworks, there is nothing which binds the CESCR to previously established 
meanings of those terms. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
50 European Convention on Human Rights (1950) art 15(1). Cf the ECtHR case of A v United Kingdom; Fiona de Londras, 
Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (CUP 2011) 200–202. 
51 American Convention on Human Rights (1969) art 27. Notwithstanding the similarities between the ACHR and ICCPR, many 
of the constitutions of South American countries set out separate regimes for a diverse range of emergencies, including 
economic emergencies; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 7) 42; Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in 
Spanish America (University of Pittsburgh Press 1993) 25. See further Exception and Emergency Powers, Gabriel L Negretto 
and Jose Antonio Aguilar Rivera, ‘Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Scmitt and the 
Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship’ (1999) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1797. 
52 Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1764, 1782; Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers 
in Theory and Practice (CUP 2006) 171. 
53 Greene (n 51) 1765; Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 51) 174–5. Although these authors do not explicitly endorse this view. 
54 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29: States Of Emergency (Art 4) (CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add11 2001); European 
Convention on Human Rights (n 49) art 15(1); American Convention on Human Rights (n 50) art 27. All of these regimes require 
proportionality by reference to the ‘exigencies of the situation’. 
55 Greene (n 51) 1766. 
56 ibid. 
57 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3). 
58 ibid. The two other conditions listed there – the requirement of non-discrimination and respect for the minimum core of 
the rights – might be thought of as ‘absolute’ or non-derogable provisions. 
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There is also a distinctive ‘emergency’ character to the changes. The use of ‘negative lists of 
exception’ is a familiar feature of emergency governance.59 By listing those elements of the 
ICESCR which should not be affected by the crisis (i.e. international cooperation, the 
protection of the core content of the rights, and non-discrimination), the Committee takes 
an approach to crisis regulation which is similar to that seen in some national 
constitutions60 and in the non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR.61 This legal method 
identifies ‘key’ values, either in the sense that they are ‘fundamental’ or that there is no clear 
reason for their infringement during a crisis. 
Finally, the Letter to States sets ‘law’ and ‘legality’ aside in a manner entirely consistent with 
an emergency ‘accommodation’ approach. Thus the Letter argues that States should not 
deny or infringe rights, as ‘[a]part from being contrary to their obligations under the 
Covenant’62 other negative effects such as political instability might arise. To a lesser degree 
the CESCR repeats this diversion from legality when it notes that the Covenant provides 
mere ‘guideposts’,63 and notes that adjustments to socio-economic rights are ‘at times 
inevitable’. 64 The CESCR’s willingness to use legal obligations as a secondary value places 
States’ obligations in a position subordinate to the ‘necessities of the situation’65; 
accommodating ‘necessary’ emergency responses is the new guiding value. 
In sum, the substance and character of these alterations to the doctrine indicates a shift 
towards greater accommodation of State responses to emergencies. This shift contained 
some paradigmatic examples of emergency-type responses. These changes are significant 
and have operational consequences which are explored below. 
6.4. Implications of an ‘Emergency’ Shift 
The previous sections have outlined how the CESCR’s approach to retrogression and 
‘emergency’ was modified in the crisis context. This section will assess some of the dangers 
of these changes. This is important because emergency regimes have historically been the 
setting for some of the most extensive and grave departures from human rights. 66 The 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
59 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 51) 58. 
60 ibid. eg Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Peru.  
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 20) art 4(2). 
62 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3) (emphasis added). 
63 ibid. 
64 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3). 
65 Gross and Ní Aoláin (n 51) 173. 
66 Joan F Hartman, ‘Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision’ (1985) 7(1) Human 
Rights Quarterly 89, 91. 
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major (but not the only) threats coming from the Letter can be categorised in terms of 
‘incommensurate balancing’, threats to the foundational principles of socio-economic 
rights, and the inadequacy of safeguards.  
6.4.1.  An appropriate test? 
The construction of the Letter’s new test of non-retrogression has the potential to raise a 
number of issues for socio-economic rights. The second condition set down by the Letter 
requires States to assess whether their proposed policies are: 
‘necessary and proportionate, in the sense that the adoption of any other 
policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social 
and cultural rights’.67 
As there are two possible interpretations of this text, it is difficult to know with certainty 
how the Committee will give effect to it. 
The test, read strictly, has two incongruent parts. On the face of it, the Letter requires that 
measures enacted be both necessary and proportionate. Yet, the Letter goes on to define 
this ‘necessary and proportionate’ test as requiring that the policy that is best for (least 
‘detrimental’ to) the protection of socio-economic rights be selected. These two strands of 
the test sit uncomfortably together, and the ‘necessary and proportionate’ test effectively 
becomes subsumed. Indeed, on this reading, the test is not readily recognisable as a 
condition of necessity and proportionality. Rather, it requires States to choose the measure 
least detrimental to the rights. As such, a measure proposed by a State would, according to 
this reading, be tested against whether the alternative is more detrimental for socio-
economic rights – not according to whether it is necessary and proportionate. 
Another (and more plausible) reading of the CESCR’s test is possible, however.  In this 
reading, the ‘necessary and proportionate’ test outlined in the Letter can be seen as 
intended to ensure that a proposed policy is necessary and proportionate in the context of 
the financial and economic crises. The Letter’s clause ‘in the sense that the adoption of any 
other policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental to economic, social and cultural 
rights’, might then be read as meaning ‘having due regard for economic, social and cultural 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
67 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3). 
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rights’. Such a reading is justifiable given the CESCR’s own usages,68 the incongruence of 
the test when read strictly, and the context in which the Letter was written.69 
Thus the test might, in practice, be said to read: ‘measures should be necessary and 
proportionate in the context of the crisis, and having due regard for economic, social and 
cultural rights’. This interpretation seems closer to what the CESCR was trying to achieve. 
Elsewhere in the Letter the Committee is preoccupied with balancing socio-economic rights 
with the economic situation of the day.70 Contextually, it is clear that the concern was not 
with States that were choosing between two rights-friendly policies (as is suggested by a 
strict reading), but with States that were enacting measures to deal with the financial and 
economic crises that were unnecessarily and disproportionately damaging socio-economic 
rights. 
Yet, if the latter interpretation was the CESCR’s intention, then it raises serious questions 
about how such a proportionality analysis might be carried out. It would entail balancing 
rights against neoliberal economic ‘imperatives’. Before even reaching such a point of 
balancing, the CESCR would have to concede that rights are commensurate with a specific 
kind of economic benefit.71 To be clear, this is an entirely different contention to the widely 
accepted view that the realisation of socio-economic rights depends deeply on resource 
allocation.72 Such balancing would instead concede that economic ‘necessities’ can ‘buy-out’ 
rights protections.73 This is particularly problematic given the lack of regard had for socio-
economic rights by neo-liberal ‘necessities’.74 Moving towards such a position risks 
representing the rights themselves as market imperatives.75 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
68 The CESCR has abbreviated the full version of the Letter’s test to simply require the measure to be ‘necessary and 
proportionate’; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iceland (n 8) para 6. 
69 An interpretation justified under; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980, 332 UNTS 1980) art 32.  
70 For example, the acceptance that ‘a lack of growth, impede[s] the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights’; Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3). 
71 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Irreversibility’ 4 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1260323> accessed 20 September 2016. 
72 See, eg, Manuel Couret Branco, Economics Versus Human Rights (Routledge 2009) 8.  
73 Rejecting balances between socio-economic rights and neoliberal economic imperatives does not necessarily preclude the 
balancing of those rights against other referents, including (sustainable) economic referents of a different kind. This will 
especially be the case where the referent can be shown to genuinely represent ‘the legitimate interests of the community’ and 
can thus be accommodated under article 4 ICESCR; Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly 
156, 194.  
74 Paul O’Connell, ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-Liberal Globalisation and Human Rights’ (2007) 7(3) Human Rights 
Law Review 483, 484. 
75 Joe J Wills, ‘The World Turned Upside Down? Neo-Liberalism, Socioeconomic Rights, and Hegemony’ (2014) 27(1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 11, 28. 
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If commensurability were to be conceded, the task of proportionality analysis would only 
become more difficult. It would be immensely difficult to accurately identify and measure 
in terms of economic statistics the ‘benefit’ of an isolated policy that reduced rights 
protection. Even if this were possible, appraising this would be an unenviable task. In 
reality, without such figures (whether as a result of the State being either unable or 
unwilling to provide them) the CESCR would be left having to rely on a heavily subjective 
and rhetorical assessment of the benefit of reducing rights protection. Given the prevalence 
of highly subjective rhetoric in this arena, including the neo-liberal rallying call ‘There Is No 
Alternative’, reliance on a necessity test seems to do little to examine the relative 
importance of decision-making factors. 
In subsequent General Comments, the CESCR has moved away from this confused necessity 
and proportionality test, towards only requiring that measures are necessary. Although still 
at odds with some earlier versions of retrogression and the thrust of the ICESCR, this is an 
improvement on the original Letter criteria. 
The other stage of the CESCR’s test for permissible crisis measures requires that measures 
enacted by States are temporary.76 The problem of becoming ‘stuck’ in a temporary state of 
emergency has been well critiqued by others and those problems apply here also.77 In 
addition, the fact that a violation was temporary is not, in a meaningful sense, sufficient to 
justify the action and such an approach would move towards a human rights’ ‘law of 
averages’.  
6.4.2. General threats to socio-economic rights 
The pseudo derogation test that is contained in the Letter is a new development that has the 
potential to blur the doctrinal distinctions between the ICESCR and its counterpart the 
ICCPR. The individual ICESCR rights are already qualified in a manner that ICCPR rights 
are not (i.e. through the mechanism of progressive realisation). Notwithstanding the many 
commonalities between the two sets of rights, the incorporation of a liberal derogations 
regime into the already relatively flexible ICESCR would result in two sets of flexibilities; 
both progressive realisation and derogation. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
76 This condition is retained in the versions that have come since; CESCR, General Comment 22 (n 36) para 38; CESCR, General 
Comment 23 (n 36) para 52. 
77 Oren Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?’ (2003) 112(5) The Yale Law 
Journal 1011, 1073ff; Greene (n 51) 1765. The spectre of ‘permanent austerity’ might also be an example of this. 
Resilience	in	Crises	 177	
	
	
As well as blurring the doctrinal distinctions between the Covenants, the Letter threatens to 
further entrench tired stereotypes about the supposed differences in the ‘nature’ of the 
rights. The CESCR developing a focus on economic emergencies while the Human Rights 
Committee primarily focuses on non-economic emergencies is problematic.78 It reinforces 
the traditional message that only socio-economic rights have economic consequences (and 
thus that economic emergencies are only relevant to those rights). By contrast the ‘security’ 
dimension of socio-economic rights is neglected in this binary divide, leaving the regime 
unable to deal with the issues of security and instability that can cause and result from 
violations of these rights.79 This polarisation leaves the reformed emergency regime in the 
CESCR’s Letter arguably less able to deal with cross-cutting emergencies than before. 
This change of approach towards retrogressive measures also has potential to damage the 
key progressive realisation obligation of the ICESCR. This obligation has been thought of as 
a ratchet, requiring that socio-economic rights standards are raised ever higher, with slips 
in those standards (retrogression) only permissible in limited circumstances and to a 
limited extent. In this sense, the protection of ICESCR rights in doctrine and in practice has 
relied heavily upon the ‘precommitence’ of States.80 Yet under the Letter’s regime, with 
fewer and weaker conditions imposed on potential backwards steps, the capacity of non-
retrogression to prevent change has been substantially reduced. Progressions in rights 
standards may no longer be so difficult to reverse and hard fought improvements may be 
less enduring. 
6.4.3. Inadequate safeguards 
If the regime of emergency retrogression is to be retained by the CESCR, significant 
safeguards should be built in to it. For example, in the Letter, the procedural requirements 
for declaring, defining the boundaries of, and the process for ending a period of emergency 
under the ICESCR are manifestly unclear. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
78 The Human Rights Committee notes the examples of ‘a natural catastrophe, a mass demonstration including instances of 
violence, or a major industrial accident’; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29: States Of Emergency (Article 4) (n 
70), para 5.  
79 This stereotyping is at odds with the UN’s various food security and human security initiatives; ‘UN Trust Fund for Human 
Security’ <http://unocha.org/humansecurity/> accessed 30 September 2014; ‘Global Food Security’ <http://www.un-
foodsecurity.org> accessed 20 September 2016. 
80 This strategy partly mitigates the impact of ‘fear’ upon the decision-maker; Posner and Vermeule ‘Accommodating 
Emergencies’ [2003] Stanford Law Review 605, 639–40. 
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The question of what constitutes an emergency, and who is to declare it, is not addressed by 
the CESCR.81 This is a clearly crucial gateway that States wishing to take advantage of 
increased emergency accommodation must pass through. The CESCR in its Letter seems to 
highlight the important features of the 2007/8 emergency as being the existence of 
‘economic and financial crises, and a lack of growth’.82 This does not amount to 
generalizable advice as to what constitutes an emergency. If the 2012 version of the non-
retrogression doctrine continues to have any relevance, the CESCR should perhaps follow 
the Human Rights Committee in issuing a full General Comment on the issue,83 be more 
rigorous in defining an ‘emergency’, and offer clear guidance on whether emergencies are to 
be declared by States or the CESCR in future. 
Similarly, the CESCR’s brief Letter offers no guidance on when and how emergency 
situations are concluded. Is a further letter to be expected from the CESCR on the 
conclusion of the financial and economic crises, for example? How is the existence of the 
crisis itself, to be separated from the effects of the crisis, and which should determine the 
conclusion of the situation? Answers to these questions are crucial if the increased crisis 
flexibilities are to be themselves to be sufficiently circumscribed. 
Nor does the new regime outlined by the CESCR provide guidance on the ex post facto 
review of the measures taken during the crisis. If the Letter and its model of retrogression is 
to be retained, greater provision should be made in the State Reporting Guidelines for 
detailing those emergency situations which have been declared and the measures taken as a 
result of them.84 Given the difficulties with necessity and proportionality analyses and the 
vagaries of the ‘temporary’ provision, ex post review of ‘emergency’ measures should 
particularly address the minimum core and non-discrimination requirements. 
6.5. Improving Resilience through (Re)constructed Retrogression 
In addition to the particular direction that the Letter took the doctrine, the very fact of the 
changes is also a concern. Altering the doctrine at all, and especially altering it to take a 
damaging course, does significant harm to retrogression. It sets the norm up to fail through 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
81 Prior to 2012, the CESCR seems only to have expressly characterised three situations as ‘emergencies’ in relation to water, 
housing and malnutrition in prisons, but had offered no guidance on the factors that constituted the situations as such; See 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Yemen (UN Doc  E/C12/1/Add92 2003) para 19; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada 
(UN Doc E/C12/1/Add31 1998) para 46; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Madagascar (UN Doc E/C12/MDG/CO/2 2009) para 
28. 
82 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 3). 
83 Human Rights Committee (n 78); Human Rights Committee (n 53).  
84 CESCR, ‘Guidelines On Treaty-Specific Documents To Be Submitted By States Parties Under Articles 16 And 17 Of The 
International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2. 
Resilience	in	Crises	 179	
	
	
confusing it at the very time at which clear applications of the doctrine are needed in order 
to steer crisis responses. 
The (re)constructed doctrine must therefore be resilient to the stresses of crises, and be 
able to remain stable, clear and applicable even in politically sensitive situations. At the 
same rate, however, it must be designed to be crisis-ready. As was discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the Committee faced a context of political, resource and other 
pressures during the crises that meant developing strong standards during the timespan of 
the crises was unlikely. A successful strategy for responding to future crises must, therefore, 
ensure that normative frameworks are in a strong and settled position prior to the break of 
the crisis. As part of that, there is adequate room for adjustment in the norms; enough 
flexibility that the obligations do not need to be broken and re-made during the crisis, but 
not so much leeway that States obligations are negated during times of crisis. 
A crucial regulating device in ensuring that this balance is struck, as was alluded to earlier, 
is a guiding purpose for the doctrine. This purpose acts as a standard against which to judge 
any changes to the retrogression which may be proposed during a crisis. However, it also 
acts as a backstop, or boundary, which can highlight when suggested changes stray too far 
from the correct role for retrogression. 
These characteristics – a clearer, more stable doctrine, and a guiding and delimiting 
purpose – can contribute a resilience for retrogression that has so far been absent. Such 
resilience in turn improves the chances of the doctrine being an operational success and 
providing an effective tool to actors during crisis situations. 
The (re)constructed doctrine incudes many of those characteristics necessary for resilience. 
The (re)constructed retrogression was defined as: 
an action, inaction or contribution to a trend which is likely to negatively 
affect the progressive realisation of individuals’ ICESCR rights.85 
This has unambiguous potential to be used in crisis situations. In particular, the focus on 
negative trends is a useful flexibility device in crises, giving the CESCR adequate discretion 
to determine when something has become a trend, and whether or not it is sufficiently 
negative so as to constitute a retrogressive measure. However, in contrast to the version of 
the doctrine in the Letter, it is important to note that the flexibility rests with the CESCR 
rather than the State; there is also no collapsing or removal of State obligations. The 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
85 Chapter 3, p118. 
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(re)construction follows the ICESCR’s traditional pattern of treating emergency and 
everyday situations alike. Thus, the ‘exigencies of the situation’ and more general contextual 
factors that are brought in through proportionality analyses, are not included as referents in 
this imagination of the doctrine. 
With the purpose of furthering the article 2(1) obligation of progressive realisation, the 
doctrine has a firm and well defined point of reference.86 In the event that there was a crisis 
so severe or so unique that change to the doctrine was genuinely unavoidable such an 
overarching or guiding value could be used to adapt the norm while retaining the thrust 
and objectives of retrogression. Of course, without being strongly defined there is a danger 
that every crisis comes to be seen as unique and severe.87 Therefore there remains an 
important role for the CESCR in resisting the impulse for change that is likely to be felt 
during crises. Rather, it should aim only to adjust ICESCR norms in truly aberrant 
examples, such as the rapid collapse of the status of States as primary duty holders in 
international law, or drug-resistant pandemics with universal effects. 
Progressive realisation has been subject to much less change than retrogression, and can 
therefore provide exactly the sort of stability that is required by the doctrine in crisis 
situations. It is also a foundational part of the ICESCR meaning that even in the most 
unusual, unthinkable settings, where the ICESCR continues to stand then so will the 
progressive realisation obligation. 
The combination of these two changes – a flexible (re)construction and a well-defined 
purpose – can give the doctrine resilience that it has so far lacked. This is crucial to 
ensuring more effective responses to future crises and concretising the utility of non-
retrogression. 
6.6. Conclusions 
It is unsurprising that the doctrine of non-retrogression, which had already proved 
malleable, was subject to further adjustment. While, the Committee might have been 
expected to display greater robustness in its protection of the Covenant norms, the highly 
pressurised context in which the CESCR was operating can explain its actions. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
86 Chapter 4, pp115ff 
87 Keith Whittington, ‘Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?’ (2002) 43 William & Mary Law Review 2093, 2096. 
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The Letter to States was a brief, but highly significant intervention. It can be given various 
characterisations, as soft law, rhetorically weighty, or as no more than a note to fill the 
vacuum of comment on the crises by the Committee. Yet, assuming any of these 
characterisations, the Letter remains central to our understanding of how the current forms 
of retrogression have been buffeted by crisis. The CESCR’s Letter introduces a number of 
significant changes and these take the doctrine of retrogression in a new, and somewhat 
counterproductive, direction. 
The Letter signals a concerning move away from the ICESCR’s traditional approach to 
emergencies. It seems to reject – at least in the context of economic emergencies – the 
uniform application of the Covenant’s standards in times of both crisis and ‘normality’. 
Instead, it endorses a quasi-derogations regime through the doctrine of non-retrogression, 
allowing States new flexibilities at the very time close scrutiny was required. Beyond this 
significant alteration, a number of other issues were imported into the doctrine by the 
Letter. Weak safeguards and confused procedures make the enforcement of any standards 
whatsoever a real difficulty. Additionally, the potential revival of tired stereotypes which 
imply security emergencies are relevant to CPR, while economic emergencies are relevant to 
ESR, is an another flaw with the construction of the Letter’s emergency response. 
The deficiencies of retrogression as it appears in the CESCR’s Letter act as a cautionary tale. 
The Letter was not – or at least need not have been – a rushed production. There was, after 
all, around four and half years between the break of the crises and its release.  Yet, its brief 
contents include more problems than is reasonable. This is an indication of how the 
pressures of a crisis situation can distort and damage normative development. The aim for 
the CESCR, should be to avoid such intra-crisis development of the ICESCR’s obligations. 
In this vein, it was argued that the doctrine of non-retrogression should be resilient, 
containing adequate flexibility and giving sufficient guidance on how the doctrine should 
be modified if the circumstances absolutely demanded it. Several features of the 
(re)constructed doctrine were highlighted to show that it could contribute exactly that 
combination of flexibility and an overall value.  
Although an isolated example of how the doctrine of non-retrogression was modified in a 
crisis, the chapter provided an important case study of how the fragility of the doctrine, the 
institutional limitations of the CESCR, and a threatening context can lead to significant 
doctrinal changes. It also suggested how such a retreat in retrogression’s capacity could be 
avoided in future. 
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The issues addressed here, however, should be read in combination with the preceding 
analysis on engagement with structural issues, and the following discussion of micro actors 
and the practicalities of using retrogression. Each of these have potential overlaps with 
situations of crisis, and demonstrate the importance of retrogression not only having 
resilience, but also the ability to engage with high-level structural issues (e.g. harmful 
economic paradigms), to respond to the demands of micro groups (e.g. a need for remedies 
to crisis-driven impacts), and to be practically implementable (e.g. provable with reasonably 
available data). By seeing these challenges in combination the potential and strength of the 
(re)constructed doctrine can best be seen. 
Chapter 7 
Micro Responsiveness 
7.1. Introduction 
While the (re)constructed retrogression can play important functions in improving 
resilience and engagement with structural issues, it can also work as a vehicle for opening 
the ICESCR system up to greater responsiveness to micro groups. The (re)constructed 
doctrine of non-retrogression might be used to supplement the difficulties with progressive 
realisation and improve the use of both obligations. The analysis in this chapter tests the 
extent to which this can be the case, and whether the (re)constructed doctrine might better 
support the progressive realisation obligation through more effectively responding to 
‘micro’ concerns. While the ICESCR system does involve ‘micro’ actors1 though a number of 
processes, there remain a wide range of institutional, practical and normative barriers that 
restrict the CESCR’s ability to properly take account of these groups’ concerns. This is 
especially true – as is discussed below – of certain types of micro actor which tend to be 
most affected and excluded by some features of the system. This limited approach is 
problematic given the extensive benefits that can come through harnessing the 
informational and organisational power that can exist at the local level. 
This chapter sits alongside the previous two in highlighting some of the more substantial 
issues faced by the doctrine of non-retrogression, and in showing how the (re)constructed 
doctrine might address them. In contrast to the previous two chapters which looked at large 
scale issues of structural threats and resilience in crises, however, this chapter looks to the 
opposite end of the ICESCR’s concerns; individuals. It is crucial that such attention is given 
to how non-retrogression works for individuals and small groups, as without it there is a 
danger that the Covenant becomes divorced from them. 
Delineating a category of ‘micro’ groups and outlining the extent to which their concerns 
should be responded to, is a challenging task. Both definitions are context dependent and 
so the large body of work on social movements and political participation can only be 
imperfectly applied. These questions recur throughout the chapter, but are addressed 
initially in the following section. However, as will be seen in section (7.3.), even where 
engagement with these groups represents a clear opportunity there are currently multiple 
barriers preventing the CESCR fully responding to their concerns. A subsequent section 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 The complexities of defining such actors is discussed below at section 7.2.1. The understanding adopted below is that micro 
actors can be seen as not, or at least not solely, state actors, international or ‘foreign’ groups, elite or power-holding groups, or 
structurally determined movements. Instead, micro actors are understood as those which construct themselves to have at least 
some of the characteristics of a subaltern group. 
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(7.4.) underlines the valuable contributions that such groups can bring. A final substantive 
section draws on this outline of barriers and benefits to assess how the (re)constructed 
retrogression and other reforms might enable greater micro engagement. It shows that the 
(re)construction can be used to ensure greater ex ante review, to ground the Covenant, and 
to incorporate individual stories. 
7.2. Defining ‘Micro Responsiveness’ 
There are two key definitional questions that need answering before proceeding to a deeper 
examination of the barriers to, and benefits of, fuller engagement with these actors. First, 
who are the ‘micro’ actors being referred to? And second, what is meant by ‘responsiveness’ 
in this context? 
 
In answering these questions, the chapter draws on social movement and critical theory. 
This leads to a working definition of micro actors as not or at least not solely state actors, 
international or ‘foreign’ groups, elite or power-holding groups, or structurally determined 
movements. Responsiveness is understood below according to the terms of the ICESCR, 
which designates a primarily enforcement role to everyone who enjoys the Covenant’s 
protections. 
7.2.1.  Defining ‘Micro’ 
The first of these questions – on what or who a ‘micro’ actor is – is substantially more 
complex than can fully be conveyed here. Most simply, a micro actor can be defined in the 
negative as ‘not a macro actor’. This might lead us to broadly define the State and 
international institutions as macro actors and micro actors as those ‘others’ (including 
NGOs, academic communities, informal organisations (both virtual and ‘real’), and 
individuals). This definition is problematic insofar as it denotes macro actors as a primary 
category, and participates in a demotion and ‘othering’ of those actors not imbued with 
State or inter-State powers. In addition, it is ill-equipped to categorise actors that are 
relatively small but which hold (inter-)State power (such as local government or smaller UN 
organs) or actors which are very large organisations but which are, at least in a formal 
sense, powerless (such as Amnesty International). When size is taken into account, it 
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becomes difficult to define Amnesty International2 as a micro actor while local councils or 
municipalities3 are defined as macro actors. 
 
The definition might instead be re-orientated to consider the geographic sphere in which an 
actor operates. Doing this we might class those actors that are ‘national’ or ‘international’ as 
macro, and the plurality of actors which operate at the sub-national level as ‘micro’ to a 
greater or lesser extent. Such categorisations are widespread, and typically emphasise 
different levels or types of activity.4 In this context, however, Guha’s four groups (originally 
identified in the Indian society of the time) are more useful as the categorisation divides 
along lines which resonate with boundaries seen in the human rights system. Guha’s 
classification has been widely used to stress the position of certain ‘voiceless’ sections of 
society.5 It divides society into: dominant foreign groups; dominant indigenous groups 
working at the national level; dominant indigenous groups working at various local levels; 
and subaltern6 groups.7 This division is attractive where it confirms what human rights 
advocates already know; that there are some situations where the international or ‘foreign’ 
actor will be seen as an elite outsider.8 However despite this intuitive appeal, the model still 
struggles to tell us which groups should be treated as micro. The third group – the 
dominant indigenous groups working at various local levels – are referred to as a buffer 
group between the subaltern and elite classes.9 Are these groups (always) a micro 
enterprise? A second difficulty relates to the ‘ambiguities and contradictions’10 in the 
categorisation. A group might be subaltern on some issues and in some senses, but firmly 
elite in others. The categorisation also fails to deal satisfactorily with the inter-national 
exchanges between the various groups. Cross-border movements (especially those 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
2 ‘3 million supporters, members and activists in over 150 countries and territories, in every region of the world’; Amnesty 
International, ‘Amnesty International 50th Anniversary: Facts and Figures’ (2011) 1 <http://static.amnesty.org/ai50/ai50-facts-
and-figures.pdf> accessed 20 September 2016. 
3 Around half of Brazil’s 5,507 municipalities have fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. A quarter of them (around 1,400) have fewer 
than 5,000 residents; Inter-American Development Bank, ‘National Program to Support the Administrative and Fiscal 
Management of Brazilian Muncipalities’ (2014) para 1.14 <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=437370> 
accessed 20 September 2016. 
4 Saskia Sassen, ‘Local Actors in Global Politics’ (2004) 52(4) Current Sociology 649; Philip C Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale 
UP 1956) 1; Jinseop Jang, Jason McSparren and Yuliya Rashchupkina, ‘Global Governance: Present and Future’ (2016) 2 Palgrave 
Communications 1, 2. 
5 Notably, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstruction Historiography’ in Jonathan D Culler (ed), 
Deconstruction: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies (Taylor & Francis 2003); Walter Mignolo, Local 
Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton UP 2012) especially chapter 4. 
6 A term that has been defined as – ‘the demographic difference between the total […] population and all those whom we have 
described as the “elite”’; Ranajit Guha, ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India’ in Ranajit Guha (ed), 
Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society (1982) 44. 
7 Ranajit Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies I: Writing on South Asian History and Society (OUP, 1982) cited in Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture 
(Reprint edition, University of Illinois Press 1988) 284. 
8 Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights 
Organization’ (2004) 26(1) Human Rights Quarterly 63, 65–66. 
9 Spivak (n 7) 284. 
10 ibid. 
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facilitated by technology) would entail a group that is subaltern in Greece, for example, 
being indicted as a ‘foreign elite’ when combining with equivalent groups in Italy or 
anywhere else. 
 
A definition of exclusion, and a group-based categorisation both rely on differentiating 
between the role, standing, and capacity of groups. As such, both of these definitions have a 
tendency to prioritise groups with existing forms of power.11 By using definitional tactics, 
both approaches ascribe merit to a specific range of features, and exclude other relevant 
factors. 
 
Social movement theory captures greater nuance by taking into account a more diverse 
range of features. It focusses less on external evaluations of the group and more on the 
internal organisation and functioning of the movement. One conception of the social 
movement – and the one that sits closest to those categorisations just discussed – focuses 
on structures as a mechanism for defining the group. These structures include ‘economic 
resources, political structures, [and] formal organizations’.12 Yet this dominant approach to 
social movements has been contested inter alia on the ground that theorists have over-
emphasised the stable and more easy-to-see structural dimensions of movements.13 This 
over-emphasis, or bias,14 effectively downplays the fluid ‘strategy, agency and culture’ that 
exists within groups.15 Predictably, this reaction to the dominant focus on structures has 
spawned a second strand of social movement thinking. This constructionist approach 
emphasises that the movements and their success are a function of more than simply 
structural inputs, but rather rely on an understanding of groups as constructing themselves 
and their own history.16 This approach has been cast as an appeal to, and an appreciation of, 
the ‘emotions’ of the movement.17 
 
Of course any definition, but perhaps especially the more constructionist approaches, must 
also be met with an appreciation of how such definitions will shift over time. While a 
movement may start with a particular size, level of resource, and identity of itself, this is 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
11 ibid 279. 
12 Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper, ‘Introduction’ in Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper (eds), Rethinking Social Movements: 
Structure, Meaning, and Emotion (Rowman & Littlefield 2004) vii. 
13 Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper, ‘Caught in a Winding Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory’ in Jeff 
Goodwin and James M Jasper (eds), Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion (Rowman & Littlefield 
2004) 4. Cf Charles Kurzman, ‘The Poststructuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory’ in Jeff Goodwin and James M 
Jasper (eds), Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion (Rowman & Littlefield 2004) 111. 
14 Goodwin and Jasper, ‘Caught in a Winding Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory’ (n 13) 4. 
15 ibid. 
16 Kurzman (n 13) 117. 
17 Deborah B Gould, ‘The Emotion Work of Social Movements’ in Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper (eds), The Social 
Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts (3rd edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2014). 
Micro	Responsiveness	 187	
	
likely to evolve over time. Consequently, systems for seeking out the views of groups of a 
certain type must reflect such evolutions and reflect on how the role for a group within the 
system might change. 
This discussion of what constitutes a micro actor is to ensure clarity about what these actors 
are, and what they are not. Such clarity is important as the chapter progresses to argue for a 
fuller role for these actors and so it is crucial that they are correctly identified. A revised 
doctrine of non-retrogression which served to reinforce the roles of those actors already 
dominant in the CESCR’s processes would add little. Instead, the aim is to reach those 
groups that have been excluded through the ICESCR’s doctrinal and institutional barriers, 
and by their own limitations. It is therefore of central importance that the doctrine aids 
those actors without significant power in the form of the controls of the State, through 
resources, through international voice, or through organisational structures. This cuts 
across the different categorisations introduced above. Constructionist social movement 
theory sets aside the focus structural features to emphasise self-definition and identity. 
Guha’s theory of subalternity highlights well the power that a well-connected international 
body can have relative to local subaltern groups. 
Together these theories can be combined to identify the micro actors that we are concerned 
with in the current context. It allows micro actors to be seen as not or at least not solely 
state actors, international or ‘foreign’ groups, elite or power-holding groups, or structurally 
determined movements. That is to say, that in what follows, micro actors are understood as 
those which construct themselves to have at least some of the characteristics of a subaltern 
group. As the chapter progresses, greater detail will be added to this identification to take 
account of the particularities and consequences of human rights, gender, and Third World 
perspectives for these groups.  
7.2.2. Defining ‘Responsiveness’ 
The second main definitional point that needs addressing at this stage is the understanding 
of ‘responsiveness’ to be adopted in this context.18 This understanding is necessarily both a 
normatively-laden and finely balanced judgement. It is normatively-laden insofar as the 
definition will be affected by one’s view of the role and importance of the international 
human rights law relative to micro concerns. The normative question can be substantially 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
18 The contextual aspect is particularly important here as responsiveness to the concerns of micro actors is different, for 
example, to structural threats. The signals that a response is needed, and the action (or response) which follows are quite 
different. 
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by-passed by referring to the ICESCR itself for guidance on the position of the ‘micro’ 
concern within the operation of the treaty. 
The preamble to the Covenant notes, for example, that the individual has ‘duties’ to others 
in the community in relation to the ICESCR rights.19 Specifically these preambular duties 
seem to require us all to ensure the promotion and observance of the rights. In a similar 
vein, the article 13 provision on the right to education refers to the agreement of States that 
education should enable individuals to ‘further the activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace’.20 These provisions signal a significant delegated role for individuals 
and groups (micro actors) in ESR realisation. However, these provisions also seem to imply 
that the nature of the role is an enforcement and local monitoring one, rather than a 
standard-setting one. As the ICESCR carves out this particular role for individuals and 
groups, it can be concluded that the CESCR should be especially responsive to micro 
concerns on these issues of enforcement and monitoring. 
The concept of ‘responsiveness’ used, additionally entails a balanced judgement. This is due 
to the fact that the relationship between human rights and micro concerns can never be 
entirely led by (or totally ‘responsive’ to) either human rights or micro concerns. Implicit in 
this discussion of balancing, is the proposition that human rights and micro concerns are 
not always mutually reinforcing. When the diversity of micro concerns is considered, it 
becomes obvious that some of these concerns are themselves contrary to the fundamentals 
of human rights standards, or are expressed in such a way as to make them so. Clear 
examples of such micro concerns would include groups that campaign for the 
reintroduction of the death penalty21 or that seek to prevent girl children accessing 
education,22 or groups which seek to achieve their objectives through suicide bombing.23 In 
these extreme cases, there is little difficulty in recognising that the groups have 
substantially different aims to the international human rights framework and that their 
claims upon the framework should be substantially rejected. Indeed this recognition that 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3) preamble. 
20 ibid art 13(1). 
21 ‘Restore Justice Campaign’ <http://www.restorejustice.org.uk> accessed 20 September 2016.  
22 See, for example, the Pakistani Taliban’s campaign made famous by Malala Yousafzai; ‘Malala Yousafzai - Facts’ 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2014/yousafzai-facts.html> accessed 20 September 2016. 
23 Robert J Brym, ‘Suicide Bombing’ in Jeff Goodwin and James M Jasper (eds), The Social Movements Reader: Cases and 
Concepts (3rd edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2014). 
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some groups will have aims that are essentially destructive of human rights is present in the 
ICESCR itself.24 
However, a balancing function becomes more important in less extreme situations. A more 
difficult situation arises in respect of groups which are not ‘human rights’ movements, but 
which have concerns that overlap to some extent with human rights objectives. These 
might be campaigns for clean water,25 fair allocation of housing,26 or perhaps anti-austerity 
movements.27 The extent to which the CESCR should be responsive to the concerns of these 
micro actors, will require a careful balancing act. The opportunities for human rights 
promotion, increased information, and a wealth of specialised expertise have to weighed 
against any conflicts with the movements’ objectives, and the potential for the ICESCR 
framework to be stretched too far. 
7.3. Barriers to Responsiveness 
There lies potential for a more productive micro groups-ICESCR relationship that can 
improve enforcement and better address the nuances of rights violations as experienced. 
While that potential is already being realised in a number of respects, there are also a 
number of barriers that exist. These range from doctrinal issues with the ICESCR (such as 
the underuse of the progressive realisation and retrogression obligations) to the more 
institutional issues with the CESCR (such as its resource constraints and backlog of work). 
The limitations of the Committee are accentuated and magnified by the nature and 
functioning of many of the micro groups. 
This range of difficulties are not solvable through a single reform to the CESCR or its 
doctrines. However, there is significant untapped potential in the strength and openness of 
the progressive realisation obligation. The flexibilities with the article that are often 
criticised, can be used as a vehicle for addressing various outstanding difficulties with the 
Covenant. When combined with, and supported by, the (re)construction of retrogression 
there is a good deal of opportunity for improved micro responsiveness through these 
mechanisms.  
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
24 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 19) art 5(1). 
25 See, for example, ‘About Us’ (Clean Water Action) <http://www.cleanwateraction.org/about/> accessed 20 September 2016. 
26 See, for example, ‘About Us’ (Focus E15) <http://focuse15.org/about/> accessed 20 September 2016. 
27 See, for example, ‘The People’s Assembly Against Austerity’ (The People’s Assembly Against Austerity) 
<http://www.thepeoplesassembly.org.uk/what_we_stand_for> accessed 20 September 2016.  
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In terms of the positive engagement that is already a feature of the CESCR’s work, one can 
point to a range of in-person and remote opportunities for engagement. In-person, there 
are chances for groups to participate in briefings around the State examination process,28 
and elsewhere in Days of General Discussion.29 As these processes are both based in Geneva 
at the CESCR’s operational home, it is safe to assume that a range of (perhaps smaller, less-
resourced, more geographically distant) groups are excluded from attending. The CESCR 
ameliorates this exclusion to an extent by accepting written submissions (known as parallel 
or shadow reports)30 when considering States’ performance and calls for evidence when 
drafting General Comments.31 In addition, the growing membership of the Optional 
Protocol ‘club’ will to produce further avenues for engagement. All of these processes 
present an opportunity for substantive micro concerns to be fed into the Committee’s State-
specific or normative guidance.  
 
Without substantial empirical research, it is impossible to accurately say how much of an 
effect (negative or positive) the representations of micro groups actually have on the 
CESCR’s approach or outputs. A snapshot survey undertaken by O’Flaherty suggests that 
the Lists of Issues and the associated dialogues with States have an inconsistent relationship 
with the resulting Concluding Observations.32 However, even without knowing the exact 
nature or success of this relationship, it is possible to identify the institutional and doctrinal 
changes that would promote stronger responsiveness to the concerns of micro level actors. 
7.3.1.  Doctrinal barriers 
There are a number of dynamics built into the ICESCR that are likely to affect the 
Committee’s ability to fully respond to the concerns of grassroots micro groups. Many of 
these focus on the type of activity that is required by the ICESCR regime.33 It being a 
document with international legal effect, its contents and the processes surrounding it are, 
naturally, of an international and a legal nature. While this character has obvious benefits 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
28 ‘Information for Civil Society Organisations’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/NGOs.aspx> accessed 20 September 2016. 
29 ‘General Discussion Days’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/DiscussionDays.aspx> accessed 20 September 2016. 
30 ‘Information for Civil Society Organisations’ (n 28). 
31 ‘General Discussion on the Draft General Comment on Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/Discussion2015.aspx> accessed 20 September 2016. 
32 Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6(1) Human 
Rights Law Review 27, 39–41. 
33 A concern that can be seen as applicable more broadly to the human rights system, and one shared Kennedy (albeit on 
different grounds) in, David Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 101, 110. 
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in terms of increasing the reach and authority of the ICESCR system, it also implies a 
number of difficulties as far as micro group engagement is concerned. 
 
First amongst these difficulties is the de facto focus of the progressive realisation obligation, 
which often looks at the higher levels of State policy rather than at localised issues. The 
operation of progressive realisation is important to consider in the context of the barriers to 
micro responsiveness of the ICESCR’s operation. This is due to its status as the primary 
general obligation in the ICESCR, and in the CESCR’s own words ‘Article 2 is of particular 
importance to a full understanding of the Covenant and must be seen as having a dynamic 
relationship’ with the rest of the articles.34 
 
It is possible to apply the article 2(1) obligation to the situation of an individual or small 
group, and there are several examples of shadow reports to the CESCR doing so.35 Applying 
the obligation to the State in such a scenario involves claiming a right to a progressively 
improving standard in one’s own housing, food, health care provision etcetera. Although 
not doctrinally incorrect, a more holistic reading of the ICESCR text, and the taking into 
account of General Comment 3 suggests a broader approach. 
 
In contrast to the substantive articles of the Covenant,36 article 2(1) is couched in general 
terms and emphasises State duties rather than individual entitlements. This level of 
generality tends to suggest that progress on realising the rights of the Covenant should be 
considered across the State as a whole. For example, article 2(1) refers to ‘the rights’ rather 
than a specific right or ‘each right’, and similarly avoids linking those rights to ‘individuals’ 
or ‘persons’.37 On the actions that are required by the State, the measures that are singled 
out – ‘economic’, ‘technical’ and ‘legislative’ – would also usually be associated with a high 
level, rather than individual, action. Furthermore, in the most relevant General Comment 
on the obligation, the CESCR takes a similarly pan-State view.38 As a result of this dynamic, 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
34 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23 1990) para 
1. 
35 See, for example, Compilation of Summaries of Canadian NGO Submissions to the CESCR in Connection with the 
Consideration of the Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Canada (UN Doc E/C12/36/3 2006) 37, 38; Amnesty International, 
Double Standards: Italy’s Housing Policies Discriminate Against Roma (Amnesty International 2013) 16; Free Legal Advice 
Centres (FLAC), Parallel Report in Response to Ireland’s Third Report under the International Covenant for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Free Legal Advice Centres (FLAC) 2014) 65, 87, 91. 
36 See Chapter 5, p135. Cf also the much less generalized attention to delimiting the entitlements of the individual in; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 19) preamble. 
37 Cf Christian Courtis, ‘La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales: Apuntes Introductorios’ in Christian 
Courtis (ed), Ni Un Paso Atrás: La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales (Editores de Puerto 2006) 4. 
38 See, for example, the CESCR’s interest (only) in situations where ‘significant number of individuals’ lack essential levels of 
food; CESCR, General Comment 3 (n 34) para 10. 
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the progressive realisation obligation is imbued with a primarily policy and/or ‘high level’ 
focus. 
 
This creates an awkward relationship between the generalised and high-level approach of 
article 2(1), and the individualised approach within the substantive articles. In a clear 
example from the Inter-American Court, Melish shows how a high level approach to 
progressive realisation can act as a barrier to the justiciability of individual cases and argues 
that: 
…’progressive development’ is designed to assess not causal responsibility 
for individualised impairments in the enjoyment or exercise of rights, but 
rather statistical achievement of rights over the national population or 
vulnerable subgroups within it…39 
 
This approach to the obligation requires an assessment of progress in large policy areas 
(rather than on isolated issues) in order to make an evaluation of a State’s compliance with 
its obligation.40 There are clear positives to this as the format of the progressive realisation 
obligation encourages the Committee to deal with the ‘bigger picture’.41 However, in this 
process the specific and perhaps local or highly technical demands of the micro group can 
easily be lost. 
 
This ‘policy progression’ approach is problematic on more levels than can properly be 
detailed in this context. However, crucially for micro responsiveness, the approach points 
away from an ICESCR system that accepts the individual as the core unit of its concerns, 
and instead seeks aggregate societal improvements.42 This, in practice, means that there are 
two qualifications to the individual’s right to the progressive realisation of her rights; the 
extent of available resources and the state of others’ rights enjoyment.43 Thus to 
demonstrate that a State has breached its duty to progressively realise a right, a micro group 
would have to demonstrate both that there is available resource and that their concern 
would be the best use of that resource. In showing that a claim represents the best use of 
available resource it would have to be demonstrated both that it is preferable to other 
(direct) rights claims, and also that the resource is not better used for macroeconomic 
purposes (e.g. that ‘spare’ resource should in fact be used as a fiscal stimulus or to reduce a 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
39 Tara J Melish, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social rights 
jurisprudence: emerging trends in international and comparative law (CUP 2008) 386. See further fn 94. 
40 This difficulty is explored in greater depth in Chapter 8, pp1214-219. 
41 Although, as noted in Chapter 5, pp140-143, it often chooses not to capitalise on this potential. 
42 Although note that these are qualified aggregate improvements (insofar as an aggregate improvement would be insufficient 
where discrimination existed or the minimum core was unmet). 
43 The latter of these qualifications commonly being subsumed within the ‘maximum available resources’ test; Radhika 
Balakrishan and others, ‘Maximum Available Resources & Human Rights: Analytical Report’ (Rutgers University 2011) 5ff, 
especially 7. 
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budget deficit).44 Even where it can be shown that there is available resource that should be 
allocated to one’s concern, in some contexts it remains open for the State to claim that it 
has taken reasonable measures in order to progress.45 Requiring such a set of systematic 
proofs makes engagement by micro groups extremely difficult.46 
 
A second potential barrier to the CESCR responding to micro concerns are the structures of 
the Optional Protocol. The Protocol itself is clearly a landmark development, and it is likely 
to result in a range of new opportunities for micro actors. Beth Simmons describes the new 
process as ‘an important form of civil society empowerment’.47 Yet at the same time 
Simmons is careful to qualify that the legitimacy of the standards developed through 
individual communications will be dependent upon the Committee’s willingness to look to 
local perspectives and constraints.48 It is important not to prejudge the success of the 
Optional Protocol communications process before it has properly developed a body of 
jurisprudence. However, even at this stage a number of potential barriers can be identified 
that might limit micro groups’ contribution of exactly these sort of crucial local 
perspectives. 
The legalism and lawyers’ dominance of the discipline that generally surround human 
rights is something often remarked upon and the tendencies contribute to a number of the 
critiques of the human rights movement.49 It has also been noted that such legalism acts to 
produce an elite and a ‘top-down’ system that isolates the contributions of the micro groups 
that we are concerned with here.50 A particular focus on the Optional Protocol as a 
potential barrier to micro responsiveness is justified in light of the critiques that have been 
levelled at it. Opponents to the justiciability of the ICESCR rights have argued the Optional 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
44 In this vein see; Mary Dowell-Jones, ‘The Economics of the Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some Human Rights Arguments’ 
(2015) 15(2) Human Rights Law Review 193, 206.  
45 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 December 2008, 
entered into force 5 May 2013, UN Res A/RES/63/117) art 8(4); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others (2000) (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19 (Constitutional Court of South Africa) especially [28], [33]; 
‘Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’ (1996) article 26(2); IDG v Spain [2015] CESCR Communication 2/2014, UN Doc 
E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 [14]; Brian Griffey, ‘The “Reasonableness” Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 11(2) Human Rights Law 
Review 275; Bruce Porter, ‘The Reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating Claims from the Margins’ (2009) 27(1) Nordic 
Journal of Human Rights 39. 
46 For an example of this dynamic in practice (albeit in a slightly different context) see; Minister of Health and Others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) (2002) (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).  
47 Beth A Simmons, ‘Should States Ratify? - Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR’ (2009) 27(1) 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 64, 69. 
48 ibid. 
49 Saladin Meckled-García, Başak Cali and Anthony Woodiwiss (eds), ‘The Law Cannot Be Enough: Human Rights and the 
Limits of Legalism’, The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human Rights Law 
(Psychology Press 2006); Shannon Speed, ‘At the Crossroads of Human Rights and Anthropology: Toward a Critically Engaged 
Activist Research’ (2006) 108(1) American Anthropologist 66, 67; Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive?: The Hamlyn 
Lectures 2005 (Cambridge University Press 2006) chapter 3; Illan rua Wall, Human Rights and Constituent Power: Without 
Model Or Warranty (Routledge 2013) especially 15. 
50 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press 2009) 67, 105; Kennedy (n 33).  
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Protocol is ‘over-legalization run amok’.51 The basis for this view is easy to see; the addition 
of ‘cases’, two opposing parties, submissions from those parties, and ‘views’ that look 
awfully similar to a judgment are all suggestive of a new international court. However, as 
Simmons argues, to view the international complaints mechanism as a court would be a 
‘contorted caricature’.52 Where the Optional Protocol system is reminiscent of a fully-
fledged judicial system this is merely a ‘quasi-judicial’53  mimicking of domestic or ‘hard’ 
international law processes, rather than a recreation of them.54 This is underlined by the 
basic scope of the Optional Protocol process; ‘we are not in the world of litigation, but 
instead in the world of communication and persuasion’.55 The Optional Protocol gives 
interpretative oxygen to the ICESCR’s legal standards more than anything else.56 
Why, then, has the Optional Protocol process been suggested here as a barrier to micro 
responsiveness? This potential lies in the ‘fears’ that remain in relation to the Protocol.57 
There is a danger that such fears about the Protocol’s success or failure are expressed as a 
hesitance to make radical decisions and a defensiveness that becomes harsh positivism. In 
other words, the long and difficult history of the Protocol has the potential to drive its 
process and actors towards overwhelmingly precise norms and excessively exacting 
standards of review. The attention that has been given to the ‘reasonableness’ within the 
Optional Protocol is one example of where this has already begun.58 However, there are also 
examples too. The CESCR’s somewhat cautionary statement on the use of the maximum of 
available resource under the Protocol, adds additional steps of review by separating out 
cases of retrogression where resources are at issue,59 and includes in its analysis the use of 
an ‘adequacy’ standard.60 This is a new use of a term that had previously been a part of a 
typology assessing the nuances of State actions in relation to substantive rights. In this new 
form, the CESCR, seems to instead invoke it as an adjudicatory standard. It is in this regard 
that the complaints system might lead to an exclusion of the very micro groups it is meant 
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52 ibid. 
53 Claire Mahon, ‘Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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Protocol to the Covenant’ (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 para 10. 
60 ibid paras 8, 12. 
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to respond to.61 Where the ‘jurisprudence’ of the CESCR incorporates additional legalism, it 
will move further beyond the technical capacity of (non-legal) micro actors. The ability to 
acquire such expertise through one method or another will in turn depend on the financial 
resources of the group.62 
Connected to this legalistic tendency, and potential barrier number three, is the 
predominance of ex post review built into the ICESCR. While there is the possibility for the 
CESCR to engage in ex ante review of forthcoming or mooted State policies in its 
Concluding Observations, for the most part the Committee concerns itself with reviewing 
events, policies and measures that are already, to some extent, history. Such an ex post 
approach – while vital – forces micro groups, the CESCR and others into an effectively 
responsive mode. While the CESCR’s opportunities for pro-activism may be limited by the 
framework within which it is bound, micro groups are not similarly bound. Those micro 
groups are likely to focus their efforts and resources on preventing the violation they are 
concerned with rather than waiting for its indictment at a later point. It is predictable that 
this could lead them to by-pass or at least postpone their engagement with the legalism of 
the CESCR. 
All of the barriers above – the focus of progressive realisation, the legalistic dangers of the 
Optional Protocol, and ex post review – are magnified in the case of current versions of the 
doctrine of non-retrogression. As has been well elaborated in previous chapters63 the 
doctrine of non-retrogression takes a view that is similarly systemic and policy focussed as 
the progressive realisation obligation and combines this with numerous technical or 
legalistic conditions that must be fulfilled.64 This approach to retrogression thus does little 
to address the doctrinal barriers to micro responsiveness and, indeed, contributes to them. 
This should be a serious concern for small groups of ESR advocates, as it paves the way for 
their exclusion (or at least their limited inclusion) within the CESCR’s processes of decision 
making and development. 
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62 Butler (n 54) 361, 386. There is no availability of legal aid at the international level for Optional Protocol Complaints, and the 
provision of legal aid at the domestic level (at least in the context of the ICCPR) is ‘very unlikely’; ‘Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
- Individual Communications’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx> accessed 20 September 2016; Jane 
Connors and Markus Schmidt, ‘United Nations’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (OUP 
2013) 381; Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press 1994) 134. 
63 See, eg, Chapter 3, pp77ff. 
64 These are further examined in Chapter 8. 
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7.3.2. Institutional barriers 
If the revised doctrine of non-retrogression is to open up the ICESCR system to responding 
more fully to micro actors, then reforms must go beyond the doctrinal barriers. To 
effectively respond to micro concerns, the range of institutional barriers faced by the CESCR 
must be addressed. The two principal barriers that are identified here are the resource 
difficulties faced by the UN treaty bodies, and the irregularity of States’ reviews. While 
these might seem only tangentially connected to the doctrine of non-retrogression, they act 
as severe limitations on the CESCR’s ability to engage in the required depth and at the 
necessary time with the requirements of the doctrine. 
The CESCR and the other UN human rights treaty bodies face ‘chronic’ resource 
shortages,65 a mere six hours with which to examine and question States on – at least – five 
years’ worth of human rights issues,66 and a 2500 word limit on their concluding reports.67  
This places pressure upon the Committee to focus its attention and prioritise its 
examination. Such pressures are likely to work against the Committee attempting to engage 
with more localised and perhaps more intricate issues of concern to grassroots 
organisations. 
Even when a State faces its six-hour examination, the irregularity of that examination may 
allow the State to avoid effective scrutiny. While States are notionally subject to a review 
every five years, there was instead in the most recent crisis an average of five years between 
OECD States entering recession68 and their Concluding Observations being released, with 
much longer in some cases.69 This length of time allows States to advance substantially new 
policy directions and violate the ICESCR rights without ongoing review. Of course, when 
the State examination does occur, the CESCR is able to look back to violations previously 
committed, but where the context has changed or the policy has already been reversed this 
type of review will be largely redundant. Recent fiscal austerity policies provide a clear 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
65 Michael O’Flaherty and Claire O’Brien, ‘Reform of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept 
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66 Navanethem Pillay, ‘Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System’ (United Nations Human Rights 
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example of how a changing context can consign the CESCR’s examinations to a status of 
historical interest.70 
While, as noted above, the CESCR’s planned schedule of State examinations envisages a 
five-yearly engagement, in practice this period is highly variable. Indeed, since 2013, as a 
temporary measure, the five-year period between examinations begins at the date of the last 
State dialogue with the CESCR, rather than the previously completely static five-year 
programme of deadlines.71 At any one time the number of State reports submitted and 
requiring examination is relatively stable at around 45 reports.72 The Committee has 
expressed its concern in strong terms that backlogs and resource constraints, ‘no longer 
permit it to fully discharge its responsibilities under the [ICESCR] … in an efficient, effective 
and timely manner’.73 Before and throughout the crisis, the body’s budget meant that it was 
permitted to meet for full substantive sessions only twice per year (usually in April/May and 
in November).74 This work has, since 2006, been assisted by pre-sessional working groups of 
Committee members which allow for the advance preparation of lists of issues.75 
These pressures mean that even during ‘normal’ times there is a significant length of time 
between examinations, and the variable periodicity of Concluding Observations is 
undoubtedly a factor that affects the successful enforcement of the ICSECR rights. 
However, in the context of a crisis such as the most recent one there are additional issues 
that particularly inhibit the use of retrogression. 
By following a strict schedule of examinations with no – or very limited – discretion, the 
CESCR leaves to chance the effectiveness of the primary State accountability mechanism. 
There are, of course, a complex web of factors that could make the timing of an 
examination ‘good’ or ‘bad’. A forthcoming election or another issue dominating a national 
psyche could change the way in which the CESCR’s comments are taken. However, one 
indicator of the appropriateness of an examination’s timing is the period between the 
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arrival of recession and the next examination of that country.76 By this measure, the 
CESCR’s scheduled approach fails spectacularly. In fact, the countries that were some of the 
worst-hit by the crisis (Ireland, Greece and Italy) were also the countries that had the 
longest period between crisis and examination.77 It took around eight years and four 
months in each of these cases. By contrast, countries such as Sweden and Hungary were 
examined in around 5 months and 13 months respectively following the beginning of their 
recessionary periods. Neither are these examples outliers; the large average gap of around 
five years for OECD countries between entering recession and the release of Concluding 
Observations underscores the need for a reformed, and more creative use of the CESCR’s 
time. 
While more than eight years of unexamined post-recession ESR developments is self-
evidently too long a period to ensure effective and contemporaneous accountability, there is 
another side to such arbitrary methods of timing State examinations. The UK, another 
prominent recession-hit country, was examined just over a year following its entrance into 
recession. Yet this, it transpired, was before the worst of the effects (of the crisis and the 
responses to it) would be felt in the country. Indeed, while the Concluding Observations 
from that examination do mention the ‘economic downturn’ in relation to unemployment, 
there is no serious foreboding expressed or interrogation of the issues present.78 In this 
situation, and working from a State Report submitted prior to the UK’s recession79 (with 
additional information in the UK’s response to the List of Issues in March 200980), there 
were significant constraints upon the CESCR. In effect, this fortuitous timing (for the UK 
State) has bought the country and the three governments which have held office, an 
absence of accountability for around seven years of recession and austerity. Such arbitrary 
timing of the CESCR’s examinations, with no possibility for re-scheduling, pose a significant 
barrier to the effective use of the system by micro groups.  
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Neither would a more flexible approach be as practically difficult as might be imagined. 
While, most famously, the financial, bank-based crisis which struck the USA in late 2007 
cascaded around the world to cause economic recessions in numerous countries, these 
effects struck different parts of the world at different times. While a sudden deluge of 
demands for examinations might be imagined, if the CESCR continued its ex post approach 
the variation in when effects are seen in different countries would mean a natural 
staggering. As a crisis ‘rolls out’ at different rates it would provide a realistic window for the 
CESCR to reorder its schedule. Even if the CESCR was to move towards greater ex ante 
review as suggested above, the Committee would still be able prioritise the review of 
countries expected to be most susceptible to the effects of a given crisis. Given the severe 
resource constraints upon the CESCR, this ability to work within its existing resources is, of 
course, central to any reform suggestion and is something that is attempted within the 
(re)constructed doctrine.81 
7.3.3.  Accentuation through micro groups’ characteristics 
The concerns noted above – the doctrinal and institutional limitations of the ICESCR and 
the Committee – are likely to have broad impacts on a wide range of State and non-state 
actors. However, there are additional features of micro groups which intensify the effects 
felt by these smaller groups. In particular, where such groups include the characteristics of 
informality, under-resourcing and shorter-termism it may accentuate the barriers that exist 
to engagement with the CESCR. 
For example, literature on social movements notes the complexities that exist in sustaining 
these movements through time, with the direction of such groups being significantly 
influenced by the prevailing social environment.82 Faced with hostile political 
environments, internal conflicts, or co-option into a larger institution, the voice of the 
micro group can be lost.83 The implication of this in the context of the barriers to ICESCR 
engagement is that the longer the period before a country is examined the greater the 
likelihood becomes of interested groups being created and mothballed. This same difficulty 
is not felt to the same degree by larger, more stable institutions (such as international 
NGOs), which can largely sustain themselves between State examinations despite facing 
hostile environments. 
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While these larger bodies undoubtedly face significant challenges in resourcing themselves, 
especially during a recessionary period when membership and government funding may be 
scarce,84 the challenge will be less severe than for newly established micro groups. In 
particular, groups seeking resources will have to invest significant time in soliciting them 
and such efforts will require ‘some minimal form of organization’ which some micro groups 
may not possess.85 Despite the low financial barriers to accessing the ICESCR processes, the 
need for at least some legal understanding will require such groups to possess resources in-
cash or in-kind. 
This array of difficulties flowing from either the ICESCR system, the Covenant itself, or the 
makeup of micro groups reduce the ability for the system to hear the voices and concerns of 
organic, new and/or radical voices from beyond the established human rights ‘community’. 
As discussed in the following section, this removes a range of benefits that might result 
from such engagements. 
7.4. Centrality of Micro Concerns 
It can be argued that the CESCR’s existing levels of engagement with civil society are 
adequate and not indeed of improvement. However, this is to ignore the barriers faced by 
certain types of (under-resourced, ad hoc) micro groups. When the specific features of 
micro groups are considered, and their potential for unique contributions is appreciated, 
the need for a re-centring of some of the CESCR’s processes on these groups’ concerns 
becomes pressing. The benefits that might be realised through a fuller engagement with 
micro concerns can broadly be divided into expanded capacity and assistance in shaping the 
ESR normative agenda.  Each of these areas are explored in depth below. 
7.4.1.  Capacity 
Given the under-resourcing of the international bodies tasked with furthering ESR 
standards,86 and the role for domestic enforcement that is acknowledged by some as crucial 
to the realisation of international standards on-the-ground,87 capitalising on the capacities 
of the widest possible range of actors is necessary. While they may be cash poor, micro 
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groups can bring with them resources of an ‘organisational’, ‘moral, material, informational, 
and human’ nature.88 These resources might be derived from, and embedded within 
communities in ways that would be challenging for human rights systems to replicate.89 
 
How, then, might the ICESCR system make use of these resources? There are two 
challenges here. The first of these is the set of barriers elaborated upon in the previous 
section; the ICESCR is not currently well positioned to responsively attract engagement 
from micro groups. The second is the non-fungibility of many of the resources that exist at 
the micro level. Resources in a number of forms are contributed in a particular context in 
order to respond in a particular way to a particular issue.90 Seeking to simply transfer the 
resources into a struggle for ESR realisation is unlikely to be successful as the form of the 
struggle will not have the same resonance those who were prepared to contribute resources 
to the micro group. As such, in order to capitalise on the resources of such groups there will 
need to be an active accommodation of appropriate micro group concerns by the ICESCR 
system. 
 
Some might reject the utilitarianism of such an argument, seeing it as a threat to the health 
of the rights regime. Such concerns can be set aside on a number of bases. First, by 
focussing on the legitimacy of the micro group as a human rights actor it can be argued that 
the substance of the system benefits from such engagements. Of course, as discussed above, 
not all micro groups will be legitimate human rights actors, but where they have aims that 
can be linked to human rights and a basis in a democratic collective of individuals, their 
inclusion moves beyond pure instrumentalism. Secondly, a focus on the makeup of the 
CESCR can help demonstrate the need for such diverse and particularly micro concerns to 
be heard. The institutional tendencies of the human rights system as legalised, 
professionalised, and internationalised are far from neutral or inherently ‘good’ values91 and 
themselves lead to the human rights system taking on a particular normative inflexion. If, as 
Stammers encourages us to, we see both the work of elites and social movements as 
‘creative’ agents, micro concerns can be seen as exerting an entirely appropriate influence.92  
7.4.2. Normative Shaping 
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Beyond the extra enforcement capacity that might be achieved through a liaison with micro 
groups, there are a number of benefits that can result from allowing such groups a more 
significant role in shaping the normative directions of the ESR framework. There is an 
obvious tension implicit in involving micro groups in such a capacity; at what point does 
the ICESCR system stop being a human rights system and turn into a simple vehicle for 
localised and non-legal concerns? However, the concern of the international human rights 
system with the individual and her dignity, can clearly provide a foundation for at least 
some further engagement with micro groups. These groups, insofar as they have a plural 
membership, can ensure the international system of norms is better connected to the 
individuals it claims to represent.93 In this sense there is both a symbolic and substantive 
benefit to engaging with micro groups formed of individuals.  
The ‘outputs’ of micro groups – known in social movement theory as the ‘expressive 
dimension’ – can have positive effects in shaping ‘norms, values, [and] identities’.94 They do 
this, according to Stammers, through affective and normative dimensions.95 Both of these 
dimensions can add to the work of ESR adjudication, development and enforcements.96 
While the system might be more familiar with claims for normative change (the primary 
level on which the closely affiliated academic field operates), the affective can contribute an 
urgency and a grounding for the system. In particular, critics of human rights’ legalisation 
might recognise a redeeming potential for the system through a better incorporation of 
affective elements. 
There are several decisive areas where micro concerns from around the world might shape 
the CESCR’s work. For example, the voices of micro groups could help bring ‘new’ issues 
onto the CESCR’s agenda. At its most significant, this might help determine the topics for 
Days of General Discussion or the issues on which General Comments are developed. 
However, at a lower level these voices might act as a signal to the CESCR of new issues of 
significance that require their attention through proactive monitoring, State examinations, 
Statements or Letters. The most recent crisis and its associated austerity measures are an 
example of where the CESCR might have seen a greater range of impacts and local concerns 
more clearly and at an earlier point. 
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Besides the contribution of new issues, micro groups might also usefully assist the 
Committee in setting its priorities as between existing issues. They could do this by 
contributing both a sense of the magnitude or severity of an issue, and separately its 
importance to the individuals the group purports to represent. This might give the CESCR a 
basis for making difficult choices between two or more policies that are negatively affecting 
the right to housing, for example. Whether the cost, quality, availability or type of tenure is 
seen as the priority issue by micro groups could, for example, usefully inform the CESCR’s 
view on its own priorities. 
Finally, active engagement with micro groups might be used to inform the Committee’s 
proposed response to a rights issue. While is it important for the CESCR to be seen as 
independent, and there must therefore be a limit to the influence held by micro groups, this 
influence can again be seen in a similar light to State influence over the Committee. Micro 
groups could be seen as shaping the responses of the CESCR in much the same way as State 
reactions (practically and politically) act to set boundaries upon the potential responses 
open to the Committee (treaty bodies are not known for their calls to reinvent national 
democratic structures or economic systems). These opposing influences would likely occur 
at opposing ends of the scale. Whereas States are likely to contribute a conservative 
impulse, micro groups might contribute a more ‘radical’ impulse with the groups able to 
indicate a base line solution below which an acceptable CESCR solution should not go. 
Moves to incorporate micro concerns more strongly might reasonably be met with unease. 
After all, inviting unrestrained outsiders into the ICESCR processes might upset a fine 
diplomatic balance that enables at least some State accountability. However, there is 
significant untapped potential in these many groups. It remains the case that a majority of 
groups – be they formalised NGOs, or more informal political or campaign groupings – are 
not engaged in the use of the international human rights system. This means there are an 
unexplored mass of benefits in terms of capacity and normative shaping that the ESR 
framework can profit from. However, it is clear that given the range of barriers that exist to 
prevent full micro responsiveness, a number of modifications to the ICESCR system are 
required. Some of these have been discussed above, such as caution about the over-
legalisation of the Optional Protocol, and the need for greater flexibility in the timing of 
State examinations. However, the task of considering where the retrogression, the ICESCR 
and the Committee might be more effective in this regard is taken up in full in the following 
section. The section particularly focusses on the role the (re)constructed retrogression can 
play as a vehicle for such engagement. 
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7.5. Improved Approaches 
There are a number of ways that the CESCR’s work could become more engaged with the 
concerns of micro actors. Inevitably, the available options range from the straightforwardly 
implementable to those requiring significant reforms. However, of particular interest is the 
role that the doctrine of non-retrogression can play in shifting the CESCR’s emphasis in a 
more micro-friendly direction. 
 
The repurposing of the doctrine of retrogression argued for in chapter 4 was grounded in 
the aim of supporting the progressive realisation obligation, while striking a balance 
between internal coherence and innovation. Recalling the suggested new formulation of 
retrogression: 
as an action, inaction or contribution to a trend which is likely to 
negatively affect the progressive realisation of individuals’ ICESCR 
rights.97 
This formulation provides a number of cues for new thinking on micro engagement. There 
is of course, the aim of promoting progressive realisation through innovations. While most 
obviously these innovations can come through doctrinal changes, there is also room for a 
broader conception in this regard. Here we might think of the innovations to retrogression 
that might be more accommodating to the affective or emotion work of micro groups. This 
might occur quite simply, through the use by the Committee of individual stories of 
retrogression and its impacts. This is encouraged by the (re)construction’s explicit focus on 
the experiences of individuals. Although this could in theory occur in Concluding 
Observations, General Comments and Statements it is perhaps more likely that they are 
included beyond these more formal materials in discussions and press releases. Even these 
more limited changes to practice would capitalise upon this aspect of micro group work, in 
addition to boosting the effectiveness of the CESCR’s work as an advocacy tool.98  
The text of the proposed (re)constructed retrogression additionally broadens the focus of 
the doctrine to include a broader range of State activities within its scope. By including all of 
State actions, inactions and contributions to trends, the (re)constructed doctrine removes a 
significant barrier to micro groups. Rather than needing to demonstrate a particular action 
(and, under the current version of retrogression, a deliberate one at that), micro groups 
would simply be able to identify negative outcomes and some State connection to them 
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according to the (re)construction. This is key in terms of reducing the barriers to these 
groups’ participation as it is more inclusive of their experiences, however it also allows the 
CESCR to receive a broader range of information and concerns from the grassroots level. 
In another sense, the work of ‘sky scanning’ for potential threats can largely be taken care of 
by a plurality of well-connected micro groups. Such groups could act as a barometer in the 
context of retrogression, allowing the CESCR to react more promptly to negative impacts 
being experienced before they become large-scale rights crises. One example of this might 
be the experience of the third sector through recent austerity policies. Many organisations 
expressed deep concerns about the future sources of funding for their services quickly after 
austerity policies were enacted,99 yet it was years before these concerns received formalised 
attention. Opening the doctrine of retrogression to such input allows it to adopt an 
explicitly ex ante approach that identifies negative trends and a human rights-based 
solution to them at an earlier stage.  
Further, while the need for demonstrations of the systematic effects of a State policy noted 
above would be difficult for a small-scale group to undertake, the revised formulation of 
retrogression removes such a systematic quality. By focussing on the likely impacts upon 
individuals – through the phrase ‘negatively affect the progressive realisation of individuals’ 
ICESCR rights’ – the revised retrogression paves the way for the concerns of even the 
smallest micro groups to be acted upon. This is one key way in which the substance of the 
Committee’s work can be guarded against undue abstraction, a problem that has been 
particularly acute in the case of retrogression. 
In addition to these retrogression-concentrated changes, there are a number of other more 
operational ways in which the CESCR could further its engagement with the micro level. 
One of these simply capitalises on an already successful link between the UN human rights 
institutions and grass roots activists. The Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, 
although far from perfect, regularly undertake country visits and discuss issues of concern 
with a range of actors, including micro ones.100 As such, the Committee has a pre-existing 
source of well-sourced information on the concerns of at least some micro-groups. While 
the CESCR and the Special Procedures are clearly different institutions and will have 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
99 Mary-Ann Stephenson and James Harrison, ‘Unravelling Equality?: A Human Rights and Equality Impact Assessment of the 
Public Spending Cuts on Women in Coventry.’ (2011) 52ff 
<https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/chrp/publications/unravelling_equality_full.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2016. 
100 Christophe Golay, Claire Mahon and Ioana Cismas, ‘The Impact of the UN Special Procedures on the Development and 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 299. 
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different mandates,101 the connection between the two could be strengthened. The CESCR 
could, for example make further references to the work of the Special Procedures in its 
Concluding Observations, re-emphasising issues of concern and highlighting instances 
where access to a country has been refused to a Rapporteur. 
Another complement to this information gathering – and a way to improve the use of 
retrogression – is through soliciting a wider range of shadow reports. There is already some 
good practice in this regard with some State examinations being aided by numerous shadow 
reports. Invariably, however, the number of reports submitted is a fraction of the total 
number of groups that are working on issues of concern to the Committee. Encouraging less 
formal or ‘fact-finding’ submissions to the CESCR would allow micro groups to contribute 
the information and understanding that they retain. Such an approach would also allow the 
much larger pool of groups without a knowledge of the ICSECR legal standards to 
contribute effectively. 
The contents of the Optional Protocol also promise new avenues for actively engaging micro 
groups. The use of third party interveners in individual complaints will enhance the role of 
such groups and can benefit the quality of the Committee’s jurisprudence. The Committee 
should accept and encourage a wide variety of interventions in relation to individual 
communications. Importantly these should include interventions which are less legally 
literate but which can contribute context or specialist understanding. In addition, when 
producing its views, the CESCR should avoid an excessively legalistic direction that could 
act to exclude all but the most specialist legal actors. 
The inquiry procedure in the Optional Protocol provides a further opportunity for the 
CESCR to seek out the views of micro groups. Although limited, in the same way as 
individual complaints, to those few States that have ratified the Protocol, the coverage of the 
procedure may expand in future. The threshold for a triggering of the procedure is high, 
requiring evidence of ‘grave or systematic violations’.102 However the mechanism for 
triggering this additional attention is open and flexible. The CESCR need only receive 
‘reliable information’ indicating such a severe situation and such information can readily be 
provided by micro groups. As such, the inquiry procedure provides a way for micro group 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
101 For a list of the mandates of the UN Special Procedures see; Office of the High Commissoner for Human Rights, ‘Thematic 
Mandates’ <http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM> 
accessed 20 September 2016. 
102 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 45) art 11(2). 
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concerns to empower the CESCR to move to ‘urgently’103 to assess a concerning situation. In 
assessing such a situation there is a further opportunity for engagement with micro actors. 
There are also a range of other more demanding reforms that could be enacted in order to 
better facilitate this relationship. Some of these would simply require an adaptation of 
current practices, while some would require more substantial reform. For example, the 
CESCR could move to a more fluid schedule of State examinations that would allow a more 
responsive approach to ESR violations. A scheduling change might even be triggered by 
information of specific issues such a retrogression or a violation of the minimum core. 
Elsewhere, greater advice and technical support might be provided by the Committee or its 
secretariat to those micro groups who wish to engage with them. Such support might help 
bridge the gap between the legal resources of micro groups and the CESCR’s specific 
processes and standards. 
There are, too, more fundamental reforms that might be pursued. Greater resources for the 
CESCR’s work would allow the body to be more proactive in encouraging crucial micro 
engagement. Or, through changes to the Committee’s working methods, micro groups and 
affected individuals might take on a more central role in the State examination process. 
There is significant value that can be added by micro engagement and there are multiple 
areas where the Committee might make improvements to its practice. A reformed doctrine 
of non-retrogression could work as one important vehicle for opening the ICESCR system 
up to greater engagement with micro groups. Through employing the emotions work of 
micro groups and adopting a more flexible and ex ante approach, the doctrine of non-
retrogression could shift away from the current approach. Combined with other aspects 
such as the individual complaints mechanism, the inquiry procedure and some more 
demanding reforms, there is clear potential for more effective practice in this area. 
7.6. Conclusions 
It is clear that defining ‘micro groups’ and ‘engagement’ in this context is a challenging task. 
There are a range of definitions that identify, with varying degrees of success, the type of 
actor that we are concerned with here. The meaning given to micro groups for the purposes 
of the analysis here combined a number of definitions and stressed the groups’ construction 
of themselves and the inclusion of at least some of subaltern characteristics. This generally 
led to a de-emphasising of the structural and organisational characteristics of the groups. In 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
103 ibid art 11(3). 
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addition, ‘engagement’ was also given a flexible definition in recognition of the context-
dependence of the term. While it is clear that engagement with some groups is clearly not 
required, in more finely balanced cases it was argued that the ICESCR carves out a role for 
such groups (especially in the enforcement context). 
The chapter discussed the significant doctrinal and institutional barriers that currently exist 
to successful micro engagement. These included the high level focus of progressive 
realisation, fears surrounding the Optional Protocol, the predominance of ex post review, 
resource shortages and the scheduling of State examinations. It was also argued that some 
of the characteristics of micro groups can serve to magnify the impact of these barriers. 
Yet, despite the barriers, the benefits of micro engagement are clear. The chapter argued 
that the ICESCR system could be enhanced by the capacity brought by micro groups’ 
participation. Beyond this more instrumental reason for improving micro engagement, it 
was also argued that there were significant substantive benefits to be had by allowing micro 
actors to be involved in shaping the normative direction and choices of the CESCR. 
Finally, the chapter addressed how the (re)constructed doctrine could lead to changes to 
the current practices of the ICESCR system in order to facilitate more effective micro 
engagement. Changes to the doctrine of non-retrogression are central to these adaptations 
and it was argued that the proposed (re)construction can act to counteract a number of the 
current barriers to micro groups. This might be done by mitigating the sometimes high-
level progressive realisation obligation, and going beyond the traditional language of the 
CESCR’s outputs to include individual stories of retrogression and its impacts. The 
(re)construction also moves away from the need for overly legalistic approaches, and allows 
for greater ex ante review. 
In these and other areas, changes to the formulation of retrogression could be a central part 
of improving responsiveness to the concerns of micro groups. In this sense, then, the 
(re)construction of retrogression would provide a successful avenue to better realisation of 
the Covenant.  
Chapter 8 
Retrogression in Applied Perspective  
8.1. Introduction 
While the CESCR’s versions of the doctrine of non-retrogression are confused and lacking 
in purpose,1 a key deficiency also lies in the impracticability of the doctrine. There are 
significant challenges in assessing whether and what type of retrogression exists. The 
multiple steps required in order to successfully show the existence of retrogression (each of 
which can be a significant challenge to demonstrate) have made discussions of 
retrogression a rarity,2 and conclusive findings all but absent.3 Added to these multiple 
levels are difficulties with terminology, and pervasive vagueness about the triggers and 
scope of application of the doctrine. 
It follows then, that a (re)constructed doctrine of non-retrogression must make advances in 
these practical matters as much as in the more attention-grabbing areas of macro policy and 
crisis. The fourth and final stress-test of the (re)constructed doctrine is therefore its 
practicability. It is implicit in the preceding chapters that task of ensuring effective 
implementation of the doctrine of non-retrogression is a significant one. It is also clear that 
without improved implementation, many of the improvements discussed in relation to 
structural, crisis, and micro issues will fail. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to dig deep into the logic and practical dynamics of 
non-retrogression, in order to understand the implementation difficulties. Each of these 
identified practical issues is then addressed and compared to how the (re)constructed 
doctrine might approach the matter. The selection of challenges is not comprehensive, but 
instead selects those matters that arise most often. It begins with the issue of terminology, 
making a plea for a rigorous and consistent use of some of the terms that are central to the 
doctrine’s functioning. Following this, the process that must be followed in order to 
demonstrate retrogression is discussed, including a particular focus on burdens of proof. 
The inconsistencies in these burdens is scrutinised. The chapter then touches briefly on the 
issue of how the examinations of non-retrogression are timed and triggered, in an attempt 
to deliver clarity about how assessments of retrogression are to be initiated. The section 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
1 See especially Chapter 3. 
2 In the 15-year period from the year 2000, retrogression was discussed in just 4% of Concluding Observations (this figure 
moves to 9% if mentions of the 2012 Letter to States, which was heavily focussed on retrogression, are included).  
3 For some of the CESCR’s firmer findings of retrogression, see; CESCR, ‘Report on the Seventh Session’ (1993) UN Doc 
E/1993/22 para 152 (Concluding Observations on Hungary); CESCR, ‘Report on the Tenth and Eleventh Sessions’ UN Doc 
E/1995/22 para 181 (Concluding Observations on Mauritius); CESCR, ‘Report on the Thirty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh Sessions’ 
UN Doc E/2007/22 para 190 (Concluding Observations on Canada). 
210	 Chapter	8	
	
also devotes attention to identifying the exact target of the doctrine. This draws heavily on 
the work of Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis to show that the empirical/ normative division can 
be both analytically useful and complex. At each stage, the differences made by the 
(re)constructed retrogression will be highlighted and discussed. 
The challenges are diverse in nature, ranging from those that would be traditionally 
thought of as ‘legal’, such as those relating to proof, to those that are at best procedural and 
could even be seen as presentational, such as the inconsistencies that exist across the 
multiple versions of the doctrine. 
Together these discussions move beyond some of the more strategic challenges faced by the 
doctrine that have been discussed in previous chapters, and towards the more operational 
issues faced in the doctrine’s implementation. As a whole, the chapter emphasises the need 
for greater consistency with the construction and use of the doctrine (showing, for example, 
a multitude of burdens of proof and terms for the doctrine). It also demonstrates that 
without attention to the operational detail, retrogression – in whatever form – will fail to be 
fully utilised. 
8.2. Terminology 
The choice and order of words seems an unlikely subject matter for a human rights centred 
discussion. Yet, a significant degree of ambiguity in the writing of all actors in this area 
means clarification is needed. This ambiguity is surprising given the dominance of the 
human rights arena by lawyers who are stereotypically fastidious with definitions and 
semantic accuracy. And, ‘[l]anguage matters when it comes to delineating international 
human rights obligations’.4 There are three terminological concerns selected for attention 
here, but many more could be similarly scrutinised.5 These are (in order); the non-naming 
of retrogression, a changeable name, and the meaning of ‘deliberateness’. 
Ironically the first of the terminological problems relates to an absence of terminology. As 
has been highlighted by Nolan, the CESCR has failed in high-profile examples to use the 
word retrogression or even regressive, instead opting to describe the situation in terms of a 
‘step backwards’.6 While replacing the term retrogressive with the backwardness concept 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
4 Aoife Nolan, ‘Putting ESR-Based Budget Analysis into Practice: Addressing the Conceptual Challenges’ in Aoife Nolan, Rory 
O’Connell and Colin Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets & the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights 
(Hart 2013) 52. 
5 Other semantic/definitional issues arise inter alia in respect of; ‘discretion’, ‘guideposts’, ‘alternatives’, ‘carefully considered’. 
There is some discussion above of the terms ‘non’, ‘prohibition’, ‘measure’ and ‘step’ in chapter 3, pp74-77. 
6 Nolan (n 4) 51; citing CESCR, Concluding Observations: Spain (UN Doc E/C12/ESP/CO/5 2012). 
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would be somewhat more accessible, such a change of language would need to be made 
explicitly. As it is, the CESCR’s uses of ‘backwards steps’ language amounts to a tangential 
reference to retrogression that, in the context of the country concerned, serves to soften 
their finding by divorcing it from the hard legal doctrine. New word choices such as this 
also serve to further the complexity of non-retrogression. Does the doctrine of non-
retrogression only relate to backwardness? What is the meaning of a ‘step’? Do the same 
justificatory criteria apply to backwards steps as to full retrogression? 
Even where the Committee is more explicit about its meaning, the terms used to express 
that meaning are varied. There are, as discussed above, various different uses of the terms 
regression, retrogressive, and retrogression.7 This is clearly causing confusion, with State 
reports using the terms incorrectly and giving them a non-legal or mathematical meaning, 
for example.8 
Further, there is currently an interchangeable use of the terms mechanism, doctrine and 
obligation to describe the bundle of duties encapsulated within retrogression. It was argued 
that there was a greater degree of solidity and separatism to be had from the use of 
‘doctrine’ rather than ‘mechanism’, suggesting that retrogression is a stand-alone entity.9 
This, it was argued, might be more appropriate where retrogression was seen as having 
separate purposes to other obligations (especially progressive realisation). Given the close 
connection of the (re)constructed retrogression to progressive realisation, an implication 
that it sits independently would be counterproductive. However, using a term such as ‘duty’ 
or ‘obligation’ might imply something more neutral and overcome this difficulty. 
Another terminological issue relates to the ambiguity surrounding the subject of 
‘deliberateness’. The question is posed; must the measure or the retrogression be deliberate? 
There are two potential meanings when ‘deliberate’ is used in connection to ‘retrogressive’. 
Unhelpfully, each of these meanings can be encapsulated in similar words. These meanings 
are (in order of ascending State culpability); 
1. Deliberate retrogressive measure:   That the measure (which happens to be 
retrogressive) was deliberate (i.e. that the 
measure was deliberate, but the retrogressive 
result was not) 
2. Deliberately retrogressive measure:  That the retrogressive nature of the measure was 
deliberate (i.e. that the measure was deliberately 
constructed to be retrogressive) 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
7 Chapter 3, At pp74-77. 
8 Chapter 3, nn73 and and 74. 
9 Chapter 3, At pp74-77. 
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Leaving aside the exact terms used by authors,10 there is some agreement that the second 
meaning above is the correct one. Sepúlveda implies agreement with the second of these 
definitions when she refers to a step backward as the result of an ‘intentional decision’ (i.e. 
she sees the decision not just to take a step, but to take a step backwards, as the result of an 
intentional or deliberate process).11 O’Connell et al (writing in 2014),12 Nolan and Dutschke 
(writing in 2010) 13 and Nolan et al (writing in 2014)14 cite this passage of Sepúlveda’s analysis 
approvingly. Elsewhere, Sepúlveda Carmona mirrors the CESCR’s work more explicitly, 
where it emphasises the range of steps to be taken before enacting a retrogressive measure 
and thus pointing towards the second definition,15 as discussed below.16 Many authors do 
not endorse either position.  
There is also a tension here in the CESCR’s work. As Nolan notes, ‘the Committee has never 
addressed the difference between retrogressive measures that are deliberate and those that 
are not’.17 Far less has the Committee given guidance on what it is that the State must not 
do deliberately. The most obvious reading of the CESCR’s work is the second of the two 
definitions (that the retrogressive nature must be deliberate). This is the approach of the 
Limburg Principles18 and in addition, some of the CESCR’s justificatory criteria sit uneasily 
alongside an assessment of whether measures were deliberately taken or not (the first 
definition). The appraisal of whether a measure was accidental or deliberate is of an entirely 
different magnitude to an assessment whether the State had carefully considered the 
measure and had had the impacts independent assessed.19 The latter criteria would seem to 
answer the deliberateness question (i.e. if the State had carefully considered the measure, it 
is clearly deliberate). Yet the two criteria are presented in competition to each other in the 
doctrine’s criteria; deliberateness is seen as bad, while careful consideration is seen as good. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
10 The terms ‘deliberate/ly retrogressive measures’ are used interchangeably in the literature. See, eg, Independent Expert on 
the question of human rights and extreme poverty, Rights-Based Approach to Recovery (UN Doc A/HRC/17/34 2011) para 18; 
Aoife Nolan and Mira Dutschke, ‘Article 2 (1) ICESCR and States Parties’ Obligations: Whither the Budget?’ (2010) 3 European 
Human Rights Law Review 280, 282; Christian Courtis, ‘Standards to Make ESC Rights Justiciable: A Summary Exploration’ 
(2009) 2(4) Erasmus Law Review 379, 393. 
11 M Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Intersentia 2003) 323. 
12 Rory O’Connell and others, Applying an International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and 
Resources (Routledge 2014) 70. 
13 Nolan and Dutschke (n 10) 282; this relevant passage of Nolan and Dutschke is cited in Nolan (n 4) 46.  
14 Aoife Nolan, Nicholas J Lusiani and Christian Courtis, ‘Two Steps Forward, No Steps Back? Evolving Criteria on the 
Prohibition of Retrogression in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Aoife Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the 
Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 133. 
15 Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘Alternatives to Austerity: A Human Rights Framework for Economic Recovery’ in Aoife 
Nolan (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2014) 26–27.  
16 Below at pp214-217. 
17 Nolan (n 4) 47. 
18 ‘The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 para 72. As the work of experts in the field these principles are influential but not binding. 
Sepúlveda’s reminder of their age and the array of developments since then is also valuable; Sepúlveda (n 11) 19. 
19 CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/19 2007) para 42. 
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Yet according to this more prevalent second definition, there is a danger that the State 
might escape duties where activity can be defined as a ‘measure’ but not as deliberately 
taken one. When ‘measure’ is defined broadly (as the CESCR does to include ‘legislation, 
strategies, policies and programmes’),20 thinking of examples of non-deliberate such 
measures is difficult. One might suggest that a relatively automated, technical and/or low 
level measure taken without the knowledge or deliberation of the ‘State’ might not be 
deliberate. However, this engages the more substantive and complex question of what 
constitutes ‘State deliberateness’. 
On the one hand, we might take the personification of the State to an extreme and discuss 
the deliberateness of its actions in much the same way the intention of individuals is 
discussed in domestic law. At the other end, however, such a treatment ignores the 
multifaceted nature of States which have at their core multiple policy processes, many 
divergent intentions, and which do not behave as individuals do. 
Even if ‘deliberateness’ can be conceptually resolved with the nature of States’ functioning, 
there is the more pressing issue about how – and what type of – deliberateness is to be 
shown. While the CESCR seems to have opted for requiring the retrogressive nature of the 
measure to be deliberate, there is a gulf of culpability between the two. The first definition 
merely excuses States for bad measures enacted accidentally, while the second definition 
opens up a route for States to escape legal responsibility for considered measures that 
damage rights. This is because, under the second definition, the State’s deliberate intention 
to damage rights would have to be shown. 
Finding evidence of such malign intent in a State’s functioning would be extremely difficult. 
While it is relatively easy to demonstrate the deliberateness with which a State enacted a 
measure (through a governmental statement, for example), it is altogether more difficult to 
show that the State deliberately harmed the rights of its citizenry. This creates a serious gulf 
between each definition. Proving that a State deliberately enacted a measure is one thing, 
but proving that it intended that a measure would damage rights is an altogether more 
significant task. Operating under meaning two would allow States to simply claim that the 
retrogressive nature of the measure was unintended and thus escape their obligations. 
Significantly, the burden of proof relating to deliberateness is one of the few criteria that 
has been left open in this way and will likely fall to the Committee or claimants to 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
20 ibid 67. 
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demonstrate.21 
In all of these terminological issues, the need for consistency and clarity should guide the 
CESCR’s activities. There are marginal choices to be made as between various terms, but 
whatever route is chosen it should be adhered to consistently. This will aid the practical 
application of retrogression in a greater number of situations and will ensure the full 
meaning and force of the doctrine is applied. 
The (re)constructed doctrine, or indeed any fully reformed doctrine of non-retrogression, 
offers the opportunity for a mass clarification of the terminology used. It also reduces the 
number of terms of art, and in so doing minimises the chances for such conflicts of 
language to arise. Finally, it is linked to the language of progressive realisation, meaning a 
second parallel set of terms does not need to be used to define similar ideas. 
8.3.  Proving Retrogression 
The process of demonstrating retrogression depends greatly on the version of the doctrine 
that is followed. It has been argued in earlier chapters that there is a lack of common 
grounding and purpose across the various doctrines,22 however, it can be seen that the 
detail of the doctrines’ application is inconsistent also. The CESCR has done little to 
discourage such conflicts between its doctrines either implicitly through its restatements of 
the terms of retrogression, or explicitly through an explanatory note. Concluding 
Observations are similarly unhelpful in understanding the dynamics of the doctrine’s 
application, with the CESCR failing to ever rigorously apply the doctrine to country 
situations. This inconsistency is one part of the difficulty in concretely proving 
retrogression. The other significant element is the lack of clarity surrounding the burdens of 
proof that are required by the doctrine. The CESCR variously notes that the ‘burden of 
proving’ retrogression is upon states, that there is a ‘strong presumption’ against 
retrogression, that retrogression is ‘prohibited’, that ‘retrogressive measures should in 
principle not be taken’, but also that they can be ‘inevitable’.23 Besides this array of 
standards, is the requirement of article 8(4) of the Optional Protocol which obliges the 
CESCR to consider the reasonableness of the State’s actions when considering complaints. 
The balancing of these standards is to take place while ‘bearing in mind’ that States are 
entitled to pursue the ICESCR rights in a range of ways (thereby giving a sort-of margin of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
21 See below at section 8.3.. 
22 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
23 CESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work (Art 6 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/18 2005) para 21; CESCR, General 
Comment 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/GC/22 2016) para 38. 
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appreciation to the State24). The substantial difficulties in unpicking the CESCR’s 
meaning(s) will be discussed towards the end of this section. First, however, the more 
general inconsistencies in the doctrines will be examined.		
A reasonable pair of examples representing the two poles of the level and variance of 
complexity in the process of showing the existence of an impermissible retrogressive 
measure, are General Comment 3 and General Comment 19. Following General Comment 3, 
there are ostensibly five aspects that must be shown in order to successful demonstrate 
impermissible retrogression.25 The responsibility for showing all of these aspects is an open 
question as the Comment does not specify who must prove each step. It might be surmised 
that, in practice, under General Comment 3 this responsibility will fall to the ‘claimant’ 
(whether an individual or NGO) that is invested in showing the breach. In some instances, 
such demonstrations will be relatively straightforward where, for example, deliberateness 
can be shown through government statements and/or legislation. Yet others, requiring 
proof that there was not ‘careful consideration’, will be substantially more difficult.		
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
24 CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” Under an Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant’ (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 paras 11, 12; Chairperson of the CESCR, ‘Letter Dated 16 May 2012 
Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) UN Doc HRC/NONE/2012/76, UN reference 
CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW; Bruce Porter, ‘The Reasonableness of Article 8(4) – Adjudicating Claims from the Margins’ (2009) 
27(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 39; on how ‘reasonableness’ and the margin might interact see, Aoife Nolan, ‘Economic 
and Social Rights, Budgets and the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2013) 21(2) The International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 248, 277. 
25 See Figure 8. 
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By the time the CESCR has developed General Comment 19 this balance has been 
significantly redressed, with the Comment explicitly putting more of a burden upon the 
State to prove the existence of some mitigating factors. In this version of the doctrine, the 
only aspects of proof not specifically assigned to the State are the deliberateness of the 
measure, and – understandably – the demonstration that a retrogressive measure has been 
taken. Yet, by this token, the complexity of this doctrine is amplified. This not only relates 
to various burdens of proof upon parties, but also to a complex sixth step of the analysis. In 
addition to the five criteria of General Comment 3, there are added a melee of six suggested 
factors that the CESCR will consider before making a finding of retrogression. This goes 
some way to positioning the previously discussed criteria (and the entire retrogression 
content of General Comment 3) as mere prerequisites to empower the CESCR to undertake 
a more substantive assessment based on a weighing of factors.		
Is measure a backwards (or 
stagnant) one? 
Are the maximum of available 
resources being used? 
Violation of the obligation to 
use the maximum of available 
resources (art 2(1)). 
Can it be shown that the 
measure was not taken 
deliberately? 
Can it be shown that the 
measure was taken after careful 
consideration? 
Violation. Falls under state 
obligation not to take 
retrogressive measures 
without careful consideration 
(GC3). 
Can the measure be justified 
by reference to the totality of 
ICESCR rights? 
Violation. Falls under state 
obligation not to take 
retrogressive measures without 
justifying them in relation to 
the totality of rights (GC3). 
No violation. Falls within 
inherent state discretion and 
‘real world’ flexibility of article 
2(1) combined with GC3. 
 
No violation of ICESCR. Falls 
within ‘real world’ flexibility 
of article 2(1) combined with 
GC3. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No	
Yes 
No	
No 
Yes 
Figure 8 
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Beyond these more general difficulties with the process of proving retrogression,  there are 
some specific problems with the various burdens of proof attached to the doctrine.26 
Primary amongst these is the difficulty in understanding what the Committee means to 
imply by its reiteration of the ‘strong presumption of impermissibility’ of retrogression. If 
simply meant as dissuasion of rights-harming State actions, the Committee would be 
advised to avoid the use of the im/permissibility terms which have a legal meaning in the 
retrogression context. It seems more likely, however, that this overlap in terms is intended 
to add something more legally significant.27 The ‘strong presumption’ could, for instance, 
indicate that the standard or strength of the burden that rests upon States is a difficult one 
to overcome. The informational hegemony of States, and the often large teams of analysts 
available to them, justify a high bar for States to pass over before escaping a finding of 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
26 For references related to this section of the discussion see Table 3. 
27 Courtis argues that retrogression is subject to ‘heightened scrutiny’; Courtis (n 10) 393. 
Is it shown that a retrogressive (backwards 
or stagnant) measure has been ‘taken’? 
Can the State show that the measure was 
taken in the context of the use of the 
maximum of available resources? 
Can it be shown that the measure was not 
taken deliberately? 
Can the State show that the measure was 
taken after careful consideration? 
Can the State justify the measure by 
reference to the totality of ICESCR rights? 
Does the CESCR find (despite a strong 
presumption against permissibility) and 
considering the following factors, that 
retrogression was impermissible? 
(a) there was reasonable justification for the 
action; 
(b) alternatives were comprehensively examined; 
(c) there was genuine participation of affected 
groups in examining the proposed measures and 
alternatives; 
(d) the measures were directly or indirectly 
discriminatory; 
(e) the measures will have a sustained impact on 
the realization of the right […], an unreasonable 
impact 
on acquired […] rights or whether an individual 
or group is deprived of access to the 
minimum essential level of [the right];  
(f) whether there was an independent review of 
the measures at the national level. 
	
Violation of the obligation to 
use the maximum of available 
resources (art 2(1)). 
Violation. Falls under state 
obligation not to take 
retrogressive measures 
without careful consideration 
(GC3 and GC19). 
No violation of ICESCR. 
Falls within ‘real world’ 
flexibility of article 2(1) 
combined with GC3 and 
GC19. 
Violation. Falls under state 
obligation not to take 
retrogressive measures 
without careful consideration 
(GC3 and GC19). 
Violation. Falls under state 
obligation not to take 
impermissible 
retrogressive measures. 
No violation. Falls 
within CESCR’s 
discretion to find 
retrogression 
permissible on the 
basis of GC19 factors. 
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No 
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Figure 9 
218	 Chapter	8	
	
retrogression. Thus the combination of the most commonly used burdens might be 
(slightly) more clearly expressed by saying, ‘there is a rebuttable but strong presumption 
that retrogressive measures are impermissible. It is for the State to rebut that presumption 
and thereby to prove their permissibility’.	
Document Burden(s) of proof suggested 
General Comment 328 [No express burden upon State] 
General Comment 1329 ‘strong presumption of impermissibility’ 
‘State party has the burden of proving’ 
General Comment 1430 ‘strong presumption that retrogressive measures … are 
not permissible’ 
‘State party has the burden of proving’ 
General Comment 1531 ‘strong presumption that retrogressive measures … are 
prohibited’ 
‘State party has the burden of proving’ 
General Comment 1732 ‘strong presumption that retrogressive measures … are 
not permissible’ 
‘State party has the burden of proving’ 
General Comment 1833 ‘retrogressive measures should in principle not be taken’ 
‘States parties have the burden of proving’ 
‘strong presumption that retrogressive measures … are 
not permissible’ 
Statement on the use of 
MAR34 
‘the burden of proof rests with the State party’ 
General Comment 1935 ‘strong presumption that retrogressive measures … are 
prohibited ‘ 
‘State party has the burden of proving’ 
General Comment 2136 [No express burden upon State] 
Letter to States37 [No express burden upon State] 
General Comment 2238 ‘State party has the burden of proving’ 
General Comment 2339 ‘has to demonstrate’ 
Statement on Public Debt40 [No express burden upon State] 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
28 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2(1) of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/1991/23) para 9. 
29 CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education (Art 13 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/10 1999) para 45. 
30 CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education (Art 14 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/1999/4 1999) para 
32. 
31 CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2002/11 2002) para 9. 
32 CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests 
Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Art 15(1)(c) of the Covenant) (UN 
Doc E/C12/GC/17 2006) para 27. 
33 CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 23) para 21. 
34 CESCR, ‘MAR under OP’ (n 24) paras 9, 10. 
35 CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 19) para 42. 
36 CESCR, General Comment 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art 15(1)(a) of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/GC/21 2001) para 65. 
37 Chairperson of the CESCR (n 24). 
38 CESCR, General Comment 22 (n 23) para 38. 
39 CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work (Art 7 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/GC/23 2016) para 52. 
40 CESCR, ‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR’ (UN Doc E/C12/2016/1 2016) para 4. 
Table 3 
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This touches on complex questions of evidence and proof that are generally under-explored 
in relation to the treaty bodies, and which go beyond the scope of this research.41 However, 
a few key points on these burdens are necessary. Firstly, while it might look attractive to 
divide the proof of the facts from legal evaluation (and the so-called burden of persuasion), 
this approach is challenging in the arena of human rights law.42 Adjudication of human 
rights questions tends to lead to overlapping considerations of the social situation, the law 
and even normative questions. In a range of judicial settings courts have been vague about 
whether burdens of proof are to be applied to law, facts, or both.43 The same is true of the 
CESCR which gives no guidance on whether the burden upon States is a burden that 
requires the production of evidence, a burden of persuasion, or a hybrid burden that 
requires a combination of the two. Yet the determination of these questions is vitally 
important in determining the ‘risk of non-persuasion’44 (i.e. who risks losing the dispute if 
the case is not proved). This should lie with the State according to the CESCR’s guidance, 
but in practice the risk has been left squarely with civil society. Were the Optional 
Protocol’s inquiry procedure to be used in relation to potential retrogression, the picture 
would become even more complex and could conceivably draw the CESCR itself into the 
exercise of proof/ disproof.45 
There are a number of areas where non-retrogression steps into the territory of other 
obligations and encounters different burdens. For example, the CESCR has been clear that 
where the retrogression leads to an infringement of the core content of the ICESCR rights, 
then there is a straightforward relationship. It notes straightforwardly that, ‘[t]he adoption 
of any retrogressive measures incompatible with the core obligations … constitutes a 
violation’.46 This amounts to a ‘strict liability’ approach in the sense that there are none of 
the flexibilities that exist in relation to retrogression. A similar approach is taken to equality 
between women and men (although this approach is more easily grounded in article 3 of 
the Covenant).47 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
41 For a classic and comprehensive look at such questions in the English common law, see HLA Hart and Tony Honoré, 
Causation in the Law (2nd edn, OUP 1985). 
42 Juliane Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil and Common Law Approaches 
With Special Reference to the American and German Legal Systems (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 4. 
43 ibid 40. 
44 ibid 2. 
45 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 December 2008, 
entered into force 5 May 2013, UN Res A/RES/63/117) art 11. 
46 CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) (UN Doc 
E/C12/2000/4 2000) para 48; See also, CESCR, General Comment 15 (n 29) para 42; CESCR, General Comment 17 (n 30) para 42; 
CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 19) para 64; CESCR, General Comment 23 (n 37) para 52. 
47 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3) art 3; CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Art 3 of the Covenant) (UN Doc E/C12/2005/4 2005) para 42. 
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Added to this is an additional layer of complexity in Optional Protocol complaints. There, 
as a key reassurance to States,48 the issues are seen through a reasonableness lens and States 
are afforded an additional discretion in choosing which policy approach to pursue.49 Thus 
in the Optional Protocol context, the CESCR will be required to filter its analysis through 
multiple and often unclear burdens of proof and standards of adjudication. This is likely to 
cloud reasoning and leave the process and proof elements unclear. 
8.4.  Timing and Triggers 
As discussed in chapter 7, the time period between State examinations can be both lengthy 
and erratic.50 This has an impact upon rights-holders seeking to vindicate their immediately 
realisable rights under the Covenant. In particular, it poses an obvious difficulty for any 
attempts to examine potential retrogression contemporaneously to its occurrence. Efforts to 
undertake ex ante assessments are similarly stymied. In the case of immediate obligations 
and, particularly in the context of this discussion, in the case of non-retrogression the 
periodic approach to examinations leaves an enforcement lag.51 
The reason for this lag is straightforward. With an immediate obligation, at the moment 
that a violation has occurred it will be relatively obvious. Take the example of the right to 
education. It contains an immediate obligation upon the State to ensure non-discrimination 
in respect of education.52 If the State enacts a discriminatory policy, then it would be in 
breach of its immediate obligation, and the discriminatory policy could be identified as a 
breach of the obligation with relative ease. While it may be more complicated in certain 
instances (for example, where a claim of indirect discrimination requires evidence of the 
differential impact), there is no doctrinal reason for a delay in finding a breach of the State’s 
obligations. However, there may be some years between the enactment of a policy (and the 
consequent violation), and the examination of the State. A delay between the violation of an 
obligation and a State examination means a gap between violation and enforcement that 
has obvious implications for the rights-holder and the effectiveness of the ICESCR system. 
Non-retrogression suffers from exactly this problem. As an example, consider the lag 
between the beginning of potentially retrogressive austerity measures in Ireland in 2008 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
48 Porter (n 24) 45. 
49 ‘[T]he Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures’; Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 45) art 8(4). 
50 Chapter 7, pp196-199. 
51 See also Chapter 7, p195. 
52 CESCR, General Comment 11 (n 28) para 10. 
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(potentially constituting an immediate violation of the Covenant) and the State 
examination in 2015.53 
The Optional Protocol provides a partial remedy to this problem, allowing two further 
triggers for the consideration of violations of the ICESCR in between periodic State 
examinations. However, the low ratification level (so far) and the slow pace at which 
complaints have been dealt with,54 means that the Protocol is far from perfect as a remedy 
to this particular problem.55 At the same time, potential doctrinal changes to retrogression 
contained in the Letter to States threaten to exacerbate the issue.56 By requiring measures to 
be ‘temporary’ in that Letter, the CESCR inadvertently intensified the difficulty with 
infrequent periodic examinations. A detailed examination of retrogressive measures that 
have ended prior to the State examination would be somewhat redundant, and ended 
measures are likely to be classed by the CESCR as ‘temporary’ ones. Yet, such retrogressive 
policies may be far from temporary if they have existed for the eight years that can 
sometimes exist between State examinations.  
However, even if such difficulties were to be addressed through an increased frequency of 
State examinations or additional triggers for the consideration of potential violations, there 
are remaining issues of process. As the flowchart at figure 9 above illustrates, the 
identification of retrogression can require at least five consequential stages of proof. 
Assuming first, that the CESCR is satisfied that prima facie retrogression is proved by the 
State report or shadow reports. The Committee would then need to request that the State 
prove a) the measure was taken in the context of the use of the maximum of available 
resources, b) after careful consideration, and c) is justified by reference to the totality of 
rights. It could do this through the List of Issues sent prior to the State examination and 
could follow up in the oral examination.57 As was shown in the previous section, even if all 
of these are sufficiently proved by the State, the Committee would then have to go on to 
consider deliberateness and subsequently assess factors in favour of permissibility. It is clear 
that this process requires persistence and an investment of limited time from the 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
53 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland (UN Doc E/C12/IRL/CO/3 2015). 
54 The two views adopted so far having taken an average of a year and nine months from the author’s submission. 
Inadmissibility decisions have been much quicker, takin an average of five months. 
55 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Table Of Pending Cases Before The Committee On Economic, Social 
And Cultural Rights, Considered Under The Optional Protocol To The International Covenant On Economic, Social And 
Cultural Rights’ (2015) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/PendingCases.aspx> accessed 20 September 2016; 
‘Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (United Nations Treaty Collection) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 20 September 
2016. 
56 See Chapter 6. 
57 Wouter Vandenhole, The Procedures Before the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Divergence Or Convergence? (Intersentia 
2004) 131, 133. 
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Committee, and a State that is (extremely) forthcoming in proving the validity of its actions. 
In reality, it is unlikely that there are enough opportunities for back-and-forth dialogue that 
is needed to establish all of the dimensions of proof. 
In practice, the CESCR does not request States to provide any information on retrogression 
in their original State reports.58 Further it has only explicitly used the List of Issues to ask 
States for (greater) information on potentially retrogressive measures in three of the 207 
available Lists (1.5%). The most remarkable of these is where the Committee asks Spain in 
the first line ‘to what extent the austerity measures taken by [it] in the context of the 
economic and financial crisis have taken into account the requirements specified in the 
letter’.59 In the other two cases (Greece (2015), Portugal (2013))60, the information that was 
requested would be far from sufficient to allow the Committee to properly assess for 
retrogression. There was nothing explicit included to remind the State of its burden of proof 
in relation to retrogression. Very similar phrasing was used by the Committee in both 
instances. The fuller of the two asked the State to: 
[p]lease provide a general assessment of the impact of the recent 
economic and financial crisis on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights, including a summary assessment of possible retrogressive 
policies and measures, as well as the principles on which such policies and 
measures were based, including the application of the relevant criteria 
identified in the letter of the Chair of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights addressed to State parties on 16 May 2012.61 
It is clear that the Committee will continue to struggle to apply the full complexity of 
the doctrine of non-retrogression without adequate information, and without using all 
possible avenues to seek such information. Indeed, even in the two instances 
highlighted above where the CESCR requested that States addressed retrogression, no 
such elaboration was forthcoming in the States’ replies to the List of Issues.62 The 
replies were instead used as a forum for a general discussion of the countries’ situations 
with no direct linkage to retrogression or its language. 
Without more robust monitoring mechanisms at the international level to allow more 
regular and more rigorous review of States’ potentially retrogressive measures, doctrinal 
changes will be ineffective. It is clear that the Committee does not have adequate time 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
58 CESCR, ‘Guidelines On Treaty-Specific Documents To Be Submitted By States Parties Under Articles 16 And 17 Of The 
International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2. 
59 CESCR, List of Issues prior to Submission: Spain (UN Doc E/C12/ESP/QPR/6 2016) para 1. 
60 CESCR, List of Issues: Greece (UN Doc E/C12/GRC/Q/2 2015); CESCR, List of Issues: Portugal (UN Doc E/C12/PRT/Q/4 2013). 
61 CESCR, List of Issues: Portugal (n 60) para 3 (emphasis added); similar wording in CESCR, List of Issues: Greece (n 60) para 2. 
62 CESCR, Reply to the List of Issues: Greece (UN Doc E/C12/GRC/Q/2/Add1 2015) paras 2-12; CESCR, Reply to the List of Issues: 
Portugal (UN Doc E/C12/PRT/Q/4/Add1 2014) paras 13-31. 
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to properly examine States. Whatever form the obligations take, and however strong 
and clear they are, they will require time to apply.  
As such, in this area the (re)constructed retrogression is a limited response to the 
difficulties. It does relieve some of the pressures through a simplification of the 
doctrine. For example, it ensures that when a periodic examination comes around, 
retrogression is capable of being properly examined without the need for excessive 
longitudinal data. It also removes the multitude of proofs and counter-proofs that 
currently affect the doctrine. These currently mean more back-and-forth exchanges 
than the Committee has time for or than their processes can accommodate. This latter 
point in particular might mean that under the (re)construction the Committee was in a 
position to make greater mentions of retrogression, even if it lacked the time to 
examine the State sufficiently to find a violation. 
8.5.  The Object of Retrogression 
The closer that the CESCR’s doctrines of non-retrogression are examined, the more complex 
they become.  We know that we are trying to identify backwardness (and maybe stagnation 
also).63 But backwardness in what? Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis – building in some respects 
on Courtis’ earlier work64 – tackle this question by drawing a distinction between 
‘normative’ and ‘empirical’ retrogression.65 Normative retrogression ‘concerns steps 
backwards in terms of legal, de jure guarantees’,66 while empirical retrogression ‘is 
concerned with de facto, empirical backsliding in the effective enjoyment of the rights’.67 
This is a useful categorisation that takes the analysis of this area further. In particular, 
Nolan et al identify through this model some of the difficulties that are faced by the CESCR 
in evidencing, showing causation of, and adjudicating on empirical retrogression.68 
Their division can be extended in order to add another useful distinction; the difference 
between retrogressive measures and retrogressive effects. In the case of normative 
retrogression, the backwardness is assessed in isolation from its actual effects. It is 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
63 See discussion above at Chapter 3, p88 and Chapter 4, p105. 
64 Christian Courtis, ‘La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales: Apuntes Introductorios’ in Christian 
Courtis (ed), Ni Un Paso Atrás: La Prohibicíon De Regresividad En Materia De Derechos Sociales (Editores de Puerto 2006). 
65 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 14) 123. 
66 Courtis defines this as ‘any measure adopted by the state that suppresses, restricts or limits the content of the entitlements 
already guaranteed by legislation constitutes a prima facie violation. It entails a comparison between the previously existing 
and the newly passed legislation, regulations or practices, in order to assess their retrogressive character’; Courtis (n 10) 393. 
67 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 14) 123. 
68 ibid 124, 127. 
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essentially a paper exercise, that at its extreme could incorporate predictions of the effects 
that might flow. This allows – as Nolan et al identify – legally trained individuals to assess 
such retrogression easily.69 The nature of such assessments as paper-based causes them to 
also to be abstract or hypothetical. This is beneficial in one sense as it facilitates early 
assessments of violations of the doctrine of non-retrogression; there is simply no need for 
negative effects to be occurring when the retrogression can be demonstrated in the law. 
How rapidly such assessments would be permitted would affect where the ex post/ ex ante 
division is placed, however with normative retrogression it would be possible to make a full 
and accurate assessment of even a draft law before any retrogression (normative or 
empirical) had been enacted. This is useful in guiding State conduct and in preventing 
(rather than reacting to) ESR violations. 
Of course, while assessing the retrogression of a (normative) measure is straightforward, 
there are significant difficulties with assessing whether (empirical) effects are retrogressive. 
Nolan et al discuss these in some depth so they will not be repeated here,70 but the focus of 
this strand of retrogression on de facto enjoyment of rights makes ‘comprehensive’71 real-
world evidence essential. The authors further emphasise the need for a longitudinal 
assessment: 
[b]uilding this kind of empirical case is much less straightforward, 
requiring a careful monitoring of the degree of empirical retrogression 
over time…72 
Naturally, in the period of time needed for evidence to appear and be collected, human 
rights violations will be allowed to persist. 
A number of further points arise when these two strands of retrogression are considered 
together. There will be an overlap between the two (a sort-of central area of a Venn 
diagram), where both normative and empirical retrogression are evidenced. A new 
legislative measure might be retrogressive on paper but not be identified as such because of 
a lack of interest in the change at the time of its passage. When later retrogressive effects 
are seen and evidenced, then a claim of both types of retrogression might occur. While not 
necessarily problematic, such an overlap will have to be consistently and clearly managed 
to avoid confusion (does such ‘double-retrogression’ require closer scrutiny or harsher 
findings, for example?). 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
69 ibid 127. See also Courtis who notes such work is ‘not foreign in a range of areas of law’; Courtis (n 10) 393. 
70 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis (n 14) 124–128. 
71 ibid 124. 
72 ibid 128. 
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Again, considered in combination, it is clear that the significantly less burdensome path to 
proving normative retrogression creates a practical bias in favour of that strand. It would 
be advisable for rights-bearers to bring their claim within the scope of normative 
retrogression if at all possible, and even if they are actually experiencing real-world effects. 
It is this latter point that is concerning. There is a danger that retrogression becomes 
predominantly an exercise in legal argumentation, and the experiences of individuals 
become isolated because the effects upon them have been insufficiently long, severe or 
widespread to constitute ‘proof’. Add to this the possibility that normative retrogression 
could be found without the law ever having been enforced or without practically impacting 
anyone, and the gap between the two strands becomes very large. 
This large gap between the two was demonstrated when the CESCR noted that it was:  
concerned at the regressive measures adopted by [Spain] that increase 
university tuition fees, thus jeopardizing access to university education 
for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.73  
Using a normative retrogression approach, finding retrogression would be relatively easy 
and substantially paper-based, involving a comparison of the laws before and after the 
change and assessing for a reduction in the level of rights protection granted. However, to 
show empirical retrogression the effects of the new regime would have to be gathered 
together over a period of time and the link to the change demonstrated.  
This discussion above, in summary, expresses a scepticism about the special place afforded 
by ‘normative retrogression’ to backwards steps based in law (rather than in service delivery, 
budgetary allocations, or discourse). One solution to this is a broader approach to 
‘normative’ retrogression, particularly in incorporating other measures that can readily be 
assessed on paper. This is why aligning the strands of retrogression in terms of normative-
measures and empirical-effects is analytically valuable. It allows Nolan et al’s key distinction 
between paper-based and practice-based assessments to be maintained, while opening up a 
space for a larger range of paper-based assessments. 
Thus possible normative retrogression (or, in other terms, a retrogressive measure) might 
be contemplated in respect of any measure that can be properly subjected to a paper-based 
assessment. This could include ‘administrative, budgetary [or] judicial’74 measures and State 
‘strategies, policies and programmes’.75 Expanding the image of normative retrogression to 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
73 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Spain (n 6) para 28. Due to the variations in terminology, it is impossible to know whether 
the Committee intended to suggest that this ‘regressive’ measure was also potentially ‘retrogressive’. See further, discussion at 
Chapter 3, p74. 
74 CESCR, General Comment 18 (n 23) para 22. 
75 CESCR, General Comment 19 (n 19) para 67. 
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incorporate some of these measures would mean more challenging assessments than might 
be the case for statutory law, but they would still possible in some instances. Care, for 
example, is required to avoid over-interpreting budget reductions as necessarily implying 
retrogression.76 The context of the measure will be relevant to determining whether 
normative retrogression has occurred. However, such context is equally important in 
respect of legal measures. The repeal of a law may appear to be retrogressive until the 
context of judicial developments, operational effectiveness, and new statutory enactments 
are considered.  
While it may be more challenging to assess for normative retrogression in respect of 
some non-legal measures, and even allowing for the fact that a conclusion will not be 
reachable in all cases, such assessments are possible in principle. For example, while all 
reductions in budgetary allocations will not amount to retrogression, it is plausible to 
assert that drastic cuts that are not justified by the context can be assessed on paper as 
constituting normative retrogression. To insist on a delay while the effects of these cuts 
are seen, evidenced, and dealt with under empirical retrogression would be perverse. 
A further budget-related example drawn from O’Connell et al’s work, further illustrates 
the need for a broader interpretation of normative retrogression. They note ‘a promise of 
funding that is subsequently withdrawn before it was actually allocated may constitute a 
retrogressive measure…’.77 It is agreed that such a State action could be properly 
addressed by retrogression, but the only realistic route for enforcement of the doctrine in 
such a scenario would be through normative retrogression (a paper-based reduction in 
standards). Attempts to bring such measures under empirical retrogression would be 
virtually impossible given the challenges of gathering evidence of reduced enjoyment 
flowing from a cancelled funding promise. 
While it will be more difficult to prove normative retrogression in non-legal measures, 
and allowing for the fact it may not always be possible to reach a firm conclusion on 
retrogression, there are significant benefits to broadening the net. By addressing a greater 
range of non-legal measures under normative retrogression, better use of its more 
straightforward methodology will be made. This would leave empirical retrogression as a 
residual strand of retrogression that can address those reductions in enjoyment that were 
less obvious from an examination of the measure itself. 
																																								 																																																											 																																																											 																				
76 O’Connell and others (n 12) 48 (table 2.6). 
77 ibid 92. 
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The proliferation of divisions, categorisations and stages of retrogression, while intended 
to assist in the task of developing normative content and clarifying the doctrine, 
simultaneously adds a complexity to the doctrine’s operation. Such complexity paralyses 
the operation of the doctrine. The (re)constructed doctrine assists in stripping away some 
of these complexities by taking a ‘flatter’ approach to retrogression. It asks a more 
straightforward question about State activity. The (re)construction can still address the 
same violations (and some further ones) as current versions without the need for the 
same degree of complex subdivision. Of course, in encouraging greater practicability, 
such a simplification also supports the doctrine’s use in response to structural threats and 
aids the idea of retrogression in becoming more accessible to micro groups. 
8.6. Conclusions 
There are a wide range of more practical or applied concerns with the doctrine of non-
retrogression that present obstacles to its use. These, it has been argued, are fundamental 
not only to the way that the CESCR operates, but also to broader questions of how the 
doctrine can function within the ICESCR. In particular, this chapter focussed on the web of 
assessment challenges that are associated with the doctrine. 
Terminology and the means of triggering an examination of potential retrogression were 
addressed and more consistent use of language and further triggers were argued for. The 
chapter considered the implications of Nolan et al’s categorisation of normative and 
empirical retrogression. The significant advantages of such an approach were 
acknowledged, while noting the accompanying complexity. Finally, the CESCR’s approach 
to proof in the context of non-retrogression was addressed. The multitude of steps that 
must be passed through in order to demonstrate a violation were set out, alongside an 
analysis of the complex burdens of proof that are attached to the doctrine. 
As has been seen, the (re)constructed doctrine holds potential in addressing these practical 
challenges. Its main function in response to many of the practical challenges is to simplify 
processes and rationalise unneeded elements. In relation to terminology this can reduce 
conflicts and complications, while in proving retrogression the more straightforward 
approach makes proof more realistic. Although, the doctrinal changes of the 
(re)construction can provide only a limited response to the long delays in State 
examinations, it can allow more efficient examinations when they occur. 
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While the (re)constructed version of retrogression offers the normative development 
required, there is a good deal of practical development required also. If successful and 
regular findings of retrogression are to be made in appropriate circumstances, at least some 
of the practical and institutional pressures must be relieved. This demands a broader 
consideration of the ICESCR and the CESCR’s operation, an assessment of the opportunities 
for cooperation with other UN actors, and a revisiting of the resource constraints upon the 
treaty bodies. 
 
Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Cross Applicability 
The title of this thesis promised to (re)construct a purpose for retrogression and 
(re)construct retrogression for a purpose. In promising this, it was implied that 
retrogression lacks a purpose and that, in any case, it is not in a form which would allow it 
to pursue a purpose. Absent both of these central characteristics (purpose and form), the 
retrogression is left without much content. The claim of the title is less stark than this as it 
is qualified by the idea of partial reconstruction, or the assemblage of current forms of the 
doctrine, some established tenets, and ideas drawn from the literature and analogous areas 
of practice. 
The doctrine of non-retrogression – like the ICESCR in many respects – is more relevant 
than ever, yet still struggles to demonstrate that relevance when it is most needed. The 
doctrine’s performance was lack lustre during the most recent crises. The chapters above, 
therefore, sought to identify the core content of retrogression and to show how the 
challenges that retrogression faces could best be addressed.  
In the first part of the thesis, therefore, the focus was on identifying what the current 
purpose of retrogression is, and what a reconstructed purpose might be. The starting point 
in this analysis was the historical background of the ICESCR and non-retrogression. This led 
to the identification of a number of factors that suggest a more disrupted and uncertain 
beginning for the doctrine than is often portrayed. Following from this, the enunciations of 
the CESCR’s doctrine of non-retrogression were deconstructed and grouped. This allowed 
the doctrine to be seen as a fragmented entity with multiple versions. These were grouped 
according to their legal basis and relationship with the ICESCR more broadly. 
Commonalties between these four conceptual models were few in number, and it was 
ultimately concluded that the retrogression lacked a core purpose. 
Having shown up the doctrine’s disarray, this part of the thesis was concluded by the 
(re)construction of the doctrine’s purpose. It was argued that a clear purpose for 
retrogression could act as a heuristic device, adding stability and a point of reference 
against which developments could be judged. The furtherance of the progressive realisation 
obligation was selected as an appropriate overarching purpose for the doctrine. This choice 
was based on the need for a strong legal basis in the Covenant, the symbolism of 
progressive realisation as an important general obligation, and the significant potential for 
operational improvements with the obligation. 
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Having (re)purposed the doctrine, the ground had been laid for the second of the 
reconstructions of the title; the (re)construction of the doctrine itself. The doctrine was 
rationalised and clarified and it was suggested that a new form of words might be that: 
a retrogressive measure is defined as an action, inaction or contribution to 
a trend which is likely to negatively affect the progressive realisation of 
individuals’ ICESCR rights. 
This process of (re)construction was substantially undertaken in chapter 4, however, the 
remaining chapters of the thesis added rigour to the (re)construction by ‘stress testing’ the 
newly (re)constructed doctrine against a number of key challenges. 
The tests set for the doctrine were chosen as issues that have in the past presented 
challenges to the doctrine and are likely to represent substantial barriers in the future. The 
four key tests which were set up for retrogression were its ability to engage with structural 
threats, its capacity for resilience in crises, its responsiveness to micro concerns, and its 
practicability.  
In relation to structural threats, it was shown that there was a pattern of the Committee 
only engaging to a limited extent with the largest issues facing the Covenant. While being 
competent at applying the ICESCR to well-defined situations, and at offering deference to 
other bodies, the Committee has generally avoided the full engagement with the real root 
causes of ESR violations, nor has it comprehensively addressed systemic threats. These 
failures are partly linked to progressive realisation, which fails to speak to high-level policy 
making in a coherent way. It was consequently argued that the redesigned doctrine of non-
retrogression could provide a more flexible and open basis upon which to engage with 
structural threats. 
The doctrine’s ability to operate in situations of crisis was addressed next. Here, the 
research focused on the most recent financial and economic crises to show the pressures 
and distortions that were brought to bear upon non-retrogression. It was argued that the 
CESCR’s Letter to States had, in a highly pressurised situation, changed the terms and 
meaning of the doctrine and taken it in a new and damaging direction. The (re)constructed 
doctrine, it was suggested, could provide greater resilience in such crisis situations. While 
remaining true to the content and dynamics of the ICESCR, it allows the CESCR a degree of 
flexibility should it require it, thus ameliorating the need for a rushed reshaping of the 
doctrine during crises. And, if such reshaping was to be needed in the context of an 
exceptional crisis, the clear purpose attached to the doctrine could provide direction and 
consistency in that context. 
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The issue of responsiveness to micro groups was also discussed. Although, there is 
undoubtedly a degree of CESCR engagement with civil society there is arguably capacity for 
greater responsiveness to a different kind of actor. There are often barriers to the voices of 
the smallest, least established, and least resourced groups being heard. A multitude of 
barriers such as the focus of progressive realisation, fears surrounding the Optional 
Protocol, the predominance of ex post review, resource shortages and the scheduling of 
State examinations were identified. Although a number of these require institutional 
changes, the role that a reconstructed doctrine could play in affirming the place of 
individuals and micro actors within the Covenant was also discussed. Particularly by 
supplementing some of the weaknesses of the progressive realisation obligation as regards 
micro actors, the (re)construction can facilitate better responsiveness to micro actors. 
The final test for the (re)construction – its ability to address a range of practical issues – was 
considered in chapter 8. The deepening complexity and variation in the CESCR’s versions of 
retrogression has brought with it significant issues that have dogged the application of the 
doctrine. Addressed, in particular, were issues of terminology, proof, the timing of 
examinations, and a vagueness about the object of the doctrine’s concerns. The 
simplification of the (re)constructed version of retrogression satisfactorily addresses these 
problems. It provides less convoluted terminology, clear lines and burdens of proof, and 
simplified processes. 
Having considered this range of issues, a number of more general conclusions can now be 
drawn. These conclusions are, of course, drawn from what has already been argued. 
However, they also highlight a number of areas of more general concern and areas for 
future development. These concluding aspects are addressed in terms of; iterative 
understandings, consistency, innovation, connectivity, and consolidation. 
9.1. Iterative Understandings 
In several places the need for new conceptions of the doctrine of non-retrogression, the 
ICESCR, or both was highlighted. In some instances of civil society and academic practice, 
the picture of the doctrine remains reliant upon a superseded view of the CESCR’s outputs 
(for example where General Comment 3 is seen as the core, or only, statement of 
retrogression). Elsewhere the research showed in chapter 2 how the view of the ICESCR as a 
whole being subjugated by the Cold War needs revisiting in order to properly consider the 
post-conflict situation. In other places it was argued that the CESCR’s role in informing 
policy making, the understanding of the central progressive realisation obligation, and the 
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place of retrogression within the Covenant would all benefit from an updated consideration 
(in chapters 4, 2, and 4 respectively).  
This call for updated – iterative – understandings of the ICESCR and non-retrogression is 
not a radical one, or an accusatory one. Many of the conceptions which might now be 
thought of as (slightly) out of date or superseded were, at one point in time, central to the 
development of the ICESCR norms and the implementation of the rights (especially the 
dominant view of the Cold War divide seen in chapter). They created opportunities for the 
progression of ESR. However, without an iterative consideration of their validity and 
effectiveness, such understandings start to look at odds with the other content and the 
context of the ICESCR. It is implicit that, unaddressed, such disjunctures between the 
understanding of the Covenant and the broader reality, will eventually halt evolution of the 
ESR project and begin to damage it.    
The thesis offered some such ‘iterative’ understandings, although there are clearly many 
more still to be undertaken in further research.  One of the most important contributions of 
the research was to return to the early days of the CESCR to identify the context of its first 
elaboration of the doctrine of non-retrogression. A return to this context suggested an 
almost accidental creation of the doctrine. Likewise, iteration was achieved by returning to 
the understanding of the doctrine as a single undivided entity with more comparators and 
more materials (for example, the Committee’s treatment of the financial and economic 
crises). This return allowed the research to mount the argument that ‘the’ doctrine was 
composed of conflicted and disparate versions. 
9.2. Consistency 
The idea that consistency of output is crucial, is a relatively obvious endpoint of the 
arguments that were advanced throughout the thesis and especially in the earlier chapters. 
Much of the confusion, lack of purpose, and weak effectiveness of non-retrogression can be 
attributed to the disarray which has often been a hallmark of the doctrine. The production 
of nine different versions of a single doctrine by a single committee in the course of 
fourteen documents is remarkable. Even accounting for the changing membership of the 
CESCR and the similarity of some of these versions (although there were still four 
substantially different models of retrogression identified), there is a clear amount of 
fluctuation. 
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The consequences of such fluctuations were given significant attention throughout the 
thesis, but in particular there is a range of practical impacts that arise from such high levels 
of inconsistency. The changes in how the doctrine is labelled, for example, were noted. 
Additionally, the myriad different mechanisms for proving and adjudicating upon 
retrogression were also unpacked to show the difficulties that can result for States, NGOs 
and the CESCR. 
To argue for consistency, however, is not to argue for an unchanging approach to the 
ICESCR and its norms. In fact, as the following section concludes, the need for change is 
also crucial. However, where such change occurs it must be clearly marked as such. Clearer 
redefinitions would avoid the melange of retrogression standards detailed in chapter 3. 
Further, change should be introduced at an appropriate place in time to avoid the scenario 
of emergency-related changeability outlined in chapter 6. 
9.3. Innovation 
A persistent line of argumentation throughout the thesis was that the CESCR should 
innovate in response to the threats, changes and challenges that it and ESR face.  
The Committee and the communities that support its activities must be attuned to the 
developing contexts around them. Some of the contexts that were identified in the thesis 
included economic, environmental, and more broadly ‘structural’ threats. It was argued that 
more could be done to engage with these phenomena in order to benefit ESR progression. 
Elsewhere, the importance of an evolving dialogue with micro groups was posited as central 
to the success of the CESCR’s efforts. 
When and how to respond to changes in context, is a self-evidently difficult and important 
question. However, the first step must be to acknowledge these changes. The CESCR’s 
failure to do so – even despite the analytical assistance of the scholarship – was highlighted 
in several instances. Beyond mere acknowledgement of contexts, the thesis argued for 
responsiveness, engagement, resilience and practicability in different circumstances. Each 
of these types of response was tailored to the threat or opportunity, yet, taken together they 
can all be seen as innovations to the CESCR’s practice. 
Such innovations, while arguably important for any institution or legal body, are all the 
more crucial for the CESCR given the fixed legal document that it works with. While the 
approaches and doctrines of many other legal bodies are refreshed by a change in the 
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(statutory or treaty) law the CESCR has worked from the same short document since its 
creation. This means that effective responses to changing contexts require the Committee 
to be innovative in its practices and to make full use of its available flexibilities. In addition, 
where new legal bases arise, such as with the Optional Protocol, the Committee should 
critically examine how it can use them to re-shape, refresh and re-start ESR monitoring 
processes.  
The thesis argues for multiple innovations on the CESCR’s practice. Most centrally, the 
repurposing and reconstruction of the doctrine of non-retrogression is argued for. It is 
possible, and indeed the intention, that a rethinking of this general obligation of the 
ICESCR would pull other obligations in innovative directions. Most obviously, there is 
potential for a more effective – and more used – progressive realisation obligation to result. 
However beyond this, the thesis also argued, for example, for a more innovative approach to 
micro groups and reforms to the CESCR’s currently rigid timetable of State examinations.   
9.4. Connectivity 
Another theme to arise from the research relates to the deep interconnections of the 
obligations. While the thesis addresses many questions that are unique to non-
retrogression, in many other respects the questions addressed and the arguments made 
could be applied to other areas. This is particularly true of the later chapters which address 
structural, crisis, micro and practical issues. These issues are all significant for retrogression, 
but they also pervade the ICESCR more generally. Similar attention to the concepts of 
progressive realisation, maximum available resources, the minimum core, and the 
typologies would be beneficial. 
However, beyond a simple claim for further research and Committee developments along 
these lines, it is arguable that more connected analyses of the obligations are also required. 
This thesis, for example, unpacked the relationship between retrogression and progressive 
realisation and the tripartite typology. However these relationships might appear differently 
if viewed from a perspective where progressive realisation was the dominant frame of 
reference. 
Neither does the idea of connectivity apply only to connections between the ICESCR 
obligations. It is a well-developed position that ICESCR and ICCPR obligations are 
interdependent and indivisible. Yet, there are further – perhaps more obvious – connections 
between the CESCR approach to non-retrogression and the CommRC’s. 
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The institutional is additionally connected to the doctrinal. It was argued at several points 
that the position of the CESCR or its institutional processes in State examinations, issuing 
letters, using Statements or drafting General Comments, has had a concrete impact upon 
the doctrinal outcome. 
More broadly, greater recognition of the connection of the ICESCR norms to externalities is 
still needed. Work on budget analysis is an important first step in this regard, beginning the 
recognition of the dependence of ESR upon fiscal policy. However, this can only be 
considered a first step. ESR are embedded within social, political, cultural and 
environmental situations. If the legal obligations are to be used as basis for serious 
engagement with policy actors, they must reflect – but not necessarily be subordinated to – 
these external conditions. 
9.5. Consolidation 
The thesis argued that retrogression is a complex, fragmented doctrine in need of sustained 
critical attention and, ultimately, (re)purposing and (re)construction. An effective response 
to structural threats, crises, micro groups, and practical complexities can, it has been 
posited, be at least partly achieved by such a reconstruction. However, far from concluding 
that such a changed approach to retrogression would satisfy the array of demands upon the 
ICESCR system, the thesis identifies a range of further themes to be pursued.  
The themes and reforms that have been discussed are far from comprehensive, but the 
thing which connects them is their need for a robust exercise of consolidation. Like the 
(re)construction exercise undertaken with respect to retrogression, there is room for 
progressive realisation, the minimum core, limitations, processes of proof and many more 
key ideas within the ICESCR to be re-addressed in a critical manner. These obligations 
should be consolidated, with the successful and central parts retained and while extraneous 
or distracting elements are removed. The array of obligations which still require refinement, 
demonstrates the degree to which the ICESCR system is still a work in progress.  
The ideas of iteration, consistency, innovation, connectivity, and consolidation are offered 
as routes to a richer and more coherent approach to the ICESCR obligations. By exploring 
retrogression in conjunction with these themes, the doctrine has been cast as more 
complex, more troubling and less intelligible. It has been shown to be fragmented and 
disconnected from many of the challenges faced by the doctrine and the Covenant. Yet, the 
thesis has also sought to rebuild retrogression, tying it, probably for the first time, to a 
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consistent purpose. A (re)constructed doctrine that works to further the progressive 
realisation obligation can, in securing the relevance of non-retrogression, have a positive 
impact on that main article 2(1) obligation, and the ICESCR more broadly. 
We can conclude where we began in the introduction. The doctrine of non-retrogression 
has great, unrealised potential to advance ESR standards. It could barely be more relevant 
to many of the threats posed to ICESCR rights. Such potential is clearly all the more 
valuable in the context of crises. Yet, the doctrine has largely been consigned to the side-
lines. The very wide gap between retrogression’s potential and actual role highlights how 
significant the required changes are. Adjusting retrogression into a tenth, eleventh, or 
twelfth version will not bring a sudden clarity of purpose to the doctrine, nor will it bring a 
landslide of effectiveness. However, the features of the (re)construction here might bring 
such changes. If continued effort from the CESCR and advocacy and scholarly communities 
is to be invested, it should be invested in the required fundamental changes and not into 
continued mending. 
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Appendix B 
Versions of retrogression criteria 
 
Document General 
Comment 3 
General 
Comment 13 
General 
Comment 14 
General 
Comment 15 
Year 1991 1999 2000 2002 
Criteria 
applied 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Deliberate Deliberate Deliberate Deliberate 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of 
rights 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
Use of 
Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
Use of Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
Use of Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
Use of Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
  Strong 
Presumption 
Strong 
Presumption 
Strong 
Presumption 
  Burden upon 
State 
Burden upon 
State 
Burden upon 
State 
  Consideration of 
alternatives 
Consideration of 
alternatives 
Consideration of 
alternatives 
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Document General 
Comment 16 
General 
Comment 17 
General 
Comment 18 
Statement on 
MAR under OP 
Year 2005 2005 2005 2007 
Criteria 
applied 
 Deliberate Deliberate   
  Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
    Use of 
Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
Use of 
Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
  Strong 
Presumption 
    
  Burden upon 
State 
Burden upon 
State 
Burden upon 
State 
   Consideration 
of alternatives 
Consideration 
of alternatives 
Consideration 
(of alternatives) 
    In principle 
retrogression 
impermissible 
  
      Where 
‘resources’ 
invoked 
consider; level 
of development, 
core, recession, 
disaster, 
alternatives, intl 
cooperation. 
 Retrogressive 
Measures that 
enact 
discrimination 
are a violation of 
article 3 
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Document General 
Comment 19 
General Comment 
21 
Letter to States 
Year 2007 2009 2012 
Criteria applied Deliberate Deliberate Temporary 
Justified by 
reference to 
totality of rights 
Justified by 
reference to totality 
of rights 
Necessary and 
proportionate 
Use of  
Maximum 
Available 
Resources 
Use of Maximum 
Available Resources 
Discrimination 
Strong 
Presumption 
Strong Presumption 
('not permitted') 
Core protected 
Burden upon 
State 
   
(Comprehensive) 
Consideration of 
alternatives 
Consideration of 
alternatives 
  
    
    
Reasonable 
justification 
  
Participation   
Discrimination   
 Sustained impact   
 Unreasonable 
impact 
  
 Minimum 
essential level 
  
 Independent 
review 
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Document General Comment 22 General Comment 23 Statement on Public 
Debt, Austerity Measures 
& the ICESCR  
Year 2016 2016 2016 
Criteria 
applied 
Temporary Temporary Temporary 
 Necessary Necessary Necessary and 
proportionate 
 Discrimination Discrimination Discrimination 
  Core protected Core Protected 
  Deliberate  
  Justification Justification 
  Use of Maximum 
Available Resources 
 
 Burden upon State Burden upon State  
 Strong Presumption 
(extreme, inevitable) 
  
 Don’t disproportionately 
affect disadvantaged or 
marginalised 
 Don’t disproportionately 
affect disadvantaged or 
marginalised 
  Careful Consideration  
 
Appendix C 
Ratification data 
Accumulation of Ratifications for the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
 
 
ICCPR 
 
ICESCR  
Year Ending Total Ratifications 
Ratifications per 
year Total Ratifications 
Ratifications per 
year 
1966 0 0 0 0 
1967 0 0 0 0 
1968 0 0 0 0 
1969 1 1 1 1 
1970 6 5 6 5 
1971 9 3 9 3 
1972 12 3 12 3 
1973 17 5 17 5 
1974 23 6 23 6 
1975 27 4 28 5 
1976 32 5 34 6 
1977 37 5 39 5 
1978 41 4 43 4 
1979 52 11 55 12 
1980 58 6 60 5 
1981 62 4 63 3 
1982 66 4 68 5 
1983 69 3 72 4 
1984 74 5 77 5 
1985 77 3 80 3 
1986 78 1 82 2 
1987 82 4 85 3 
1988 84 2 88 3 
1989 84 0 89 1 
1990 86 2 91 2 
1991 90 4 95 4 
1992 98 8 102 7 
1993 113 15 116 14 
1994 124 11 126 10 
1995 128 4 130 4 
1996 131 3 132 2 
1997 135 4 134 2 
1998 139 4 136 2 
1999 141 2 138 2 
2000 143 2 141 3 
2001 146 3 142 1 
2002 147 1 145 3 
2003 149 2 146 1 
2004 151 2 148 2 
2005 154 3 151 3 
2006 154 0 151 0 
2007 160 6 155 4 
2008 160 0 157 2 
2009 164 4 160 3 
2010 165 1 160 0 
2011 167 2 160 0 
2012 167 0 160 0 
2013 167 0 161 1 
2014 168 1 162 1 
2015 168 0 164 2 
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Time Gap between the Ratification of the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
 
State Date ICCPR 
Ratified 
Date ICESCR 
Ratified 
Delay to 
ICESCR 
(days) 
Delay to 
ICESCR 
(years) 
Afghanistan 24/01/1983 24/01/1983 0 0.00 
Albania 04/10/1991 04/10/1991 0 0.00 
Algeria 12/09/1989 12/09/1989 0 0.00 
Andorra 22/09/2006 ICESCR not 
Ratified 
- - 
Angola 10/01/1992 10/01/1992 0 0.00 
Argentina 08/08/1986 08/08/1986 0 0.00 
Armenia 23/06/1993 13/09/1993 82 0.22 
Australia 13/08/1980 10/12/1975 -1708 -4.68 
Austria 10/09/1978 10/09/1978 0 0.00 
Azerbaijan 13/08/1992 13/08/1992 0 0.00 
Bahamas 23/12/2008 23/12/2008 0 0.00 
Bahrain 20/09/2006 27/09/2007 372 1.02 
Bangladesh 06/09/2000 05/10/1998 -702 -1.92 
Barbados 05/01/1973 05/01/1973 0 0.00 
Belarus 12/11/1973 12/11/1973 0 0.00 
Belgium 21/04/1983 21/04/1983 0 0.00 
Belize 10/06/1996 09/03/2015 6846 18.76 
Benin 12/03/1992 12/03/1992 0 0.00 
Bolivia  12/08/1982 12/08/1982 0 0.00 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 01/09/1993 01/09/1993 0 0.00 
Botswana 08/09/2000 ICESCR not 
Ratified 
- - 
Brazil 24/01/1992 24/01/1992 0 0.00 
Bulgaria 21/09/1970 21/09/1970 0 0.00 
Burkina Faso 04/01/1999 04/01/1999 0 0.00 
Burundi 09/05/1990 09/05/1990 0 0.00 
Cabo Verde 06/08/1993 06/08/1993 0 0.00 
Cambodia 26/05/1992 26/05/1992 0 0.00 
Cameroon 27/06/1984 27/06/1984 0 0.00 
Canada 19/05/1976 19/05/1976 0 0.00 
Central African Republic 08/05/1981 08/05/1981 0 0.00 
Chad 09/06/1995 09/06/1995 0 0.00 
Chile 10/02/1972 10/02/1972 0 0.00 
China ICCPR not 
Ratified 
27/03/2001 - - 
Colombia 29/10/1969 29/10/1969 0 0.00 
Congo 05/10/1983 05/10/1983 0 0.00 
Costa Rica 29/11/1968 29/11/1968 0 0.00 
Côte d'Ivoire 26/03/1992 26/03/1992 0 0.00 
Croatia 12/10/1992 12/10/1992 0 0.00 
Cyprus 02/04/1969 02/04/1969 0 0.00 
Czech Republic 22/02/1993 22/02/1993 0 0.00 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea  
14/09/1981 14/09/1981 0 0.00 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 01/11/1976 01/11/1976 0 0.00 
Denmark 06/01/1972 06/01/1972 0 0.00 
Djibouti 05/11/2002 05/11/2002 0 0.00 
Dominica 17/06/1993 17/06/1993 0 0.00 
Dominican Republic 04/01/1978 04/01/1978 0 0.00 
Ecuador 06/03/1969 06/03/1969 0 0.00 
Egypt 14/01/1982 14/01/1982 0 0.00 
El Salvador 30/11/1979 30/11/1979 0 0.00 
Equatorial Guinea 25/09/1987 25/09/1987 0 0.00 
Eritrea 22/01/2002 17/04/2001 -280 -0.77 
Estonia 21/10/1991 21/10/1991 0 0.00 
Ethiopia 11/06/1993 11/06/1993 0 0.00 
Finland 19/08/1975 19/08/1975 0 0.00 
France 04/11/1980 04/11/1980 0 0.00 
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State Date ICCPR 
Ratified 
Date ICESCR 
Ratified 
Delay to 
ICESCR 
(days) 
Delay to 
ICESCR 
(years) 
Gabon 21/01/1983 21/01/1983 0 0.00 
Gambia 22/03/1979 29/12/1978 -83 -0.23 
Georgia 03/05/1994 03/05/1994 0 0.00 
Germany 17/12/1973 17/12/1973 0 0.00 
Ghana 07/09/2000 07/09/2000 0 0.00 
Greece 05/05/1997 16/05/1985 -4372 -11.98 
Grenada 06/09/1991 06/09/1991 0 0.00 
Guatemala 05/05/1992 19/05/1988 -1447 -3.96 
Guinea 24/01/1978 24/01/1978 0 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau 01/11/2010 02/07/1992 -6696 -18.35 
Guyana 15/02/1977 15/02/1977 0 0.00 
Haiti 06/02/1991 01/10/2013 8273 22.67 
Honduras 25/08/1997 17/02/1981 -6033 -16.53 
Hungary 17/01/1974 17/01/1974 0 0.00 
Iceland 22/08/1979 22/08/1979 0 0.00 
India 10/04/1979 10/04/1979 0 0.00 
Indonesia 23/02/2006 23/02/2006 0 0.00 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 24/06/1975 24/06/1975 0 0.00 
Iraq 25/01/1971 25/01/1971 0 0.00 
Ireland 08/12/1989 08/12/1989 0 0.00 
Israel 03/10/1991 03/10/1991 0 0.00 
Italy 15/09/1978 15/09/1978 0 0.00 
Jamaica 03/10/1975 03/10/1975 0 0.00 
Japan 21/06/1979 21/06/1979 0 0.00 
Jordan 28/05/1975 28/05/1975 0 0.00 
Kazakhstan 24/01/2006 24/01/2006 0 0.00 
Kenya 01/05/1972 01/05/1972 0 0.00 
Kuwait 21/05/1996 21/05/1996 0 0.00 
Kyrgyzstan 07/10/1994 07/10/1994 0 0.00 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 25/09/2009 13/02/2007 -955 -2.62 
Latvia 14/04/1992 14/04/1992 0 0.00 
Lebanon 03/11/1972 03/11/1972 0 0.00 
Lesotho 09/09/1992 09/09/1992 0 0.00 
Liberia 22/09/2004 22/09/2004 0 0.00 
Libya 15/05/1970 15/05/1970 0 0.00 
Liechtenstein 10/12/1998 10/12/1998 0 0.00 
Lithuania 20/11/1991 20/11/1991 0 0.00 
Luxembourg 18/08/1983 18/08/1983 0 0.00 
Madagascar 21/06/1971 22/09/1971 93 0.25 
Malawi 22/12/1993 22/12/1993 0 0.00 
Maldives 19/09/2006 19/09/2006 0 0.00 
Mali 16/07/1974 16/07/1974 0 0.00 
Malta 13/09/1990 13/09/1990 0 0.00 
Mauritania 17/11/2004 17/11/2004 0 0.00 
Mauritius 12/12/1973 12/12/1973 0 0.00 
Mexico 23/03/1981 23/03/1981 0 0.00 
Monaco 28/08/1997 28/08/1997 0 0.00 
Mongolia 18/11/1974 18/11/1974 0 0.00 
Montenegro  23/10/2006 23/10/2006 0 0.00 
Morocco 03/05/1979 03/05/1979 0 0.00 
Mozambique 21/07/1993 ICESCR not 
Ratified 
- - 
Namibia 28/11/1994 28/11/1994 0 0.00 
Nepal 14/05/1991 14/05/1991 0 0.00 
Netherlands 11/12/1978 11/12/1978 0 0.00 
New Zealand  28/12/1978 28/12/1978 0 0.00 
Nicaragua 12/03/1980 12/03/1980 0 0.00 
Niger 07/03/1986 07/03/1986 0 0.00 
Nigeria 29/07/1993 29/07/1993 0 0.00 
Norway 13/09/1972 13/09/1972 0 0.00 
Pakistan 23/06/2010 17/04/2008 -797 -2.18 
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State Date ICCPR 
Ratified 
Date ICESCR 
Ratified 
Delay to 
ICESCR 
(days) 
Delay to 
ICESCR 
(years) 
Panama 08/03/1977 08/03/1977 0 0.00 
Papua New Guinea 21/07/2008 21/07/2008 0 0.00 
Paraguay 10/06/1992 10/06/1992 0 0.00 
Peru 28/04/1978 28/04/1978 0 0.00 
Philippines 23/10/1986 07/06/1974 -4521 -12.39 
Poland 18/03/1977 18/03/1977 0 0.00 
Portugal 15/06/1978 31/07/1978 46 0.13 
Republic of Korea 10/04/1990 10/04/1990 0 0.00 
Republic of Moldova 26/01/1993 26/01/1993 0 0.00 
Romania 09/12/1974 09/12/1974 0 0.00 
Russian Federation 16/10/1973 16/10/1973 0 0.00 
Rwanda 16/04/1975 16/04/1975 0 0.00 
Samoa 15/02/2008 ICESCR not 
Ratified 
- - 
San Marino 18/10/1985 18/10/1985 0 0.00 
Senegal 13/02/1978 13/02/1978 0 0.00 
Serbia  12/03/2001 12/03/2001 0 0.00 
Seychelles 05/05/1992 05/05/1992 0 0.00 
Sierra Leone 23/08/1996 23/08/1996 0 0.00 
Slovakia  28/05/1993 28/05/1993 0 0.00 
Slovenia   06/07/1992 06/07/1992 0 0.00 
Somalia 24/01/1990 24/01/1990 0 0.00 
South Africa 10/12/1998 12/01/2015 5877 16.10 
Spain 27/04/1977 27/04/1977 0 0.00 
Sri Lanka 11/06/1980 11/06/1980 0 0.00 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 09/11/1981 09/11/1981 0 0.00 
State of Palestine 02/04/2014 02/04/2014 0 0.00 
Sudan 18/03/1986 18/03/1986 0 0.00 
Suriname 28/12/1976 28/12/1976 0 0.00 
Swaziland 26/03/2004 26/03/2004 0 0.00 
Sweden 06/12/1971 06/12/1971 0 0.00 
Switzerland 18/06/1992 18/06/1992 0 0.00 
Syrian Arab Republic 21/04/1969 21/04/1969 0 0.00 
Tajikistan 04/01/1999 04/01/1999 0 0.00 
Thailand 29/10/1996 05/09/1999 1041 2.85 
The former Yugoslav Rep. of 
Macedonia  
18/01/1994 18/01/1994 0 0.00 
Timor-Leste 18/09/2003 16/04/2003 -155 -0.42 
Togo 24/05/1984 24/05/1984 0 0.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 21/12/1978 08/12/1978 -13 -0.04 
Tunisia 18/03/1969 18/03/1969 0 0.00 
Turkey 23/09/2003 23/09/2003 0 0.00 
Turkmenistan 01/05/1997 01/05/1997 0 0.00 
Uganda 21/06/1995 21/01/1987 -3073 -8.42 
Ukraine 12/11/1973 12/11/1973 0 0.00 
United Kingdom  20/05/1976 20/05/1976 0 0.00 
United Republic of Tanzania 11/06/1976 11/06/1976 0 0.00 
United States of America 08/06/1992 ICESCR not 
Ratified 
- - 
Uruguay 01/04/1970 01/04/1970 0 0.00 
Uzbekistan 28/09/1995 28/09/1995 0 0.00 
Vanuatu 21/11/2008 ICESCR not 
Ratified 
- - 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 10/05/1978 10/05/1978 0 0.00 
Viet Nam 24/09/1982 24/09/1982 0 0.00 
Yemen 09/02/1987 09/02/1987 0 0.00 
Zambia 10/04/1984 10/04/1984 0 0.00 
Zimbabwe 13/05/1991 13/05/1991 0 0.00 
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Appendix D 
Time from OECD recessions to Concluding Observations 
State Entered 
recession 
First Concluding 
Observations after 
recession 
Period before 
Concluding 
Observations 
(days) 
Period before 
Concluding 
Observations 
(years) 
Hungary 31/12/2006 16/01/2008 381 1.04 
Ireland 30/03/2007 08/07/2015 3022 8.28 
Greece 30/06/2007 27/10/2015 3041 8.33 
Italy 30/06/2007 28/10/2015 3042 8.33 
New Zealand 31/12/2007 31/05/2012 1613 4.42 
Denmark 31/12/2007 06/06/2013 1984 5.44 
Finland 31/12/2007 16/12/2014 2542 6.96 
United Kingdom 30/03/2008 12/06/2009 439 1.20 
Germany 30/03/2008 12/07/2011 1199 3.28 
Turkey 30/03/2008 12/07/2011 1199 3.28 
Japan 30/03/2008 10/06/2013 1898 5.20 
Austria 30/03/2008 12/12/2013 2083 5.71 
Portugal 30/03/2008 07/12/2014 2443 6.69 
France 30/03/2008 13/07/2016 3027 8.29 
Luxembourg 30/03/2008 State Report due 
30/06/2008 
- - 
Sweden 30/06/2008 01/12/2008 154 0.42 
Netherlands 30/06/2008 09/12/2010 892 2.44 
Estonia 30/06/2008 16/12/2011 1264 3.46 
Spain 30/06/2008 06/06/2012 1437 3.94 
Belgium 30/06/2008 22/12/2013 2001 5.48 
Slovenia 30/06/2008 14/12/2014 2358 6.46 
Chile 30/06/2008 07/07/2015 2563 7.02 
Mexico 30/06/2008 Not Scheduled - - 
Switzerland 30/09/2008 26/11/2010 787 2.16 
Czech Republic 30/09/2008 22/06/2014 2091 5.73 
Canada 30/09/2008 23/03/2016 2731 7.48 
Norway 31/12/2008 12/12/2013 1807 4.95 
Iceland 30/06/2009 11/12/2012 1260 3.45 
 
 
  Average 1817 4.98 
Notes 
1 Data for the 28 OECD member States that entered into recession in the period surrounding the 
recent financial and economic crises. There are 33 OECD member States in total. 
2 Countries in ascending order according to time delay before Concluding Observations were 
released. 
3 Luxembourg and Mexico are excluded from averages. If both were to be examined in September 
2016 the averages would change to 1905 days and 5.22 years respectively. 
4 Data on entry into recession derived from OECD records on quarterly GDP (OECD (2016), 
Quarterly GDP (indicator). doi: 10.1787/b86d1fc8-en (Accessed 20 September 2016)). 
5 Entry into recession taken as the start date of the first quarter (of at least two consecutive quarters) 
of negative GDP growth.  
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